EXCERPTS FROM THE NEWLY DISCLOSED PENTAGON PAPERS ON THE VIETNAM TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 28, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2ooim4 ip : CIA-RDP80-016
" "uN 1972 STATINTL
-om the _Newly
apers.on
on the Vietna
? Special to The NfIf Torte liteE'S
? WASHINGTON? Tune 27?Following are excerpts from
'the four volumes of the Pentagon papers dealing with efforts
to reach a peace settlement in Vietnam, as Made available to-
day by the columnist Jack Anderson:
65 Repdrts on .Outlook for War
By IS. Intelligence Community
'Section of Pentagon papers dealing with reports on outlook for Commimists'
activities, April 22, 1965. First section is attributed to "leading personalities of
the United States intelligence community." Section in italics is the Pentagon
analysts'. explanation, which introduces comments by Adm. William F, R.aborn
Jr., then Director of Central Intelligence.
If present U.S, policies continue with- cause him to meet our present terms
out the introduction of large addi- in the foreseeable future. I note very
tional forces or increased U.S. air cf- recent evidence which suggests that our
fort, the Communists are likely to hold military pressures are becoming some-
to their existing policy of seeking vic- what more damaging to the enemy
tory in the local military struggle in within South Vietnam, but I am inclined
South Vietnam. They will try to intellsi- to doubt that this damage is increasing
fy that stritggle, supporting it with at a rate 'which will bring him quickly
additional men and equipment. At the to the conference table.
same time, D.R.V. air defenses will be With particular reference to Mc-
strengthened through Soviet and per- Cone's recommendation that the U.S.
haps Chinese aid,
odd much heavier air action against
If, however' ihc d"pens its al. the North to its planned combat force
volvement by increasing its combat role
deployment to the South, Reborn indi-
and intensifying its air effort, the intel-
ligence officers believed:
? . that the Vietcong, North Viet-
nam and China would initially . . try
to offset the new enemy strength by
stepping up the insurgency, reinforcing
the Vietcong with the men and equip-
ment necessary. They would likely count
on time being on their side and tr); to
force the piecemeal engagement of U.S.
troops under conditions which might
bog them down in jungle warfare, hop-
ing to present the U.S. with a de facto
partition of the country. The Soviet
Union . . would almost certainly ac-
quiesce in a decision by Hanoi to inten-
sify the struggle.
This lack of any real prospect of
"give" on the enemy's part was also
confirmed by Admiral Reborn,- shortly
after he had succeeded John McCone
as Director of Central Intelligence. On
the clay of Raborn's swearing-in (April
28), the President had given him a let-
ter from McCone which McCone had
handed to the President cc his last
official act. The President had ached
Reborn to prepare his own comments
on McCone's views. Raborn's comments,
circulated to Secretaries Rush and Me.,
Namara on May 6, included the fol-
lowing: ' I Wt.': tOlAkROP
cated his agreement, and expressed his
belief that such art action would have
the following consequences:
The D.R.V. is, in my view, unlikely
to engage in meaningful discussions at
any time in coming months until U.S.
-air attacks have begun to damage or
destroy its principal economic and mili-
tary targets. I thus concur with the
U.S.I.11's judgment of 18 February 1905,
that, given such U.S. punishment, the
enemy would be `somewhat more like-
ly' to decide to make some effort to
secure a respite, rather than to intensify
the struggle further and accept the con-
sequent risks.
And then he added the following
advice:
Insofar as possible, we should- try
to manage any program of expanded
bombings in ways which (1) would
leave the D.R.V. an opportunity to ex-
plore negotiations without complete loss
of face, (2) would not preclude any
Soviet pressures on Hanoi to keep the
war from expanding, and (3) would
not suddenly produce extreme world
pressures against us. In this connection,
the timing and circumstances in which
the bombings were extended northward
could he of critical importance, partic-
be advantageous to expand -bombings
after, not before, some major new VC
Move (e.g., obvious concoutration? for
imminent attack on Da :Nang or ?Kon-.
tum) and after, not before, any current
possibilities of serious negotiations have
been fully tested. And such bombings
should not be so regular as to leave
no interval for the CommunistS to make
concessions with some grace. -Indeed,
we should keep in mind the possibility
of a pause at some appropriate time,
which could serve to test the Communist
intentions and to exploit any diffen,
ences on their side.
'65 Note on ..Aestit.,:;,;A
BOrnbin,-
.
Message from Secetary of State Rusk to United
States Ambassadors in Saigon, London and Ottawa,
May 17,-. 1965.
You should iY-1' Fon Min immediately
to inform that beginning Tuesday morn-
ing, Saigon time, bombing of North
Vietnam will be resumed by U:S. and
South Vietnamese forces, marking the
end of a five-day suspension.
You should convey message from me
that we regret that the reception of
the other side to the idea of a pause
was not merely negative but hostile.
Gromyko told Rusk. that our message
to Dobrynin on subject was "insulting."
Nevertheless, we do not exclude pos-
sibility of other such attempts in future.
There will be no public announce-
ment of the resumption of bombing.
When press questions are asked, it
will be pointed out that there have
been and may again be periods when
no bombing will take place in response.
to operational factors and that we do
. not discuss these operational questions._
Our limited bAbffroued FlochR000 Alninrtions of differing 80L01601R000. ?
300350034-7
and our present 0bn-dram? build-up views between Moscow, Peiping and
in the South are not likely to exert 1.1
,anot, For example. it would probably.
V.4117 YORE: TIUES
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 MARIFID
Bombs for Peace?
The United States is a four-time loser in the bombing
of North Vietnam's only .steel plant. The fifth bombing
last weekend again has halted production there, but it is
unlikely that it will hamper North Vietnam's war effort
any more significantly than did the other four. Nor is
there any substantial military purpose to be achieved in
the ? stepped-up aerial attacks this week in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area, which undoubtedly are taking a heavy
civilian toll.
The Pentagon Papers revealed the futility of bombing
so-called strategic targets in underdeveloped North Viet-
nam, President Nixon and his aides may not have been
willing to accept this Johnson Administration study, but
a secret Nixon Administration analysis in 1960 by Henry
Kissinger's National Security Council Staff along with
seven other Government agencies reached a similar
conclusion. .
This first Kissinger National Security Study Memoran-
dum (NSSM-1) showed that almost four years of American
bombing destroyed $500 to $770 million of capital stock,
military facilities and current production in North
Vietnam. But aid from other Communist countries during
this period totalled $3 billion, four to six times as much.
"In terms of total economic and military resources
available to support the war, North Vietnam is better off
today (1969) than it was in 1965," Defense Secretary
Laird's office noted in NSSM-1.
Aid from the Soviet Union, China and other Communist
countries averaged only $115 million a year through 1964.
But it was stepped up after the bombing began in 1965
and was in the neighborhood of $1 billion a year by 1968.
When the bombing was suspended, aid from those coun-
tries dropped off again.
There has been no change in the commitment of
Moscow and Peking to supply everything Hanoi needs
to continue the war. In the 1965-68 period, Communist
China even provided up to 50,000 transport troops to help
keep roads and railways in repair between Hanoi and the
.Chinese border. The return of some of those troops now
hinted in a statement by Radio Hanoi that "new
forces" have just joined North Vietnam's "communica?
tions and transportation forces."
President Nixon may be counting on the mining of
Haiphong and other ports to increase North Vietnam's
import problems, particularly in petroleum. Mr. Nixon
has been forewarned since the 1969 NSSM-1 study that
the capacity of the overland routes from China alone
r ?
r
0-01601M:0CM a50 34-
was two and a half times larger than North Vietnam's
combined sea and land import tonnage. The "smart
bombs" and virtually unrestricted attacks now under-way
on this transport network undoubtedly are hampering
the flow. But even an unlimited bombing campaign would
leave North Vietnam with enough material to carry on,
the C.I.A. and Secretary Laird's office informed Mr. Nixon
in NSSM-1,
Differences between Moscow and Peking may cause
some temporary .supply difficulties. But a shift from
Russia to China as major supplier is unlikely to reduce
the flow of Soviet weapons and ammunition, virtually
all of which has been coming overland across China all
along. As for petroleum, a new pipeline from China may
help to ease North Vietnam's problem, even if sections
are bombed out at times.
The only effect of the bombing on the war is that
it imposes hardships on the people of North Vietnam..
It might damage morale?but never has in the past.
It Might influence North Vietnam's Politburo, now in
the midst of an important policy review, to soften its
negotiating position in Paris. But it never did so in the
past, despite President Johnson's carefully calculated
orchestration of bombing and peace offers.
More bombing is no more likely now to pressure Hanoi
to accept American terms. De-escalation and a resumption
of . negotiations for a compromise settlement offer a
better hope of peace.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350034-7