AGREED GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE ON DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000900010033-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: April 28, 1960
• Content Type: REGULATION

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DRAFT 28 April 1960
Agreed Guidance for the Implementation of the Presidential Directive
on Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
For the purpose of providing uniformity in the implementation of rlE.
Presidential Directive and in the preparation pi reports thereon, the following
guidance is agreed upon by the U. S. Intelligence Board. To the extent appli-
cable, this agreed guidance should be incorporated in any regulations or instruc-
tions issued in the implementation of the Presidential Directive.
1. The Presidential Directive "veets requires the Heads of depart-
ments and agencies concerned to take certain actions to ensure a greater
degree of protection to all classified intelligence and intelligence sources and
methods. In addition to those actions that are taken to imp}ement the directive,
particular attention should be directed to the fact that the unauthorized dis-
closures of classified intelligence in the past several years which have beer
most damaging to the intelligence effort have involved vital intelligence sources
having direct bearing on the national security. The intelligence informatior,
involved in the more serious unauthorized disclosures has been disseminated
in channels protected by authorized code words or project designators and
limited to those officials upon established need-to-know basis. It is in this
area of intelligence reporting and dissemination that greater emphasis is
needed in providing adequate controls and protection of such information from
unauthorized disclosures. In establishing and administering such controls, it
is agreed as a matter of policy that only under the most exceptional circum-
stances should such classified intelligence involving sensitive sources and
methods be considered for use outside the authorized channels or released
to the public. For purposes of uniformity in applying proper controls over
the use and dissemination of this category of classified intelligence, such
intelligence is defined as that classified intelligence which contains information,
or which tends to reveal sources or methods, requiring special controls uuoon
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its dissemination because its disclosure could lead to counteraction (1)
jeopardizing the continued productivity of intelligence sources or rrLethods
which provide intelligence vital to the national security or (2) offsetting the
value of intelligence vital to the national security. Classified intel~.igence
within the meaning of the foregoing should be identified by (1) reeegt are4
code words authorized for such use (2) project designators, (3) the mark-r_ -
"WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE ~At~I~I~ .CAI-T,4~A7D .RI;':
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, 11 or (4) any combination the reof.
2. Departmental and agency regulations goa ra.i. .t oo- eel -4b14-
e se -o -&la-ss .fib- rtforuatio-skew 4 be-a~r~e4 to i xri.~tde i ellige~ce-
a-s+l ia4-cTategli. e - lassi 4ed i fer~rra~3ea -w riek-eer#,a x-e ~t A- i
re*ri-ew p~ac1et i ras awe- e~u~ret .- should include control and review_ prrocecluEres
to be followed prior to the disclosure or public release of intelligence. T114-
regulations and control procedures $hould establish the responsibility of the
Intelligence Chief for the assessment of the risks to the national security
and to the intelligence sources and methods involved when dissemination =31"
classified intelligence is contemplated outside of authorized channels, including
releases to the public. Such control and review procedures should include:
a. Disclosure and Release Control:
(1) A review by intelligence authorities of any classified
intelligence proposed for declassification or for use or
disclosure in background briefings, symposiums, seminars,
speeches, writings for publication, presentations, ~,ourser
of instruction, press releases, formal and informal intervi=~ws
with press representatives, and other aspects of public re-
tion activities whereby intelligence sources and methods nr,-y
be revealed. A record should be maintained of any class-.f d
intelligence declassified or authorized for disclosure ancc
should contain the name of the individual who authorized such
action.
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AL I
(2) Classified intelligence inadvertently discussed wit
disclosed to any person or persons not authorized for acceR;
to such intelligence should be made a matter of record by the
responsible official and reported to the appropriate Intelligence
Chief.
(3) Any disclosure of classified intelligence not made in
accordance with the provisions of the regulations and control s
of the department or agency concerned should be promptly re---
ported to the Intelligence Chief for appropriate action which
may include (a) such steps as are feasible to repair or limit
the extent of the damage (b) a request for investigation by ap-
propriate authorities (c) an assessment of the possible harm
intelligence sources and methods and notification to intelligence
authorities concerned and (d) prompt notification to all o_=ficial
recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred i ogethe r
with advice of remedial action to be taken and guidance for
responses to inquiries from public media representatives that
may result from the compromise.
(4) Existing procedures for the control and release of
classified intelligence should be reviewed and revised in light
of the foregoing and should be supplemented by appropriate
enforcement provisions. In particular, such procedures shoed
include provisions whereby recipients of special categories of
intelligence including code words and special projects mar
determine whether or not individuals with whom they are in
contact are authorized to receive such intelligence.
b. Disclosure and Release Techniques:
(1) Each Intelligence Chief should establish procedure-s
for the assessment of risks to the national security and to the
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intelligence sources and methods involved in any proposed
dissemination of classified intelligence outside of authcrizer3
channels.
(2) Release procedures should include in the assessment
of the risks those ways and means by which an attempt may #e
made to sanitize intelligence sources and methods. However,
before classified intelligence can be sanitized effectively and
sensitive sources protected, a plausible source or sources
should be available to which attribution may be made if neces -
sary. When this condition exit" then such devices as obscrir,,g
or qualifying source attribution by approximating figure 3,
omitting place names and geographical locations, appro:cimatin,c
the time and circumstances and altering other factors which rna r
be revealing of the source and method involved should also be
used.
(3) Classified intelligence disclosed in official briefings
and budgetary reports should be separated and clearly iden-
tified from other information of a non-intelligence nature
utilized in such briefings. Similar measures should be emplovf! ,
in disclosing classified intelligence to those Government of-
ficials who deal with public media and who cannot readily be
expected to know the origin of all information with which they
are dealing.
(4) The proposed release of classified intelligence derived
from a joint or combined project of the intelligence community
should consider the interests of other intelligence community
members participating in the intelligence project.
3. Each department and agency should develop a continuing education.tl
program for all recipients of classified intelligence concerning the damage
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that can accrue to intelligence sources and methods through the improper dis-
closure of such intelligence. Such a program may include where appropriate
(1) specific instances of known unauthorized disclosures of classified intel-
ligence involving sensitive sources and methods (2) an assessment of the
possible harm resulting from such disclosures and (3) examples of the counter-
measures that might be taken by foreign intelligence services to negate the
information or the sources and methods involved.
4. Current practices for the dissemination of classified intalligennree
should be reviewed and revised where necessary in order to ensure protection
to intelligence sources and methods. In particular, such review should include
but not be limited to:
a. Reviewing on a continuing basis the dissemination d
classified intelligence with a view to ensuring that such dissemination
is confined to authorized recipients on a strict need-to-know bas-_ .3
b. Restricting the dissemination of details of classified intel-
ligence. Normally, those details of intelligence which clearly re-
veal vital or highly sensitive technical sources and methods should
be limited to the intelligence specialists responsible for technical
evaluations. Whenever possible, without adversely affecting the
intelligence effort, such intelligence should be sanitized before the
substance is disseminated to other recipients.
c. Marking of intelligence. When disseminated in bulletins,
briefs, and similar docufents, classified intelligence involving
sensitive intelligence sources and methods should be marked to
distinguish it clearly from other information normally printed in
such documents.
- fte ~e-~r Iem&nt ior~o#~ r.e-e deiti.e.. H ac4 ve Ka.s- ~r-
r:i i-alb y-of#eet-ecl a sere -eKp-iesee has..been-gai-re?c eConsideration
shall be given to the need for any additional legislation to provide furthe-
protdction to the national security and to intelligence sources and methods.
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Official Secrets Act, 1911.
[1 & 2 GEO. 5. CH. 28.]
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS.
Section.
1. Penalties for spying.
2. Wrongful communication, &c. of information.
3. Definition of prohibited place.
4. Attempts to commit offence, or incitement to commit
offence, under Act.
5. Person charged with felony under Act may be convicted
of misdemeanour under Act.
Power to arrest.
7. Penalty for harbouring spies.
8. Restriction on prosecution.
9. Search warrants.
L0. Extent of Act and place of trial of offence.
11. Saving for laws of British possessions.
12. Interpretation.
13. Short title and repeal.
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 C T O P BvTrvm
UNCLASSIFIED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
Mr.
2
221 Admin
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY.
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Attached is final version of the
Implementing Paper as approved by the
Security Committee on 28 April subject
to staffing by the Members within their
departments and agencies.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
A
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4m
5/2/60
UNCLASSIFIED I I vuNthm"".."..
(40)
F Form 101 R NO. 237 Wh places 1Ch may b ll3 d4 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955 -0-342531