THE ELECTION SPEECHES FOR THE SUPREME SOVIET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000100320003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 21, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
Intelligence Memorandum
The Election Speeches for the Supreme Soviet
Confidential
August 21,-11974
No. 1111/74
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL. SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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The Election Speeches for the Supreme Soviet
August 21, 1974
The Soviet people went to the polls in June in their quadrennial exercise of
"socialist democracy" to elect over 1,500 members of the legislature, the USSR
Supreme Soviet. In keeping with relentless Soviet claims of "progress," the officially
announced turnout of 99.98 percent of eligible voters was slightly higher than for
the last election in 1970. Despite calls in some official quarters in the 1960s for
multiple candidates in such elections, the Soviet voter still has only the choice of
voting "yes" or "no" for the one candidate running from his electoral district.
Even that choice is circumscribed by the official eyes that follow the move-
ments of the Soviet voter. Having established his eligibility to vote (and therefore his
identity), he either hands over his "vote" unmarked, indicating "yes," or retires
conspicuously to a booth, presumably to write "no." As in 1970, Estonia this year
produced the highest proportion of negative votes and spoiled ballot papers, fol-
lowed by the Russian Republic, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia, but whether this was the
result of dissatisfaction or of untidy electoral practices is unknown.
The Soviet procedures stand out even more strongly as a formal ritual when
compared with the pseudo-democratic political process that obtains in Eastern
Europe. Since the end of the Stalin era, several regimes in Eastern Europe have
begun to put more names on the ballot than there are seats to be filled. The voter is
still faced with a single list of candidates approved by the regime, but he is free to
strike out the names of prominent leaders at the top of the ballot. This automat-
ically confers the vote on the remaining names on the list.
No leaders of the regime or other approved candidates have ever been known to
"lose" an election under this system, though some have squeaked by with as little as
85-90 percent of the votes cast in their constituencies. Thus, the elections in these
East European countries serve to some extent as limited public preference polls with
regard to the top leadership, and are so read by both the people and the regimes
concerned.
No such tabulation is possible in Soviet elections, which simply result in a list
of those elected. There is, however, a careful choreography that reveals the relative
standing of individual leaders in terms of prestige in the Kremlin, if not of popular
Comments and queries on the contents of this report are welcome. They may be directed to
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sentiment. Some electoral districts are "better" than others, some leaders receive
more "honorary" nominations from districts they will not ultimately represent, and
the closer to the date of the elections the individual leader gives his speech, the
higher his standing in the pecking order.
The real political significance of the elections is found in the campaign
speeches. These speeches give the individual leaders an opportunity to go on public
record with their personal emphasis on aspects of policy issues facing the leadership
as a whole. Overall, the leaders do not appear to sort themselves out into opposing
camps, but instead present different groupings on different issues. The spread of
opinions suggests pulling, tugging and politicking in which no clear polarization of
positions has developed.
Speeches by members of the top leadership began this year on May 28 and
continued until Brezhnev delivered the final address on June 14 (see chart).
Not all speeches are available in full text; many have been pieced together from
recorded excerpts broadcast by the Moscow domestic radio and from summaries in
the central press. Nevertheless, some firm and some tentative conclusions can be
drawn from them.
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The Soviet Leadership
(in order of election speeches)
Politburo Politburo Candidate Members Non-Politburo Secretaries
Brezhnev (General Secretary of
Central Committee)
Podgorny (President of Supreme
Soviet)
Kosygin (Premier of USSR)
Suslov (Secretary for Ideology
and International Communism)
Kirilenko* (Secretary for Party
Organization and Industry)
Gromyko (Foreign Minister) Ponomarev* (Secretary for
Non-Ruling Communist
Parties)
Kunayev** (Kazakh First
Secretary)
Mazurov (First Deputy Premier
of USSR)
Kulakov* (Secretary for
Agriculture)
Shcherbitsky (Ukrainian First Kapitonov* (Secretary for
Secretary) Party Staffing)
Andropov (Chairman of KGB)
Pelshe (Chairman of Party Con-
trol Commission)
Grechko* (Defense Minister) Solomentsev* (Premier of
RSFSR)
Grishin* (Moscow First Secretary)
Shelepin (Head of Trade Unions)
Polyansky* (Minister of Demichev (Secretary for
Agriculture) Propaganda and Culture)
Masherov (Belorussian First Ustinov* (Secretary for De-
Secretary) fense Industry)
Dolgikh* (Secretary for
Heavy Industry)
Katushev* (Secretary for
Communist Bloc Liaison)
Romanov (Leningrad
First Secretary)
Rashidov (Uzbek First
Secretary)
*Full text of speech not available
**Did not deliver speech due to illness
Underlined speeches were broadcast live
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Brezhnev's Position in the Leadership
Although there was no question about Brezhnev's overall pre-emi-
nence-indeed, his mini-personality cult was enhanced by the election
speeches-some intriguing differences emerged in the way other leaders
referred to the General Secretary.
Brezhnev gained his strongest personal encomiums from Kirilenko-his
unofficial deputy; from party secretary for agriculture Kulakov, who works
under Brezhnev's close guidance; and from septuagenarian party inspector
general Pelshe. KGB chairman Andropov and two former comers who have
suffered political reverses-trade union boss Shelepin and Minister of Agricul-
ture Polyansky-also praised Brezhnev highly. Politburo members or party
secretaries Ponomarev, Kapitonov, Ustinov, Dolgikh, Romanov, Rashidov,
and Solomentsev were equally enthusiastic.
Premier Kosygin (appropriately, as a near equal of Brezhnev); his first
deputy, Mazurov; Foreign Minister Gromyko (somewhat surprisingly); Mos-
cow party boss Grishin; and junior party secretary for ideology and culture
Dernichev delivered proper but relatively perfunctory praise of Brezhnev's
leadership.
At the other end of the spectrum, with an almost chilly attitude, were
two other leaders almost equal to Brezhnev in their standing-President
Podgorny and senior party secretary Suslov. In the same cool and reserved
category were Belorussian party boss Masherov and junior party secretary
Katushev. Defense Minister Grechko's speech is available only in a sum-
marized version in the central press, but he apparently also is on this end of
the spectrum.
It is significant that all speakers mentioned Brezhnev's contributions in
foreign affairs, but only his fervent supporters referred to his leadership in
domestic affairs. Clearly, an effort was made to present a front of monolithic
unity concerning detente on the eve of the President's visit to Moscow.
Domestic problems, however, required no such unity, and the selectivity
with which these aspects of Brezhnev's leadership were praised, as well as the
speeches themselves, suggest deep uncertainties within the leadership as to
the future directions for Soviet economic planning and management, both
over the short term and in the long-term plan scheduled to cover 1976-90.
Planning and Management
One common theme in the election speeches was the need for improve-
ment of planning and management of the economy. The leadership's concern
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seems to be based on a growing awareness of the problems involved in
attempting to apply the fruits of the "scientific and technological revolu-
tion" to the inflexible and unreceptive economic system.
The repetition of the theme :indicated concern, but the variety of
approaches showed little agreement even on where to start. Insistence that
all would be well if everyone would just work "conscientiously" contrasted
with a call for adoption of "a comprehensive systems approach." The wide
spread of opinions suggested pulling, tugging, and politicking in which no
clear polarization of positions has yet developed.
The dimensions of the debate on the organization of the economy were
apparently defined by Brezhnev in his speech to the plenum of the party's
Central Committee last December. The full text of this speech has never
been published, but references to it in the press and by other leaders suggest
that the General Secretary favored some sort of reorganization of economic
planning and management. Excerpts published in a new collection of Brezh-
nev's works this spring indicate that he called for "an entire system of
serious measures" to improve both management and planning. Podgorny,
speaking shortly after the plenum, insisted that no "radical" measures were
contemplated and delivered an unexpected defense of the sectoral approach
(e.g., agriculture, defense, heavy industry, consumer goods) in planning and
management. His apparently gratuitous defense of the sectoral system raised
the possibility that Brezhnev either on his own initiative or under pressure
from other leaders may have proposed its modification.
The December plenum was cited frequently and enthusiastically in the
press for three weeks. In early January, however, a Central Committee
appeal for "socialist competition"--the time-honored technique to raise
production through exhortation-took the spotlight, and references to the
plenum dwindled.
In his campaign speech, Brezhnev did not refer to the reorganization
that seemed to have been at the heart of his plenum speech, although he
again called in general terms for improved planning and methods of manage-
ment, and for increased use of "economic levers" in the economy. In the
mid-1960s, "economic levers" were equated with economic reform. Brezh-
nev's most specific criticism was directed against the plethora of "legal con-
trols" in the economy, the "thousands of different directions and instruc-
tions," often outmoded but still on the books, that have "piled up" and
stifle initiative. "Unfortunately," he noted, "the necessary attention was not
paid to this matter for a long time." This remark could have been expected
to annoy both Podgorny, who is responsible for legislation, and Kosygin,
whose Council of Ministers issues arid operates under such instructions.
Soviet economic reorganizations and reforms in the past have, indeed, simply
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added layer upon layer to the complex list of plan fulfillment "indicators"
that are used to guide the activities of industrial enterprises throughout the
USSR.
Brezhnev commented that the December plenum had discussed this
problem, and he predicted that the Supreme Soviet, the government, minis-
tries, and departments would study the matter "seriously." He did not men-
tion "socialist competition" as a means of increasing production.
Podgorny made no reference to a need to improve planning. Instead, he
called for an improved "style" of work in economic agencies. He asserted
that lower echelons that passed problems up for solution usually had the
authority to resolve them themselves; the possible implication was that there
is nothing wrong with the system itself. He represented the December
plenum as having called for only a strengthening of discipline and order, with
no hint that any organizational proposals had been made. And while he did
not specifically cite the appeal of the Central Committee in January, he
described socialist competition as "the powerful motive force, now as in the
past, for a further boost in the economy."
In contrast to Brezhnev's criticism of outmoded regulations that stifle
initiative, Podgorny called repeatedly for unswerving obedience to existing
norms. In a remarkably defensive passage, he pointed to all the legislative
work done by the Supreme Soviet in the past 15 years (he himself only took
office in December 1965) and concluded with some anticlimactic remarks
on new laws on the state notary system.
Kosygin devoted much of his speech to the progress being made in
various sectors of the economy. He referred to the importance of improved
management and cited the "decisive" influence of scientific and technical
progress in increasing labor productivity. He touched only briefly on the
December plenum, although he did credit it with playing a very large organ-
izational role in achieving economic successes and eliminating shortcomings.
Kosygin's references to improvement in planning were made in the
context of developing a longer term plan for 1976-1990. There was no hint
of a change in planning methods. He did, however, cite favorably the shift of
Soviet industry to a two- or three-tier system based on production associa-
tions. A law embodying this change in the structure of the economy was
passed this year, although it has not yet been fully implemented. Kosygin
considered very important those measures announced this spring that call on
consumer and food industries to establish closer ties with retailers in the
hope of achieving greater responsiveness of supply to demand. Unlike
Podgorny, he gave only formal obeisance to the concept of socialist competi-
tion as a means of encouraging output.
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Suslov, as might be expected of the senior party secretary for ideology,
joined Podgorny in expressing his faith in socialist competition. He made the
most precise and detailed reference of any of the leaders to the appeal of the
Central Committee in January 1974, asserting it had led to an increase in
industrial production of nearly two percent over last year. Podgorny and
Kosygin at least gave lip service to the December plenum, but Suslov com-
pletely ignored it. Far from seeing any need for changes in planning and
management, he simply called for discipline.
Kirilenko's speech is available only in summarized form, and conclu-
sions drawn from it should be treated with reserve. Still, there is no flavor of
enthusiasm in it, either for the new paths of the December plenum or for
changes in planning and management.
Mazurov, Kosygin's first deputy, referred to both the plenum and the
appeal. While he credited Brezhnev with having advanced fundamental
proposals at the plenum, he spoke only of improving management, making
no reference to planning in this context. In one passage, however, he noted
that measures were being worked out to improve the planning system by
greater use of economic "levers" and incentives.
Shelepin, in keeping with his position as a former challenger who has
stubbed his toe politically, played it relatively safe. He cited not only the
1974 but also the 1973 Central Committee appeal. He also noted that at the
December plenum, Brezhnev had laid down new, fundamentally important
measures aimed at improving planning, economic efficiency, and organiza-
tion.
The most radical stand on technological improvement of the economy
was taken by Masherov, the Belorussian party chief. He called for a transi-
tion from the worn-out tracks of former practice and archaic organizational
methods to the rails of a modern, scientifically substantiated, rational system
of management. He specifically mentioned a "comprehensive systems
approach" utilizing computers, mathematical models, and other sophisti-
cated techniques. Masherov attacked attempts "to combine what cannot be
combined-ultra-modern equipment such as the computer with obsolete
management methods and information gathering." Only Ustinov, party
secretary for defense industry, mentioned similar technological techniques
for improving industrial efficiency..
Masherov's enthusiasm for innovation contrasted particularly with the
approach of Shcherbitsky, the Ukrainian party boss. Shcherbitsky insisted
that improving work quality is more important than technological progress.
Socialist competition, he said, "organically binds" producers to economic
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policy. Brezhnev presumably handpicked Shcherbitsky when the latter was
elevated to his present post two years ago, but the Ukrainian party boss may
now be responding to the pressures of his own constituency rather than to
those of his patron in the center.
Longer Term Issues
The debate on economic reform may be spilling over into the area of
intraparty, and even socialist, democracy. In the past, calls for innovation in
the management of the economy have been associated with pleas for more
"openness" in the discussion of problems and policies. At least two of the
Supreme Soviet campaign speeches suggest that a revival of this debate may
be taking place, although the sensitivity of the subject demands a more
muted tone than the discussion of economic affairs.
In a discussion of the further development of socialist democracy and
the political system of mature socialism, Brezhnev said that the need for an
increase in the political awareness of the working people and the extension
of glasnost-openness-in the work of party, soviet, and economic organiza-
tions was especially urgent. The term glasnost has a checkered past, develop-
ing "liberal" connotations during the mid-60s and falling into disuse after
the invasion of Czechoslovakia. As far as is known, neither Brezhnev nor any
other current leader has previously used the word in this manner. Its
appearance in the present context might reflect a realization that a greater
flow of information is necessary if the increasingly complex technological
society is to operate efficiently. Unless he more clearly defines what he
means by the term, however, Brezhnev risks stirring up greater ferment
among Soviet "liberal" intellectuals.
Podgorny took a rather different approach. He called for the strength-
ening of discipline and order in Soviet life, declaring that "the higher the
degree of organization and self-discipline of all members of society, the more
effectively will the system of socialist democracy function." He noted
vaguely that "socialist democracy is developing and improving," but
specified that in its present stage, the fundamental task is to combine the
scientific-technological revolution with socialism. Podgorny also made an
intriguing reference to "unwelcome proposals" to improve socialist democ-
racy according to bourgeois standards, but it is not clear whether he had in
mind Western criticisms, those from dissident physicist Andrey Sakharov, or
Brezhnev's modest proposal.
During the mid-60s, agitation for glasnost was associated with the
efforts of younger, technically trained party members to influence Soviet
policy. These "young Turks" met opposition from older members who
maintained that the primary responsibility of a communist was political, not
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technical, supervision. Discussion in the speeches of technical versus ideolog-
ical training for cadres may be a continuation of this debate and another
facet of the glasnost controversy.
Belorussian boss Masherov made the strongest pitch for technical train-
ing, declaring "appeals and exhortation alone are not enough." Masherov has
also been the strongest supporter of technological innovation in managing
the economy. First Deputy Premier Mazurov, Masherov's predecessor as
Belorussian party boss, called for improvement in production "not by
numbers but by skill." Dernichev, party secretary for propaganda and cul-
ture, stressed the need for constant growth of skills and expertise.
Most of the other leaders confined themselves to bland statements on
the development of high moral qualities through socialist production.
Kosygin spoke of the high degree of moral fiber exhibited in the Soviet man.
Kirilenko, party boss for heavy industry, referred to the creative activeness
of the masses in building communism. Among the stronger statements on the
importance of political virtues in production was the declaration by Ukrai-
nian boss Shcherbitsky that work quality depends on "the level of political
work in the collective."
Most of the other leaders also stuck to generalities concerning the
virtues of the Soviet political system. Typical is Suslov's stricture that
officials be "attentive to the needs of the population, that they avoid red
tape in receiving visitors and in examining their requests and complaints, and
that they strictly adhere to Soviet laws." Kosygin, Mazurov, and Shelepin
spoke of the increasing authority and broad social representation of the
soviets. Suslov contrasted the Supreme Soviet deputies to the US Congress in
terms of social background, age, and other features. Such accolades for
Soviet parliamentarianism, however, are standard propaganda fare and have
little substantive importance..
Long-Term Planning
By early 1976, Moscow should unveil its much-heralded 15-year
(1976-1990) economic plan. The campaign speeches of the top leaders hint
at the scope and direction of the project. Brezhnev gave the most detailed
and enthusiastic description of the idea. He stated that the next five-year
plan will play an integral part in a general long-term plan for the develop-
ment of the national economy. The result will be "not simply another
five-year plan, but documents of truly programmatic significance." He
described the plan as "an immutable condition for successful economic
development."
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Brezhnev placed consumer welfare high on the agenda. For the three
five-year plans, he called for more high-quality foodstuffs and consumer
goods, expanded public services, and higher wages. He asserted that the
15-year plan will provide for the "reconstruction of the majority of our
cities and villages" and "a well-appointed apartment for every family."
The other leaders did not extend as unqualified an endorsement of
long-term planning. Kosygin referred to the next five-year plan several times
in different contexts before mentioning that "work is in progress on a draft
long-term plan." Without specifying the time frame, he declared that the
project "will facilitate the organization of a harmonious system of inter-
locked continuous plans, long-term, medium-term, and annual plans."
Podgorny's statement did not commit its author; he simply announced that
an integrated approach involving long-term planning "today characterizes the
party's whole economic policy."
Mazurov said that long-range planning was a major new step along the
path of the building of communism, which would take into account the
enormous advantages to accrue from greater technological development.
Demichev pointed out that long-term planning was one of several means by
which the party provides for future generations. Curiously, the Pravda
summaries of the speeches of Kirilenko and Kulakov, party bosses of
industry and agriculture respectively, contain no references to the subject.
The attempt by the Kremlin to project long-term trends will have
serious implications for both domestic and foreign policy. Clearly, the
difficulties attendant on meshing three successive five-year plans will
heighten the importance of planning methods, and can be expected to
aggravate the always contentious subject of resource allocations.
It is obvious from his description of the long-term plan as a document
of "programmatic significance" that Brezhnev is trying to use the plan to
institutionalize his own policies so that they will continue beyond his
leadership. (By 1990, he would be 84.) Soviet plans are referred to as the
"law" of the land. Although they may be adjusted and their goals revised
(generally downward), the overall directions of the plans are solemnly
approved by party congresses and plenums and by the "legislature"-the
Supreme Soviet-not only in their five-year form but also yearly.
Foreign Policy Issues
Although disagreements on foreign policy issues were not expressed as
openly as those over domestic policy, variations of tone and emphasis
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revealed some differences. All speakers favored detente, but some were more
enthusiastic than others, and assessments of the motivations and intentions
of the West diverged.
Brezhnev, the leader most visibly associated with detente, came out
strongly for further improvement in relations with both the US and Europe.
He recognized that problems remain and that some matters "are not yet
ripe," but insisted that the two nations should not "mark time." He called
for continued improvement in relations with the US despite "fortuitous
factors"-a clear allusion to Watergate-and was optimistic about the then
upcoming summit with the President.
Brezhnev spoke well of summits in general, noting that better relations
with Europe had resulted in part from efforts at earlier summits with De
Gaulle, Pompidou, and Brandt. The Soviet leader said that Giscard and
Schmidt had pledged continued progress. The General Secretary roundly
criticized "those who are pursuing tactics of delay and procrastination" at
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Regarding the two areas of the world where Soviet and US interests
have recently collided, Brezhnev was notably more optimistic than his
colleagues. He cited the "`victory" of the Vietnamese "people" and com-
mented that "dangerous hotbeds" of tensions in the Middle East are being
liquidated.
Premier Kosgyin, too, was sanguine about detente. He declared that the
change in relations with the US is in the interests of the Soviet people. The
Premier's remarks about remaining "contradictions and difficulties" were
mild and more than offset by pledges to continue and expand "cooperation
with the capitalist countries."
He hewed close to Brezhnev's positions on foreign policy, except on
two points:
? He declared that the easing of international tensions "will not mean
an end to the class struggle between the two opposed social systems."
Brezhnev apparently felt no need to make such a declaration.
? Kosygin was less tough than Brezhnev on the Indochina war. The
former spoke of the "end of aggression"; the latter of "American imperial-
ist aggression" and the continuing importance of political struggle in the
region.
Not surprisingly, Brezhnev also had strong support from his top deputy,
Kirilenko, who was effusive on the success of summitry and the prospect for
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extensive cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union, and from KGB
chief Andropov, who endorsed Brezhnev's policies and offered a generally
upbeat view of detente. Ukrainian boss Shcherbitsky, who diverged from
Brezhnev on domestic policy, approved the party leader's course on detente
and gave him personal credit for successes in foreign policy.
Reservations concerning detente were most clearly expressed by Presi-
dent Podgorny. He credited the success of Moscow's foreign policy specif-
ically to the growing strength of the Soviet Union. This strength, he said,
enables socialism to wrest concessions from the West. While reciting the
usual list of benefits produced by detente-the end of the Vietnam war,
normalization of relations with Bonn, and the convening of the European
security conference-Podgorny tied any future progress to the solution of
the "acute social problems of our time." Speaking of the then-approaching
summit, Podgorny could only hope that the results would coincide with the
interests of the Soviet people.
Ideology chief Suslov was apparently on the same wave length as
Podgorny. His speech included an extensive discussion of the crisis of
modern capitalism. While conceding that a relaxation of tension between
states might occur, Suslov pointed to an "unceasing confrontation" between
the two systems. He cited inflation and the growth of unemployment as
signs that the West is in serious difficulty.
Suslov's line was supported by Shelepin, the trade union boss, and
Demichev. Shelepin spoke of the "hereditary nightmare of crisis" infecting
the capitalist system, while Demichev defined detente in terms of con-
solidating the Soviet Union's leading position in the world.
Foreign Minister Gromyko was less effusive about detente than either
Brezhnev or Kosygin. He expressed reservations about the US and noted that
"zigzags" might occur in relations between the two countries. Unlike col-
leagues who saw the forces behind detente as irreversible, he observed only
that "it will not be easy" for American critics to reverse the tide.
He stressed the seriousness of the remaining problems in the Middle
East and said that "half measures favored by Israel and its backers must not
be allowed." In a general statement designed to emphasize the Soviet
Union's leading role in world affairs, he declared that "not a single" impor-
tant international problem can be solved without Soviet participation.
Ponomarev, who has overlapping responsibilities with Gromyko, also
gave a mixed notice to detente. He saw the results of summitry as "extraor-
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dinarily important" and spoke approvingly of "realistically minded political.
circles in the capitalist states,'' but he also called attention to "the intrigues
and adventures of imperialism."
Kosygin's first deputy, Mazurov, seemed to give pride of place to
relations with Europe. He discussed Soviet achievements in dealing with the
US in the past tense, while expressing great hopes for future Soviet-European
relations. He also differed with his boss, on the Middle East.
Defense Minister Grechko, whose speech is available only in summary
form, seemed to express modest expectations for detente. He declared that
steps toward preventing war have "successfully begun," but attributed the
progress of detente to the defensive capability of the Soviet Union.
Unity Lacking on National Security Issues
Issues of national security, particularly arms limitation, appear to have
been the subject of some disagreement. While Brezhnev and Kosygin stressed
the value of limiting arms as a means of ensuring national security and
deterring war, Podgorny and Suslov expressed strong preferences for main-
taining powerful Soviet forces.
Overall, however, the leaders do not appear to sort out into two
opposing camps. Podgorny and Suslov, for example, seem to disagree over
the seriousness of the Chinese threat. Gromyko indicated a preference for
Europe in the relaxation of tensions, while Ponomarev placed more emphasis
on the US. Both called for strengthening the military. The campaign state-
ments do not establish clear lines of conflict, but they do show different
groupings on different issues.
Party chief Brezhnev stressed the need for further progress in the
negotiations on arms limitation. He assured his audience that Soviet leaders
want political detente to be complemented by military detente. He ex-
plained that Moscow has not yet succeeded because of the opposition of
certain circles in the US, but added that the Soviet-US agreements of 1972
and 1973 have set the two powers on the right path. Brezhnev appeared to
be addressing his own critics as much as Westerners when he referred to "the
supporters of the arms race" who believe that reducing arms means taking a
risk. He argued that there is immeasurably more risk in continuing the
unrestrained accumulation of arms.
Premier Kosygin seems to agree. He may well have had Soviet oppo-
nents of arms limitation in mind when he spoke of some in the West who
"believe that increased military expenditures can be accommodated amid a
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policy of detente." Such a policy, Kosygin stated, will "increase the danger
of war and result in unending waste of mankind's strength and resources."
The Soviet Premier said that "the USSR resolutely rejects such an approach"
and noted that the Soviet Union "is reliably protected by our armed forces."
By placing this statement on the strength of the military in the present tense,
he seemed to undermine the argument that Soviet defense needs bolstering.
President Podgorny's assessment of Soviet defense needs differed con-
siderably. Since "militarists" in the West are pressing their governments for
increased arms expenditures, he asserted, the Soviet Union must "take
appropriate measures to strengthen our country's defense capability."
The available summary of Defense Minister Grechko's speech suggests
that he, like Podgorny, had reservations concerning arms limitation. Grechko
warned that "imperialism is even now preparing for war" and that "the
danger of war remains a grim reality of our times." Grechko argued that
Soviet defenses must therefore remain prepared not only for the most likely
course of events but for "unexpected shifts" as well. In contrast to Kosygin,
he spoke of the "indivisibility" of strengthening peace and defense.
The defense minister apparently did not make an explicit pitch for
increasing Soviet armaments. Instead, he acknowledged that the government
is "doing everything necessary to maintain the defense of the country at the
level of present-day requirements." He assured his listeners that the Soviet
armed forces possess good modern weapons and military equipment.
Foreign Minister Gromyko also warned that the threat of nuclear war
has not ended. He noted with approval that the Soviet government is
strengthening the defense capability of its armed forces. Ustinov, the party
secretary for defense industry, declared that the "imperialists" have not laid
down their arms, and he called for greater military strength.
Suslov, Shelepin, Ponomarev, and Mazurov all called for vigilance and a
"strengthening" or "consolidation" of the military. Kirilenko and Demichev
expressed their satisfaction with the present state of Soviet defense, but their
speeches are available only in heavily edited and summarized form. KGB
chairman Andropov declared that "the land of the Soviets now is not to be
vanquished by the military path," but warned of attempts at subversion.
The China question got considerably less attention from Soviet leaders
than detente and national security. Two officials who normally would
discuss the issue-Grechko and Ponomarev-either did not or their remarks
were not reported. Among those who mentioned China, attitudes ranged
from mild to belligerent, with most of the Politburo, Brezhnev included,
falling somewhere in between.
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Brezhnev asserted that China has aligned itself with representatives of
extreme reaction, such as the present Chilean government and out-of-power
conservatives in West Germany, the UK, and the US. He nevertheless con-
cluded his remarks on China by maintaining that the Soviet leaders continue
to support a return to normal relations with China, and he spoke of "the
great Chinese people."
Podgorny and Shelepin were more outspoken than ever on the military
threat that China poses to the USSR. The Soviet President went so far as to
refer to China's "nuclear missile potential." This is the first such statement
by a Soviet leader since Grechko brought the matter up last January.
Shelepin also broke new ground for a Soviet leader when he used the China
"threat" to justify strengthening the USSR's defenses.
Kosygin's approach was more moderate, but still less conciliatory than
Brezhnev's. He did not discuss China as an explicit threat to Soviet security,
but depicted China's action as directed against the "socialist community."
Gromyko took a somewhat more conciliatory approach than Brezhnev.
Suslov's remarks on China-in marked contrast to his position in March
1969, when he seemed to see China as a real danger-were distinctly mild, as
were those of KGB chief Andropov.
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Confidential
Confidential
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