NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA (REVISION OF PAGES 1-6, AS AGREED UPON BY BOARD ON 16 JANUARY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700040033-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 20, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC!
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
20 Peb y 1951
SUBJECTS EM-29a TUGOSLAVIL (Revioion of Pages 1-6, ac + d
To - s tbs. oupablities and Intentions of the RM
its a pear satellites with re nt to action against
T , during 19510
CONCLUSIONS
1.. The Ire .in to eliminate the Tito G t,
to replwo it by a regime sub wviieent to the USSR., and to
Integrate !ugoala politically, ee icai3,y, and strata-.
gioany Into the Buropeen Satellite structure,
2. key believe that Tito$e reglm will not be over-
t of during 1951 by a Soviet-Inspired coup or by inter-
=a r .to T retaro, avert armed invasion by Soviet or
Satellite foram will be required if the Soviet objective
is to be aac.iehed during 19514
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DOCUMENTNO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 8~/t?JI /~
ALIT H: R I -2
DATF~, . REVIEWERS ce514
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SECitET
3. In the evwt of full.. wle invasion by Soviet fcraes,
Yugoslav forces u .d be Incapable of resisting for more than
taut two weeks yr L.as they more witbclraun and oeseoentrated
in the moamtsixeo ua area of Boen i.a, Bex cegoviana, and Monte-
negro. Even if so conaentratedf they could not ensign to
resist for mare than one maynth.
d,. Recent military builder in the Satellite oountrier
(sto cling, re-equipment, gasoline oonservation, stepping-
up of war industry, ete.) paints to a great increase in Sat.
eUito capabilities for military action. bar .4&iple, the
total ground forces (including security troops) of Hungary
and Bulgaria have increased during the past six months from
1 1,000 to 258,000. Thus the SateeUlites now have the cap&-
bil.ity for a successful attack against Yugoslavia, and
such an attack during 1951 must be consid.-
wed a serious possibili#y.
5o Against Invasion by the armies of the four neighbor.
ing Satellite powers (Bulgaria, Rtmeania, Hungary, and Al-
), organized Yugoslav resistance could be sxpeated to
continua for about three months, but probably no mare than
four months under the most favorable de-feesive conditions.
In either masse, guerrilla--type resistance would continue
after collapse of organized resiataocao
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Ste'
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`// S'T
6e Substantial Western military assistance, in the farm
of weapons and equipment which could be readily integrated in-
to Yugoplav units, if provided well in advance of an aback,
ffi.ght enable Yugoslavia successfully to defend itself against
a Satellite attack, and to check a Soviet attack for consider..
ably more than a month.
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SET
SOVIET OBJECTIV1S WITH RESPECT TO YUGO
1. The Kremlin aims to eliminate the Tito Garet as
som as practicable, to replace it by a regime subservient to
the USSR, and to integrate Yugoslavia politically, spa ic~ally,
and strategically into the tropean Satellite stiruature.
gpMRENT STRENGTH AND STABILITY OF TITOIS REGIME
20 The Tito regime is stable. Internal security farces
are large and efficient, and have dealt successfully with ac-
tive opposition elements. Efforts of the Cacninform to pei-
trate and underndne the regime by subversive means have the
far failed conspicuously. There is no evidence of effective
there are
organized opposition within the country aad/no serious personal
rivals to Tito himself.
3. A rarity of the Yugoslav population are non-Coanmunists
or even anti nista. Living standards are lower nor then
before the war. The resentments caused by the nationalization
of the eocnoeV, by the campaign against religion, and by the
dsvelu inont of police state techniques is still strong. In
the party hierarchy there is some criticism of the mal-edmin-
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istrati on of the import program and of unsatisfactory economic
progress.. It is al a possible that soma of Tito's follows,
though seemingly lcyal, may be awaiting an opportunitay to im-
prove their fortune at the expense of their leader. Howe ,
-most of the Yugoslav people prefer the present regime to the
reestablishment of alien control from Moscow. Tito's bold and
successful stand in the face of mounting Soviet and Satellite
pressure has appealed strongly to Yugoslav natic?al prig,
in the event of invaaionb the great ma4ori1 of Yugoalavs a+ooald
support Tito and carry out what resistance was militarily pose=
Bible. Even the long-.standing national minority tensions in
the country are relatively quie at. The improvement of Yugo.-
slay ralationo v th the Western Powers, and particularly with
.the US, has not favorable popular response.
4. Tito's freedom of political. action Is hampered by his
peridoxical Ideological position. A considerable retreat
from C?smaaaniat theory or practice and any conspicuous associa-
tions with the Western Powara give substance to the Krmnlines
contention that Tito is a traitor to Communism and might cost
him the allegiance of some of his more zealous Marxist followers
who are indispensable functionaries in his totalitarian regime4
On the other hand? if he adheres too faithfully to Communist
dogma, he may antagonise the Western Powers and non-Cc nist
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W480' SEME*T
elements within Yugoslavia vhoge support is eesential if national
is to be mdntainedQ
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