SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 11, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2953/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet and Chinese Communist Attitudes
Toward the Rhodesian Problem
1. Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence (UDI) provided a propaganda windfall for
the Soviet Union and an opportunity to work for
greater influence in a number of African capitals.
The immediate object of this effort is to place
the USSR in the "forefront" of those nations seek-
ing to destroy the "racist" regime in Salisbury.
In addition, Moscow may later on expect. to succeed
in complicating the situation still further for the
West by encouraging Africans to stand behind the
Rhodesian "libezfat&on movement ."
2. To date, Soviet propaganda coverage has
been heavy, asserting that the UK is involved in
a "colonialist deal," which could not have occurred
without the "blessings" of other NATO countries--
primarily the US. Moscow's public and private
allusions of "support" for the policies and actions
of the African states, particularly those represented
in the OAU, contrast with what many Africans regard
as the weakness of the means suggested by Western
capitals for dealing with the problem.
3. We do not expect the Soviet Union to involve
itself directly in military action against Rhodesia.
In mid-November, a counselor of the Russian Embassy
in Tanzania stated, "The Soviet Union will of course
take a strong position at the UN, but it has no in-
tention of'intervening militarily in any way in Rho-
desia." The Soviets probably reckon that such in-
volvement would carry risks of a direct confronta-
tion with the West, and would probably also provoke
a negative reaction from many African countries at
this time. 3,-
C
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 4. Both public and private Soviet statements
indicate that the Soviet Union's policy in the
Rhodesian situation, will be to give the appearance
of supporting the Africans, and will largely be
determined by the policies the Africans.,: adopt,
particularly those agreed upon by the OAU. On the
whole, Soviet statements so far seem to have been
aimed at enhancing Moscow's image as an Afro-Asian
leader. Despite Moscow's private assurances that
it would render assistance to a potential African
military force, there is no hard evidence of any
specific commitment. Moreover, Moscow probably
calculates that it is unlikely any such force will
ever be formed. Soviet propaganda statements have
focussed on Moscow's intention to continue its gen-
eral policy of support for African countries on the
Rhodesian question.
6. Moscow probably would back up an African
military effort with some limited and indirect
arms assistance. However, whether the Soviets will
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be called upon to do so appears doubtful at :.this,junc-
ture. The Africans independently or within the the
OAU have not yet proved willing to undertake such an
action, but have sought a more forthright British
response. Moreover, they lack sufficient capabilities,
even collectively, to defeat the Rhodesian security
forces without intolerable costs. In addition, Zambia
is presently unwilling to allow foreign troops upon
its soil--with the exception of the British, because
of the risk of provoking Rhodesian economic reprisals
against Zambia.
7. It is more likely that the Soviets possibly
through, third parties would;supply;arms:and training
nationalist organizations such as the Zimbabwe Afri-
can Peoples Union (ZAPU) in operations against Rho-
desia. Such efforts would have only limited impact,
however, for several reasons including the factional-
ism of these ,groups. ZAPU's inability seriously to
threaten Rhodesia's security force has been demon-
strated. Although some influential militants in the
Zambian governmentar+e known to favor providing mat-
erial support for Rhodesian nationalist paramilitary
action, Pres-
ident Kaunda's determination to continue with olding
any attributable support for Rhodesian freedom fighters.
8. The Chinese Communists will have consider-
able difficulty capitalizing upon the present sit-
uation. Their ability to render tangible aid to any
future Rhodesian rebels remains limited. Present
Chinese assets in the area are an Embassy in Zambia,
a large representation in Dar-es-Salaam, and a train-
ing camp for Mozambique rebels on Zanzibar. However,
even if Tanzania and other countries agree to co-
operate with them in establishing bases for guerilla
activities against Rhodesia, the Chinese could do
little more than support a small scale sabotage effort.
As expected, Chinese propaganda has been particularly
heavy and anti-Western in tone.
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