SE-24: COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600050027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 18, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIrhA
18 March 1952
1 VDU M FOR TEE INTELLI tY ADVISORY CO i
SUBJECT s SE-24 -. exist OJbarges of US Bee of Biolo oal Warfare
1. The attached draft estimate hae been approved by the
Board of National Eet matoe paareuant to a consideration of it
by the IAG rep ss tatf s.
2. TABS "A", ftB" s. and "C" have not been coordinated. These
fitted at this time for your 1nfor tion and for review by
the I'A.C representatives. It the lAC rol xtat3.vee request a
meeting on the TABS, we will sohedule one In t to Permit their
publication with the estimate itself. In any event we propose to
solicit fib IAC coneurrenees on the TAB by telephone.
3. The eatin to proper has been pieed on the agenda of the
IAG resting scheduled far 1000 Th sd iq , 20 Tbreh,
25X1A9a
cutive Secretary
Distribution "A"
DOCUMENT NO. _
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO. TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70.2
DATE:2- 'FkB .1REVIEWER:_018557
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SECU' Tit TrUMIATION
C F I'I T R A L I N T "L L I C E N C E A G E N C Y
18 March 1952
SUBJECT* SE-24 s CO ZIUNIST CHARGES OF US) USE OF IBIOLOGIC.PL
THE PRODI,E'U
To estimate the significance of the Communist psychological
Warfare campaign alleging use of biological warfare by the US
in Korea and China.
FACTS BEM NG ON 'ME PROBLE1
I,,, The currant large-scale propaganda campaign, charging US
forces with bacteriological warfare in Korea and China has been
carefully coordinated throughout the Communist Orbit, It has been
directed at both domestic and foreign audiences,, The scope and
intensity of this campaign has exceeded that of any recent
Communist propaganda effort0 (See Tab A),
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2 Q The, campaign began with a charge by the North Korean
Foreign Minister on 22 February that the US was using LIin North
Korea, On 6 ,March tho charges were ectended to include, Communist
China when the Peiping F!! Da3 , an official Communist organs
stated that the US had sent a total of 4118 planes on germs warfare
missions over Manchuria during the preceding week, and h.-. in
addition bombed and strafed at least one area in Manchuria?
3,, On 8 March statements by Chinese C moist Premier Chou
E lai and an editorial in the offi.cia. Chinese Communist Party
organs
a. Charged that American use of IRV weapons was aimed
at "wrecking the armistice talks in Korea,, prolong-
ing and expanding the aggressive. war in Korea, and
instigating new wars";
b, Called upon the "peace-loving people of time world"
to "rise up and put an end to the s? nful designs
of the United States Crovernment."
c0 Threatened that US pilots "using bacteriological weapons"
will be treated as "war crimin,,as" when taken prisoner.
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t 0 Comenmist and Corxnunist front orr snizations have
protosted to the' TIN anal to the International Red Cross against
US use, of bacteriological warfare. At the UN on iI Larch,,
Soviet Deputy Foreign 11inister Malik gave official Soviet
support to M ping radio accounts of 113 use of BTI. So for,,
no Conic nist govern. nt has asked for any specific international
action aside' from "condemnation of the US" by the UN, nor hen
the subject of 3W as yet been mentioned by the Camsttuntats at
Panmunjom.,
5. The acousatic regarding bacteriological wsrf arcs
have been directed against the US rather than against UN
forces generally.
6,, The campaign has been supported by allogod "evidence,,"
From a technical standpoint, however, both the Commnniat
description of the attacks and this "evidence" contain flaws
and inconsistencies.
7, Elaborate local efforts have been taken to alert Com-
munist military personnel and civilians to carry out counter-
measuresa It is probable that many of the Communist mi.it
personnel in the combat area have been convinced that the
reports of the attacks are authentic.
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8 a Last spring there was evidence of extensive typhus,.,
cholera., typhoid., and smaUp x in North Iforea. There is at
present no evidence of a recnlrrence of these conditions and
the Carar fists have dented that there are y epidemics
North Korea, HHoorever,, neither the absence of evidence nor
the Communist denial precludes the possibility that these
conditions have recurred, In view of the season and a :ieti ;
public health conditions in North Kor?ea, Comnznnist leaders
may be expecting an early outbreak of epidemics of serious
proportions,, (See Tab B),,
9 The Con uniste have reported disuses of epidemic
proportions in Comunist Chi..na9 but have not -is yet related
these epidemics to the alleged H4"1 attacks,
lO, Although Comaunist forces in Korea are estirrrated to
have the capability of conducting sri i l-scal e 91 attacks u
they are .ll prepared either to guard against the possibility
of such an effort backfiring into their oin ranks, or to defend
thermaelves against possible UN retaliation. in kindr If the
Savlots provided the rrsoansz, Communist capabilities for offensive
employe ont of 13W might become substantial. However., UN vulnerability
to Communist 1AV attacks Is probably far leas than Corr unist
vu.nerabilit - to SIN Id`J att^.oks,, (See Tab C)0
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POSSIBLE PUPWOSk Or I WE CA AIGN
110 A major purpose of the campaign IS almost certainly to
serve internal Communist propaganda needs, In this respect the
following objectives are probably most it portant s
The establish snt of an alibi for sedating
epidemic conditions in Communist China and/or
Korea or in anticipation of such epidemics, with
which Communist authorities might be unable to
cope;
b0 The etfmulaticri of civilian and mility public
health and sanitation efforts;
c. The stimulation of hatred of the US throughout
the Couanmiat world0
12. The scale and nature of the campaign are such, however,
as to suggest purposes beyond those of internal propaganda,
broader purposes may be liaii.ted solely to general foreign
propaganda ai s$ or may involve preparations for some early
major Communist move.
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Such
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13 Jl ng probable ford propaganda purposes area
To discredit the US in the eyes of its allies
and the rest of the nonnCouuunist world;
Syr . To arouse fears that the US is. aggravating
already explosive situation in Korea and in the
mast-Xlest struggle;,
i.s, Ong possible foreign propaganda poses area
a.0 To strengthen the moral position of the Corr .iste
in the event that the Comenvnieta undertake large-
scale offensive mil.it; operations in Korea. or
elaewher e;
To weaken the moral position of the US In the
event that large-scale hostilities are resumed
in. Korea and the US attempts to expand. the
Korean conl.ct?
i!w The campaign is entirely consistent with and could be
pa rax?ation for an early Cor unist political move with
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respect to the truce neiotir tionat or for a renewal of large-
scale military action, iloaevor,4 the current care aign, which
is still gathering mo;:entum, does not yet, in itself provide
a basis for determining whether a major political or mi.iiitr+ry
move is inninont. If the Communists should undertake larger
scale military operations in Korea,, we do not believe they
would e=mploy '/e
16, There ''are no f irrs indications that a Coimunia t rd .itar
offensive is irriminent in Korea or elsewhere, and there is no
firm evidence regarding future Corm st moves in the Korean
cease-fire negotiations ,>
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? .~. VIT- MY IWOR 'ATION
'ABA
THE PUOFAGANI A CAMPAIGN
NOPTf! KORMA, ADD CC'M4Ur11ST CHINA
,I-,. The awrrent Grrtartaniat r a?npaign s ha.rgir ; the US w tma
large a .e bacteriological operations against North Korea and Cost]
rminist China began with a Corr unist New China News Agency report dated
2 . February ?a:Lieging that the US had used ha e &,eriolog. ;a:l. iia.:rtare-
against North Korea in the period since 28 Jarxu.ary0 At this time no
charge of the use of MG/ against China itself was published, (A state
meent of alleged "air viola a ions t of Manchuria by US planes drin,: the
first -. months of 1952, broadcast by Feri p' ing on 20 P ebr aay9r de
no men .ion of W. however., It charged that s e:veral localities in
M sicbur.'ia were subjected to conventional bombing and strafe` attacks,..
2: The initial charge of 21 February c .s given unusual. pmrdmence
an 23 ?ebruary when Pal. Ilonyong$. the North Korean foreign nti.niaterp
su d a lengthy proteIst against the allegFd American "atrocity;,' Cm
the same day the various fide ocratici groul:s and personage custom riiy
used i.n Chinese -Coara pnaset cropaaranda cam. paigne began to isrsue 1protestsVe
againe4 the alleged BW operatioi . On 2j February Chinese CoTMMInIet
?',.reign tiinister' Chou I i-iai specifically seconded Pak Honyo to pn)
est., The campaign -wats quickly picked up in other Satellite countries,
In the Far F stq the Viet Minh radio broa.dca.- the charges' a c: r? y as
h Feb aaary ,, although, to date" it ha not a.e :'lifted them into a . jor
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.i o A n ew? and ominous note was injected into the accusations on
6 March, when the Pei?p e ink; radio charged that on 29 February the US
had utilized bacteriological weapons also against Manchuria., This
charge became the basis for statements by Chou th lai and the official
ei? p`' ing L l e?s iy to the effect that the US was using B'4ii against
"M/anchuria with the "Obvious aim of wrecking the armistice talks in
Korea, prolonging and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and the
instigating of new ? rs,,' `These statements, subsequently amplified
by other propaganda sources, threatened that American air force per-
sonnet captured whi .e "invadingn Chinese territory would be dealt with
as war criminalsv Tha statements called upon "peace`=loving peoples to
"rise up" and upon US 'Satellite" countries to protest against the
inful designs" of the US Governments
1a On ]J March the Pei-pO i.ng radio emended its ,barges to Chin.
proper by alleging that the US had dropped infested insects in Shantung
Province near Taingtao on 6 and 7 March 19520 Charges of Th against
China proper have not been further amplified to date,
5 Although Coup nist.origjn ted news dispatches have described
epidemics of various diseases including types involved in the
chargess., in several North Korean provinces and in some areas of north,,
east, and central China., at no time has an existing epidemic been speciz=.
ically linked to the alleged B campaign, The Commatnist news dispatches
give no indication that the epidemics described are more exte ive than
those periodically expected in China and Korea,
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Following American proposals for an International Red Gross
investigation, radio Pei-pu ing issued a strong denial that axw eg;idemi.cs
had been caused by the alleged Bti# stating that l"eptde ics have so far
been prevented by the swift action of the authorities and the public^"
k'ei.'p"ing accused the US of trying to get the IRC into North Korea in
order to "report on the effectiveness of gem warfaro" and organized
an international body of Co rrxnists to inspect and verify their charges
7A Although the 8W charges will have inevitable repercussions
in the cease--fire negotiations, there has been no major effort to tie
the charges into the propaganda concerning the talks,, other than to
charga that the US is delaying the talks in order to complete its
alleged Sri experiments and to state that the Chinese and Koreans must
not be dissuaded from continued efforts to strike "still heavier blows"
against the American "aggressors." Nor has the 8W campaign beers closely
connected with the other themes of Commaxrxist' propaganda in Asia. There
has been no effort to connect the Bpi charges with the charges that the
US is plotting aggression in southeast Asia,, nor have the 8W charges
been linked to the Sino-Soviet alliance.
8 n The charges of Japanese coma licity in American 8W ret earth,
which were prominent in BW propaganda campaigns in 1950 and 1951,, have
been repeated, but the Japanese have not been charged with participating
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directly in the actual dropping of infested vermin or insects. -Tse
only Chinese Communist propaganda statement that has linked the $d
charges to the Sino-Soviet alliance was one issued on 10 March by
the SinomSoviet Friendship Association in Pei--p-lingp which stated
that "under the unity of China and the Soviet Unions, ax treacherous
American scheme will be completely crushed." The absence of more
prominent statements of this type in the present campaign is all the
more remarkable in view of the extravapent emphasis given by Pei-p 0ing
to the strategic aspects of the Sino-Soviet alliance an the occasion
of the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty on l)a Februarys
9o Chinese Communist and North Korean propaganda has emphasized
that "preventive" measures are being taken against the alleged HFJ
campaign,; In North Korea the Communist Milita.. y Committee on 20 and
29 February designated certain "danger sores" and ordered widespread
anti-epidemic measures, including quarantine., innoculationn., and sani-
tation measures, with communications priority for all "anti-epidemic
information.,# In China "anti-epidemic teams" for Korea were organized
in major citieso the first of which was reported to have arri'Rred in
Korea on 3 March. Similar teams were apparently formed locally for
use in the areas of .China and Manchuria subjected to the alleged BW
attacks. In addition a Chinese Communist investigating commission has
been dispatched to Koreaq headed by Mme., Li Teh-'chuan (Mrs. Feng Yu-
hsiang), the Minister of Health of the Pei-p?ing regime.
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106 The I31 charges have. received what is probably the heaviest
and nest continuous Proprtanda coverage of any recent Chinese Ccmanunist
,n. Almost a quarter of all recently monitored items
propaganda cam aip
on the various regional Chinese radio services dealt i-rlth VI charges.
They treatment accorded the subject by Pei-VP'ing has apparently been
roughly the came,, whether directed at domestic or foreign audiences.
The coverage in worth Korea has been similarly intensive.
Ur= AND EIIROPEJW :' 11EIJMES
11. The current campaign by the USSE' and its satellites appears
to exceed in scope previous campaigns which the Ceymiunists have con-
ducted in connection with various types of alleged US "atrocities':
during the Korean u arr. Although apparently .a.kirag its lead from its
no-Korean allies, the USSR seems to be taking a more active role
than' teas the case previously, with the satellites and international
Conrunist front organizations also contributing their share. It
should be noted that during the Btd ca-npaign, Soviet press coverage
of the Korean truce talks has declined.. However, Soviet-satellite
c entc give little indication of the effect of the B't charges
on those talks.
12. Beginning on 23 February the soviet press almost daily
carried dispatches telling of Since-Koreean charge and reactions to
alleged us use of bacteriological warfare (M). The USSR's
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propaganda, like that of its Asian allies, it the locus of alleged
US activities first in North Korea and then in t%nchurisa (since 8 march),,
!'larch 7.4 a rred to mark a new and intensified phase in the Soviet
~aupaign when "oviet delegate Malik repeated the Sino-Korean charges
in his speech before the UN Disarmament Commission and both Pry
full pages to a Moscow meeting, on 13 March
and Izvesti p. devoted
protesting alleged US use of W. The neoting passed a condemnatory
resolution and arcs accompanied by statements by Soviet intellectt.als
on US "'crininal behavior". There were unconfirmed press reports
that other meetings wore being held elsewhere in the IIL
13. Moscow's Eastern European satellites have contributed con-
siderably to the campaign in the form of editorials, meetings? and
several protests, The International Iced Cross on 13 March announced
the recepit of protests from the Hungarian, Polish, fhzmenian, and
#ulgarian Red Cross Societies. The Fu].garian National. Face Cmittec
sent a cable to the UN on 6 March. Meetings of protest have been
and
reported in Poland, Rumania,/Hunga 7.. Communist-sponsored rallies
are also In full owing in Prance and Italy.
34. All the leading international Communist front organizations
have contributed their formal statements of protest: the , 13,c"T(T
?9 February) , ' !orld Peace Council. (8 ),larch) 9 T TIDF (10 March),, the
and
UPUY (12 1-larch)./the :':scan Liaison lureau of the dM (14 ?arch):,
The '. and WIUF statements were sent to the UTJ. In addition, as
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reported by the Soviet press on 3 March, an investgiating commission
sent by the International Association of Denocratic Jurists arrived
in North Korea on the previous days The Soviet press on 17 March
carried reports from Pyongyang that the committee had witnessed US
use of BW in North Korea,
15. In the main, the statements confine themselves to Protest-
ing the heinousneso of alleged US behavior and calling for world wide
protests against the US and an international. ban on nW. Several pro-
tests call for punishment of those responsible while the 1J`TU and
Bulgarian Peace Committee cables to the UN included calls for an end
to the Korean war.
16. The Soviet statements have charged that the US has used BW
because of US failures to win the Korean war, and. that the US intends
to expand the tsar and/or to prolong the negotiations- For example,
SSoviet legal expert Korovin, on 6 March, gave the first reason, while
Soviet international law expert, Kozhevnilrov, was quoted on 16 March
to the effect that "the use of bacteriological Treapons means that the
aggressors intend to extend the war, to entangle Peoples China in,
it as well as other Asian countries. This treacherous act throws
additional light on the position of the American dele ation at the
truce talks in Korea,."
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117. Soviet and satellite statenents attempt to brush aside
secretary Acheson's denial of 4 "'arch and his offer to su `t to an
impartial international investigation. soviet Academician Grokov
at the Moscow meeting of 13 March said that the Acheson statement
reflected the "growing indignation ... which has been spreading over
an increasing, number of people in Asia and Europe,, as well as in the
US," that the "ecretr "probably" hoped that "in the Geneva red Cross
there are people who would carry out any of his orders,," and stressed
US silence on the question of banning D.J.
l The soviet press has transmitted Sino Koroen reports as well
as dispatches from Soviet correspondent Tkmchenko in North Korea
giving alleged details verifying the Sine-Korean cgharges. Umbassy
Moscow reported that it was these alleged eye witness accounts which
impressed Moscow citizens,, In this connection, the "oviet press
account of the international jurists' commission tried to lend further
credence to the charges by claiming that "certaian "es tern jurists"
had themselves witnessed US use of IsW In North Korea? Among the
satellites, the Hungarian press in particular was vivid in its
descriptions of the type of bombs, the nature of the germs, etc.
19. In the campaign the US has been called ors a than Hitler
often
or the Japanese imperial late,, Referrenceshave/been made to previous
Japanese plans to use B11, plans which the US reportedly is nou incor?-4
porating into its own activities.
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SECURITY INFO TION
DISEAM IN TIM, KORAN AREA
1. Available intelligence does not indicate the present
incidence of typhus, cholera, sn.lpox, typhoid and other diseases
in North Korea, It is doubtful whether factual information
on the incidence of each disease will ever be available since
the diagnostic competency of the Chinese Communist and North
Korean medical services is poor. Consequently, true current
incidence of any given disease in the North. Korean (and China/
Manchuria) area is likewise not known by the Communists. How-
over, the area contains the natural conditions causing many
diseases to be endemic and epidm-nic..
2. Endemic diseases of military significance in the NE
China - Manchuria - Korea area are given below.
(The importance of each is indicated by the following)
(symbols.-
1 - Special Military Importance
2 -,Potential Military Importance
(
a, .
Endemic Diseases
(
b.
May be introduced
(
3 - Serious diseases not of military Importance
(
but 11.k:ely to affect ,all numbers of troops)
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Disease _ China Hmeburia. Korea
Dysentery & Diarrheas 1 1. 1
Endemic-louse 3.
Typhus
Endemic-flea 1 1 1:&; scrub-
Venereal Diseases
cholera
Malaria
Skin Diseases -- gycosee
Plague
Trench Foot & Frostbite
Dengue
Infectious Hepatitis
Relapsing Fever
Papptaci Fever
Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever
J'ap B Encephal1tie
Leptospiro sis
Rat-bite Fever
Rabies
Cerebrospinal Meningitis
Leisha iasia 2a. 3
Russian Spring-Swrn r Encephalitis
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3., Diseases I7iatorlealiv follow the movement of armies,
and there fig eve--y reason to believe this fact applies in the
case of Chine , movement Into North Korea, 111oreonrer, hygiene
and ssnitar';r conditions in the MKP and Mr, have become o_.
.?cssively more propitious for disease outbreaks as the Korean
conflict has centinred. Exhausting forced marches and inndeqvate
food and shelter have lowered the resist nee of the troops?
a
s be
n
r;...
+.+cn
e
Vv.FIAAAIVdl {d ase LACK 01medicci. equip
Brent and rnon- tiii.zation of -itation pe;raoiiel, even in rear
erect are evidence of neglect from a pe entl -Medical stand-
point, The absence of an effective lota icide is another factor
contributing to the generally primitive sanitary condition in
the field (DDT is Ineffectual against certain types of Korean
and Manchurian lace) .
4 During 1051, cholera, , llpcxv and typhus were reported
to be widespread among North Koreas and Chinese Communist troops,
typhus fever had. a high incidence among enema troops during
the sparing; the rate fell sharply early in July. It was reported
that in some areas of North Korea% 50% of all civilian cormunities
contracted the di sense? with a resulting 30% mortality,, I
March 11,451 there were reports that typhus A typhoid, and all-
pox had affected a large proportion of civilians and North Korean
troops the Ch gtxne;h on area; . the mortality rate was reported
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to be 5c. In April 1951 the NKF and CCF disease victims
were reported to eoual battle casualties.
5. In November 1951 GNQ?FECCM concluded that "lack of
an effective lousicido,, together with the apparent neglect of
universal typhus irsmunizationa and the high louse infestation
of enemy troops will inevitably result in many cases of typhus".
6. There have been several recent reports of an unusual
disease in both the NKF and the CCF.. The disease is characterized
by an acute onset with headache, chills, and fever; nosebleed,
vomiting, and abdominal pains were reported in some instances.
Uhile there was no mention of conjunctival hemmorrha (or "red
eye") in connection with these reports, a large percentage of
PW r s were found to be suffering from some form of conjunctivitis
at the time of capture. No estimate of incidence of the malady
In enemy troops can be obtained.
7. There wa^ one covert report of a. a 'nallpox Tike disease
epidemic in North Korea during November--December 1951; no con-
firming intelligence is available.
8, CCF Immunisation. There is every indication that CCF
troops have been more universally and more effectively imn mimed
than is generally believed. Vacei.nes were plentiful in China
and Manchuria prior to CCF intervention in 1950 and in Korea
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of 1951 (except for tetanus toaoid). Vaccines were all made
in China and Manchuria at any one of a number of centers such
as the Poking Central Epidemic Prevention Bureau and the Dairen
Municipal `anitation Center. No Russian or U:? made vaccines
were used,, However,, there wore no inoculations for typhus or
for Japanese B encephalitis.
a. 5mal : Vaccination was universal in 19500
About 90;% coverage of military forces was achieved
in 1951. Ten percent were missed because of the
unfavorable tactical situation and fear of being
vaccinated.
ba ZZphot
ofd-Cholera: Combined vaccineb
Given in divided doses of 0.5cc9 1.0cc and 1.0cc
at intervals of 1 week? Universal coverage in
1951 for the first dose,, about 90% coverage for
the second-dose, and about 80 coverage for the
third dose. The lack of university of the last
two doses may be ascribed to the unfavorable
'tactical situation.
o. Tetanus. Given in divided doses of 0.5ec9 1 Ccc
and 100cc at intervals of 3 - 4 weeks. Universal
coverage in 1951 for the fir at dose. about 40%
coverage for the 2 dose, and 15% for the 3rd
dose. The lack of universality of the last
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two doses may be ascribed to the unfavorable
tactical situation and to a shortage of toxoid,,
9. MA Immunization. The immunization program in the
NKA was far less u versal du n{, the first half of 1951 than
in the CCU', There were aio specific inoculations for tetanus.,
cholera or Japanese B encephalitis. It is estimated that 15
20 of troops received nr Immunization of any kind in 1951.
a. Snial x: Vaccination was universal in 1950
Only about 113 of troops were revaccinated in
1951
b. oic--Para ooide Combined vaccine. Given
twice yearly in divided doses of 0.5cc and l,5cc
with a one Creek interval. About 90;% coverage in
early 1950 and about 30% coverage in 1.951
c, TTVh-uR# None in 1950 Given in two divided doses
of l.Oce each to approximately 60% of troops between
February and May 195"L.
d0 void-P,t?Iio1dw'iaao Combined vaccine given
in divided doses of 1,0cc each to approximately
60 o of troops in 19510
e, 0Nisin Laktin": This is the phonetic pronounciation
of a Russian, combined vaccine that was given to
approximately 80% of f troops between March and
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May 1951. T Inoculation of one dose results in fever
of three or four days duration. No fatalities
resulted, As far as can be ascertained# the vaccine
contained Immunizing agents against the following
diseases: typhoid, cholera, probably paratyphoid
A and B, and. tetanus or dysentery. The information
concerning the use of this vaccine is reliable s
but the list of diseases against which it is
supposed to be effective is not reliable.
1Co From cur-ent reports it appears. that both the Chinese
and North Koreans have ordered (at least on paper) plague and
cholera immunizations for civilians as ,,ell as for troops*.
"Antimpl.a. a corps are said to be carrying out emergency decon-
tamination and epidemic prevention work in the front-line posi-
tions and villages affected. Epidemic prevention stations have
been set up in germ affected areas."
li, Military nitation orders include the boiling of
all drinking watcrg the burning of garbage and to the eking
of latrines in specified areas. Insect and rodent control
measures have also been instituted,, It is emphaei e??d that
while these orders exist on paper9 it is not known how adequately
they are carried out.
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S Fi- 24
SECURITY INFORMATION
TAB C
COMNIST BW CAPABILITIES IN KOREA
OFFENSIVE
L. There is no proof of Chinese Conmiunist or North Korean
biological research for the express purpose of waging biological war-
fare. Available intelligence of Comrnuniet BW capabilities in the
Korean area is almost entirely concerned with possible CCF activities,
although it must be assumed that some technical interchange takes place
between Chinese and North Koreans.
2. Intelligence indicates that the Chinese Communist Government
may have established a sman.9 basic,, and applied laboratory BW research
program. This program is probably carried out in three scientific
institutes located in North China and Manchuria. Research appears to
be centered on enteric diseases of man and selected food-crop-killing
hormones.
3. Top control of the B11 research program probably rests in the
"Chinese Communist Military Council"j technical assistance is obtained
from specialists in the various research Institutes. Control by the
Council is exercised through three main scientific institutes in areas
where the requisite laboratory facilities are alreac available for
biological research. The principal institutes are at Peiping; (Peiping
Scientific Research Institute); Chang Chun (The People's Arnr Chemical
Viarfare School and Research lAboratory wider the Northeast Scientific
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Institute); and Peian (Faichia Special Diseases Research Institute),
Other institutes possibly connected with the Chinese Communist program
are located at Harbin (branch of the Continental Scientific Research
Institute); 'Yukden(Cattle Disease Research Laboratory); and i)airen
(the Dairen Sanitary Research Laboratory) r
?,, The Chinese B W progra 2 intimately related to its CW program';
is reported to be closely supervised and supported by the USSR. Soviet
personnel participate as directors of the principal laboratories and as
research scientists and technicians4 As many as 50 percent of the
technical personnel are reported to be Soviets 120 Japanese specialists
from the former Kwantung Army B W units have been put to work by the
Chinese Communists.
5o Reported work of these facilities and scientists cover bubonic
plague, t5phoidf, cholera, and other intestinal diseases, The Chang
Chun institute has facilities closely associated with airfielde; however,
there is no evidence to confirm or deny actual employment of aircraft
in munition or agent tests,, Likewise, there is no evidence from the
other research centers to indicate pilot-:.plant or large-scale Ffb' pro-
duction,, field testing of gents, or devolopment and tit of 133 munitions
and equipment.
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6? Recent tests by the Arcs Chemical Corps have served to
'. ,ustrate the ease with which limited ta.rgete can be attacked with )
agents. in view of the results of these tests, it seems probable that
the Communists could, in limited areas., sabotage South Korean crops,
wells. municipal water systems , and.populated point targets with iii
agents,
D F2 SIVE
7, BW defensive capabilities are closely tied to the public
health systfl medical facilities., and medical supplies., In China and
Korea all three are very poor ~ The Communists are attempting to improve
these in their basic public health programs such improve mentp when
realized,, will be of value in combating .
8, The Chinese Communist Goverment announced in 1951 an expan-
sion of epidemic control and prevention unitag and expenditure of large
sums for medical and sanitation work, Although inoculations against
contagious diseases have been reported% it is doubtful if a significant
percentage of the population has been protected,, Many CCU` IM' S in
Korea report inoculations are incomplete or entirely omitted? The Soviets
have been aiding and advising the Comminists in Chia Manclmria
particularly as regard prevention and control of plague; whether this
Soviet interest is primarily benevolent or is associated with the EN
program is not known.
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ever,, in view of the Cominmiste u relatively poor defensive capability
vis-a-vis US defensive capability, large-scale employment of -1 with Soviet
munitions, agents,, and the necessary concurrent air superiority,, is
considered highly unlikely.
9, It is possible that Soviet developments in Fri equipment an
m nitions might be made available (at least in design) to the COMM_
nists in Korea if it was determined that Thi should be employed,. fNow-
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