INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT: SOUTH AFRICA: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING A NUCLEAR TEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002900120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1977
• Content Type: MF

National Intelligence Officers
18 August 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT Interagency Assessment: South Africa: Policy Considerations
Regarding a Nuclear Test
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The attached interagency assessment has been coordinated at a working
level; because of pressures of time it has not been reviewed at higher
of the Center for Policy Support in the Directorate
of Intelligence in CIA managed this project.
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National Intelligence Officer
for Africa
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18 August 1977
INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT: South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a
Nuclear Test*
KEY JUDGMENTS
1. It is our judgment that the South African government plans to pro-
ceed through the various stages of a nuclear weapons program, including the
eventual testing of a weapon.
-- We believe that domestic political concerns would argue
in favor of testing; and that these concerns weigh more
heavily than foreign policy considerations in a decision
whether or not to test;
F wethink that, on balance, m tart'
cons: erat ons, too, would argue in favor of testing;
-- We do not believe that fear of adverse foreign reaction
poses a sufficiently compelling reason for South Africa
to avoid a test.
2. Yet we can discern no over-riding pressure on South Africa's leaders
to rush to test a weapon in the immediate future; indeed, we think foreign
policy considerations could lead them to adopt a flexible attitude toward
its timing.
-- There would be considerable pressure on Vorster within the
cabinet to go ahead with a test as scheduled, to project an
image of power at home and abroad, and to demonstrate that
South Africa is not to be coerced by foreign threats to its
security;
-- But Vorster might well be persuaded to delay a test for a short
time if there were indications that a major turnaround in U.S.
policy toward South Africa was possible, or if he judged that a
test could undermine sensitive ongoing negotiations, e.g., on
Namibia.
* This assessment has been coordinated at the working level by representatives
of the Intelligence Community.
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3. While we thus ascribe some flexibility, or "give,' to the South
African position regarding the timing of a test, we do not see any circum-
stances arising which would lead to a termination of their long-standing
program to develop a nuclear weapon. We see no credible threat from the
West which would be sufficient to deter the South African government from
carrying out a test; indeed, threats would, in our judgment, be more likely
to harden South African determination.
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NOTE
This paper examines the political and other non-technical factors
bearing of a South African decision to test or not to test a nuclear weapon
in the near future. It also addresses specifically the further question,
what might induce South Africa to postpone a test?
Because of real current uncertainties regarding the state of South
Africa's test readiness and the availability now of South African-made
fissionable material for a test, assumptions on these points have been made
to facilitate consideration of political and other aspects. We have assumed
that the South Africans, without specific additional foreign assistance or
consent, could conduct a nuclear test within amatter of weeks, and that
they could continue their nuclear weapons development thereafter without
foreign assistance. If South Africa's test readiness, in fact, depends on
receipt of materials from an assisting foreign country, or an acquiescence
of that country in a final test decision, another avenue of US counteraction
which has not been considered in this paper might become available.
The following assessment is based in part on technical analysis of the
program. In the main, however, it reflects the Community~s knowledge of the
Afrikaner people and their leaders; their perceptions of themselves and the
outside world; and the policy imperatives to which they seem most likely to
respond,
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DISCUSSION
I. Factors Bearing on the Decision to Test/Not to Test
A. Domestic Politics
1. The ultimate and over-riding concern of the South African government
is to ensure the survival of the Afrikaner nation. During its 30-year rule
the National Party has accomplished this to the satisfaction of its constitu-
ents, primarily by achieving a rapid growth in South African economic and
military power, subjugation of the non-white majority, and keeping the levers
of political power in Afrikaner hands. Under this system the Afrikaner people
(and English-speaking whites as well) not only have survived, but have enjoyed
high and rising living standards.
2. In the past couple of years, however, things have not been going
nearly so well for the Afrikaners. Their leaders, long prone to see South
Africa as fighting a lonely struggle in a hostile and misunderstanding world,
have increasingly adopted a siege mentality, driven by such events as:
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-- the end of Portuguese colonial rule;
-- the apparent imminence of majority rule in Rhodesia;
the growth of world support for the guerrillas operating
against Southwest Africa;
-- the collapse of South Africa's detente policy in southern Africa;
-- the broadening condemnation of apartheid by the West;
-- the installation of Communist-backed radical regimes in
black African states;
-- the recent hardening of official U.S. policy toward South Africa.
At home, too, the government has had few, if any, recent successes to demon-
strate to its constituents that it is coping effectively with the country's
mounting problems, including:
-- continuing serious racial disturbances -- the worst in a
century;
-- a recession that will soon enter its third year;
-- the embarrassment of the Angolan intervention;
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-- sharply rising defense costs;
-- growing emigration.
3. Faced with these developments, the testing of a nuclear device
would have strong appeal to the Vorster government as a way to restore
confidence in the government''s capability to keep the present social system
intact without significant change and without major concessions to the
black majority,
4. We also note that it is consistent with Vorster's personality to
favor proceeding with nuclear weapons development and to undertake testing.
Vorster throughout his career has shown a strong inclination toward actions
which project power and toughmindedness and has made no secret of his personal
contempt for world opinion directed at influencing his freedom to make South
Africa's decision. This would be an important factor in South African reac-
tions to attempts at forcing Vorster's government not to test a nuclear
device. Additionally, Vorster, who has a great interest in his place in
Afrikaner history and who has lamented privately that his achievements in
maintaining the status quo are not appreciated, may view development of a
South African nuclear capability as a dramatic achievement for which he
will be remembered.
B. Military Considerations
6. Since South Africa, even after a test, would probably still be
several years away from a dependable delivery capability, it is our judgment
that many in the military would favor going ahead with the testing phase as
the next step in the long process of acquiring deliverable nuclear weapons.
We further believe that the military would defer to political leaders on the
decision whether or not to test, and on the timing of a test. For many South
Africans, the rationale for going ahead in the development of nuclear weapons
stems from a fear that ultimately South Africa faces the threat of being
invaded by Communist-backed black regimes and perhaps even by Soviet and Cuban
forces. Historically, the Afrikaner response to a perceived threat has been
to assume the worst and to prepare for it; and we believe that this attitude
will be a major factor in Pretoria's opting to test and continue to develop
nuclear weapons.
C. Foreign Policy Considerations
7. We are virtually certain that Vorster is aware that a nuclear test
would sooner or later be detected and made known throughout the world. A
decision to test must therefore be seen as a conscious decision to defy the
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world and to increase greatly the risk of bringing on various combinations
of censure and sanctions, as well as jeopardizing any sensitive negotiations
South Africa might be engaged in at the time.
8, We find this attitude entirely consistent with the defiant, tribally-
oriented cast of the Afrikaner world view, which is based on a strong deter-
mination to be able to stand alone as a nation and a desire to demonstrate
to the outside world that the Afrikaners will not brook outside interference
in their affairs. In short, a test would be viewed as projecting an image
of Afrikaner power to the world. While some analysts believe that Vorster
would feel this drive could be satisfied merely by possessing the capability
to test, most think that he would not rest content without the demonstration
effect of a test.
9. We note that the approach to the test phase is but one step -- albeit
a critical one -- in South Africa's long-standing, complex program of weapon
development. We therefore see the foreign policy objectives of this program
as being more general and long-range. A recognized nuclear weapon capability
would, in vorster's view:
-- break the linkage of the world's image of South Africa
solely as the country of apartheid;
-- compel the world to pay attention to South African whites
(particularly Afrikaners) as a force which must be taken
account of;
-- exert pressure on all the parties involved in southern
African affairs to give more serious consideration to the
interests of South African whites.
10. At the same time we believe that Vorster recognized that interna-
tional reaction to a test would in all probability weaken the chances for
moderate influences to predominate in the Rhodesian and Namibian crises, and
perhaps enhance Soviet influence in the area. While this consideration would
not be likely to prevent a test, it could lead Vorster to delay a test so long
as he still perceived significant advantages to be gained from ongoing negotia-
tions.
D. The Question of Sanctions
11. South Africa's leaders cannot separate foreign policy concerns from
consideration of censure, sanctions, and other punitive measures which other
countries might adopt in the wake of -- or in anticipation of -- a South
African nuclear test.
12. We agree that particular sanctions (discussed below) could hurt
the South African economy -- particularly if they involved participation of
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all the major industrial countries and a few peripheral ones, e.g., Iran
and Israel. It is our judgment, however, that the impact of sanctions,
even under the most optimistic assumptions about universality of applica-
tion, would not be felt for at least a year. It was also pointed out that
imposition of financial sanctions might lead South Africa to renounce or
cease payments on its outstanding short-term debt to the West, amounting
to $3.4 billion,
13. It was noted that South Africa has gone a long way toward achieving
its goal of industrial self-sufficiency.
-- It has a 2-3 year stockpile of oil;
it has recently claimed to be 80% self,-'sufficient in
industrial machinery and 66% in transport equipment:
its two greatest industrial vulnerabilities in the past,
14. In addition, the Vorster government already has cranked into its
plans a judgment about the prospect of sanctions. The 1978 budget, for
example, reflects a sharp drop in Western credit and the resulting lack of
real economic growth.
15. It is our view -- and probably that of the Vorster government -- that
it would be extremely difficult to get general and effective Western coopera-
tion in economic or financial sanctions, even in the condition of shrill censure
of South Africa that would inevitably follow a nuclear test.
16. Based on all the above, it is the consensus that South Africa's
leaders would probably not be deterred from testing a weapon out of concern
over the imposition of economic sanctions.
E. The Special Case: South Africa's Peaceful Nuclear Power
17. A separate but related question is whether South Africa's leaders
would be willing to jeopardize peaceful nuclear development in the interest
of testing a weapon. There are two major elements in this development: fuel
enrichment, and nuclear power plant construction. South Africa's dependence
in the enrichment case is neither immediate nor great, although the South
Africans have been seeking foreign financial and technical aid in its plans
to build a much larger plant so as to compete in the world's market for
enriched reactor fuel. In the nuclear power program, however, South Africa
is critically dependent on foreign sources of supply, particularly France.
18, The power plant program is an important one, planned to provide
eventually on the order of 10% of South Africa's power needs. These needs
could be met from coal-fired plants, but would involve long-distance power
transmission and other extra costs.
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19. The enrichment program involves South African plans to export
by the mid-1980s some $400 million of enriched uranium annually --- this
would equal four times the value of raw uranium ore exports. While this
would be only a small part of total exports (currently running at $8 billion
a year), it nonetheless would mean foregoing a sizable piece of foreign
exchange earnings,
20. We estimate that sacrificing foreign assistance for these two
programs would eliminate nuclear power possibilities for many years and
reduce significantly South African participation in the enriched reactor
fuel market.
21. Whether this would affect a current decision to test is uncertain.
We think it is a better than even chance that the South Africans already have
written off U.S. deliveries -- which probably are not due until 1980-81 -~
in the light both of the current worsening in their U.S. relations and
earlier foot-dragging by the U.S. in delivering components for these two
programs.
II. The Timid
22, In spite of our overall judgment that South Africa's leaders
perceive persuasive reasons to continue a nuclear weapon program, including
the testing phase and beyond, we do not feel that they are yet under any
over-riding pressure to rush to test a weapon in the immediate future. We
see this program as having a certain technically-derived calendar or schedule;
but this schedule is not unchangeable. There are decision-points along the
schedule where Vorster and his inner circle -- whom we believe are in close
touch with every apsect of the program have the option of moving ahead,
delaying for a short period, or cancelling indefinitely.
23. The relevant question, we believe, is not, "why would they test
quickly?"; but rather, under what condition or circumstances would they be
induced to delay a test shot?
24. We would stress that Vorster would be under pressure, particularly
from the hard-liners within his cabinet, to go ahead with a test on schedule.
It is our consensus also that the Afrikaner electorate would not be much
impressed by anything short of a test shot; and that the Vorster inner circle
would be aware of this need for a demonstration effect. Others, for example
his foreign minister, might well argue:
-- that there is no urgency to test;
-- that a test might not only complicate current negotiations
on Namibia, but would make it difficult for those Americans
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(and Europeans) who are sympathetic to white South Africa's
cause to exert any influence on U.S, and Western policy
toward Pretoria.
25. We judge that there is a somewhat better than even chance that
South Africa's leaders would adopt a relatively flexible attitude toward
the timing of a test; and that they might be persuaded to delay a scheduled
test for a short period if there were indications that a major turnaround
in U.S. policy towards South Africa was possible.
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26. While we perceive this degree of "give" in the South African position
on testing, this give has severe limits.
-- We perceive no credible threat which would be sufficient to
deter South Africa from carrying out a test; indeed, our
reading of the Afrikaner personality suggests that threats
would have the opposite effect to that intended;
-- We do not foresee any circumstances which would induce South
Africa to terminate, or even to postpone for a prolonged or
indefinite period, its nuclear weapons program;
-- If South Africa were within two to three weeks of a scheduled
test, the costs of a prolonged delay and the long lead-time
needed before again reaching the test phase would probably
be prohibitive.
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