SOVIET MOTIVES FOR THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00887A000500010005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 29, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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29 August 1968
SUBJECT: Soviet Motives for the Invasion of
Czechoslovakia
1. The final Soviet decision to invade
Czechoslovakia appears to have grown out of a
complex set of foreign and domestic political
considerations. Many of these undoubtedly had
been debated for several months as the trend
of post-January developments in Czechoslovakia
became clearer. There were strategic consider-
ations involved in the possible loss of Czecho-
slovakia to the Warsaw Pact and the consequent
removal of a key buffer state. The communist
party in Czechoslovakia was losing its "leading
role" with dire consequences not only for that
country but for the rest of the communist world.
Perhaps most frightening, the infectious freedom
could spread to the USSR. Even if this seemed a
rather long term threat to the leadership, the
failure to act decisively to thwart it could
be held against then in the much more immediate
future by more militant members of the establishment.
2. There is good evidence, however, that
the final decision was a last-minute one. it
probably was made only on the weekend preceding
the invasion, although at least the military
planning involved seems to have been under way
for some weeks. The meetings at Cierna and
Bratislava resulted in a brief break in the
rising curve of Soviet invective, but we know
that the Cierna meeting, in particular, involved
very tough bargaining and even tougher talk. The
public smiles displayed by Brezhnev at Bratislava
almost certainly concealed continuing doubts that
Dubcek could be counted on to keep the Czechoslovak
reform movement under control.
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3. The curve of Soviet invective rose again during
the period between Dratislava and the invasion.
Czechoslovak press restraints proved relatively
ineffective, increasingly explicit Soviet statements
appeared to the effect that Du:cek was losing control to
"counter-revolutionary" elements. The Soviet leaders
went on vacation during this period, but they stayed
in close touch with the situation. We are inclined to
accept reports that some of the leaders were in almost
daily telephone contact with Dubcek warning him in
private, as the Soviet press was in public, that he
was not living up to the Cierna and Bratislava agreements.
4. We cannot say which, if any, single event
tipped the balance from testing and political pressure
to invasion. It seems likely that the trend of post-
Bratislava events"' in Czechoslovakia swung what was
probably a close balance in the politburo in favor of
invasion. The views of Ulbricht, who visited Prague,
during the middle of this period were undoubtedly a
factor, but almost certainly not a decisive one. There
is some evidence that the weekend before the invasion
was marked by lengthy discussions among the Soviet
leaders conducted in what must have been a charged
political atmosphere. Undoubtedly tensions were high
at this time and the foreign. pol,cy calculations ---
the weighing of the gains and losses that would accrue
to Moscow's world position -_. were influenced by
considerations of personal political advantage. The
results of the 1remlin in-fighting are still to be
seen, however, and they will probably depend on the
ultimate outcome in Czechoslovakia.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 August 1968
No. 1567/68
SUBJECT Soviet Foreign Policy After Czechoslovakia
15
1. Some time before Tuesday, 20 August, the
Soviet leadership decided to put an end once and for
all to the threat of an erosion of Communist power
and Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia. It was the
most important decision taken by a regime which, dur-
ing nearly four years in power, had confined itself
to small actions because it was afraid of big risks.
Even this step--the invasion of Czechoslovakia--stemmed
more from desperation than from determination, came after
months of almost palpable agonizing, and quickly
showed signs of fumbling execution because of either
miscalculation or irresolution, or both.
2. There is no question but what Moscow can
effectively choke off movements toward reform in
Eastern Europe, but it has demonstrated that it lacks
the resilience to accommodate the pressure for change
in the area. The intervention in Czechoslovakia is
also a victory for the men in Moscow who, in their
attitude toward the non-Communist world, fear con-
tamination more than they favor collaboration. We do
not know and may not know for some time what the
margin of victory was and to what extent the attitude
that has won will color Soviet behavior elsewhere
than in Czechoslovakia.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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3. We do not think it possible to link in any
reliable way the dozen or so men who count most in
Moscow to this or that attitude, nor that there are,
for that matter, more or less consistent blocs of
"hards" and "softs" on the whole range of foreign
policy issues. The presence of separate and con-
flicting strains in the Soviet approach to these
problems has, however, long been evident. Some of
the men are more inclined to look for opportunities
in the policy of "peaceful coexistence"; others are
more attentive to the risks. The interplay of these
tendencies within a framework of committee rule
has been a hallmark of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime
and a source of persistent tension within the
leadership.
4. Such differences of emphasis as these are
bound to have influenced the Soviet handling of the
Czech problem. No matter how much it was felt that
it was Moscow's duty and right to deal with the
problem as a domestic affair, it must also have
been recognized that the issue had implications for
Moscow's position as the paramount center of inter-
national Communism and as a great power. Although
the first consideration has prevailed, it is safe to
suppose that the decision and its aftermath have
brought tension within the Politburo to the highest
point ever. If this is so, it will not be surprising
if the ruling group in its present form fails to
get through many more months. But at this point it
is hard to know who might be more vulnerable; those
who may have urged intervention, or those who may
have resented it.
5. No matter how much or how little personali-
ties count in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy,
they can only tell part of the story, By whatever
means a consensus in favor of intervening in Czecho-
slovakia was arrived at, the Soviet leadership had
to make some calculation of how this action would
affect its position as a Communist state in Europe,
as the patriarch of the Communist movement, and
as a nuclear power confronting the US on the broadest
international front. The conclusion was that
Czechoslovakia must be saved whatever the cost. It
may even have been supposed that this cost would be
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tolerable. These calculations, perhaps made in an
overheated political and emotional atmosphere, were
certainly imperfect and very possibly badly mistaken.
This will have to be seen. Either way, in the
short term, the USSR's position will inevitably be
damaged, and probably nowhere more seriously than
among other Communists.
6. After trying for the better part of 12
years to put their relations with the East European
states on a more voluntary basis, the Russians have
demonstrated that a half-way house is uninhabitable.
Their prescription--a little bit of independence,
but not too much--has been shown not to be the cure.
Since they have not found the way to ensure the
more or less willing consent of the East European
peoples to their domination, much Soviet military
power, as well as political energies and economic
assets, will remain tied down in East Europe. The
November conference of Communist parties, if now it
takes place at all, cannot possibly do what the
Soviets intended it to do: develop a new pro-
Soviet, anti-Chinese front of Communist parties.
Having discovered this, Moscow is likely to value
all the more loyal allies like Ulbricht and to con-
sider it all the more necessary to remain sturdy in
its support of North Vietnam.
7. Communist parties outside the bloc, especially
those in Western Europe, will either move further in
the direction of "polycentr.ism" or suffer electoral
blight. They will, in either case, be less able to
render useful service in support of Soviet foreign
policy.
B. In Europe and in the Third World, the Soviets
will lose the advantage of having seemed morally
superior to. the US vis-a-vis Vietnam. The fears and
attitudes of the high Cold War era are not likely to
be revived, but the progress of the USSR's efforts
to cultivate the confidence of the European nations
and to reduce US influence will inevitably be checked.
West Germany's Eastern policy faces new and probably
insurmountable obstacles. At the same time, the
prospects for early or easy acceptance of the NPT by
the West Germans--as by others--have probably been
set back.
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9. In the Third World the Soviet position is
not likely to be much weakened immediately where it
is now strong, as among the Arabs. Where it is
weak, it may become even weaker. But, generally,
the leaders of nonaligned nations will want to
treat the Czechoslovak issue as none of their
business. The vote on the Czech question in the
Security Council, in which India, Pakistan, and
Algeria abstained, bears witness that recipients of
Soviet economic and military assistance will
naturally put their own national interests before
what they may consider remote, largely irrelevant
conflicts between the great powers or within the
latters' spheres. Nevertheless, the USSR's rough
and fumbling handling of Czechoslovakia may at
least cost it the loss of some respect in the Third
World. And, if, as seems likely, the USSR, because
of its needs in Eastern Europe, will in the future
have less military and economic aid to dispense,
the spread of Soviet influence may be slowed.
10. Finally, where the future of US-Soviet
relations is concerned, the outlook depends to some
degree on the US attitude. The idea of a mutual
reduction of forces in Central Europe, as a first
step toward a solution of the problems of European
security, is already a casualty. Such hopes as
there were for cooperation between the US and USSR
in removing some of the sources of tension in the
Middle East are dimmer, although it may be all the
more in the USSR's interest to see that the con-
flict there remains mainly in the political arena.
But, on the question of the Soviet position on
nuclear weapons control, we cannot be sure what
Soviet behavior toward Czechoslovakia portends. It
may be that the economic and technological arguments
for an agreement with the US are apparent to one
or another degree across the whole spectrum of
Soviet opinion, from militant to pragmatic. Not to
be excluded also is the possibility that Moscow will
see the need as greater after Czechoslovakia for
offsetting steps in order to keep US-Soviet rela-
tions from settling into a total freeze.
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11. US-Soviet missile talks have, however,
promised all along to be difficult. Distrust of
the USSR. in the US, which is bound to grow as a
result of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia,
combined with the defensiveness and insecurity on
the part of the Russians which that action repre-
sented, will mean that any talks will now face
harder going still. How the Soviets deal with this
question in the days and weeks immediately ahead
may be, however, the best indication of whether the
cold wind blowing out of Moscow across Eastern
Europe is blowing in other directions as well.
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