SE-39: PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100080027-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 9, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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X39
This is a provisional esti-nateo The subjects herein
treated gill be discussed at greater length in 1lT65i
Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AfENCT
9 March 1953
SDDJECTz 5E-39s PROBABLE CO1S1 OU 2CE$ Of HE DE,171 OF STALIN
AND OF THE ELEV NI'I011 OF MALEUKOV TO L'!ADF,R.
SHIP IN Z!IE USSR
1. THE INITLIL TRATISFER OF ATITIIORITT
1. The problem of transfer of par is one of the most diffi..
cult which the Soviet system could face, The important initial step,
the forrtsl transfer of authority, has apparently been effected with
remarkable rapidity and precisions, The smoothness of the transfer
of authority to Idalenkov and the speed with which the Government
and Party posts were filled, suggest an acute awareness on the
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part of the Soviet leaders of the dangers inherent in the situation,
2e Lsalenkovae key position in the Soviet Corm2niat party
throughout the past fourteen years, his conspicuous and apparently
planned elevation mince 19480 his prominent role at and since the
19th Party Congress, and the accolade accorded him by Beria at
Stalin's funeral euggeot that there will be no immediate challenge
to his authority. However, we cannot estimate whether he has the
the new organ nation, Malenkov apparently now holds the same
cormanding position within the Presidium and the Secretariat of
the Party and in the Council of Minietera rthich Stalin hello
In the Council of Ltinisters, par has been concentrated in the
hands of L a1enkov as Chairman and four First Deputy Chairment
Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich. These five snake up
the Presidium of the Council of !tinisters, a body that in nature
and membership closely parallels the wartime Committee of State
Defense under Stalin. The concentration of power has been in..
creased, and the top party and government organs have been re.
duced in namber and in size. The new organisation of Party and
Government and the extensive reorganisation and merger of several
major industries under Malenkov appear to tighten and streamline
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qualities necessary to consolidate his position and to attain
unchallenged power, since he has always operated with the backing
of Stalin. Neither is it possible to estimate with confidence the
capabilities or probable courses of action of hie possible opponents.
3d A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet
hierarchy at w time. Given the nature of the Soviet state, such
a struggle would probably be carried on within the Party organization.
In axr case, the peoples of the USSR are unlikely to participate
actively in the struggle. Even if a struggle should break out in
the near future, we believe that the hold of the Communist Party
over the USSR is not likely to be shaken during the next year. We
do not believe that such a struggle would in itself lead the rulers
of the USSR deliberately to initiate general war.
J.J.. PROBABLE CONSMUENC OF DEATH OF STALIN
A. Probable Future Soviet Policies
!t. In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will almost
certainly attempt to follow the foreign and domestic policies esta-
blished during recent years. It will probably continue to emphasize
unremitting hostility to the West, the enlargement of the Bloc
economic base, and the increase of Bloc military power.
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allow
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5. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruth-
less and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his
ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his foreign
policy. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet regime
will have Stalin's skill in avoiding general war. At least initially,
the regime will also lack his freedom of action and his ability to
manoeuvre, since it will not possess Stalin's immense prestige and
authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the new regime will
probably find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin
and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly to what it
regarded as new aggressive moves of the West. If the West should
suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided
Fast and West, the new Soviet Government would probably adhere to
established Soviet positions.
bo The new Soviet regime probably fears that, while it is in
the process of consolidating its power, the West may make aggressive
moves against the Bloc. It would probably view with extreme sus-
picion any new moves made by the West, particularly those involving
long-range air forces or military forces close to the Bloc frontiers.
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.-5U i ONOW
B. Probable Effects upon the Peoples of the USSR-
7. The death of Stalin removes the man who had been built
up to the status of a demigod. To muW of the people of the USSR,
he was the man of steel who had raised Russia to industrial and
military power, who withstood the German attack, and who led the
peoples of the USSR to the greatest military victory in Russian
history. Stalin's death will be a psychological shock to large
numbers of Soviet people. However, we estimate that the psychological
shock will not significantly affect the strength or the effectiveness
of the new regime.
0. Probable Effect upon the Bloc and the International
Cowunist movement
8. For some time, no successor to Stalin will be able to
achieve comparable status or similar significance as a symbol of
the international Communist movement and as the undisputed leader
of world Communism. Therefore, the cohesion of the Communist move-
ment outside the Bloc may be. impaired, at least temporarily. If
there should be a struggle for power within the Soviet Communist
Party, the cohesion of the Coi nist movement outside the Bloc would
almost certainly be weakened.
OWAYMIM
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9? Kremlin control over the European Satellites is so firm
that we do not believe it will be impaired by the death of Stalin.
However, in the unlikely event that a struggle in the Soviet Commu-
nist Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security
Forces, Soviet control over the Satellites would almeost certainly
be shaken.
10. Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change
as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not purely
personal, but arose from a genuine clash of Yugoslav national
interests with the Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, both sides
have taken actions and adopted positions which would be extremely
difficult to reverse, The Kreml3an could not recognize Tito as an
independent Communist ally without undermining its position with the
European Satellites,
11, We do not believe that Tito's influence within the Satellites
or within Communist Parties outside the Bloc will increase, unless
there should be a prolonged struggle for power in the USSR.
12. We believe that Stalin's death will have no immediate
effect upon Sino-Soviet cooperation or upon Chinese Communist foreign
policies. However, no successor to Stalin will have prestige and
MOOMM
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authority in Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao as leader
and theoretician of Asian ConswAsm'will inevitably increase with
the disappearance of the former supreme leader. Mao will almost
certainly have more influence in the determination of Bloc policy
affecting Asia. He almost certainly will not seek leadership of
the international Cor manist movement. The new Moscow leadership
will probably deal cautiously with Mao; if it does not, serious
strains in Sinn-Soviet relations will almost certainly develop.
III. F4 OBAALF WESTERN REACTION TO DEATH OF STALIN AND ELEVATION
OF MMOV
13. We believe that in general the Western guropean leaders
will be disposed for the time being to conduct the East-West struggle
with greater hesitancy and caution. They will probably fear that
any iiwtediate Western pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger
of war and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the USSR.
They will also probably hope that, if Western pressure is not exerted,
the problems involved in the consolidation of the authority of the
new regime of the USSR will bring about at least a temporary relax-
ation of tensions and enable them to postj.*ne disagreeable policy
decisions.
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