SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01622R000100040022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 13, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved For-Rele a 2002102/13 CIA-RDP80BO1622R0'Qf 0040022-
FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
: Deputy Director for Intelligence
: Southeast Asia Military Analysis
Your Memorandum of 23 August 1974,
Subject: Financial Guidance for 1975
and 1976
1. In the reference memorandum, you asked me to
consider and to submit my recommendations regarding the
shifting to OSR of the positions in OER devoted to Southeast
Asia military analysis.
2. I have taken the liberty of expanding this instruction
to include a review of the entire DDI production office effort on
Indochina military activities which, as you know, includes OCI
as well as OER. Representatives of the offices concerned have
completed a review of the question. I have reviewed their study
and have discussed the various options with the Office Directors
and the NIO/SEA. On this basis, I have decided to reduce the
effort devoted to military analysis on Southeast Asia and to move
it to OSR effective 1 July 1975.
3. Despite the marked change in the tactical and strategic
environment since the January 1973 ceasefire, the Agency continues
to be tasked with the production of reliable and timely intelligence
on Communist and friendly forces in Indochina. There have,
however, been a number of developments which have enabled us
to make significant cutbacks in the resources devoted to intelligence
production on the Indochina military problem. These include a
lessened demand for in-depth research and basic studies on the
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military aspects of the Indochina problem, a significant decline
in collection capabilities and assets, the development of a strong
basic research capability in DIA, and a growing practice of
producing interagency studies which involve a more limited role
for CIA as a contributor to rather than a producer of independent
CIA assessments. The cumulative effect of these factors has
enabled me to reduce my production office resources committed. STATOTHR
to the Indochina military effort from a peak of about positions
in 1970 to the Present level -professional positions in OER
STATOTHR and in OCI.
STATOTHR
4. Cutbacks of this size mean, of course, that the much
vaunted "Vietnam dividend" is pretty well spent. I do believe,
however, that by transferring the Indochina military responsibility
and refocusing a reduced effort that some modest savings-- STATOTHR
positions- -could be realized immediately. I would propose to
leave these savings in OER to help it to cope with the increasingly
insatiable demand for economic intelligence.
STATOTHR
It is my intention to establish in OSR/RAD a small unit
to handle the
nndochina military responsibility. This unit will function primarily
as a producer of current intelligence but would have sufficient
capability to make quality inputs to estimates and interagency
assessments. In short, I envisage an operation that might be
characterized as "current intelligence plus". To ensure that
this expertise is available, the positions transferred to OSR will
be filled by analysts with long experience on Indochina.
6. Implicit in this arrangement is a decision to rely on
DIA for the production of basic research and intelligence on
Indochina military. This decision obviously entails some risk,
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4 fL
 Ap
and if this risk is to be kept within limits, both Agency managers
and the NIO/SEA must be particularly careful in apportioning
future requests between CIA and DIA for intelligence support.
There is, of course, the possibility that future developments
in Vietnam could increase the demands on us for more in-depth
studies. In that event we would, of course, find whatever
resources were needed to do the job. With a cadre of seasoned
experts in OSR, it would be possible for us to rebuild a basic
research capability--but only after some lead time.
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
APPROVED
DISAPPROVED:
/ai M. Colo
Distribution:
Original - Director (return to DDI)
1 - DDCI
1 -ER
1 - Comptroller
1 - Director/OER
1 - Acting Director/OSR
1 - Acting Director/OCI
1 - C/-Management Staff
proved For ReI ?ts*20d2102133 CtA-RDP80B01622RQOO 4ydd 2-1
14 MAR 1975
STATOTHR
Approved For R Ieaser20O2i?QVf43. ,;CIA-R DR8013,Q1922,PQQ01 QQ4OP022-1