SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1966
• Content Type: FORM

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
BEST COPY
Available
THROUGHOUT
FOLDER
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
 _,,..~~z m~Ra.llnn4wnatscx~=~..,.r;.4m.
Approved For.elease 2004h):`/3'IA-RDP79T0082YA000900430001-9
22 J u a n l
i E M O M X 1 i l t l 105 TU XMCW
UBJMGT: White a al iwst for Mamarandum one Prospects
for 5ediwtiea of diet Troop Strength in Eastern
Burope
1. Mr. Bator of the White a9mo staff called Mr.
Smith this morning aM. requested a memorandum which would
educate Mr. Poster and himself on the "thin-out prol3lem"
in astern *wOpe.
2, He would like to know the facts regarding the
current Soviet military presence in betern 8urope, Boviet
attitudes toward saintaioing farces there, and the prospects
for reduction of Soviet military strength in the area. If
we do not have sufficient information to answer certain
questions, we should asy so.
3. Mr. Bator requested that the memorandum be availa-
ble early next work.
Distribution :
Original nag
M oul
i oltth)l c men,
&ceo Cu'ooo
1 Policy oupffimtwfLte ~ Eiso
On file NSC release instructions apply.
Elcciut :;i t, .
declassiti ;. iaa
'Approved For Re are 2 4 03/ 1 CIA R~P79TA A 000900430001-9
25X1
 Approved For Rqj,pase 2P?319/3.SMRE7pT00826AW900430001-9
T3
29 June 1966
Copy No.
25X1
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25X1
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
Approved For Release 2'UQB/3$:EEa 7-UT00826A000900430 -
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
 Approved F~r Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9 I 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Soviet Military Forces in Eastern Europe
SUMMARY
The USSR has been urging reform of the Warsaw
Pact's structure on its Eastern European allies,
and proposals for change will probably be on the
agenda of the forthcoming Pact "summit" meeting in
Bucharest. Measures which would result in tighter
integration of all member states are not politically
feasible, much as Moscow might desire thorn. These
restraints need not, however, preclude a reorganiza-
tion entailing some reduction of Soviet forces in
East Germany (GSFG) and there are some indications
that this is contemplated. This might make sense
on military grounds in addition to bringing Moscow
political dividends in Western Europe. But, even
so, in the present climate, it is probable that
Moscow will prefer a conservative course, and the
odds are against a dramatic gesture.
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000909430001-9
 Approved F
1. The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative
Committee (PCC)--the political and military chiefs
of the member states--is scheduled to meet in Bu-
charest in early July. This will be the first
meeting in about a year and a half of a body which
is supposed to convene twice a year at a minimum.
To accomplish even this much--agreement on the
meeting itself--has meant hard bargaining by Moscow
for more than six months.
2. It is not coincidental that the Bucharest
meeting will come hard on the heels of De Gaulle's
visit to the USSR, because Moscow and its Eastern
European allies do not overlook the relevance of
developments in NATO to their own alliance. To Mos-
cow these developments represent an opportunity
which can be best exploited if the political and
military cohesion of the Eastern bloc is preserved,
but to others, like the Rumanians, they hold the
promise of a further reduction of Soviet hegemony
in Eastern Europe.
3. Faced with this divergence of purpose, Mos-
cow probably can not accomplish the degree of "strength-
ening" and "perfection" of the Warsaw Pact structure
it has sought. The Bucharest meeting might, never-
theless, be able to agree on compromise arrangements
which will satisfy Moscow's desire to maintain a.
degree of political and military interdependence in
the Soviet bloc while giving the Eastern European
countries a more genuine say in some of the Pact's
decisive deliberations.
4. Much more problematical is that a reorganiza-
tion of the Pact will entail a reduction of Soviet
forces in Eastern Germany. This is a step, however,
which would have appeal in both Eastern and Western
Europe and could be undertaken without impairing
Moscow's military security.
Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe
5. There are at present an estimated 280,000
Soviet troops in East Germany, 25,000 in Poland, and
50,000 in Hungary.. These forces are all there at
the invitation of the three governments concerned,
but within the over-all legal framework of the Warsaw
Pact Treaty which provides, in Article 5: "They (the
contracting parties) shall likewise adopt other agreed
25X1
25X1
Approvedl For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900440001-9
 Approved Fc
measures necessary to strengthen their defensive
power, in order to protect the peaceful labors of
their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their
frontiers and territories, and provide defense
against possible aggression." In addition, bilateral
status of forces agreements between each of these
three countries and the USSR have been worked out
since 1956. These agreements cover such matters as
location of the Soviet troops in each country; shar-
ing of the cost of maintaining the Russian troops;
and the degree to which these troops are subject to
the laws of the host country.
6. All told, there are twenty-six Soviet combat
divisions in the three Eastern European countries,
plus nondivisional combat support and service units.
These forces are under the jurisdiction of three large
field commands called groups of forces, apparently
the peacetime designation of the Soviet wartime "Front."
Most representative and by far the largest of the
groups of forces is the Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany (GSFG)--organized into five armies--which
commands 20 of the 26 divisions outside of the Soviet
Union. The Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland
has only two divisions and the Southern Group of
Forces (SGF) in Hungary commands the remaining four.
It is the GSFG and the NGF which, together with some
24 combat-ready divisions of Poland, East Germany,
and Czechoslovakia, provide the major ground offen-
sive and defensive capability against the central
force of NATO.
7. Soviet ground forces in the forward area are
also organically supported by the tactical aviation
25X1
25X1
25X1
8. The bulk of these forces are commanded by
General of the Army P. K. Koshevoy, commander in chief
of the GSFG. The NGF is commanded by Col. Gen.. G. V.
Baklanov, and the SGF by Col. Gen. Provalov. These
forces, particularly the GSFG, are the mainstay of
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0009004430001-9
25X1
 Approved
Strategic Developments
10. Soviet planning for their forces in Eastern
Europe is apparently based on the assumption that a
war in Europe would begin with a NATO nuclear attack.
25X1
25X1
With this type of
conflict in mind, the Soviets purposely have kept
logistic requirements low. In striving for maximum
speed and decisive shock effect, the staying power
of both Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions
has been sacrificed. This could be a serious organi-
zational deficiency should the conflict be protracted.
11. In recent years, there have been indications
that the Soviets are giving greater weight to the
possibility of a nonnuclear or more protracted war.
We have not determined how strongly this opinion holds
in the USSR, but Soviet military leaders may have
decided that some reorganization of forces in Eastern
Europe is now required.
The Pact's Value to the USSR
12. The Soviet forces in East Germany are a first
line for offensive operations and for defense against
an attack from the West as well as a prop to the
Ulbricht regime. The divisions in Poland maintain
and protect the lines of communication and supply be-
tween the USSR and the GSFG. The troops in Hungary,
although they have a less vital strategic role, con-
trol the alternate East-West supply and communications
lines between the USSR and the West. They remain also,
though probably to a diminishing degree, a reserve of
support for the Kadar regime originally installed by
force of Soviet arms in November 1956.
Approved for Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0009Q0430001-9
25X1
 Approved
13. Politically the Pact is one of the few ef-
fective devices available to Moscow for holding the
Soviet bloc together at a time when the forces of
national self-interest are increasingly coming into
play in Eastern Europe. For Moscow, the Pact organi-
zation would have even greater value if it were more
fully integrated both militarily and politically,
but'rthishas become an unattainable goal. This being
the case, the Soviet Union seems to be trying, in-
stead, to strengthen the Pact militarily where it
counts most--in the "northern tier," East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
25X1
25X1
Approved
25X1
 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
The USSR's Broader Tactics
19. The Soviet Union is seeking to exploit dif-
ferences within the Western alliance by suggesting
that improved and profitable relations with Moscow
are possible. This line also is aimed at reinforc-
ing the growing belief in Western Europe that the
USSR no longer has aggressive designs in that direc-
tion. In contrast, it alleges that West Germany is
the only power on the Continent with claims on
neighboring territory and with a vested interest in
the perpetuation of tension, and that Bonn pursues
these policies with the full backing of the US.
20. While holding out the promise of fruitful
negotiations with Moscow on European security, the
Soviets have attacked Bonn for propagating the "myth"
of a menace from the East as a means of acquiring
atomic weapons with which to satisfy its aggressive
ambitions. Moscow hopes in this manner to promote
in West Europe both a growing interest in detente
with the USSR and a growing impatience with Washington
and Bonn's position on contentious East-West issues.
A reduction of Soviet forces in East Germany undoubtedly
would be represented as proof of Moscow's contention
that it is willing to take practical steps toward
easing tension in Europe and that it poses no threat
to the Continent.
21. Soviet purposes would, however, be nearly
as well served by a token reduction of Soviet forces
as by a sizable withdrawal on the order of five or
six divisions, Such a step might, of course, merely
be making a political. virtue out of a military con-
venience.. Such a dramatic gesture, particularly one
Approve
25X1
 Appro~
which might arouse concern in the East German regime
about its internal security, has so far not been
typical of the style of the present Soviet leader-
ship. This conservative temper, as much as anything
else, leads us to anticipate that Moscow, in dealing
with the problems of the Warsaw Pact and of European
security, will move cautiously rather than boldly.
25X1
25X1
Approvefd For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000909430001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900430001-9
 Approved Felease X0/33 -'49T0OWA000900430001-9
Approved For Release 22 /36 E1 IRE'TT00826A000900430001-9