NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 22, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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O OOZE!
IJG? PRO11to T Di;47,f.,OP?4T1XTS IN 'lam RASf3t~YTR D2
TO . or 19si
August 22, 3961
Thie is an intolligence raport; nothing
in it is to be cons urued, as a statement
of US or Do' artmental policy or sa a
reeomnandetioa of any given policy.
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
IV CIA has no objection to deolass
De>,artment of Stato Contribution p It contains Information of CIA
Interest that must remain
Prevarad bye classified at TS .
Authority: till 10.2
South Asian Branch 13 f~itt aentains nothing of tat msl
data " Review"
i96 5 7
t*ision of Research for Near cast, South Asia and Africa
Offico of Intelligence Research
,GR7+~T
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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TAB QE CONTENTS
Page
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
I4 What Is The Current Status of Kashmir? . . . . . . . 1
it what Are The Objectives of India and Pakistan
in Kashmir? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?
What Are India's Capabilities and Probable
Intentions? . . . . . . . . . . a . . . . . . ? . 9
IV. Pakistan's Capabilities and Probable Intention3. . . 11
V. UN Courses of Action Likely to Affect The
Situation Up to The End of 1951. . . . . . . . . . 15
VI- Conclusion -- What ax'e the Probable Developments
in The Near Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-f
DTI What Effect Would These Probable Developments Have
On The Unites States Security interests? ?
Appendix A - Chronology of Significant Events in
The Kashmir Dispute. . . o . _ . . . . . . . . . 21
SECRET
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aron Km
ABSTRACT
War is not likely to be precipitated by India since India already
holds most of Kashmir. But Indian intransigeance in the face of
seemingly endless UN proposals for solution of the Kashmir dispute has
driven Pakistan leaders so close to frustration and desperation that
if the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is convened, as it is very likely
.to be, and if the Graham Mission and subsequent UN action fails to
produce in the minds of the Pakistanis even a faint hope of successful
UN action in their behalf, then there is a real'denger that they may
attempt once again to resort to localized military action in Kashmir.
In the emotional public advance of Pakistan leaders, close to if
not beyond the point of no return in their public utterances, lies,
we believe, the greatest danger. if responsible Pakistan leaders
were moved only by reason, logic and cold calculation there would
probably be no, war. But the degree to which their own emotional windup
may propel them is both unpredictable and the key factor in the present
situation.
Pakistan will not wish to precipitate an all-out war. However, if
hope of any successful solution short of force of arms fades, it may
attempt limited assaults in Kashmir, utilizing tribesmen and local
Azad (free) Kashmir forces in.an effort to focus world attention on its
frustration and speed world action and world opinion to force India to
take a less adamant position. Pakistan will hope to avoid an all-out
war by claiming that the action in Kashmir is a spontaneous local up-
rising of Muslim residents unconnected with the Pakistan Government.
it is probable, however, that India would counter by attempting to move
into the West Punjab. Hostilities, in turn, would thus likely be
extended to the Bengals. A resumption of communal slaughter would un-
doubtedly result.
If the Graham report, however, and subsequent UN action, can
succeed in even holding out the hope to Pakistan that all doors of
action short of force are not closed, it may, we believe, be willing to
allow tensions to relax and permit the issue to run into 1952 unresolved.
There was more danger that Pakistan would resort to force upon the c:on-
vening of the Constituent Assembly prior to the Indian movement of
troops to the frontier. Before this move Pakistan might have hoped to
achieve quick and limited local successes with effective Indian
retaliation questionable. Now it must be'clear to Pakistan that any
move upon its part will be strongly opposed and any gains will be at
considerable cost. This realization, plus a UN door still held open by
Graham, may yet avert war on the subcontinent.
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SECRET ~?.//
Hostilities on the subcontinent would have a very serious
impact on US security interests. i~xtended costly hostilities, if
they should occur, would so weaken both India and Pakistan as to
make the maintenance of orderly government a matter of question.
Even if the consequences of war should be something less than a
Communist take-over, political stability in the subcontinent
would be gravely threatened by a prolonged conflict and the ensuing
chaos and economic and financial pressures would severely weaken,
if not destroy, those groups presently most favorably disposed to
US security interests in the area.
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P R O A A , - , a W :NTS IN SW4 R DI3P1-11 TO VP1 T
I.. What is the currqnt ,stags of Kashm
Ram - When India and Pakistan achieved fell independence and
Dominion status on August 16, 1947, there arose a series of conflicts
rooted in the historical animosity between the Hindus and Sikhs, on the
one hand., and the Moslems on the other. By far the greatest source of
animosity between the two Dominions, however, was the question of the
accession of,the more than 560 vrincely states of the subcontinent. which
were not partitioned or allocated to either Dominion by the Indian Indo-
uendenre Act. This Act terminated the connection between the British
Crown and the princely states, but was silent as to the future of those
states. The decision on accession was left to the rulers although official
British statements indicated it was exneeted that the states would accede
to one or the other of the Dominions and that such accession would be
based on the geographical proximity to the Dominion of choice. However,
there was no agreement on whether popular choice sho.l.d be consulted.
Pakistan took the position that the rulers had the final decision while
India urged some arrangement for consulting nonular choice. All of the
states with Muslim noryulatione border Pakistan and most of them acceded to
that Dominion. Similarly, most of the states with Hindu or Sikh nonula-
tions acceded to India. There were four major exceptions: a) ,.Several
small Hindop-uoru1atod states on the Kathiawar Peninsula whose Muslim
rulers acceded to Pakistan, b) the important state of Hyderabad in central
India with a Muslim ruler and a largely Hindu nomination, e) the Muslim
ruled and Nuelim-nomalated state of K.alat on Pakistangs western border
and d) the State of Jammu and Kasbn-ir with a Hindu ruler and nredomi-
nantly Muslim no'mlation. The rulers of latter three states announced
their intention of remaining independent.
Th2 Development of the KaghmirIs s - The State of Jamntu and Kashmir
had an overwhelmingly Moslem population and had close economic ties with
Pakistan. The ?Iaharajah was, however, a Hindu. At the end of August 1947,
Moslem inhabitants of Poonch and Mir ur districts in Jarmiu rose in armed
revolt against the ?1aharajah because of their fear that Kashmir would
accede to India. State forces were sent to the area to restore order.
Beginning in September, there were minor invasions of the Kashmir border by
-tribesmen from the Northwest P+rontier Province of Pakistan. On Seotembor
29, Sheikh Abdullah, President of the nro-Indian Kaskunir National Conference,
was released from prison while leaders of the Moslem Conference remained
behind bars. Abdullah, a close friend of Nehrii, favored accession of
Kashmir to India. Meanwhile, the "Azad (free) Kashmir Provisional Govern-
ment" was formed in Kashmir in opposition to the Mah~a.rajah?s Government,
and. sought the State's accession to Pakistan.
S' Rr
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Arnmd October 22, a large number of ..armed Tribesmen from the
Xorthwiat Frontier Province crossed into Kaehrrir and advanced toward
Srinage.r, the s-xsmner capital of the State. Concurrently, with the at.
tack of the Tribesmen. Pfoslem units of the 116harajahas army and toolice
deserted, several rulers of oottg states in the North which were feuda-
tory to Ifashmir declared their Independence of the Maharajah and acceded
to Pakistan, and the revolt in western Kashmir enroad and was aided by
infiltrating Pakistan nationals. On October 26, the Maharajah of Kashmir
addressed a letter to Ford Uountbatten,.Governor General of India, stating
that heiv was needed; that he intended to set uo a -TPOnular government
under Sheikh Abdulleh; that he would accede to India, Mountbatten, on
October 27, informed the Maharajah that the Government of India would
accent the accession of Kashmir and stated that tTooos of the Indian art r
would be sent to Kholmir to help suinort the State forces in ronelling the
raiders. On October 27, Indian troo7)s bepAn entering Kashmir. althoug'n
the Indian forces succeeded in drjving back the Tribesmen so as to relieve
the threat to Srinagar, fighting continued and Indian troops battled
Tribesmen and Azad 'ashmir forces,
In Mountbatten?a letter accenting the Maharajahs offer to accede to
India, it was -Pointed out that "as soon as law and order have been restored
in Kashamir, and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the Staten,
accession should be settled by a reference to the neogle". On October 28,
1947 Prime Minister Nehru said in a rublic address that his Government was
-orenared, when noeace tee restored in Kashmir, to hold a referendum under
the auices of an international organization such as the United Nations.
Following the Maharajah, s accession, the Governments of India and
Pakistan made various attempts by direct negotiation to reach agreement on
means of solving the Kashmir uroblera. Negotiations between the two Govern-
ments during November and December 1947 failed to -resolve the conflict
because of disagreement (a) whether the Tribesmen and other intruders from
Pakistan or the Indian troops should be the first to withdraw; (b) whether
the Ma rajeh and Sheilah Abdullah should continue to administer the State
in til a niobiscite was hold,
t + 9ct~ tom Fire Phase (1 Januaxy 1948 r 17 December
The Pirst Phase of the s heir dia'mte, so far :as its United Nations
as',ect is concerned, began when the Government of India brought the disrnute
before the Security Council on 1 January 1948, charging that a situation
existed between India and. Pakistan, the continuance of which would be, likely
to endanger the maintenance of international noace and security. India
claimed that the situation existed because of the aid given by the Gove:s:n.
Mont of Pakistan to the invaders, both Pakistan nationals and Tribesmen
from the Northwest frontier territory. The Government of Pakistan denied
the Indian charges and filed counter char?;es.
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On January 20, I948, the Security Council established the United
Nations Comroisaion for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)c with an initial
rn nbershia of three which use subsequently increased to five: Argentina,
Pelgiula, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, and the United States. The Commission,
was charged with the functions of investigating facts in the'dienute,.
vndqr Article 34, and exercising any mediatory influence, reporting how
far the advice and directions of the Security Council had been carried
out. A Security Council ? Resolution of 21 -)nil 1948 instructed the Com-
mission to aroceed to the subcontinent and use its good offices to effect
a truce and a v1abiscite. The Commission, after months of negotiation
van siccesst.in obtaining agreement to a cease-fire effective January 1,
1949 and also to 'nrincinlec under Which a truce and a nlebiecite could be
bro ht about. These nrinei-olea were contained in UNCIP resolutions of
13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 to which both parties. subscribed. UNCIP
was unsuccessful, however, in its efforts to bring about and proceed to
the major objective of holding the plebiscite to determine the accession
question. On 17 December 1949 the Commission reported its failure to the
Security Council. It concluded that., "The issues of the disposal of the
Azad.?K'ashmir forces, the withdrawal of troops, and the defense and adminisc
tratio: of the northern area, had made of the trace an and in itself; the
difficulty or disposing of those issues to the sati9faction of both Govern-
ments had been out of proportion to their real importance, if these issues
were jndgod independently of other implications and as -preliminary to a
plebiecite.s The UNCIP indicated that a 5-member body,was not the most
flexible and most desirable instrument to continue in the task, and sug-
pested that a single person be appointed as negotiator.
Se co s_ The N hto R tort (17 Decorh r 1949 -- la A?nr
1_ - This phase began on 17 December 1949, when the Security Council
requested the.President of the Council, General McNav.-hton of Canada, to
meet infoz ally,-ith the two -parties and to a tine with them the -oo3si-
bility of finding; a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the
Kashmir -oroblem. General McNaughton continued his efforts during the
month of Ja uary, and reported to the Council on February 3 that his ef-
forts had not been successful; that the Goverment of Pakistan had accepted
his vroooosale in substance; that the Goverment of India did not agras on
the iuroortaant issues of thQ withdrawal of trorms, the disposal of both
the Azad forces and Kashmir State Forces, and. the administration of the
Northern Area of the State.
General Mccaa,htonea 3 February 1950 retort rsae used as the basis
for the Security Councilge resolution which recommended that a single
United Nations Reoreeentative (to replace UNCIP) should be appointed to
assist in nr"aring and to etmervise the imnlementa?tion of a demilitarisation program. At its 12 April 195r meeting the Security Council appointed.
Sir Owen Dixon of Australia as United Nations Re! reeentative.
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Thies age The Dixon Mission- r/ Sale 50 ? rs~i I.i?~ ~I January 1513 -? Sir
? 1 ~t~~
O%Ysn Dixon arr3Qed in New Delhi on 27 May 1950 and spent almost two months
in talking sevaratoly to Indian and Pakistan officials on all levels ae
well as trave22ing extensively in the Kaebmir area. Dixon found he could
not obtain India's consent to any workable plan of demilitarization. He
therefore decided to ',resent other solutions such as taking the plebiscite
by sections or areas and roartition plus a nlebiecite in the Vale of Ka& ir.
Pakistan agreed to discuss partition plus a olobiscite in the valley at a
conference with Indian officials -provided India would agree In advance to
the conditions which would assure the fairness of the -plebiscite. To this,
of course, the Government of India refused to agree. Dixon then -ortmoeed
that the Uff take over the civil go err?ent of Kashmir, during a plebiscite
limited to the Vale, excluding from the area all troops of every descrip-
tion. India would not accent this.
Dixon concluded:
1. Both parties were committed by their acce+,tance of the 5 January
1949 UNCIP resolution to the nrinci>le that the accession of Kashmir to
India or Pakistan would be decided throue the democratic method of a
free and impartial plebiscite. The -practical moasures, such as demili..
tarization, not the general -proposition, were the obstacles.
2w Unless India would agree to the details necessary to tut into
effect a fair and impartial state-wide plebiscite, there ,as no ho'e of
bringing about such a general olebiecit?e.
3o A state-wide ,alebiacito was not desirable because it would
,rocioitate a vast refugee movement of the Hindu or Moslem element losing
the vlebiscite.
4. The only possible hone for settling the dieoute vas ?partition
nlue some means of allocating the Vale of Kashmir.
5. The oa'ties should. assume the initiative in effecting a settle-
ment, instead of placing the burden upon the Security Council or its
reoresentativea.
6? The Security Council should concern itself with pressing the
parties to raftee their military forces on the ceasefire line, since
this is the proximate danger to noace in the area.
mix Ntional C ore, ce On Octobor 27, 1950 the General
Council of the "A11 Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" adopted a resolu-
tion which was moved by Sheikh Abdullah and ondorsec? by Prime :sinister
Nehru. This resolution condemned the "prolonged failure" of the United
Nations to solve the Kashmir Dispute. and called for the taking of immediate
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steps to convene a constituent assembly in the Indian-controlled area
of the State for the o urnose of determining the future form of govern-
ment and affiliation of the entire State, Including Pakistan-held tea
ritory. Pakistan denounced thisoolan and in the following months some
Pakistani officials in public addresses and in the press made implied
threats of a holy war, of "jehad", if the elections for the Constituent
Assembly should be held. Pakistan requested that the UN Security Council
give -argent consideration to the Kashmir question, talce measures to imple-
ment t:erties? commitments under the 1S August 1948 and 5 January 1949
1TWCIP resolutions. and call ,on India to refrain from proceeding with
the Constituent Assembly, Bowovor, thus far, neither Sheikh Abdullah nor
Nehru have been deterred from their intention of holding the election for
the Constituent Assembly. Dates presently set range from September 10
to September 30, varying; by -rovince. The Indian News Chronicle of
January 20, 1951 stated that one-fourth of total seats in the Assembly
would be left vacant for Pakistan held parts of Kashmir. It added, how-
ever, that "the decisions of the nroposed sovereign body would be apvli-
ceble `co all narte of the, State, including Pakistani-held areas, as they
would reflect uublic opinion of an evert,ihe]sning majority of the State's
o-rotation 78 mercent".
The LopdM a e o Commontiaalth P e Ministers (Jan iar . -
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Ibian of Pakistan followed un his Government's
acnroaach in the Security Council by refusing to attend the Conference of
Commont;oalth Prime ttinistors. unless the Conference would consider the
Kashmir disrcute.. Diaquat0 s firm position forced the Commonuoalth Ministers
to agree to discuss tha Xashmir dispute at the Conference, without oalacing
it on the agenda. An official statement issued at the conclusion of those
informal talks indicated that they were unsuccessful. Liaquat, in a cress
confer*.nce, disclosed that three alternative oro-)osals advanced by the
&-,mmonv,ealth Prime Ministers to ensure the security of Kashmir during the
plebiscite ueriod, were accented by him but rejected by Nehru:
(a) Some of the other Commonwealth countries should crovide and. cay
the exnenses of a Commonwealth force to maintain order;
(b) A joint Indian-Pakistan force should be sat ii ;
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator would be authorized. to raise a
local force from among the 1 ashmiris.
The British :foreign and Commonwealth Relations offices concluded, as a
result of the failure of these discussions and Nehruve adamant intransi-
geanea, that it tract necessary to nrese for the earliest ooesible action
in the Security Council.
SC
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Sri' w
sW R"; I T
IN Fourth Phase .- Thye Graham Mis$ion?(1951) The IN Security Council
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on 30 March 1951 adnvted a resolution sponsored by the US-IW delogations,
which reaffirmed in its vroamble the desire of the parties to settle
Kashmir1 a future through a plebiscite conducted under IN aust3ices, and
provided for the aouointment of a new UN rsaoresentative for India and
Pakistan to -succeed to the ,lace vacated by Sir Owen Diran.. the UN renre..
sentative was instructed to -proceed to the subcontinent and, after consal-
tation with the Glovormaente of India and Pakistan to effect the demili-
tad ation of Aaebmir on the basis of the 13 August 1948 and 6 January 1949
UNCIP resolutions or to obtain the oartiee agreement to a demilitarization
Plant The T1N representative was also instructed to report to the Security
Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the subeonti..
nent. If at that time he had not effected demilitarization or obtained
the mrtiesf agreement to a demilitarization clan, the Ilrr representative
was to report to the Security Council those points of difference between
the =artier which he considered must be resolved to enable such demili-
tarization to be carried out. The parties wore called tenon, Inthe event
their discussions with the Uff representative failed in his p=inion in full
agreement, to accent arbitration noon all outstanding points of difference
as reported by the IZT representative,
Mr. Frank Graham, former IT. S. Senator and college President, was an-
pointed tlr' renresentativo and arrivod in the subcontinent on June 29, 19.51,
He is due to report to the TT.1 Security Council by Sentomber 20, 1951,
thnugh he may, of course, request a delay.
Rea nt fli ,ita_ Mgges - Over the past two months tension between India
and Pakistan has been greatly increased by a soriee of military moves by
both national, which in each case was justified on the ground that it was
undertaken only to counter a previous .Move by the othr;r, but Which has now
resulted in almost all of the combat trnra of both facing each other in
large and threatening; border concentrations.
Indian armed forces totaling over 460,000 men outnumber by about two
to one, both in nereonnel and in material, the Pakistan armed forces which
total over ^40,000 (including Azad. Kashmir units). On the Indo-Pakistan
border in the Punjab 46,000.50,000 Pakistan trnnns face 75,000..90,000
Indians, and here also.all the armor of both forces is concentrated, one
Pakistan armored brigade ocuosing one Indian armored division and one
In( ian armored brigade, In Naebmir, Indian forces of 65,000 are ownosed
by 19,00.20,000 Pakistan troops, who are backed ur by one Pakistan infantry
division of 18,000 heft. in reserve at Peshawar, 100 miles vest of the front.
In `'aet Pakistan, Indian forces of ^5,0 0 in two g*ouns. are facing; Pakistan
troo*se of about 11,000.
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SS. Ob1ectiyoe of India and l'atdsten in Kashmir
A. Ik4lan I t iotaYom, - India bas a five-fold . interest in
Kashmir. 1) 1 ietorically the leaders of the Congress Party, and vartieu-
larly Gandhi and Nehru, sus orted the development of a -oo'nilar movement
in Kashmir and the demand for the reulacement of the Hindu PZahara3ah by a
res,onsible government that would represent the tiredominantly Muslim aoon-
lation of the State, Congress Party sumort for Sheikh.Abdvllah and the
local Kashmir movement throughout the 1930's and 19409s was wart of the
uart74s general canroaign in favor of the development of po ular governments
in the nrincelr states during the -pre-partition period when the t4aelin
L?axpne sunnorted the princely rulers, Congress Party suonort for the rocrnlar
movemew in the states was not confined to moral encouragement but involved
vigorous -nublicity and the personal aid and, rarticination of ton Congress
leaders, Both Gandhi and Nehru took vast in no+na1ar demonstrations in
Kashmir against the Hindu Maharajah, notably in the Quit Kashmir camroaign
launched by Sheikh Abdullah against the ruler in 1946, which uas^ut down
by wide-scale uolice action. Accordingly, the Congress Party Govcrnnent
and Nehru in 'iarticular have strong 'olitical ties and re-?sonal associa-
tions frith Kashmir'e National Conference Party whose aoueal for Indian aid
against the irregular invasion from Pakistan in October 1947 was matched
by the genera lack of -oooular welcome for the invading forces, 2) Closely
related to its historical interest in Kashmir is the Congress Party Govern--
mont's concern to demonstrate that India is a secular state and that there
are important Muslim groups who did not euo,ort the Rnslim League demand
for Pakistan, Again, both Gandhi and Nehru played nrominent roles in the
Congresc Party'e long camnaign for Hindu4Iuslim cooperation and in the
adonntion of a uolicy of a secular state,
These two interests undoubtedly account for Prime Minister Nebru'e
adamant stand on Kashmir; viz., his desire to see his life-,time su port
for the nounlar movement in Kashmir and for Hinduo-Muelim unity vindicated.
Jinvahls rejection of Nehru's suggestion of plebiscite at the time of the
October invasion in 1947 au oars to have convinced the Indian Prime
Minister that Pakistan recognized that the invaders were not being wel-
comed in Kashmir and that it could not win &plebiscite in the state with-
out additional military intimidation, With the progress of the dispute
over Kae mir, the overriding interest of most of th3 Congress Party and
of the neocle generally, has now become one of national prestige, vis-a-vis
Pakistan, There is general. and full sunnort for the government9a position
in Kashuair, so that the issue does not ?slay a major role in Indian domestic
polities. There is general determination to resist any renewal of the fight-
ing by Pakistan and sunnort for India's indefinite occupation of the state
along the present cease-fire line. In addition to is three major interests,
India also has an interest in orotecting the security of the non-Muslim
minority of the state and the more minor interest of completing her line of
defense against Tibet.
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,India has virtually no economic interests in Kashmir. The state has
some valuable forestry resources but India has neither the plans nor the
-erosnects of exploiting these on any significant scale. Indian-occupied
'kashmir also commands certain rivers feeding into Pakistan but the engineer
ink; difficulties of diverting these enters array from Pakistan make it un-
likely that India could exert any significant economic pressure on Pakistan
through control of the water sunaly.
B. Pakistani Interests in Kasbmtr - Pakistan's interests in Kashmir
are as deeply e;rounded as those of India and poaular excitement over the
issue is noticeably more intense. Pakistan's major interest in-the state
is to vindicate its claim to all the Muslim-majority areas in the subconti-
nent -- the claim which was the basis for Pakistan's oirn foundation. It is
this basic claim which has made the Kashmir dispute a major issue of conflict
with India, far outshadowing all other disputes. As in India the dispute has
also become one involving national -prestige, both because of the military
troops involved and the long diplomatic exchanges before the TTN. National
prestige is also involved in the Pakistan's government'.s continuous insistence
that it would not rest until it had won the entire state. Pakistan also has
a serious interest in assisting Pakistan's supporters in the state, large
numbers of whom are concentrated in Palcistanoccrmied territory and are re-
lated to Pahari, Punjabi and tribal groups on the Pakistan side of the border..
Finally, Pakistan has a security interest in completing its line of defense
against incursions from the north through Sinkiang by maintaining the integra-
tion which it has achieved between the Pakistan-occupied tribal territory of
Gilgit and. the rest of the northwest frontier tribal area T;conomic interests
are not a significant factor in the dispute as Kashmir has few resources which
"'a&Tistan could readily exploit.
There is enthusiastic popular support in Pakistan for the government's
adoption of a firm position on the Kashmir issue. The announcement of the
iashmir government's intention to convene a Constituent Assembly, and the
implication that this carries of finalizing the status clue is viewed as a
challenge in Pakistan. Government officials have taken the initiative in
announcing that Pakistan will not accent any such attempt to finalize the
status quo. Liaquat All enjoys general public confidence and res-oect and his
demonstrated ability effectively to_sunoress opposition groups makes it un-
'Likely that his government would fall in the event that Sheikh Abdullah's
overnmont -proceeded with the Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless the prestige
of both government and country may seem to the Pakistanis to require some
dramatic action which will either seriously handicap or discredit the pro-
,dosed Assembly.
0. Minimum demands of India and Pakistan - Although both India and
Pakistan claim the right to the entire state both would vrobably be prepared
to accent less. India has made it clear that it is prepared to accept the
-)resent cease-fire line which includes the Kashmir area occupied by the bulk
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of the National Conference Party suvroorters and portions of the Janmu
and Ladakh areas occuvied by most of the state's non-Muslim minorities.
Pakistan would also probably be -orenarod to confine itself to Lad.alti
and. the Muslim majority districts in the rest of the state. Both these
minimum claims, however, include the Kashmir Valley area and its hinter-
land. the Buddhist -nart of Ladakh. While both might agree to a partial
-plebiscite, confined to the disputed districts, neither side & Mears
n re,sared to accent the olebjecite conditions insisted on by the other
and either side would have difficulty in receding from any territory
which it now occupies except through military force.
II.I. I dials Qa*oabilities an Probable Intentions
A. Indian Mili acv Capabils - Although India's military forces
are double those of Pakistan, Indian government leaders, and particularly
Nehru, have repeatedly stated. that they do not want war with Pakistan.
Field reports also indicate that India recognizes that such a war might be
prolonged and. costly and would encl. the country's present hones for economic
development. The present ceasefire line was achieved after a year of
fighting; and although there has been some strengthening of the forces on
both skies both Indian Government and military leaders have increasingly
tended to accent the line as a permanent one, anoarently in the view that
difficulties of terrain would continue to ?prevent India from making any
significant gains in Kashmir without invading Pakistan. India might hone
to make some important gains with the aid of a limited invasion of Pakistan,
but the fact that India already occupies the areas in which it is most
vitally interested and the desire to avoid involvement in a general war
with Pakistan have acted as deterrents. Although Afghanistan would probably
attempt to exploit Pakistan's difficulties the relative weakness of the
Afghan military forces and the government's own domestic difficulties
make it unlikely that Afghan action could seriously handicap Pakistan.
N. In an Political Cavacit e - With the convening of the Constituent
Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah with Indian support is preparing to convert his
present caretaker administration into a more representative government.
There are four main advantages which both Ab(lullah and India may ho'oe to
pain from the undertaking to support a representative assembly and the
subsequent reorganization of the government. 1) To strengthen Indians
formal ties with 'the state by a declaration of a popularly elected assembly
favoring; accession to India, as India's ties currently rest on the acces-
s ion of the Hindu Maharajah,. now retired, and the informal anneal for aid
from Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference Party; 2) to
demonstrate India's readiness to sun-sort ?oooular government in Kashmir as a
contrast to the allegedly limited -rowers exercised by the Azad government
in Pakistan-oceu-hied areas; 3) to give as wide a group as possible a stake
ON
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in the pre sent regi*te, thus diverting attention from the quo ct ion of
accession to internal political develaomnnts; and 4) to convert the
government from a tennorary to a tiormanent basis and pave the way for
accenting the present cease-fire line as a -,ermanent boundary.
The fact that India is sunnorting the roan for a state constituent
assembly a>nears to indicate that Delhi does not ermect that the t7N or
any other outside source is likely to cause Pakistan to withdraw its
forces from the state and that India is oreoared to accent the present
cart it Ion of the state as final.
C. Indian I tteationa - Indial s obvious interest in neaceful con-
c'.itions for the elections for the Constituent Assembly announced for
Kashmir, the -.fact that India holds most of Kashmir 'neludirL_o the much
prizea and desired Vale, Tndiar s awareness that a rolong ed t. r would
endanger economic stability, indicate that the country does not nartiotp-
larly wish to become involved in ware In fact, as the first announce-
ment of the Kashmir election?olans immediately provoked. belligerent
threats by Pakistan the original movement of troops may -ell have been
c'esigne:?. as '?rotection against any Pakistan attempts to interfere with
the el,,=:ctions. '.?iith the mounting hostility of the -Drees and of public
affiici..ls in Pakistan, however, Ind.ia"s Prime?linister has announced
that India Yrill use all of its resources to resist any military action
by Pakistan and that any attack on Kashmir will be viewee as an attack
on India itself. This warning appears to have a two--fold. nurn-ose: 1) to
deter '1-'r~,kistan from any military action against Kashmir and 2) to disabuse
Pal-istan of any idea that India might be afraid of i?ar with Pakistan..
Last year Nehru invited Pakistan to join India in declaring; that neither
side would attempt to settle its mutual disputes by resort to war.
Pakistanis rejection of the offer and the subsequent militancy in the
tone of official Pakistan statements led to the belief in India that
Pakistan had interpreted Nohrut s overture as a sign of Indian weakness
and. an admission that India feared it would lose ground in Kashmir if
Pakistan ;-ere to resume the camnaigm.
D. Pros and. Cons of Resorting to tlar - India is not likely to
mrecinitate cvnr. Apart from its strong desire to balld itself *Lr) in-
ternally in order to Play a major role in world affairs, there is the
fact that it already holds the Kashmir areas in which it is most vitally
interested, its reco~;n.ition that an all-out war with Pakistan would not
mean any quick or easy victory but would. involve heavy losses in mon,
money and materials, and the danger of internal communal riots and the
conseou.ent strain on relations with i uslims in Kashz ir. There is little
question, however. that tho Nehru. government would win tremendous prestige
and surnort if it could. lain some Pakistan territory and inflict some
ir,roortant military Jef.eats. There would be little -prestige or advantage
for the government, however, if the Indian army encountered he!..vy losses
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oxr got bogged. down in a stalemated campaign. Accordingly, if Pakistan
should, renew the attack in Kashmir it. seems prob.ble that the Indian
government would for political reasons attempt to move into Vest Punjab,
concentrating on some limited objectives that India might hone to hold
'ermanently, such as the district of Sialkot which commands important
southern aroaehes into Kashmir and nerhans certain Sikh holy places
nearest to the present Indo-Pakistan border. Fighting; might also break
out in. East Pakistan.
E. .There has been general -oorular sup-port for the Indian Govern-
mont's warning to Pakistan that India is prepared for war if Pakistan
wants it. However, this has not been followed by any general cress
car!oaign demanding war with Pakistan. Such as appeared last year in the
West Bengal press during the communal trouble in 'Plast Pakistan. Further-
more, reports from the field do not indicate any noticeable increase in
communal tension. On the contrary, India's interest in promoting a good
atmosphere for the Kashmir elections and in bolstering its claims to the
state can be expected to result in special efforts to suppress militant
communal elements. Any significant increase in communal tension and in
the ovt-flow of refugees from 'last Pakistan, however, would. provoke
immediate reactions in lest Bengal, reviving the demand for military
intervention or a retaliatory war.
F. India may be expected to continue to refuse all suggestions for
a -plebiscite in Kashmir unless the conditions include the complete with-
drawal of Pakistan's forces and the disarming and disbandment of all
militant groups in the state, effective guarantees against all religious
anneals or efforts to whip ur religious fanaticism and recognition of
Abdullah's record as the leader of the popular movement in the state.
Accordingly, there arrears to be little chance of its accenting alternative
M1 recommendations. Instead India can be expected to continue with its
present -program of arranging for the conversion of the Kashmir govern-
ment in the Indian-occupied areas from a tern-porary to a permanent basis.
IV. Pakistan's Carabilitios and Probable Intsentions
B. Pakistan's Poliittical Caoabilitiea_ - Pakistan's political ca-na?-
bilitios for obtaining a favorable solution of the Kashmir -oroblem, are
very limited. The TM provides Pakistan with its nrineipal non-military
means of seeking a favorable settlement, but.it appears highly doubtful
whether the TTN can find. common ground for such a settlement before the
end of 1951. Both India and Pakistan have agreed in prinei-ple that the
question of Kashmir's accession should be decided by an impartial plebi-
scite under UTN auspices but neither country is tire;,ared to accept the
-plebiscite conditions insisted on by the other. In view of this fact
there seem to be little possibility of the Graham 'fission's getting the
two countries to agree on a procedure for holding the plebiscite.
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Pakistan leaders a1 though far from confident , of the UNI a ability to
solve the Bair ?problem aonarently have not yet abandoned all hope that
a satisfactory solution may eventually be reached. There even seems to be
some ali,*t hgne that the Graham Mission may succeed in winnisp; sufficient
concessions from Nehru to break the ')resent impasse and to make some pros.
roes -oossible. At least one Pakistan Minister has expressed the onini_on
that Mehra is not com-oletely insensitive to world opinion regarding Kashmir
and. that, he must modify his Intransigent attitude if Graham and the UN
exerted sufficiently strong pressure.
Pakistan has not as yet been able to enlist sufficient support from
tho Comronwealth or elsewhere abroad to exert significant ')ressure on
India for a settlement of the Kashmir issue. However, certain Cortmorr
wealth countries have made a ?proposal which if carried out might make
tossible eomeoxogress tovard a solution. This oronosal contemplates the
reolacin g of the Indian and Pakistan troo-os now in Kashmir by Commonvzealth
forces. India. would be unlikely to accept such a ororosal, but Pakistan
might possibly agree to having its forces in Kashmir replaced by Common-
wealth troops even if the Indiana refused to withdraw theirs. This action
by Pakistan would leave India with little excuse for then refusing to
withdraw its own troous from Kashmir.
C. Pakistan!RProbable Intsntjons - If Pakistanws leaders were
motivated solely by rational and rorudential considerations there would
be little likelihood of Pakistan's resorting to arms as the grouncs for
such a course are far out-Neighed by those for avoiding war. 'Unfortu-
nately, however, there is a danger that Pakistan's leaders may be carried
away by their emotions. If the Kashmir Constituent Assembly elections are
held ana_ go unrebuked by.the UK and the Graham Mission report is unsatis-
factory to the Pakistanis their feelings may be heightened to the extent that
emotion overcomes reason. As long an UN" action holds out some hope to the
Pakistanis of their ultimately achieving their ?goal in Kashmir by peaceable
Means, Pakistan may refrain from deliberate resort to arms. There -",s, how-
ever, always the possibility in view of the ?oresent hig=h state of tension
between India and Pakistan that border clashes, communal disturbances or
other untoward incidents may set off hostilities between the two countries.:
In order to sustain the flagging hopes of the Pakistanis for a peaceful
settlement of the Kashmir issue in the event Graham is unable to work out
some sort of mutually satisfactory agreement between India and Pakistan,
the UN would probably have to take action strongly condemning the Constituent
Assembly elections and placing the onus for the failure of the Graham Mis-
sion on India, and indicate its Intention of making further efforts to
achieve a settlement of the Kashmir problem.
It is believed that the ton Pakistan leaders do not want a war with
India as they realize that such a wax would be economically ruinous and
mi.cht even result in ending Pakistan's existence as an inde encl.ent state.
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Nevertheless if they became convinced that there was no hope of gaining
'possession of Kashmir (or at least the greater Hart of it including the
Vale) by non-military means they might as a last decooratie exnocUent or
from rage and frustration resort to arms. If the situation should come
to this, the Pakistanis would presumably attempt limited assaults in
Kashmir, utilizing tribesmen and local Azad Kashmir forces and hope to
limit the fighting to the area.
Neither PaId,stan's.military actions nor the political statements of
its leaders since the redeployment of India's troops has as yet indicated
a desire to provoke tar. They have, however, shown no lack of readiness
to fight should it become necessary. The statements of Pakistan political
leaders have moreover been fiery and far from conciliatory in tone and
have in every possible tray soup at to -out India in the wrong. All the old
charges stemmin- from Inc14a9s vast actions in Kashmir have been reiterated
again and main. India's use of force to imvlement the accession of
Jun
a
gadh and Hyderabad and India's recent intervention in Nepal have been
condemned while, with regard to the present, India has been accused of
usin.7 a show of force to strengthen its hold on Kashmir and. of wishing
to destroy Pakistan altogether.
33. Pros an Cons of a Deliberate Resort to P;ar b AU!,-t2 There
appear to be three considerations that might lead Pakistan deliberately
to undertake armed actions in Kashmir:
(1) The Pakistanis might hope that by reovening hostilities
in Kashmir they could succeed in focusing world attention
on the Kashmir issue and stimulate the UN into taking
some strong action.
(2)
Po-oular pressure to free the Muslims in. Kashmir from
Iiindu domination.
(S) Utter hovelessnoss and frustration regarding Kashmir which
might cause the Pakistan leaders to prefer a financially
ruinous and perhaps devastating war pith India to allow
India to gain Kashmir without a fight.
These three considerations are none of them, objectively and rationally
considered, strong, Pakistan's charco^ of winning Kashmir by force of arms
are -!,)oor. Prior to the redeployment of Indian troops in early `Yuly a hasty
thrust by Pakistan in Kashmir might have succe9ded In upsetting the status
quo and resulted. in the establishment of a new cease'-fire line with addi-
tional areas of Kashmir under Pakistan control. But conditions have now
changed. Any attempt by Pakistan to take military action in Kashmir will
now be vronmtly net by strong Indian resistance. But even if, as is doubtful, Pakistan could confine hostilities to Kashmir and avoid all-out viar,
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there seems little chance that Pakistan could greatly enlarge its present
holdings. Moreover, it ao ears likely that India, as it has threatened,
would reply to any Pakistan thrust in Kashmir by a counter thrust in the
Punjab and uosaibly East Pakistan.
The possibility of Pakistan public opinion forcing the Qovernment of
Pakistan to undertake military action in Kashmir is not easy to estimate.
Observers in the field are agreed that -iublic opinion, although aroused
and Quite ready to support the Government should it declare war on India,
is not at present at such witch as to force the Government to take military
action. The failure of the Graham Mission and the holding of the Kashmir
Constituent Assembly elections are events which, if they occur, will further
arouse no-oular feeling but whether to the point of forcing; the Government to
war is -uncertain. However, in view of the fact that the Government of
Pakistan has in the -past been able to exert a very considerable measure of
control over nouular sentiment and opinion, it appears probable that the
Government of Pakistan can, if it wishes, keen popular feeling under control,
The danger of its getting out of hand cannot, however, be entirely dismissed
and that there is a -possibility of war from this cause cannot be denied.
That Pakistan's leaders would be willint7 to risk: the very existence
of their young nation by going to war ,pith India for the vossession of
Kashmir is, despite the evident irrationality of such position, an eventu-
ality that cannot altogether be dismissed. There is no question but that
virtually all Pakistan leeaere (and the great majority of their followers)
feel strongly that the non"-inclusion of Kashmir in Pakistan would violate
the fundamental princi-ple of Pakistan nationalism and is a situation which
they could never willingly accept as final. It is therefore not incona
ceivablte that the fanaticism which lies in the heart of Islamic Pakistan
might become aroused to the -point of countgrbalancin; reason and -prudence
with the result that Pakistan would move against India regardless of the
weighty reasons for avoiding such a course.
Chief among the consideration which would lead Pakistan to seek to
avoid war are India's greater military strength and resources and the fact
that Indian arm7 stands ready to move against Pakistan_ at any time. Not
only is Pakistan's initial position less favorable than that of India, but
what is more i.nmortant, its ability to obtain additional military su-p-polies
is much Inferior. Unlike India, Pakistan has virtually no munitions industry
and a UN embargo on the shipment of arms to these countries in the event
of an outbreak of hostilities between them would .ffooct Pakistan far more
adversely than it would India as ;test Pakistan has but ono -port (Karachi)
through which military strmnlies might be smuggled.
In view of these facts Pakistan has little chance of winning a war
with India and would inevitably suffer severe losses,, both human and
economic.
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The difficulty of defonding 'ast Pakistan because of its exposed
position is doubtless a consideration that influences the Pakistanis in
the assessment of their strength viac.a-via India but it cannot be expected
to act as a major deterrent to war.
Pakistani leaders probably have no great fear of attack by Afghanistan
in the event of tsar with India and are therefore not measurably deterred
on this account. or are the Pakistanis sensitive in any marked degree to
the fact that war between India and Pakistan would weaken the area in the
face of a Soviet threat. Neither are Pakistanis leaders seriously deterred
by the,poesibility of adverse world and Commonwealth opinion.
E. The possibility of the Pakistan armyls getting out of control
and taken, unauthorized action in Kashmir, although probably not great,
does exist. Considerable dissatisfaction with the government in general
and with its Kashmir policy in particular is known to exist in army circles.
Indeed the anti-government plot nipped in the bud by the Government of
Pakistan last spring was primarily,the work of a group of dissatisfied
Pakistan army officers who planned, the renewal of hostilities in Kashmir
as part of the basis of their coup. Some communists were involved in the
plot, but the degree of communist participation is not altogether clear.
The Government of,Pakistan dealt vigorously with the conspirators and on
the basis of the communist involvement has locked up most of the imortant
communist leaders. By these actions the Government has lessened, although
probably not entirely eliminated, the possibility of a second attempt on the
part of the army to take unauthorized military action.
V. Core of tion Lie to Affect the Situation tto to the End of 1951
The prospects that the Graham Mission may succeed in arranging a demilic
tart ation of Kashmir or even agreement on plans for the demilitarization.in
accordance with the March 30, 1951 Security Council resolution are boor. UN
representative Graham has reported a cooperative attitude in Pakistan but
regards Nehru as the chief obstacle to a settlement. There is a slight chance
that some appeal to the combination of vanity and idealism in Nehru's makeup
might be effective through offering to him a unique otinortunity to set an
example to the world as an exponent of peace. The chance must, however, be
reckoned a slim one.
Should Graham fail it is unlikely that the Security Council could ef.
fectively auply force to effect a solution of the Kashmir Imbroglio. If
hostilities broke out, however, the Security Council would probably find it.-
self compelled to issue a new ceasefire. In the absence of hostilities
before the ena of 1951 one or more of the following steps might be taken.
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1. Consideration of the findings and recommendations of the Graham
Mission&s revort either by the Security Council or by the General Assembly,
followed by such action by the UN as the Graham recommendations might sug-
gest.
2. The Security Council might ask India and Pakistan for explanations
regarding trooo movements and, call upon them to maintain an atmosphere
favorable to the promotion of further negotiations,
3. The Security,Council might develop a detailed statement`of the
exact way in which the Council believes the demilitarization and plebiscite
should be carried out. The British, with whom this -proposal originated,
also suggested that once this stems was taken the Security Council should,
at least for the time being, make no further efforts to solve the Kashmir
problem. This proposal was advanced by the British trior to the develop-
ment s of June-4'uly 1951.
4. In addition to evolving a detailed olan regarding demilitariza-
tion and -olebiscite, some form of continuing mediatory machinery might, be
set ur by the UN. This could take the form of a UN representative with an
indefinite term of office who could re-nort progress to the Security Council
at s-oecified.periods. This possibility was a US addition to the British
suggestion outlined above and was also made prior to the incidents of June-
July 1951.
5. no Kashmir issue might be placed on the agenda of the General
Assembly either in November or at the Seventh Session in 1952 and either
with or without removing the question from the list of problems with which
the Security Council is concerned, The UK UN delegation is reported to
favor turning the Kashmir problem over to the General Assembly. Underly-
ing such an action is the hope that India -nip t be more sensitive to the
weight of world opinion as exoressed by the General Assembly than to the
resolutions of the smaller Security Council which India -probably regards as
dominated by the US and TIK.
6. The expansion of the UN military observer grouo and the extension
of its patrols to those portions of the Indo-Pakistan border near which
there are troop concentrations.
7! The placing of Kashmir under a UN trusteeships
84 The establishment of a condominium,
9. The creation of a UN development and observation authority.
10. An attempt to get India and Pakistan to agree to administer
existing territory along agreed lines, 1. e., to accept de fat o pa.rti-
tion rending a do iu settlement.
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VI. What are the Probable Developments inthe. Haar Futures
Tensions have mounted 4engerously particuleriy in Pakistan. The
degree to which Pakistan leaders have gone out on a limb publicly in
their expressions concerning Kashmir is perhaps beat exemplified by a
recent speech Of Liequat Ali Khan. On August 13 he declared that
Pakistan v~.uld never accept Kashmir as a part of Indian territory
and stated that he v,uld shed his ova blood to defend Pakistan. In
this public advance of Pakistan leaders, close to if not beyond the
point of no return in their public utterances, lies, we believe, the
greatest danger. If responsible Pakistan leaders. were moved only by
reason, lc+gie and cold calculation there would probably be no war.
But the degree to which their own emotional windup may propel them
is both unpredictable and the key factor in the present situation.
War.is not likely to be precipitated by India since India already
holds most of Kashmir. But Indian intrensigeance in_the face of seem-
ingly endless UB proposals for solution of the Kashmir dispute has
driven Pakistan leaders so close to frustration and desperation that
if the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is convened, as it is very likely
to be, and If the Graham Mission and subsequent OF action fails to
produce in the minds of the Pakistanis even a faint hope of successful
UN action in their behalf, then there is a real danger that they may
attempt once again to resort to localized military action in Kashmir.
Pakistan will not wish to precipitate an all-out war. -However, if
hope of any successful solution short of force of arses fades, it
my attempt limited assaults In Kashmir, utilizing tribesmen, and
local Azad Kashmir forces in an effort to focus word attention on
.its frustration and speed world action and world opinion to force
India tq take a, less adamant position. Pakistan will hope to avoid
an all-out war by claiming that the action in Ksshair is a spontaneous
lc.cal uprising of l+fliai residents unconnected vit`1 the Pakistan Govern-
ment. it is probable, however, that India will coenter by attempting
to move into the West Punjab. Hostilities, in tur a, would thus likely
be extended to the Bengalss. A resumption of communal slaughter would
undoubtedly result.
if the Orabaaa report, however, and subsequent. US action, can suc-
ceed in even holding out the hope to Pakistan that all doors of action
abort of force are not closed, it may, we believe, be willing to allow
tensions to' relax and permit the issue to run into 1952 unresolved.
There. was more danger that Pakistan would resort to force upon the
convening of the Constituent Assembly prior to the Indian. movement of
troops to the frontier. Before this move Pakistan might have hoped to
achieve quick and united local successes with eff ctive Indian
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retaliation questionable. Nov it must be clear to Pakistan that
aty- NOW Upon its part will be strongly opposed and any gains will
be at ccrosiderable cwt. T3-is realization, plus a US door still
hold, open by Grohem, may het avert ww Cu the subcoutineut.
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VII. What Effect Could These Proba~Develop?ents flays as United
8ttea curity Interests$
War on the subcontinent would have a very serious iogaat on US
security interests. Extended costly hostilities, if they should
occur, would so weaken both India and Pakistan as to make the
maintenance of orderly government a matter of question. Particularly
severe Mould be the impact on the economy of India of a prolonged war
accompanied by vast commmal disturbances and the resulting increase
in the severity of the refugee problem. In the four years since
independence.. India's basic problem of supporting a donne population
with a backward and badly organized economy has beccme progressively
more acute. The strains of war on a patchwork eco u y might be
sufficiently disrupting to enable the Indian Communists with the-aid
of their Chinese comrades, to take over in India.
If theC'uiunists gained control of India, neij,hboring states
would-be exposed to military threat from the flank. The Soviets
would be enabled to threaten (if nut completely dominate) the prin-
cipal communications routes between Europe and the Far East in time
of war, and Asian opinion would be driven toward the view that Com-
munism represented the "wave of the future". Southeast Asia would
probably fall completely under Communist domination. The relatively
pro-Western governments of Pakistan and Ceylon would find it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to take a firm position against Soviet
or Chinese aggression even if strong Western military support were
forthcoming. Neutralism would be greatly encouraged in Iran, the
Arab Near East, and in the Philippines.
Not only would the West be deprived of the strategic and
essential materials of South Asia such as manganese, mica, graphite'
etc., but the probable fall of Southeast Asia with its rubber, tin,
oil, and food surpluses would be an-even more serious lose. Further-
more the probable immobilization of Pakistan would deprive the West
of excellent air bases from which to bomb Soviet Central Asian indus-
trial facilities in the event of an all-out war between the US and
the USS?i. A Communist India would immediately add to the military
power or the Soviet bloc an army of about 400,000 men, a navy con-
sisting of a cruiser, three destroyers, and miscellaneous smaller
craft, and a small air force composed largely of World War II type
aircraft. India is believed to have about 1,.OO,OCO trained reserves
and, given Soviet equipment, might, in time, develop an army comparable
to that of the Chinese Cosmlaunist$.
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Even if the consequences of war should be somrething less than
a Cc imist tale-over, political stability in the subcontiatieot
would be gravely tbseatened by a prologged.conflict and the wing
chaos and economic and fr mncial pressures, would severely tek.n,
if not destroy, those groups presently met favorably disposed to
US security interests in the area.
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APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE
197
October 20 Armed tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier
Province entered Kashmir.
October 26 The Maharaja of Kashmir acceded to India; He
announced he would set up a popular government
under Sheikh Abdullah.
October 27 Lord Mountbatten, on behalf of the Government of
India, accepted the accession of Kashmir to India
and ordered Indian troops into Kashmir in support
of the state forces. He also stated that as soon
as law and order were established the question of
accession would be finally determined by a "reference
to the. people".
1948
January 1
January 20
April 21
The Government of India protested to the Security
Council of the United Nations charging that Pakistan
had ailed the Kashmir invaders and asked United Nations
help in preventing any furtlc.r assistance.
The Security Council established a United Nations
Commission on India and Pakistan to investigate the
facts in the dispute and to exercise a mediating
influence.
The Security Council passed a resolution instructing
the UNCIP to proceed to the subcontinent, to place
its good offices at the disposal of both governments
and to aid in the restoration of peace and the hold-
ing of a plebiscite. The resolution also suggested
the terms for troop withdrawal and the holding of a
plebiscite.
July 7 United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan
arrived in Karachi.
August 13 The Commission passed a resolution establishing the
terms for withdrawal of troops and the conditions for
a plebiscite. Resolution ultimately accepted by both
India and Pakistan.
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1949
January 1 Informal preliminary cease-fire was ordered.
January 5 UNCIP passed resolution regarding; the conditions
necessary for assuring a free and fair plebiscite.
Resolution accepted by both parties.
July Cease-fire line demarcated.
December 17 The Commission reported to the Security Council its
'ailure to bring about the major objective of holding
a plebiscite. It called for the appointment of a
single negotiator to continue efforts to bring the
governments together.
December 17 The Security Council appointed Canada's General
McNaughton, then Council President, to meet with the
two parties. Discussions were carried on through
January, 1950.
1950
February 3 General McNaughton reported that his efforts had been
unsuccessful, that Pakistan had accepted his proposals
but that India did not agree on the major issues.
March 14 The Security Council passed a resolution based on
General McNaughton's February report, calling for the
two governments to execute a demilitarization program
within five months. Pakistan accepted the resolution,
but India had major reservations.
April 12. Sir Owen Dixon of Australia was appointed United
Nations representative. His appointment was accepted
by both governments.
Nay 27 Sir Owen Dixon arrived in New Delhi to begin talks.
July 2O-21 Joint talks held between the two Prime Ministers and
Sir Owen Dixon. No agreement reached.
July-August Sir Owen Dixon worked out a proposal for withdrawal
of troops, partition, and plebiscite in the Volley
only.
August 16 Nehru refuses Sir Owen's suggestions and his con-
ditions for holding a plebiscite.
October-January The beginning of efforts by the United States and the
United Kingdom to find an equitable basis for a
plebiscite.
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October 10 Tentative United States-United Kingdom plan proposed.
October 27 General Council of the A11-Jammu-Kashmir National Con-
ference called for the convering of a Constituent
Assembly in Kashmir.
December 14
1951
January 9-15
Sir Zafrullah Khan protested to the Security Council
action of the Kashmir National Conference.
During the Commonwealth Conference in London, discus-.
sions were held regarding Kashmir. No aLreement was
reached, although the area of disagreement was alle0ed
to have been narrowed.
February 21 The IS-UK draft resolution was presented to the
Security Council.
March 1 Sir B. N. Rau in the Security, Council reasserted
India's position, and reaffirmed ,India's acceptance
of the August 13, 19+8 and January 5, 1949 resolu-
tions. Announced that his government was opposed
to the US-UK resolution.
March 6 Sir Mohamed Zafrullah Khan voiced position of
Pakistan, reaffirmed acceptability of present
resolution and Pakistan willingness to accept
arbitration to solve deadlock.
March 8 Ambassador Munz of Brazil put forth his proposals for
settlement.
March 10 Sir B. N. Rau rejected the Brazilian proposals.
March 21 A revised US-UK draft resolution was presented to the
Security Council.
March 29 Sir B. N. Rau rejects the arbitration proposals of
,the revised resolution also.. Insisted that Pakistan
had no rieiht to be consulted in matters of demili-
tarization.
March 30 The Security Council adopted US-UK resolution.
April 2 Stir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan said Pakistan fully
accepted the resolution.
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19j1 (Continued)
April 30 Dr. Frank Graham was appointed United Nations
representative for India and Pakistan.
April 30 Kashmir Council issued a proclamation calling for
the convening of a Constituent Assembly and pro-
viding for elections.
May 29 The Security Council authorizes its President to
write India and Pakistan rearding the Council's
apprehension over the proposed Kashmir Constituent
Assembly.
June 1-6 All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference unani-
mously endorses decision to convene a Constituent
Assembly with elections set for September. An-
nounced that the terms of the March 30 resolution
were "wholly unacceptable".
June 26 Dr. Graham left New York for India. Kashmir Govern-
ment spokesman states Graham would be received but
that he could not establish headquarters in Srinagar.
July 3 India issued complaint to the Security Council over
Pakistan violations of the cease-fire line.
July 10-14 India moved the bulk of her combat troops near
Pakistan borders.
July 15 Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan wired Nehru strongly
protesting troop movements. A protest was also
delivered to the Security Council.
July 16 Prime-Minister Nehru admitted troops had been moved
near Pakistan borders, but insisted they were there.
for defense purposes only.
July 17 Nehru telegraphed Liaquat stating that India had no
intention of taking aggressive action.
July 18 Pakistan troop movements completed.
July 26 Liaquat wired Nehru offering; a five point peace
proposal and extending an invitation to Nehru to
visit Karachi.
-July 30 Nehru rejected Liaquat's invitation in a return
telegram, saying that withdrawal of Indian troops
an unacceptable condition. Urged a joint "no-war"
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declaration, and invited Liaquat to Delhi
"without any pre-conditions".
August 1 Liaquat declined Nehru's invitation to come
to Delhi. Denied Nehru's claim that Kashmir
is Indian territory since accession still to
be decided. Urged Nehru once again to accept
five-point plan and renewed his invitation to
Nehru to visit Karachi.
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