CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vietnamization, CPYRGHT
Approved For
Can It
Succeed?
All the years of fighting come
down now to a single question: Can the
South Vietnamese army-rearmed and
retrained-stand alone? Experts on
the scene think the chances are
good, and getting better
desolate Plain of Reeds in South
Vietnam's Mekong Delta. Their
mission was to seize a district head-
quarters at Long Khot, a small town
just half a mile from the border, and
thus strike a blow at confidence in
the Saigon government's ability to
A r 3 A.M. last
December
3, some goo
well-armed
North Viet-
namese troops
slipped out of
their sanctuary
in Cambodia
and crossed the
border into the
take over the combat burden of the
war.
At one time it would have been an
easy task. Long Khot was defended
by fewer than 300 members of South
Vietnam's Regional and Popular
Forces. In the past, these "territori-
al" troops, armed only with worn-out
had been hopelessly outgunned by
the communists, who are equipped
with AK-47 automatic rifles sup-
plied by Communist China. As a
result, many territorial units had
been cut to pieces, or else they had
simply bolted in panic.
But when the North Vietnamese
tried to storm Long Khot, they were
greeted with devastating fire from
new American M-16 automatic rifles
and M-60 machine guns. Although
the communists quickly blew three
pathways through the barbed-wire
erimeter, the territorials stood firm,
ease \Ye9I Oe/D2ictcgFA- t7,9d9V 194A0:O3OO 0000
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 Approved For Release I 99 09 O2 IA RDP79-01194A00030015d r R 3HT
he attackers. At daylight, when the American troop withdrawals, 6o,ooo
orth Vietnamese tried to with- men were sent home. Another
raw across the plain to Cambodia, 50,000 are to have left Vietnam by
any were mowed down by Ameri- April 15. Further withdrawals, says
an and South Vietnamese helicop- Washington, will depend on the
ters and jets. When this reporter level of enemy activity, continued
visited Long Khot soon afterward, improvement of the Vietnamese
some 16o North Vietnamese lay armed forces, and progress, if any,
dead in and around the town. Only at the Paris peace talks. But some
12 of the defenders had been killed. officials have voiced a cautious hope
Long Khot was more than a that the bulk of American combat
victory for the once-despised ter- troops will have been sent home
ritorials. It is a promising sign for by the end of this year. U.S. troop
the future of the war in Vietnam, strength thus might be cut to around
and. a prime example of what is be- half the peak force of 543,000. The
ing accomplished under "Vietnam- remaining Americans would provide
ization"-the series of programs air, artillery and logistical support
designed to enable the South Viet- for the South Vietnamese. Eventu-
natnese to fight the war on their own. ally, these troops would also be
Cautious Hope. Vietnamization pulled out, leaving behind only a
is going on in a spectacular way all relatively small advisory force.
over Vietnam, from the chilly, wind- Thus, while the Army of the
swept hills along the Demilitarized Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) can
Zone in the north to the steaming probably count on American back-
mangrove swamps at the southern- ing of one kind or another for some
most tip of the country. All troops, time to come, the day is nearing
including all the territorials in thou- when it will have to fight the ground
sands of small communities like battles on its own. Will it be able to
Long Khot, have been rearmed handle the job?
with up-to-date weapons. Far-reach Years of Heartbreak. With
ing training programs, involving al- 930,000 men under arms (including
most everyone in the armed forces, territorials), South Vietnam has the
have also been launched. Indeed, fifth-largest military establishment
seldom in modern times has an en- in the world (after the United
tire army been so drastically over- States, the Soviet Union, Commu
hauled in so short a time. nist China and India). Yet despite
The aim of Vietnamization is to its formidable size, the ARVN has
make it possible for the United problems.
States to extricate itself from The key to this force's future per-
X7` t m without i nominiously formance-the typical South Viet
A rove ? C F ir7v9 h1 a man about 150001-7
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 Approved For Release 1M M2r7Z1ARG Ps eQA494A00036gKW9 ~
Approveq'
aaal y ao 111 11900.
is barely literate, if that. As a private
W 1111 1F-JS Loan tnree years' service tinue to fight ? Not because he feels
and
d
no
ependents hh
,e earns te
any particular loyalty to either ov-
free-market equivalent of $12 a g
ernment or country; his only alle-
month. (An American private in gtance 1s, to his family and village.
Vietnam gets $200.80 a month- He fights
more than senior Vietnamese offi- the communists. Hardly a day goes
cers.) He is serving for the duration by in Vietnam during which the
of the war, and his casualty rate is Reds do not throw grenades into
high, his margin for survival not crowded buses or marketplaces, or
overly good. fire rockets or mortars at random
Losses have been staggering. Since into towns, killing men, women
196o, nearly 100,000 ARVN soldiers
and children. During the Tet offen-
have been killed. Relative to the pop-sive in 1968, they killed nearly 3000
ulation, this is as if the United civilians city States had lost almost 1,200,000 men were buried alive. In all, the commu-
in Vietnam. Some 32,000 ARVN nests have murdered nearly 27,000
soldiers are listed as missing in civilians in ten years and kidnaped
actign. some 6o,ooo others, most of whom
Despite this, the South Vietnam- are presumed dead. In all of this
ese soldier continues to fight and, at they have sought to terrorize the
times, to fight superbly. In more population into submission; but they
than ten years of war, not one ARVN have also succeeded in stiffening the
unit has gone over to the enemy. resistance of many.
The individual desertion rate is Inferiority Complex. More than
high-12 men per thousand per anything else, the performance of
month for all the armed forces and ARVN units depends on the caliber
as high as 25 men per thousand per of its officers. American advisers
month in combat elements-but who live and fight with ARVN troops
American advisers say that a major- ity desert to visit their families or be- tinsist that there are excellent officers
hroughout the army. But there are
cause of a crisis at home, then either problems,
rejoin units closer to their village or Until recently,
sign up for elite units such as the officer came from the a special typical world.
ARVN Airborne, where the pay is some- Only young men who had success-
what better. All units are happy to fully completed their secondary ed-
get recruits, no questions asked. And ucation were accepted for officer
if the ARVN has a desertion problem, training. As only the upper classes
too has the Vi L ar C~j 1~~3
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those classes-high government offi- surprised the Americans. The coup
cials, large landowners and wealthy try was put on a full war footing, an
businessmen and merchants. Talent the armed forces were expanded b
in the ranks was wasted. Also, after one third. American advisers repor
more than ten years of war many of that the announcement in 1969 of th
the bravest officers have fallen in first American troop withdrawals al
combat. Some of those remaining so had a healthy psychological of
avoid combat whenever possible; fect, in that it further galvanize
some-in part,-probably, because of the ARVN's determination and led to
abysmally low pay-are dishonest. a rise in self-respect and confidence
Along with its other problems, among the officers.
the ARVN has labored in the past New Look. In overhauling the
under a monumental inferiority ARVN under the Vietnamization
complex. In the early ig6os, it was program, the first task was to pro-
very much on the defensive against vide it with modern weapons. To in-
mounting Vietcong attacks. When crease firepower, some 76o,ooo M-16
ARVN units ventured into rural rifles, 37,000 M-79 grenade launch-
areas, they were often annihilated in ers, 12,000 M-60 machine guns, 1300
communist ambushes. The situation heavy mortars and loon howitzers
worsened in 1964 when North Viet- were shipped to Vietnam. To give
namese divisions invaded the South. the ARVN a mobility it never had
The first U.S. troops landed in before, it was equipped with 1350
early 1965. Partly because there was tanks and armored personnel car-
no time to reorganize the ARVN, riers and 31,000 jeeps and trucks. To
partly because of characteristic remedy inadequate field communi-
American impatience, the Ameri- cations, 29,000 tactical radios were
cans pushed aside the ARVN and distributed.
made the war an American war. In addition, the Vietnamese air
ARVN officers felt humiliated, and force was given 6o A37 jets, and 8o
many concluded that there was no UH1 (Huey) helicopters. Eventu-
need to risk their lives if strangers ally there may be 400 choppers,
were not only willing but insistent still a relatively small number
on doing the fighting alone. compared with the 2000 U,S. Army.
But the Tet offensive of early 1968 helicopters now in Vietnam; the
jolted the ARVN out of its lackadaisi- communists, on the other hand,
cal approach to the war and its near- have no combat helicopters there.
total reliance on the Americans. The U.S. Navy is turning over its
Faced with a countrywide commu- fleet of 500 high-speed riverboats to
nist onslaught-more than loo cities the Vietnamese. These boats, operat-
and towns were attacked simulta- ing in the labyrinth of waterways
neously-both regulars and territo- in lie
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infiltration of North Vietnamese uates are sent to the United States
troops from Cambodia. By June, all for 34 weeks of helicopter pilot
of the boats will be operated by training-there were 527 of them in
South Vietnamese crews; American the United States at recent count.
officers and sailors will function only Others are trained as mechanics or
as advisers and in shoreside logistical as communications experts. Says one
and training roles. American : "There's not a piece of
With deliveries of military hard- equipment, even the most sophisti-
ware almost completed, the major cated ones, that the Vietnamese
emphasis now is on training South haven't been able to learn to handle
Vietnamese armed forces. The pre- with proficiency."
requisite of a secondary education Of equal importance to the build-
for all officer candidates has been up of the ARVN has been the
abolished. Last year, 20 percent of strengthening of the Regional and
the nearly io,ooo men who gradu- Popular Forces. These men fight in
ated from officer training schools their home areas and usually have a
were sergeants who had proved stronger motivation than regular
themselves in battle. This year it is troops from remote provinces. The
hoped that the number will jump to victory at Long Khot was only one
40 percent, and next year to a major- of many such battles; the territorials,
ity. Steps are also being taken to re- fighting small-unit actions that go
move incompetent ARVN officers virtually unnoticed in the press, ac-
from command. counted for nearly one half of all
Under new programs, all Viet- enemy casualties last year.
namese troops are getting up to six Glowing Future? While the per-
weeks of refresher training. Nearly formance of some ARVN units still
loo,ooo men were graduated from makes American advisers wince,
advanced military schools last year many are showing a new aggressive-
-more than twice the number of ness. At a time when American
two years earlier. And more than casualties have declined, those of the
iooo men a year are taking special- ARVN have risen and in recent
ized training in the United States. months have been running at three
In training helicopter pilots, the and four times the American rate.
U.S. command discovered that it In the past, many ARVN units ven-
was virtually impossible to translate tured out of their base camps only
all the hundreds of thousands of by day and only in force. Now they
pieces of technical literature into are conducting more and more
Vietnamese. So six schools were set small-unit night actions. And Viet-
up in Vietnam, where American namese pilots now fly more than
instructors are currently giving Soon half of all tactical air strikes by
eduFo f WS ~J/ 2 fi l~ r e t 3
and sneaking English. ome gra 9~ Cy
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Approved
A QUESTION OF BALANCE
BY SIR ROBERT THOMPSON
Noted for the key role he played in the defeat of the communist guer-
rillas in Malaya during the 1950s, Sir Robert is now an adviser to Presi-
dent Nixon on Vietnam. His article, "On the Road to a just Peace," was
published in The Reader's Digest last month. Here he oflers some
cautionary thoughts on the process of Vietnamization.
I AM convinced that Vietnamization is the road to a just peace in Vietnam.
But this does not mean simply re-equipping and retraining the South
Vietnamese army. We must do that, of course, but in the process we must
be sure that we create an army that will not become a bottomless drain
on the revenues and skilled manpower of the country -and which, at the
same time, will be closely identified with the people.
In carrying out Vietnamization, therefore, it seems to me that a number
of balances have to be preserved. First, American troop w?thdrawals must
be balanced against a declining enemy capability and a rising South Viet-
namese capability: they must not be so fast that they allow the North
Vietnamese army to stage an all-out offensive before the South Vietnamese
are ready to cope with it; they must not be so slow that they encourage
the South Vietnamese to think that American combat forces will be around
forever.
A second balance concerns the composition of the remaining United
States forces as they are reduced. Obviously, the situation will require that
they should be weighted toward air and artillery support and logistic
units. But if the force is to be reduced to a level of 2oo,ooo men, as has
been suggested, there must be some combat-infantry support for its own
protection.
A third, and quite the most difficult, balance to preserve is the size and
composition of South Vietnam's armed forces in relation to its total re-
sources. During the next few years the test in South Vietnam is likely to
be as much in the political, administrative and economic fields as in the
military field. Thus, there is a great need for a rational direction of man-
power to avoid a situation in which the whole talent of the country-its
best-educated, most highly qualified citizens -is consumed by the military.
Which raises some interesting questions. For example, who is more
important at this stage of the war, a helicopter pilot or, say, a good teacher
in a village primary school? Which of the two has to be a South Vietnam-
ese? If South Vietnam cannot provide both, which can the United States
more easily provide, and withdraw when the time comes?
These questions must be answered, for as soon as a country is overloaded d Rele'aseyI, ~o 0 1021: CIX-RiD 79 01194Aand O0 3001y.
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The army inevitably becomes the source of political power, the economy
declines and expenditures soar. Because revenue is depressed, pay scales
are kept at the lowest possible level. In an inflationary war situation this
leads straight to corruption, because no government officials, including
the police, can live on their pay.
Or consider a future situation in which the ARVN, all highly modern-
ized, are in occupation of former American bases like Phu Bai and Chu
Lai, and are then kept just sufficiently occupied by North Vietnamese
army probes to justify their continued existence. Meanwhile, remnants
of the Vietcong put all their effort into reviving communist influence in
rural areas. There will be no Vietcong in jets, helicopters and tanks; they
will be right in among the population in the towns and villages. If Viet-
namization were to develop in this way, it could lead the country straight
back to the situation that existed at the end of the 195os, when the war
started. At that point the South Vietnamese had a large, American-
equipped army with a sizable strength superiority over the Vietcong.
And look what happened.
All this means that problems of revenue, taxation, salaries, the training
of civilian staff and so on must be as much a part of the Vietnamization
program as any improvement or increase in the forces. It is not enough
that ARVN should be able to deal with the North Vietnamese army. The
war must be won on both fronts-military and civilian-at the same time.
ARVN has not yet been put to a
major test. The enemy did not stage
a single large-scale offensive in 1969.
In part this may be because he has
been badly mauled, but some Amer-
ican officers feel that he may simply
be biding his time until more Amer-
ican troops are withdrawn.
In summing up, American officers
point to the fact that the ARVN
of 1970 is a vastly improved army.
The Regionals and Populars have
emerged as formidable units in their
own right. And while the ARVN in
1964 controlled little of the country-
side, 92.5 percent of the population
now is rated as living under "reason-
ably" secure conditions.
App vec ReI a &
dictions about the outcome of the
war stand like the hulks of so many
burnt-out tanks along a five-year
road. As a result, Americans on the
scene are notably reluctant to make
any kind of prediction. The con-
sensus is that some major tests lie
ahead and that the ARVN may lose
some battles. Yet, though no one
will say so with certainty, the feel-
ing in South Vietnam is that there
is a very good chance that the ARVN
will manage on its own in the long
run.
Reprints of this article are available.
Prices,postpaid to one address: 10-750;
50-83; 100-84.50; 500-$15; 1000-
$28. Address Reprint Editor, The
4 Reader's Di &t 9-011' 4Aoo 300
lOS 79
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REPRINTED FROM THE APRIL 1970 ISSUE OF THE READER'S DIGEST
@1970 THE READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PLEASANTVILLE, N.Y. 10570 PRINTED IN U.S.A.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300150001-7
U. 5.IIEWS S, WORID?REPORT, Dec. 21, 1970
EL DES CU
Red strategy for Chile was to take "the peaceful road"-a
far cry from Castro's guerrilla warfare. Story of how it
worked is related by some of Latin America's newest exiles.
Since FaIly o em. er, Cline Has been The Communist-Socialist coalition led
ruled by a Marxist Government, domi- by Salvador Allende came out on top in
nated by Communists dedicated to turn- a three-way race last September with
ing the country into a socialist state in 36 per cent pf the vote.
the Soviet style. In .other democratic countries, two or
This development, which has rocked more anti-Communist candidates gaining
the ,Hemisphere as well as the rest of nearly two thirds of the total vote often
the Western world, came about not have joined forces to win congressional
through violent revolution but in a free
election approval for one as President. But that
.
Chile
.
Why did it happen in Chile, a nation did not happen in
it
th
I
d
with the - oldest democracy in South
America? And how did it happen? Is
,Chile lost to the free world? What does
this portend for other nations of the
Hemisphere?
To get at the answers, talk with busi-
ness and professional people among an
estimated 17,000 Chileans who have
fled their country since the September
vote.
A grim picture. What emerges from
such talks is a chilling picture of how
the Communists, through a combination
of circumstances, oreanization and skill-
ful maneuvering, gained power as they
have in no other nation of the,. Americas
except Castro's Cuba.
Says a prominent Chilean lawyer:
"It is now clear that we have been
playing Russian roulette every six years
with our presidential elections.
"In-each, we permitted the Reds to
run in a left-wing coalition in spite of
the Communist vow to, destroy free. in-
stitutions and implant an authoritarian
system.
"Every six years, the Reds became,
more. powerful in that coalition, from
being weak, junior members 18 years
ago until they gained the dominant
voice.
"Yet. in the name of democracy, we
winked at their creed and the threat it
presented--only to watch them squeak
into office."
e oppos
ion majority in
nstea
,
Congress gave Allende and his Marxist
allies the votes they needed to gain the
Presidency.
"Allende and the Communists had peo-
ple anesthetized," says an engineer who
fled to Argentina. "They made many
Chileans feel it would not be as bad as
they might fear under those Reds.
"People told each other: 'Chile, after
,all, is a democracy. We've always
worked this way. Why, I've got a cousin
whose brother-in-law is one of them, and
he's nobody to be afraid of.' That's just,
how people talked."
In spite of such talk, many Chilean
refugees declare that there was a real
feeling of fear, following the election,
as to what the Communists and their
array of left-wing allies might do if de=
nied power.
Strength of Reds. A former security
official says:
"The Communist Party in Chile is
the strongest and most disciplined in
all of Latin America outside Cuba. It
has at least 50,000 members, and they
hold control over a network of so-called
'Popular Unity Committees' that reach
into every walk of Chilean life.
"There are more than 8,000 of these
political-action groups. They work for
the Socialist cause in factories, offices,
on newspapers and radio and television
stations and in the universities and
CPYRGHT
neighborhoods.
A Chilean doctor says:
"The Reds are so well-organized that
Allende was able to put thousands of
his followers into the streets of many
cities at short notice during the election
campaign.
"And on election night, they massed
in the streets once again to 'defend' Al-
lende's victory-even before the votes
were counted.
'All- this was not lost on the Chil-
eans, or on the Chilean Army that some
anti-Communists were urging to break
its long tradition of keeping hands off
politics, and to move in.
"Red propaganda said: Watch it,
brother, because, if you move, well take
to the streets with arms. Then well oc-
cupy the factories. Besides that, we've
got you penetrated so that you can't
trust your noncommissioned officers.'
And soon."
Background of take-over. Actually,
many of the Chilean refugees explain,
the stage for a Communist take-over had
been set a long time before the 1970
election.
"As far back as the 1940s," a lawyer
'recalls, "the Chilean Communist Party
made a decision to follow the Moscow
line in seeking to win
powwr through quiet pen-
etration and membership
in popular-front move-
ments, as against the fire-
brand revolutionary ap-
proach taken by Castro
and many other Latin-
American left-wingers.
The Communists in
Chile called it !a ofa pa-
cifica-the peaceful road
to power."
This Communist stmt-
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