KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360126-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 126
• Publication Date: June 15, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/630461dVALRDP80-0161
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Following are texts of key documents accompanying the
Pentagon's study of the "Vietnam war, covering the opening of
the. sustained bombing campaign against Norlh Vietnam in,the. i.1\111:
first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is i'ndicated, the dva
? documents are printed verbatim, with only 'unmistakable typo-
Oaphical errors corrected. aria
.Lette.r ,Froin Ros. tow Favoring -. . mei.
Comn-ritment of -Troops- by U.S. ,........__.._.
, (?.N.7. 23, n
. ' :to tile Crum
Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow,,cliairman of the State Department's _:. .
. .
. .
.Policy 'Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dis-. 1 leave :
positions and Political Signals." -..- .. CIAP and
In early D
-
, N ? On Stmthei
Following on our conversation of last sponse. This means that the initial use therefore, -
?night I am concerned that too much of force in the north should be as lim- observatio
thought is being given to the actual ited and as unsa.nguinary as possible. It ready corn
damage we do in the North, not enough Is the installation of the principle that ?I. We I
thought to the signal we wish to send, we are initially interested in, not tit -rninc as
ls ,
The signal consists of three parts: for tat... , ,..,.. ...., raa CLLUUIRA, V VI
appreciation of the view ,in Hanoi and
(I a) damage to the North is now to be 3. But Our force dispositions to ac- ..Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem.
. inflicted because they are violating the
\rj ...
19a4 and 1962 accords; , .company . an _initial retaliatory move I agree almost .completely with SN1E i
.. against the north should send three 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the criti-
b) we are ready and able to go. Much further signals lucidly: . . cal passages: -
further than our initial act of damage; . .
- a. that we are putting in place - a . "While they will seek to exploit and
- c) we are ready and able to meet any-capacity subsequently to step encourage the deteriorating situation in
and naval pressure on the north, if that
level of escalation .they might Mount in up direct Saigon, they probably will avoid actiona
'response, if they are so minded be required; .that would .in their view unduly in-
should - ' - - : : .
: Four points follow. : ., crease the chances of a major US re-
:
'..; b. that we are prepared to face down Sponse against North Vietnam (DRV) or
? 1.? I am_ convinced that, we should not
any forth of escalation North Vietnam Communist China. We are almost cer-
go forward into the next stage without .might mount on the growici; and
, a US ground force commitment of some . . . ., . , .. ..- ? - tam n that both Hanoi and Peiping are
--kind: ? . . ? c. that we are putting forces into anxious not to become involved in the
. a. The withdrawal of those ground place to exact retaliation directly against kind of war in which the great weight
, forces could be a critically important
Communist China, if Peiping should join of superior US weaponry could be
. - in an escalatory response from Hanoi. brought against them. Even if Hanoi and
part of our diplomatic bargaining posi-
, The latter could take the, form of in-- Peiping estimated that the US would not
tion. Ground forces can sit during a con-
ference more easily than we can main- creased aircraft on: Formosa plus, per- , use nuclear weapons against them, they
? haps, a carrier force sitting- off China Could not be sure of this..... .
tam a series of mounting air and .naval.
'pressures. . ?disthbicalished from the force in the "In the face. of new US pressures
b. We. must make clear that counter
, . ? South China Sea. . .against the DRV,, further actions by
? escalation' by the Communists will run . 4. The launching of this track, almost ?Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a
?directly into US strength on the ground; certainly, will require the President to -;considerable extent on their estimate of
? , explain to our own people and to. the US intentions, i.e., whethdr the US was
and, therefore the possibility of radically .
,ly extending their position on the ground world our intentions and objectives. This . actually determined to increase its pres-
.at the cost of air and naval damage will also be perhaps the most persuasive sures as necessary. Their estimates on.
,alone, is ruled out. ? form of communication with Iio and this point are probably uncertain, but
Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think we believe that fear of provoking severe'
: c. There is a marginal possibility that the most direct .communication we can 'measures by. the US would lead them to
in attacking the airfield they were think. mount (perhaps via Vientiane and War- temper their responses with a good deal.
- ing two moves ahead; namely, they saw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of caution. .. a
might be planning a pre-emptive ground of cut-outs. They should feel they now
force response to an expected US retail- "If despite Communist efforts, the US
confront -an I,BJ who has made up his
talon for the Bien Hoa attach-. - attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders wOuld
? . mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed have to ask themselves whether it was
! . The first critical military action at an earlier stage, I believe it quite not better, to suspend their support of
i against North Vietnam should be de- possible to communicate the limits as Viet Cong military action rather than
signed merely to install the principle well as the seriousness of our intentions suffer the. destruction of their major
?- that they will, from the present forward, without raisin,' seriously the fear in military facilities and the industrial sec-
be vulnerable to retaliatory attack in the Hanoi that we intend at our initiative
'north for continuAppirovedforaReleasen20014073/041 GIARRDPEta-61thilteddldatkatliA41,4 :
1954 and 1952 Accords. In other words, Delta, in :China, or seek any other ob- their favor in South Vietnam, they might -
we would signal a shift from the prin- jective than the rcainstallation of the
ciole involved in the Tonkin Gulf re- 1954 and 1962 Accords. .
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EXAMINER
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,EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
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WASHINGTON ? (NNS) ?
The McNamara report dn forces actively. involved in wenCwith outgoing PresidenC that complete information
e Vietnam has 'surfaced at an Johnson when he returned to was available to us." ,
inopportune t i e for t e ?the fighting.
A 'obey of deceptien stir- ? Texas. Another copy was de?Ziegler declined . to . corn-1
S Nixon Administration, which
already is under great pres-
sure- to speed up. American
? withdrawal from the war.
s The mammoth, previously
? secret document on the evo-
lution of the war, being pub-
.' lislied piecemeal by the New
;. York Times, will provide a
.rich new source of data for
the antiwar movement, par
ticularly in the Senate, which
ment on a question as to.
faces in the wealth of official livered by the Pentagon. .
cablegrams, memorandaand the White House yesterday, a whether this administration.
other documents accompany- day after the Times began its repudiated the policies of de-
lug the 3000-page analysis, series. ? - . .
ception hat, according to the
official documents, ? were in
Department. specialists under tary Ronald Ziegler said yes- - effect in 1964 and subsequent
years through 1967. .
written by teams of Defense . White House press secre-
orders of the then secretary, terday that the administra-
Robert McNamara. tion had found no surprises
rectly to questions on the ef-
Nor would ' he respond di-
The report and accompa- hi the report, and that the .
feet , the disclosures. might:
nying documents constitute, Na tie n a 1 Security Council
it is believed, the mot corn- had had access to the same have on this administration's
plete - existing account of how basic documents when it was problems of Vietnam crecli?-?
'votes to in o r r ow on an the U.S. involvement in Viet- drafting its own war history bility.
'amendment to force a United nam grew and how the U.S. in 1969. A Gallup ? Poll, published
States ullout by the end of began to plan for overt war a Rather than relying On past
? ? of the respondents believed
May 2-3, found that 67 percent
1971. year before the extent o
White House ? officials ac-. American involvement was
disclosed.
Lcepted the disclosure of the publicly
-report with nervous, resigna- The report, which carried
tion. ? ? . . "a high level (security) clas-
, ?Already beset with Viet-' sification," according to a
. , ... _ .
. nam credibility problems of White - House source, had
its own, according to a re- very_ limited?circulation when
'cent- Gallup Poll, the Nixon it was completed in late 1963.
. :Administration will have to Perhaps ?as few as six copies,
wait and see . whether this including the one obtained by
new shadow on the Johnsen the Times, exist. .
period in Vietnam further The Nixon White House did
erodes the public's tolerance not use this particular report ment, . the , Cent.ral?Wej4-..
. . -.
:for continuing the war. ? .in drafting- its own history of ' gericse_AgenCy,_ and the Na- ..
Perhaps the report's Most .the Vietnam involvement in rtgiiai Security Council. .
damaging aspect ? at least early 1969,. prior te the in- . "The President,"_ Ziegler
-
the; part that seems to worry coming. President's determi- said, "did not focus , on this.
. the White -House the inost --- nation of a new Vietnam war specific report before it ap-e
:is the disclostre that the U.S. policy. .. - . .. peared in the Times."
- government worked ? out a- ,
The copy earmarked for ' But, the press secretary:
strategy, months before the
White Houseeapparently strongly implied, Nixon was
? so-called August. 19C.4.,* Ton- the.
' kin. Gulf attack on two U.S. ? 'fully aware of the chronology,
destroyers,. to get American : of U.S. inVolvement, through:
stddies, "the President felt i
was essential to undertake the administration ,'as not. ?
our. own assesiment," ?Zie- ."telling the public all it
gler said. ? should know "about the war
Ziegler attempted to 'mini- in 'kiletnam." . ? . ? .,. :
? ?-
e _
mize the overall importance
of the Defense Department-
prepared report, pointing out
that it was only an internal
study by one department,
and did not contain assess;
Monts of other key agencies,
such as the State ? Departs
,J other reports and documents. -
I? "I think it is safe to as-
sume," Ziegler
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STATINTL _
Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-
LYNN, N.Y.
TIMES
JUN 15 10Fg
E - 43,427
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joint chiefs- almost 20 years -
ago Warned that a successful defense
!CiUauth Vietnam could not he guar-
anted Linda( the 1fg54 Geneva ac-
. J Cord; The joint chiefs are said to
have. agreed to Send American mili-
tary 'advisorS only . on the insistence
of the then .Seeretary Of State, John
gaily pie-s-64 ad-ad--Foster Dulles.. Both. President Ken- .
'", A. along w
.. . ? ?t because the - . . . . .
ily document s ith thou- not apparen
'l'. ?
ands of pages of analysiS concin?ning ministration was not oven in office nedy and PrOsiderit -Johnson were
.. ? ?
the American involvement in the when the inquiry completed it of- described - as choosing partial mea- '
fort. Secretary of Defense 'McNamara .Sur es ..6 'military proposals that
-:__,.---. , , . A . ., n. .-? e; ? ,7. ,_. was not in office Ale is 'reported te would only work if they were under-
, Vietnam War have conic- to light and .
? i have received a copy after he becam. : taken as packages rather than be,ing ,
. . ,
:-. Erre being punted in the K4 0,17 I arx ?
Times.- The. White _House,- wa 3 un a- chairman of the World Bank. H : adopted piecemeal - -.', ' '',:.-:1?'?-? ?:;,:' i ?-
Wfire of the. research and writing. It looked at it briefly and sent it to th - - ' '--- '' '''. : '' : -'-',' ? .; '-'
. .? e.,
I: ..'? The ?studyi. also found - that the
'undertaken in 1:C?07 and l8 un-' '.National Archives where today Mf-- . . ?' - . _ - -
American goqernment was unable to
0 orders of the tbe.n?s'oere,?te:ry of ? Namara's own copy is still i '
..,*
. - ? rtre . ? , - persuade the South Vietnamese to
-? tefense,' Robert - S.J.IcNamara. The '''ora be ' - ' ? -: ?-? . ' ? - ... !make the' Political and economic re-
?-studY extended to 2,500,0.00 word's While the details of its develop: forms that were .necessary in 'order
.....
' and may number only .ten or 15 Cop, ment and publication are of interest.; to win the allegianee of the people.
7ies.? , .- When ilie study wa'? completed,
....e. e . _?,.. ......, : ..?2-,..?:e ..., ? .., . some of its: conclusions are signifi- ,..
- ' ? ' -- - - '2.? '-? - ' , cant. The Vietnam poliey ef the Unite the Assistant Secretary of Defense
.. White .Home assistant Henry A. ed States grew out ef the Truman acl? .was .Paul in cc who was in charge
? Kissinger' never heard of thr. study' ministratigns.-dcision to give .mili,- of security affairs. He says today that .
? until he read about it in the New, tary aid to France, which was con. . the "purpose (of the studyjwas to try ?
York. Times. Others have eithUi pro.? ducting a colonial war in Indo-China to preserve history before it disap-
teSted '? its existence or, knowing' a:?-o.iinst the Communist Viet Minh. .
about it, claim that its revelation Feared." It is good journalism that
The . Eisenhower administration
vip- ? the New York 'Times has delved so
,lates ' security ? because some of the decided, to rescue . South Vietnam deeply info the Pentagon studY. Oth, .
'paper's contained are labeled Top Se-, from falling to Communism% Next &wise, it might have disappeared be.
cret. '" ?:' --? I' ? - ::-..: ?? ' .--; '-;?-? ' -i came the Kennedy administration cause. ' such analys'e.1:'' have . been
r-:'-'? Secretary McNainara ordered 30- which enlarged the commitment of; known in the past to have become .
? . ..
or 40 governmental officials to re- America from limited risk to a broacl. lost because, of - inattention. Taking r,
view - all the documents, - Converse- risk commitment. Then the Johnson advantage of inattention, - a 'mewl,
ton memoranda which concerned administration began'
' '
plan ovei:t.,' edgeful mole Inews where ...the' pap
the American relationship with Viet. . . -
s,. ' t ' :o ?
war the ver ors are hidden and decides to chew
- .- - , -
ram. This was net a full tune job fel in 1904 ! 'e ? y year when the them. up. -
G.O.P.
.these expertS. They 'plugged aWay fq president was attacking his
Tore than ?a? yeLe w 0 - -etting ' book , adversary, Senator Barry GGoldwater,
.
length volumes with .documentatioi.: for his efforts to escalate the war.
t ' d -shows. further that the
. . .. . -1
from cablein
gras, i-a house . debate :
and the public and private The s u y, :observe. '':
. :,
tions _of :officials an the ,various dc government intelligence agendas,
the :C.I.A., and that of the Defense
Alartments .01 govern Ment; inchiclin?
/ the 'Joint . Chiefs of . SZaff?and the department, warned that the govern.
,i.c..-.I.A.- .'.., - -? ..',:,?7::?!:',....-!:-.,-;;:-,--',:;:il: -.?,;? Inent s policy- would not Work with "
This - may not ie :thP definitive . respect to the -Viet Cong insurgency. ,
study of America ,and Vietnam .i. The same intelligence Study indicat- ,
. It
. probably. the closest Vi nag to such h --ed that bombing woul.d, become Mill. '
. '
study that the nubile will e tarily ineffective, within a few.
Tenths Ver hay-.
. . . . ..
,.
- access tO. If it ,verdn't. for the Nev
York Times,: ell this tote-the- !
--- -, 0. data, oe. - ' The ' first 'Military equipment
.,
with its interpretation ,by govern from. America to go to Vietnam was .:
? ,. .
Tent experts would ne,Ver have
:Peared. Why AP rneketkEprsa.61e we201ANQA61,,q
in i 0 th t
95 eand ereafw and
. kt8A1-.0i1601R000300360126-4
be sensitive 'about the revelations i-- ,
visors, 'anti then American soldiers
ivhn iigerl-thn n'n.ar. !