THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 22, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
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BACKGROUND USE ONLY OCI No. 0651/65
Copy No. 11 ()
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
22 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
State Dept., DIA declassification & release instructions on file
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GROUP I
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH INANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0651/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(16 December - 22 December 1965)
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE iv
South Vietnam, facing page 1
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1
POLITICAL SITUATION 1
Tribal uprising points up fragility
of ethnic-minority loyalty to GVN
(p. 1); FULRO-staged revolt erupted
in four central highland provinces
(p. 1); Tribal problem has been
simmering since 1964 (p. 1); GVN
reaction is liable to follow hard
line (p. 2); Viet Cong may exploit
tribal unrest (p. 3); Tri Quang
increases influence at Buddhist con-
ference (p. 3); Viet Cong propaganda
focuses on Front's fifth anniversary
(p. 3); GVN's 1966 budget is outlined
(p. 3); Rice, meat, and construction
material show price rise, but Saigon
retail index remains stable (p. 4).
B. MILITARY SITUATION 6
Combat activity at low level (p. 6);
Weekly statistics show decline in
incidents (p. 6); Situation generally
quiet in allied areas (p. 6); Combined
operation ends in I CTZ (p. 6); ARVN
inflicts heavy casualties in IV CTZ
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Page
action (p. 7); NEW LIFE 65 ends in
Binh Tuy (p. 7); Naval surveillance
results and B-52 raids are noted
(p. 7); Communists continue to con-
centrate on terrorism (p. 8); Minor
Viet Cong actions are noted in the
four CTZs (p. 8); Current status of
major transportation routes (p. 9).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 9
Chieu Hoi ralliers show decline
(p. 10); Current refugee totals are
given (p. 10); Special training
program for district chiefs to be
provided (p. 10); Critical situation
in Binh Dinh is reviewed in detail
(p. 10); Priority province pacifica-
tion program planned (p. 12).
Map, North Vietnam, facing page 13
US aircraft conduct several major
strikes (p. 13); Both Hanoi and Peking
concentrate propaganda on Front an-
niversary (p. 13); Chinese show con-
cern that Hanoi may falter (p. 13);
Chou En-lai warns against US "tricks"
(p. 14); DRV-Soviet economic aid agree-
ment signed (p. 14); Hanoi denounces
Italian peace initiative (p. 15); So-
viet ambassador suggests Hanoi is not
totally disinterested in negotiations
(p. 15).
GVN to list war prisoners with ICRC
(p. 16); ICC investigation of North
Vietnamese violations of Geneva ac-
cords is stalled again (p. 16);
Australia defers combat-force aug-
mentation until 1966 (p. 16).
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ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it
is edited and published by CIA without final coordina-
tion.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Fighting was less heavy last week than in the preceding
weeks. US casualty statistics reflected the relative lull, with
ten Americans killed during the seven days as compared to 99
the week before. The incident rate was still high, however,
particularly in Saigon where Viet Cong terrorism has increased.
A tribal uprising late last week, although quickly suppressed,
points up the fragility of the South Vietnamese hold on the loyal-
ties of ethnic minorities in the central highlands, and may fore-
shadow increased government resistance to tribal aspirations.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. A tribal uprising late last week, although
quickly suppressed, points up the fragility of the
South Vietnamese hold on the loyalties of ethnic
minorities in the central highlands, and may fore-
shadow increased government resistance to tribal
aspirations.
2. The revolt, staged by the dissident tribal
autonomy movement, FULRO, erupted in four provinces
of the central highlands on 18 December. The gov-
ernment was tipped off to possible trouble from
FULRO just before the revolt when, on 16 and 17 De-
cember, it arrested some 25 to 30 adherents of the
movement who were attempting to stir up fellow
tribesmen in Pleiku town. According to these
prisoners, a FULRO plan called for the seizure of
five provincial capitals in the highlands.
3. In spite of an alert in several government
paramilitary camps, two companies of armed FULRO
troops--believed to have come across the border
from Cambodia where the movement is reportedly
headquartered--entered Gia Nghia, the capital of
Quang Due Province, on 18 December and held the
town's administrative offices for about five hours
until government reinforcements arrived. This
group surrendered peacefully to government regu-
lars. Almost simultaneously, a Montagnard regional
force company in Phu Bon Province revolted and
seized the district town of Phu Thien. Before the
town was recaptured by government regulars, 32 per-
sons including the district chief were killed, and
22 others wounded. The insurgents fled, but about
82 members of the rebel company have since sur-
rendered. Three government special forces camps
were also subjected to internal revolt: Plei Mrong
and Plei Djereng in northwestern Pleiku Province,
and Lac Thien in Darlac Province. Government con-
trol was apparently reasserted over all of the
sites by 19 December.
4. The problem of dissidence by FULRO--an ab-
breviation for the "United Front of the Struggle
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for the Oppressed Races"--has been. simmering since
September 1964, when a similar revolt occurred among
tribesmen in four government special forces camps
in Darlac and northern Quang Duc provinces. Al-
though that uprising was quieted by negotiations,
several of the troops involved deserted--under the
leadership of Rhade tribesman Y-Bham Enoul--and have
since sought foreign support; for Montagnard autonomy.
They have also attempted to recruit followers from
among the various tribal villages and government
paramilitary units.
5. Following the 1964 revolt, then premier
Khanh laid down a program of assistance to the
tribes in an effort to satisfy some of their long-
standing grievances against ethnic Vietnamese rule.
More recently, during the latter part of 1965, the
Ky government has engaged in negotiations with
representatives of FULRO to try to effect the re-
turn of FULRO's 700-1500 armed troops. However,
government stalling in the implementation of Khanh's
program as well as in the more recent negotiations,
together with increased disruption in tribal areas
as the war intensifies in the highlands, has tended
to increase disillusionment among the tribes re-
garding the government's sincerity and effectiveness.
6. There are indications that the reaction of
government officials is one of increased suspicion
of FULRO treachery and of determination to punish
the instigators. has reported 25X1C
that military tri un s are being es a ished in II
Corps, and that any tribal leaders found guilty will
be publicly executed. II Corps commander General
Vinh Loc has long been an advocate of a hard line
toward tribal dissidence. Evidence that FULRO sup-
port has spread from the Rhade tribe to the Jarai
tribe has also demonstrated the potential appeal of
FULRO throughout the highlands, including Montagnards
serving in government special forces camps.
7. The US Embassy has speculated that the mo-
tive behind the latest FULRO uprising may have been
the belief that the government would be forced to
face up to the need for concessions. There are
also reports, however, that within FULRO a group
exists which is dissatisfied with the results so
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far obtained by Y-Bham, and which may have sought
deliberately to provoke an adverse government re-
action and final break. Although there is no
strong evidence to date of any collusion between
FULRO and the Viet Cong, the present unrest and the
prospect of an increasingly unsympathetic govern-
ment approach toward the Montagnards offer obvious
opportunities for Viet Cong exploitation.
8. According to the US Embassy, last week's
conference of the Unified Buddhist Association,
had two striking aspects. One was the apparent
increase in the influence of Tri Quang as a re-
sult of amendments to the association's charter.
One amendment places the secular branch under the
partial supervision of a new "synod" associated
with the clerical branch headed by Quang. The
other noteworthy aspect was the apparent lack of
unity among the Buddhists, centering particularly
about regional loyalties.
9. Propaganda disseminated during the week by
the Viet Cong Liberation radio continued to focus
on the Front's fifth anniversary on 20 December,
and on the Front's accomplishments in extending its
control and "destroying" allied units. Almost no
further mention was made of an earlier Front appeal
for 15 minutes of silence on 19 December--approxi-
mately at siesta time on a Sunday--to honor the
Front anniversary. Moreover, the appeal was com-
pletely ignored in Saigon and other major towns.
The Front has repeated on a number of occasions
its offer of a 12-hour Christmas Eve ceasefire to
permit allied troops who are Catholics to attend
services provided they are unarmed; however, this
offer also continues to receive relatively low-
keyed propaganda play.
10. The GVN cabinet has adopted a 55-billion-
piaster ceiling for the 1966 budget, only slightly
above the 52-billion-piaster budget for 1965. The
US Mission has been emphasizing to the GVN the im-
portance of holding the budget under 60 billion
piasters, and views the 55-billion-piaster ceiling
as salutary from an economic standpoint, though an
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assessment of the effect of the budget ceiling on
GVN military force goals and civil programs must
await a detailed budget presentation. Military ex-
penditures are held to 35 billion piasters, which
entails reduction in certain projected force in-
creases. On the civil side, about 19 billion
piasters will be available for actual programs as
against 21.6 billion piasters in 1965. Under the
ceiling, the police force will be held at the
present 50,000-man level rather than being in-
creased to 72,000 as originally proposed. In line
with the austerity program, Premier Ky has not
permitted the GVN to proceed with its import pro-
gram, although the GVN had foreign exchange reserves
of.-US $144.:4.million,as.of 30 September. The
US Mission has told the GVN that the US will ex-
pect the GVN to utilize US $75 million of its own
foreign exchange for imports during the last quarter
of 1965 and the first quarter of 1966.
11, Wholesale rice prices (No. 1/25 percent
broken) rose above VN $700/100 kg for the first
time in two months, reaching levels of VN $720-727
during the first half of December. The rise may be
due either to reduced rice stocks in Saigon (down
to about 20,000 metric tons - MT) or possibly to
the higher prices at which imported Thai rice is
being sold in Saigon (VN $830/100 kg). Prices may
decline again with increased deliveries from the
delta. Under the GVN rice purchasing policy for
1966, the GVN will buy paddy at a price of VN $700
for 100 kg milled white rice equivalent. There
is a surplus of red rice that the government does
not intend to buy, and rice storage space in Saigon
is short due to preemption of existing warehouses
for other purposes.
12. Retail prices in Saigon remained stable
with the exception of beef, pork, and chicken,
which rose in response to reduced pork deliveries
after price ceilings on pork were imposed by the
GVN. Prices of construction materials continued
to rise, with cement prices now 122 percent above
levels one month ago, and round steel bars up by
33 percent. US military services have now begun
trying to avoid competition with each other that
had resulted in bidding prices up.
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13. Currency and gold prices in Saigon con-
tinued to rise, reaching VN $171 and VN $129 per
US dollar and MPCs (scrip), respectively. The
Hong Kong rate for dollars also rose to 158
piasters.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. Combat activity was at a relatively low
level throughout the week, as Communist forces
generally avoided contact and the number of gov-
ernment and allied operations declined. Although
there was an over-all numerical decrease of Viet
Cong incidents, their intensity increased and
there was a significant rise of terrorist activity
in the Saigon area. Only two of the 11 attacks
mounted by Viet Cong/PAVN elements were of batta-
lion or larger size.
2. During the period 12 to 18 December, 866
Viet Cong incidents occurred, a 12.5 percent de-
cline from last week's 975. This week's kill ratio
favored the government 4.3 to 1, an improvement over
last week's 3.4 to 1. Viet Cong casualties included
1,028 killed and 131 captured, generally comparable
to last week's 976 and 106. The government lost 359
killed, 555 wounded, and 257 missing or captured, as
against 196, 454, and 193 the previous week. US
casualties dropped to 10 killed, 126 wounded, and 6
captured from last week's 99, 392, and 7. One Aus-
tralian and two Korean soldiers were killed, while
one Australian and two Koreans were wounded. The
weapons-loss ratio again favored the Viet Cong.
GVN/Allied Activities
3. The situation remained generally quiet in
allied forces' areas throughout the week with the
only major actions taking place in I and IV Corps
tactical zones (CTZs). Of 69 battalion or larger
sized friendly operations, 31. resulted in contact,
whereas last week's 82 had achieved 47 contacts. A
total of 22,055 small-unit operations, including
2,322 US, resulted in 145 contacts with 69 of these
by US troops. In addition to its other troubles,
the government was required again to face tribal
dissidence in the II CTZ highlands, when the FULRO
organization attempted unsuccessfully to stage an
uprising.
4. In I CTZ, LIEN KIET 18 - HARVEST MOON, the
combined ARVN-USMC operation in Quang Tin Province,
achieved sporadic contacts and terminated on 20
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December. While ARVN units searched last week's
battle scene, three US Marine battalions swept B-52
strike areas and attempted to block Viet Cong west-
ward moves. Numerous caves and tunnel complexes
were discovered, containing abandoned uniforms,
sewing machines, cloth, paper, fuel oil, bicycles,
and weapons. Five PAVN captives from the operation
have indicated the presence of a 195th AAA battalion.
Latest Viet Cong - PAVN casualty figures are 419
killed and 53 captured; allied forces have lost 158
killed (50 US), 326 wounded (195 US), and 181 missing
(2 US).
5. The other major friendly action of the week
occurred in Vinh Binh Province of IV CTZ, where the
9th Division (ARVN) employed seven battalions and
two river-assault groups to force an estimated Viet
Cong battalion into a pocket. Effective artillery
and air strike support inflicted heavy casualties.
The Viet Cong lost 154 killed and 13 captured while
friendly losses were 16 killed and 46 wounded.
6. NEW LIFE 65, the 24-day combined operation
in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces to protect the
relocating of civilians and the harvesting of crops,
terminated during the week. A total of 13,736
civilians were moved to new areas and 1,244 tons of
paddy were harvested. The Viet Cong lost 22 killed
and 25 captured, while 207 rallied to the government.
Friendly losses were three killed (two US and one
Australian) and 32 wounded (nine US and two Austral-
ians).
7. Sea, river, and coastal forces searched
3,655 junks and 15,078 persons, a marked increase
over last week's 3,490 and 13,717. None of 50 de-
tainees were confirmed as Viet Cong. A noteworthy
bonus from MARKET TIME (surveillance) operations has
been the apprehension of draft-dodgers and deserters.
The stringent enforcement of curfew and "no junk"
areas is expected to be of considerable benefit, al-
though progress is now reported as slow.
8. Twelve B-52 Stratofortress raids were flown
during the week against target areas in Quang Tin,
Pleiku, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa provinces, bringing
the total of such missions to 123.
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Communist Activities
9. Viet Cong and PAVN forces developed no major
engagements, as contact generally was avoided in
favor of terrorism, harassment, and probing actions.
Enemy units apparently are regrouping and preparing
for renewed efforts. The Saigon-Cholon area has
been the scene of current emphasis on terrorism
against Americans and Vietnamese police. The total
of terrorist incidents for the week of 12 to 18
December rose to 33 from 26 the previous week, and
the rate has continued high. Elsewhere, terrorism
as usual accounted for more than 60 percent of all
incidents.
10. In I CTZ there were two attacks, one of
small scale in Quang Tin Province on 12 December,
and a battalion-size attack on the My Trang outpost
in southeast Quang Ngai Province on 15 December.
The majority of Viet Cong incidents in I CTZ con-
tinued to consist of harassing fire directed against
US Marines in the vicinity of Da Nang and Chu Lai.
11. Only one Viet Cong attack was reported in the
II Corps area during the week. On 14 December, an
unknown number of Viet Cong attacked a company of the
41st Regiment (ARVN) five kilometers northwest of
Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. For the seventh con-
secutive week, the II CTZ incident total (110) was
low, with only about 12.5 percent of all terrorism
in the country occurring there.
12. In III CTZ, there were seven small-scale at-
tacks during the week. A strong Viet Cong thrust
came on 1..6 December when a unit of unknown size
ambushed to ARVN companies on a road-clearing op-
eration in Hau Nghia Province. ARVN casualties were
50 killed, 21 wounded, and 18 missing; 87 weapons
were lost.
13. On 14 December, a Viet Cong unit attacked a
police station on the edge of Cholon, scattering
the defenders and seizing 19 weapons. Several
Americans and Vietnamese have been injured in a
wave of grenade attacks; in an effort to reduce
American vulnerability, a dusk-to-dawn curfew began
on 19 December.
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable primarily
becausc of Viet Cong sabotage/
interdiction efforts.
SECRET
Information as of 18 December 1965
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14. Two small-scale attacks on government out-
posts in IV CTZ were reported, and the number and
intensity of incidents decreased.
15. National Route 1 is closed in Quang Ngai,
Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, and Binh Tuy prov-
inces. In Quang Tri Province, Route 9 is closed.
Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc,
Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is
closed west of Pleiku town, and Route 7 is closed
in Phu Yen Province. Provincial Route 10 is
closed-in Hau Nghai Province, as is Interprovincial
Route 1 in Binh Long and Binh Duong provinces. The
national railroad is closed between Gia Ray, Long
Khanh Province, and the Binh Thuan - Ninh Thuan
province border; between Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Prov-
ince, and Da Nang, Quang Nam Province; and from Hue,
Thua Thien Province north to the demilitarized
zone.
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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION
1. Official GVN statistics indicate that 499
Chieu Hoi ralliers returned to government control
during the past week, a decline from the previous
week's total of 562. The sharpest drop was re-
flected in the number of military returnees--214
this week in contrast to last week's 376. However,
the number of Communist political cadres and civil-
ian refugee ralliers increased to 101 and 182, re-
spectively, against last week's respective totals
of 55 and 129. No change was noted in the continued
low level of draft dodger/deserter returnees: only
two for the second consecutive reporting period.
2. As of 12 December, the number of Vietnamese
refugees totaled 748,858, of whom 463,033 were lo-
cated in temporary shelters.
3. The National Institute of Administration
(NIA), in conjuction with the ministries of Rural
Construction, Interior, and Justice, will provide a
special training program to 40 district chiefs in
late December. The 70-hour program will include 20
hours on pacification and rural construction, 20 on
administrative techniques, 1.6 on special problems,
and 14 on justice, courts, and boards work. In ad-
dition, Premier Ky, acting at the request of the
Ministry of Interior, has ordered another 100 per-
cent increase in trainees for NIA's regular program
to develop field administrators for local govern-
ments. This will begin with the next school year.
4. The status of rural security in central
coastal Binh Dinh Province was the subject of a re-
cent memorandum by a returning USOM provincial re-
porter. Rural security in Binh Dinh began to col-
lapse in late 1964 and during the first half of 1965
the province administratively dissolved--in effect,
abandoned--three of its eleven districts, losing
control of virtually all the countryside. In Feb-
ruary and March, considerable fear prevailed that
the capital of Qui Nhon might be attacked. The
situation became somewhat less critical when the
first US Marine elements landed in early July, fol-
lowed by elements of the US 101st Airborne Division,
the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and most of the ROK
Tiger Division.
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5. Between August and November 1965, there
were a number of improvements in security in the
southern part of Binh Dinh. More than 80 kilo-
meters of strategic lateral Route 19 from Qui
Nhon toward An Khe is a safe daytime drive for a
single vehicle, as is coastal Route 1 for some 30
kilometers north of the provincial capital. Ele-
ments of the ROK Division presently patrol within
a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) that in-
cludes Binh Khe, An Nhon, and Tuy Phuoc districts,
and appear to have kept sizable Viet Cong units out
of a large portion of the province's southern low-
lands. A number of refugees have been able to re-
turn to rural areas: about 7,000 to Tuy Phuoc, 6,000
to An Nhon, and 4,000 to Binh Khe. In addition, a
significant portion of the main valley of sparsely
populated Vinh Thanh district in the center of the
province has been cleared with the aid of US 1st
Cavalry Division elements, and the Vietnamese CIDG
paramilitary camp there has been strengthened in
anticipation of the reintroduction of district
administration.
6. The southern lowlands of the province re-
main a difficult area, however. The Korean TAOR
is enormous, comparable in size to Gia Dinh Prov-
ince, and has a high population density, so that a
division is easily absorbed in it. Guerrilla
presence remains, and units from Binh Dinh's esti-
mated 12,000-plus Viet Cong regular force are nearby,
in a position to attack a number of villages within
the TAOR. The situation is further complicated by
two other factors, the weakness of local government,
and the many changes in GVN ?- Viet Cong ascendency
that the area has experienced.
7. In the three northern coastal districts--
Hoai Nhon, Phu My, and Phu Cat, together containing
some 360,000 inhabitants--Communist control includes
ascendency over most of Hoati Nhon outside the chief
town of Bong Son, and administrative presence in
nine of Phu Cat's 11 villages with partial control
over more than half its population. Although inland
Hoai Nhon district is in precarious condition, the
large An Tuc district, which forms the western bound-
ary of the province, is secure in the environs of An
Khe and the remainder is vi.rtually unpopulated plateau.
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