SE-54: THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000200020042-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 28, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved ForlZelease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP7 000200,;Q2,Qi
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 December 1953
P ANDl14 PQ THE INTELLIGENCE ADVIS CRY MUM=
1ITTEE
StBJWT: SL-54: The Pbliticl Outlook In Italy
1. The attached draft contains several typographical
and editorial revisions in the 24 December draft. The Board
of National Estimates does not believe a clean-up session is
necessary and reocmaends that the attached draft, dated
26 December, be considered at the I:AC meeting scheduled for
14:45 Tuesday, 29 December.
2. Release to P'nnreicn Gov ents
The Board reactvds that this ete not be re-
leased to foreign grmment.
;VIII
Acting Exeoutive Sec taxy
National Estimates
Distribution "As
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000200020042-7
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP7 020002 ~ ' t --
WiAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 December 1953
SUBJECPs 8E-54: THE POLITICAL CJTLOOE IN ITALY
1. The political situation in Italy is highly unstable.
As a result of the elections of June 1953, the composition of the
parliament is such as to make almost impossible the formation of
a stable governmental majority. A series of cabinet crises therefore
seems inevitable.
2. The morale of the center parties has accordingly been
lowered and that of the extremes encouraged. While the Christian
Democrats are still the largest party, the Ca unist Nenni Socialist
bloc is by far the better organized and more homogenous. The
center parties are confused and divided and in straitened financial
circumstances. Furthermore, the morale, discipline, and orgenize-
tion of the Christian Democrats have seriously deteriorated, and its
parliamentary members are not united in firm support of any policy or
leader.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-R
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000200020042-7
SEC M
3. Pella's administration was established as a "caretaker"
government and its term of office was to have expired at the end
of October. However, the Trieste issue was seized by Pella as a
means of strengthening his political position and his tenure in
office. If a solution of the Trieste issue acceptable to Italy
should soar be reached, Pella might remain in power for a brief
period. Honeever, Pella's approach to a number of controversial
domestic problems has generated increasing opposition from within
his own party. This opposition will almost certainly lead to the
early collapse of his government.
4. Italy is a bitterly poor country faced by immense social
sad economic problems. Governments led by either wing of the CD
will probably be able to maintain economic stability, but they are
not likely to produce significant improvement in social and economic
conditions. This inability to satisfy popular demands for social
and economic improvement will continue to stimulate dissatisfaction
and to encourage extremist sentiment in the mass of the electorate.
Labor's willingness to adopt aggressive tactics has been demonstrated
in the 11 December and 15 December strikes. There will almost car-
tainly be further serious strikes within the near future, which will
contribute to the general deterioration of the political situation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : C
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000200020042-7
5. The Comounists and their allies, the Nonni Socialists,
have capitalized an Italy's underlying political, social, and
economic weaknesses to remain a major threat to Italy's democratic
system. Together they received about 35 percent of the popular
vote in the June elections, sod they control about thirty-seven
percent of the seats in the Chamber. Their popular strength-will
increase in the absence of further progress toward resolving
Italy's basic economic and social problem., but we believe that
they are unlikely to attain pmnr, at least within the next two
6. It is possible? though hi _ i ikely, that the combina-
tion of a Trieste setback and a prolonged general strike could
create a revolutionary situation in Which the left might seek to
overthrow the government. It is also possible that the Coem uniats
might attempt a coup, in the unlikely event of a sharp gonsvm~ent
move to the right. However, we believe that the loyalty gad capabi-
lities of the Italian Public Security and military forces are
adequate to prevent the Comsunists from seizing power.
7. It is possible, though me consider it very unlikely, that
a government might be formed according to the so-called "Nenni Solution,
i.e., a coalition of the Christian Democrats, the Nonni Socialists,
-3 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CI"- 00890A000200020042-7
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP G8~36A9~00020042-7
CMT
and the minor democratic parties. We consider this very unlikely
because: (a) it is improbable that Nonni could be detached from
his Communist alliance; and (b) the formation of any government
with Nenni's participation would require the support of about four-
fifths of the CD parliamentary representation. Such deep differences
exist between the CD and the Nonni Socialists on foreign and domestic
policy and on clerical issues that it would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to form such a government.
8. We believe that when Pella falls he will be succeeded by
a series of other center combinations under CD leadership. All such
combinations will be unstable and short-lived. The center parties
do not have a majority in the Chamber. At the same time, the majority
of the Christian Democrats will not tolerate a coalition including
the Nonni Socialists and will find it difficult to form a coalition
with the Monarchists.
9. In these circumstances, we believe that national elections
are almost certain before the scheduled date of 1958 and perhaps at
a fairly early date. Their outcome cannot be predicted. Whether or
not the position of the center parties is strengthened will depend
upon the skill with which their leaders time the elections and present
the issues to the electorate. Above all, the outcome of the elections
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CI C9R0089OA000200020042-7
 ti.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000200020042-7
will depend upon the energy and cane with which the non-Commsumist
parties rebuild ad develop their country-wide party organizations.
10. We believe that in such new elections the Conmunists are
unlikely either to be voted into power or to gain enough seats to
insure their representation in the government. We also believe that
the center parties would not call new elections if a Communist-Nenni
Socialist success seemed possible. However, if the non-Communist
parties continue to neglect the rebuilding of their own political
organizations, or fail effectively to counter the growing Communist
strength, elections might take place under circumstances which would
make. Caa mist participation in the government possible.
11. In discounting the likelihood of an early accession to
power by the Communists, we do not mean to understate the gravity of
the situation in Italy. The disintegration of the center political
parties end the deterioration of the Italian economic situation may
go so far as to endanger the existence of democratic institutions.
The chances of such a development would be increased if a relaxation
of international tensions should remove an urgent sense of the
Communist danger, or if conservative elements in Italy should fail to
take measures to improve social and economic conditions or to take
anti-Conmmist measures to protect their interests.
-5 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : Cl*- 00890A000200020042-7
 t+,
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000200020042-7
12. We believe, however, that if threatened by a Communist
takeover the non-Communist elements in Italy, supported ad
assisted by the Public Security and military forces aM relying
also on outside assistance, would be willing end able to suppress
the extreme left. Such a development would probably mean the eM
of democratic government in Italy. Ultimately, however, it is
a more likely development than the ending of democratic government
through a Communist accession to power.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 :