ONI CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIE-27/1: CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700020027-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 4, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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n1F0wuON
bo Experience in the past several months with Sinti oviat relation, however,,
indicates that Soviet aid to the Chinese Con iste would not be limited only
to planning,teechnical advice and logistic support, but r be etpandeed to
to increase Chinese Corr nist capabilities in submarine and mine warfare, A
limited nuebar of Soviet submarines could be used offensively on a Ilvolunteeerr
basis and could also be used for recoa jssa nce and the landing of special.
personnel,
Although a mmatom Chinese Cc iet effort .th1n the next few months
could be mounted with 200,E men from the consideration of water lift
available, the lack of n coal support, the certainty of detection p either A-am
Nationalist-hold offshore islands or by U.S. aerial or sea patrols, the
c ty of the intervention of the U.S. fleet and the difficulties to be
encountered in reinforcement and resupply combing to make it doubtfnl that
such an effort will come about. A further limiting factor would be weather
considerations. which are outlined in Appendix A of VIE-27A
6, T information, provided in the ONI contribution to SE-20 relative to
strength, dE.spossition, ceXsitioo and combat effectiveness of the )atiernalist
naval forces remains unchan
7. In spite of U.S. efforts to strengthen the Nationalist forces by means of
G. inefficiency, political i ntripmeas, and lack of cooperation amongst the
services serve to weaken the overall. capabilities of the Natienmi ts,
8, An indicated above U10 political Intrigues and manifest lack of cocperatio
amongst the various c 'vicon corhaine to make it improbable that the ti is
alone could successfully defend a gai t. a llmam Chinese Co ist effort,
Without direct Soviet participation in an attack, ho eveer, and given material
and moral aid by the United States, the probability of a successful. defense
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of Taiwan would be gre ati r enhanced. The presence of the U.S* Seventh Fleet
and its active participation would be the decisive factor in such a suer-
ce ssful defense.
9, Over-All Soviet policy is based on global considerations and at present
undo+ustedly takes Into consideration such factors as the NATO situations the
Southeast Asia and the Middle East situations, the U.S, rOQrm=mt program
and the situation In Korea. Cc i deration of such factors wiL1 influence
any Soviet policy aimed at the Invasion of Taiwan prior to mid -IM. If the
Soviets were assured of a reasonable chance of succees, or for reasons un-
known to the U, 5,, felt that Taiwan =at be taken prior to mid--19S2, of-
fensive actin a might be taken without regard to the above factors a The Soviets
may also consider that such actiaa might split the Western Powers and in-
stitute another war of attrition for the U?S, with slight effect an Soviet
war potential. At the present time it is impossibaa to deter ine Soviet
policy with regard to Taiwan except to state that Soviet policy does un--
doubtedly envisage eventual Chinese Comminlst control of Taiwan.
10, U.S, Far East naval forces were ce tted by the President to the do-
fame of Taiwan for the duration of the Korean hostilities, Of all the
foreign naval forces committed to the Far Earst, only the U.S. force are
considered available for the defense of Taiwan. Naval forces based at
Okinawa would require at least one 'day to reach Taiiwan. Naval forces en-
gaged in the Korean operation would require at least two days to reach the
area between Taiwan and the China coast. 71[hile availability of fleet units
at the time is impossible to predict, it is considered that the Korean
situation presently Is such that the naval forces required could probably
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110 At present there are no indications apparent to ONI -Which would show
Chinese Qo ist Intent to attack Taiwan, However, this situation,
naval.-jses could change at any time It is desired to point oat; nevertheless,
that while an all out.attack does not at this time appear imminent there
are other actions short of this course of action which the Chinese Cs mists
might erraler either to a aarraass the U.S. internationally or to weaken the
Natio Liat position in Taiwan. Such actions might include airborne drops for
sabotage and subversive pupa:po see, a limited amphibious ,assault designed to
embarrass the U.S. poli,.ticaall because of offensive nav~al action taken against
its as well as a combination of limited amphibious assault and airborne
drap?
12A The Communiats at all, time will hope that they can eliminate U.S
commitme .ts to Taiwan through political memo and will seize upon eve y
opportunity to exploit this poesibilityr? if Taiwan were then left to its
own resources the CoaumuwAists could seize the island almost at at will.
SECP,YY'T
3M!n INFORMIoN
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