POSSIBLE SITUATIONS ARISING FROM KOREAN PRISONER ISSUE ON 23 JANUARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000200020029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORT

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?IONS ARISING nom KOREAN
ISSUE 01 23 JANUARY
or*s: That there is no change in t 's position
*000 Chinese and North Korean anti-Cassunist prisoners
use civil an status and hence be released from custody on
ry: and that there is no change in the Comounist stand
prisoners must be held in custody until the Korean
e 2 conference discusses their disposition.
25X1X
-25X1 Possibilit of a dela in the release;
ar vitb
t t25X1X
India ispla:naro Ltu:nthe prisoners o
ing
sides it no other disposition has been agreed on prior
ary. General Thimaym Chairman of the RUC, has publicly con
this intention. Mimosa* Indian delegate to the UN, hovver. is
attempting to repoonvene the UNGA to discuss the question and India
has denied responsibility for Thimayya's statemeht. It is possible
therefore, that not only the prisoner issue,* but the Korean politi-
cal conference as well, might again be brought up for discussion
at the UN, thus delaying the planned release. It is also possible
that ladle, because of the Pakistan arms issue or other reasons*
will change its present position favoring the prisoners' release.
possiblein event of the
Ac Conemenists: It is unlikely that the Communists
resort 4 action since (1) entry into the demilitarized
of regular or irregular troops would be violation of the armi
agreement and entails the risk of renewed war; (2) they
probably do not actually want the prisoners back; (3) they prob-
ably want the prisoner issue disposed of prior to the holding of
a political conference to avoid another psychological defeat: and
(4) the situation presents them with a face-saving solution and
an opportunity to accuse the US of violating the armistice terms.
b.
A threat that th. release of the prisoners would lead to a
resumption of hostilities is unlikely, since there is no indica-
tion that the Commuaists are preparing for this course of action.
Propaganda could take the form of a last-einute appeal or threat
to the POW., but in view of the probability that the Communists
do not actually vent the prisoners back these courses appear
unlikely.
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A re probable course weld be a tiul world-wide
blast the. and possibly Indians chair
terrorisa, etc. Because ease of the prisoners would represen
a defeat for the issunists, it is possible that they might attempt
to divert world attention fran the Korean issue by creating a
spectacular event somewhere else in the world.
Action bit Name No action is contemplated by
mend a prompt turnover of the prisoners by the UNC
pt departure of the Indian troops, sad possibly
al by bus and train as presently contemplated.
Raving obtained the release of the prisoners, however,
tent deterrent to taking unilateral military action is
ed.
ry
Since
C and the 303
e UNC at some pa
orderly.
they
rt,
g the south-
There in some possibility of an attack by 32,000 anti-
Communist prisoners upon the 330 pro-Communist prisoners,
especially it the latter are not released first. In this con-
nection, the pro-Communists may refuse to leave the compound
since, in the Communist view it would violate the armistice.
There is some possibility of disorder following the release
use of the possible presence of some prisoners desiring ro-
tation to the north among the anti-Communist group. Thimayys
stem these may number 1,300-2,000.
event 0
waists: Since t
cour
to use for
any such mov
Action
vast Marshal
by agents and r
order a mass break?
tenpia ed, even
Indian troops.
e, rests with the UN Command.
favor this
Rh,* attempts
ty to repel
Reports indicate that the South Korean Pro
a maintaining contacts with the prisoners
adcasts. It is probable that Rhee will
f a prolonged detention is indicated.
Rhee is already threatening action !against the Indian cue-
1 forces, but may find it difficult to implement this. The
ROI forces in the area of POW site Is the 2nd Noreen Marine
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Oa is attached to the let Division.
en to prevent this force from nov tug into
is known, there are no South Zorisa police
the area.
will consider retention of the prisoners a violation
istice, which autoaatically Justifies a renewal of the
as indicated that he is freed from his obligations to
27 January. me also continues to assert that he will
march northward.
a unpredictability (malls* and rapid shifts
e his probable convictionat the US cannot abandon
tated belief that a suicidal attack would be better
rangulation," all point to the possibility that be
y out his threat of unilateral action.
litary preparations for such action have been noted,
except that the recent establishment of a Joint Chiefs of taff
would facilitate such action. The most likely possibility is
that Rime 11 not undertake such action unless he sees the
possibility of involving the US; since he probably has no
illusions regarding US determination not to coque to his assist-
ance, he may create front-line incidents in an attempt to provoke
the Comaunists into attacking first. Statements attributed to
Foreign Minister Pyun end en-Prime Minister Ti Poa-sok support
this estimate.
lett.** b7 the prisoners: Since the zatiCoemunist prisoners
havebeen laformed of tfie UN timetable, and are expecting their
release on or about 23 January, any prolonged detention is almost
certain to cause rioting and attacks upon the Indian troops.
Unless there is some prospect for release, an attempt at a
se breakout seems inevitable, with or without instructions from
Rhee. Advance preparations by South Korean authorities for their
absorption into the South Korea* community can be expected.
The prisoners on both sides who are considered unreliable
may be killed. Some pro-COmmuaists among the uarepatriated anti
Communists will probably attempt to Join guerrilla forces opera-
ting in the South, or operate as agents.
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