DECISION ON UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500120002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 29, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Approved Fol%,e'IegNTRAL/0NTE~.LCI -RDP7 ADEN 002500120002-0
29NOV1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Charles W. Robinson
Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee
FROM Dr. Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Decision on United States Withdrawal from
the International Convention for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries
REFERENCE NSC-U/SM-165, 19 November 1976
The Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed the
Memorandum for the President concerning United States
Withdrawal from the International Convention for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). In our judgment all the
essential options, along with pertinent pros and cons, have
been presented. We have no intelligence inputs to make which
would affect a decision among the options listed.
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1 - DDCI
1 - D/DCI/NI
1 - OGCR
1 - DDI File
1 - DDI Chrono
O/DDI:kmz 29 Nov 76
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NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COP714ITTEE
Es4^vV ie W'-,;;?try
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC-U/SM-165 November 19, 1976
TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
The Deputy Attorney General
The Under Secretary of the Interior
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of Transportation
The Director, Office of Management and Budget_
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
SUBJECT: United States Withdrawal from the
International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)
Attached for your comment and/or concurrence
are a draft memorandum for the President and
supporting material concerning US withdrawal from
the International Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). Guidance is needed
for the US Delegation to a Special Meeting of
the ICNAF Commission which convenes on December 1.
Therefore, addressees are requested to provide
their position on the options in writing to the
.Chairman by c.o.b. Monday, November 29. Editorial
comments may be provided to Mr. Douglas Marshall,
Department of State, 632-2798.
Acting Staff Director
As stated
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NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: United States Withdrawal from
the International Convention
for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF)
Are U.S. national interests, as they are affected by
the implementation of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976, better served by U.S. withdrawal from.
ICNAF on December 31, 1976 or by a decision to remain in
ICNAF through December 31, 1977?
U.S. actions since the passage of the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-265) in April
have thus far protected both of the policy choices expressed
above. A final decision on U.S. withdrawal,.however,_must
be made by December 31, and could be made sooner if desirable.
In either case, guidance is needed for the U.S. Delegation
to the December 1-9 Special Meeting of the ICNAF Commission
at which the 18 member-nation Commission will make decisions
binding on the U.S. if the U.S. remains in ICNAF for 1977.
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
inter ilia, asserts U.S. jurisdiction and exclusive manage-
ment authority over all living marine resources out to 200
miles off our coasts. It also requires.the prompt renego-
tiation of any ex.isting.fishery treaty that is inconsistent
with the purposes, policy or provisions of the Act. In this
connection, the House/Senate Conference Committee report on
the Act stated that it was the opinion of the Committee that
the United States should withdraw from the International
Convention for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) before
March 1, 1977, if the treaty has not been renegotiated to
conform with the Act by that dates Most east coast fishing
interests support withdrawal this year.
Passage of the Act requires, however, a transition from
the present regime of international management of the re-
sources to an exclusive U.S. management regime. There are
serious problems involved in such a transition which could
be affected by our withdrawal from ICNAF and which require
careful consideration before a decision is made on the tim-
ing of that withdrawal..
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Accordingly, at the June 1976 annual meeting of the
Commission the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw from
the Convention as of December 31, 1976, to establish the
legal condition precedent to preservation of the December
withdrawal option. However, we reserved the right to revoke
the withdrawal notice if the Commission would agree to meet
certain U.S. conditions for management of the fisheries in
1977 and for transition ultimately to full implementation of
the new U.S. law.
The Commission was unable to resolve all of the out-
standing issues at the annual meeting and consequently
agreed to a special meeting, December 1-9, to complete its
business. The U.S. Delegation then stated that our Government
would review the Commission's decision after the December
meeting in light of U.S. conditions and the requirements of
U.S. law, and decide whether or not to withdraw from the
Convention by December 31. This would of course limit us to
a rather short period of time (December 10-30) in which to
assess the meeting results, consult as necessary with the
industry and key members of Congress,.and make our decision.
Technically, only one of the conditions set by the
United States -- acceptance by foreign fishing vessels of
U.S. registration permits -- is a requirement of the new
law. The other conditions include U.S. enforcement, U.S.
rule-making with respect to fishery resource management, and
U.S. determination of total allowable catch and American
harvesting capacity. All these latter are responsive to the
.intent of the Act and reflect the recognition that a failure
to enact effective control over the fisheries after March 1,
1977, through whatever means, would not only prolong the
fisheries problems but also create significant domestic
political problems.
A reassessment of the various considerations involved,
including developements since the June ICNAF meeting, has
raised the question not only of.whether or.not the.U..S.
should withdraw at the end of 1976 but also within what
guidelines, and at-what time, that decision should be made.
Attached is a paper which describes the background of
our participation in ICNAF, the effects of the passage of P.L.
94-265 and recent developments in fishery negotiations. The
timing of our withdrawal is then discussed in terms of
foreign policy, domestic political considerations and the
conservation and management of fishery resources, leading to
the development of the following four options.
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Regardless of which option is selected, certain steps
.must be taken. The Department of State is sending diplomatic
notes to all the ICNAF member-countries asking them to
respond by note indicating their willingness to accept a
system of U.S. registration permits if the United States
remains in ICNAF through 1977. We indicate that we must
receive replies before the beginning of the December meeting
and that we will consider a lack of response as a negative
answer, We also state in the note that the United States
-wi_l1.i.nterpre.t the reference in the ICNAF scheme of joint
enforcement to areas of national jurisdiction, as referring
to the U.S. fishery conservation zone after March 1, 1977,
and will accordingly enforce-ICNAF regulations in that zone.
If there is not acceptance of U.S. registration permits
by all ICNAF members who fish off our coast we cannot legally
remain in ICNAF and must withdraw at the end of 1976, and
our choice of options becomes irrelevant. Should all members
agree to accept registration permits, we would proceed to
the action laid out in whichever of the options has been
approved.
OPTIONS
it should be noted that none of the options is risk-
free, has a guaranteed outcome, or solves all of the problems.
It should also be noted that time limitations will preclude
our meeting all National Environmental Policy Act require-
merits in the event we withdraw from ICNAF. The National
Marine Fisheries Service indicates that there could be major
effects on at least six species of fish if unregulated
fishing by Americans and foreigners resulted from a United
States withdrawal.
OPTION A
Make a concerted effort to obtain acceptance by all
members of ICNAF of U.S. registration permits. If success-
ful, remain in ICNAF through 1977.- This would fulfill the
legal requirement in the Act for remaining in ICNAF for a
transitional year.
'Di'scussion
.We would, by staying in ICNAF, resolve for the Atlantic
coast the impending problem of not having completed the pro-
cessing and issuance of permits under GIFA arrangements be
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fore the U.S. fishery conservation zone becomes effective on
March 1, 1977. Additionally, we would postpone by one year
the effective deadline for conclusion of GIFAs with ICNAF
countries, except for Japan and the USSR. To some extent
any risk of confrontation would then be restricted to the
Pacific and Gulf coasts. We would continue a system of
regulation of both foreign and domestic fishermen which
would otherwise be lacking for January .and February for all
fishermen and beyond March 1 for American fishermen if
regulations pursuant to management plans under the new law
are not in place. Although the extent of stock damage from
unregulated fishing can only be estimated, it could be quite
significant.
From a negative point of view, we could be accused by
certain elements of the Congress and the fishing industry of
"retreating" from all but one of the conditions we laid down
earlier. Certainly the Regional Councils for New England
and the Middle Atlantic would be upset and would publicly
attack the one-year delay in implementation of our unilateral
program to establish total catch levels and U.S. harvesting
capacity and to allocate among foreigners. Also, it is
possible that this could be interpreted by some countries as
a signal of a certain reluctance on our part to implement
the legislation in a vigorous manner. (These countries
could, of course, also interpret our action as designed to
avoid sterile confrontation by allowing more time for smooth
implementation of our law and for transition to the new
regime.)
A further consideration is that ICNAF quotas would be
higher for some stocks than they would be if we insist on
all the conditions we laid down in June or if we set the
levels under our domestic law. This would be true for
mackerel and herring. Furthermore, certain elements of the
Congress would probably accuse the Administration of having
delayed negotiation of governing international fishery
agreements (GIFAs) deliberately in order to have an excuse
for remaining in ICNAF an-additional year.
OPTION B-
Make a concerted effort to obtain agreement by all
ICNAF members that they accept U.S. registration permits. If
members accept registration permits, then attempt at the
December meeting to gain as many of the remaining three
conditions we have laid down as possible. Report the results
of that meeing to the UnderSecretaries Committee for a
decision by the Committee on when the United States should
withdraw,
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Discussion
The arguments in favor of this course of action are
those laid out in favor of Option A and those against it are
likewise those in Option.A to the extent that we are not
successful in obtaining all our previously laid down condi-
tions. The advantage of this variation is that it enables
the United States to pursue our expressed goals regarding
ICNAF and then make a decision, weighing not only the
degree of our success but also any other relevant developments
or circumstances at the time.
If this option is selected, it will be necessary for
the UnderSecretaries Committee to reach a prompt decision on
our continued participation. Lack of decision would cause
our automatic withdrawal since the notice is already on
file.
Make a concerted effort to obtain acceptance before the
December meeting of,U.S. registration permits and of U.S.
enforcement in the 200-mile zone. Attempt to obtain the
other-U.S. conditions at the meeting and if.successful on
all-counts, remain in ICNAF through 1977. If all U.S. con-
ditions are not met, withdraw at the end of 1976.
If we pull out under this scenario it will clearly be
after having made a major good-faith effort to stay in for
a transitional year. We will effectively have placed the
onus of our withdrawal on those members who have not ac-
cepted our conditions. We will have demonstrated that we
have kept our word. _
Furthermore, if we do remain in ICNAF under this
option, it will be as a.result of having obtained the agree-
ment of other members to all of our previously-stated con-
ditions. There would be regulation of both American and
foreign fishermen during the months of January and February
when there otherwise would be none. These gains should at
least mitigate, to some extent, the domestic political
reaction to our having foregone-the authority we have under
the new law to allocate:and to our undercutting the role of
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OPTION D
Attend the December meeting as scheduled, but withdraw
at the end of 1976 regardless of the outcome of the meeting.
Discussion
The uncertainty of a situation involving a popular
domestic law and international treaty obligations which are
at least to some extent in conflict with the law could-be
confusing and possibly disruptive. We cannot repeal the
law, but we can legally unburden ourselves of the treaty
obligations by simply withdrawing. An argument can be made
that this would allow the manpower and expense devoted to
ICNAF matters to be redirected toward implementation of the
domestic law.
From another viewpoint, a decision to withdraw even if
the Commission meets our stated conditions for remaining
would make the United States appear to be. reneging on a
promise or a publicly stated position. It would make.our.
problem,; on March 1 more difficult to cope with and it
clearly would face us with two months in which there will be
no regulation of fishing off our North and Middle Atlantic
coast.
If it. Is deterinined that on balance our interests are
best served by leaving ICNAF this year, we could follow
either of two approaches. We could announce at the beginning
.of the December meeting that our withdrawal will stand,
.citing whatever reasons might be-appropriate... In.a less.
direct fashion, we could let the meeting run its course and
announce our withdrawal and the end of the end of the meeting
Withdrawal from ICNAF would place full control of
resource management and allocation of surpluses in U.S.
hands as intended by the new law. This would find great
favor with the Congress, the industry, and the two Regional
Fishery Management Councils concerned.
Since our June statement GIFA negotiations have pro-
gressed. Although timing.problems remain, the likelihood of
confrontation seems lessened although questions remain
regarding Japan and the USSR. Staying in ICNAF will not
resolve their overall problems, since both countries also
fish in the Pacific.
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citing any adverse developments during the course of -the
meeting among our reasons for leaving. The selection be-
tween the two approaches should be left, as a tactical
matter, to the head of the U.S. Delegation to the meeting.
Charles W. Robinson
Chairman
1. Background-Discussion Paper
2. Environmental Assessment Paper
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i
Drafted: OES/OFA:DGMarshall:RLRidgway:OFA Staff p'
Clearances: (All in draft)
OES - Amb. Irving JK
L - Mr. Feldman
D/LOS - Mr. Taft ' 4O1
S/P - Mr. Blaney / t
.EUR/RPE - Mr. Po1ansky'
EA/J - Mr. Ecton ('..7
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Execut4ve Secretary
Previous correspondence on Establishment of
Under Secretaries Committee Interagency Group on
Fisheries Negotiations sent to DDI and D/DCI/NI for
information.
75-9249
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