SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000800300002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 28, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
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April 28, 1975
Soviets Meet with Syrian Foreign Minister . . . . 1
Soviets Speak Up Against the Hegemony
Clause in Japan-China Treaty. . . . . . . . . . 3
Grechko Discusses World War II . . . . . . . . . 4
Nomination of Leaders to Republic
Supreme Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Soviet Official Discusses European
Security Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bosnia-Hercegovina Party
Divided on Cominformists . . . . . . . . . . .11
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Soviets Meet with
Syrian Foreign Minister
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's visit to the
USSR last week marked a continuation of Moscow's
efforts to prepare for a resumption of the Geneva
conference.
The communique issued at the end of the visit,
however, left unclear whether the Soviets were able
to make substantial progress on Geneva with the
Syrians, particularly over the issue of PLO repre-
sentation. The Syrians have been strong advocates
of early participation at Geneva by an independent
Palestine Liberation Organization delegation. Al-
though the Soviets have supported the "equal" par-
ticipation of PLO representatives, they have been
ambiguous about the timing of Palestinian attend-
ance and have kept open the possibility that the
PLO will become part of another delegation.
The Palestinian issue will be discussed dur-
ing the visit to Moscow of a PLO delegation headed
by Yasir Arafat, which began yesterday. In addi-
tion, Gromyko is apparently planning a trip to the
Middle East next month to continue discussions on
Geneva.
The Syrian-Soviet communique was markedly
warmer on bilateral issues than the one issued
after Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit last
week. In what may be an effort to signal their con-
tinued displeasure with Cairo, the Soviets once
again stated their commitment to building Syrian
military strength and praised Syria's political
policies.
The four-day trip to Damascus by Soviet Chief
of Staff Kulikov--which coincided with Khaddam's
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stay in Moscow--may have been designed to under-
score continuing Soviet military support at a time
when Moscow was pressing Khaddam on Geneva. Kuli-
kov met with President Asad and Syrian military
leaders and probably checked on how Damascus is em-
ploying Moscow's substantial military aid.
It is likely that Syria's dispute with Iraq
over the waters of the Euphrates River was dis-
cussed in Moscow. Pre-
mier Kosygin assure Iraqi strong man Saddam Husayn
during his recent visit to Moscow that the Soviets
would bring up the matter with the Syrians.
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Soviets Speak Up Against the Hegemony
Clause in Japan-C ina Treaty
The Soviets have inveighed against the pro-
spective Japan-China peace and friendship treaty
with signed commentaries in Pravda and Izvestia.
Moscow seems reconciled to the conclusion of a
treaty, but it is trying to stiffen Japanese opposi-
tion to the inclusion of a reference to "anti-
hegemony" that is patently directed at the Soviets.
The commentaries are tough on the Chinese and
--given the fact that Moscow would prefer that,
Tokyo not sign any treaty with China until it is
willing to sign one with the USSR--relatively easy
on the Japanese. The Soviets charge that Chinese
leaders have admitted that the Soviet Union is the
target of the hegemony language, and that Peking's,
purpose is to cover its own designs and'to drive
a wedge between the USSR and Japan. The commen-
taries praise Japanese leaders who are sensitive
to the real purposes of the Chinese and are re-
sisting the hegemony language in the treaty.
The timing and tone of these commentaries sug-
gest that Moscow sees some hope that Tokyo will be
able at least to water down the treaty's language.
The Soviets probably believe, with some justifica-
tion, that their strong representations in Tokyo
against the treaty have caused the Japanese to take
a tougher stand in the talks than they would have
otherwise. Even if Tokyo capitulates, the Soviets
would have helped create a controversial issue be-
tween the two countries and would have the Japa-
nese on the defensive when they deal with Moscow.
The Soviets might also press the Japanese to make
amends by supporting Moscow's Asian security con-
cept, which the Soviets will probably dust off
before very long as their contribution to the
litical adjustments under way in East Asia.
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Grechko Discusses World War II
Defense Minister Grechko, in an article ap-
pearing in the March 1975 issue of Problems of
Peace and Socialism, attempts to clarify four major
contradictions the Soviets face in trying to pro-
ject their version of the causes and the course of
World War II. While it breaks little new ground,
the article is the most detailed and authoritative
statement of its type to emerge during the pub-
licity for the "Great Thirtieth" celebrations. The
four contradictions are: 1) the wartime alliance
with the Western imperialist powers, 2) the non-
aggression pact with Germany, 3) the repression and
privation of the 1930s in the USSR, and 4) the So-
viet role in the war against Japan.
Grechko grapples first with the complex prob-
lem of explaining how imperialism could be at once
the enemy and the ally of the Soviet Union. He ex-
plains this in standard class terms: the "people"
sided with the Soviets, while the exploiters were
for the Germans. The ruling circles of the im-
perialist powers, he writes, saw German fascism as
their class ally in the struggle against the Soviet
Union. "However complex and contradictory inter-
national relations in the capitalist world were in
the 1930s," he continues, "it remains an indisputable
fact that other imperialist powers, directly or in-
directly, invested effort and money in the prep-
aration of aggression against the USSR and the
creation of the German fascist army." The policy
of appeasement practiced by the imperialists served
the same end, he claims. Meanwhile, the Soviet
Union was doing all it could to avert war and was
trying to arrange an international alliance against
Germany. These overtures were rebuffed, however,
because the imperialists saw socialism, not fas-
cism, as their main enemy. When the Western
powers' calculated attempts to direct Germany's'
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aggression against the USSR failed and they found
themselves instead victims of the German army,
they were unable to offer effective resistance and
fell one by one to Hitler's forces. This gave
Germany the economic base from which to launch an
attack against the Soviet Union--the primary target
all along--and the Soviet Union and the Western
powers became allies.
Grechko then attempts a detailed explanation
of the need for the repression and privation in the
Soviet Union during the 1930s, a need which he as-
serts was directly related to war preparations.
Bearing in mind Lenin's dictum about being encir-
cled by hostile forces, the Soviet Union was aware
of the risk of war and took the necessary meas-
ures during the prewar period to build up an eco-
nomic, military, moral, and political base of de-
fense. Soviet domestic policy of the 1930s--col-
lectivization, liquidation of the exploiting
classes, the uniting of the disparate nationalities
of the USSR and other measures--were directed to
this end and made it possible for the USSR to em-
bark on a fundamental technical restructuring of
the Soviet armed forces and their armament.
This process, Grechko explains, took time,
and it was therefore necessary to try to delay the
start of a war that was becoming "increasingly in-
evitable." In this situation, the only recourse
was to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany,
which gave the USSR two vital years to build up the
country's defenses.
Grechko addresses himself to the fourth con-
tradiction, the Soviet role in the war against
Japan, in terms somewhat more straightforward than
previous Soviet statements, including his own. He
notes that the Soviet Union entered the war against
Japan only in August 1945, and he does not make the
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Japan. He does, however, ignore the US-Japanese war
in the Pacific, saying only that the Soviet army and
the Mongolians defeated the Japanese Kwangtung army.
In an ambiguous formulation, he states that the So-
viets estimate "at their true worth" the contribu-
tions of the peoples of the USA, Great Britain,
France, Canada and other countries who fought the
usual claim that the Soviet Union defeated militarist
Germans:
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Nominations of Leaders to
Republic Supreme Soviets
The results of the first day of nominations of
candidates for election to republic Supreme Soviets
were published by Pravda on April 25. The ranking
of Politburo members according to number of nomina-
ting districts indicates little change in status
following the Central Committee plenum that dropped
Shelepin from the leadership. Brezhnev leads with
nominations from 16 electoral districts. Podgorny
and Kosygin are tied for second place with 10;
Suslov and Kirilenko have three each; and the other
leaders all have one.
The distance between Brezhnev's score and that
of Podgorny and Kosygin is not quite as great as in
Pravda's first day of reporting on last year's nom-
inations to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless,
coverage of Brezhnev's candidacy overwhelms all
others. Pictures of meetings in electoral districts
carried by all central newspapers but one show only
Brezhnev's portrait being held up by enthusiastic
supporters. (The Moscow Oblast paper shows Brezh-
nev's portrait out in front, flanked by those of
Podgorny and Kosygin.) Brezhnev's name appears
first in the accounts of meetings in each republic.
Nominations of top leaders are honorary in all
cases but one. The ratio established by Pravda on
its first day of reporting is generally maintained
throughout the nomination campaign. The central
and republic press will continue to publish reports
of these honorary nominations during the next couple
of weeks. Election day is June 15.
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Following is a tabulation of the number of
district nominations for each leader as initially
reported by Pravda this year and last year:
Brezhnev
21
16
Kosygin
11
10
Podgorny
11
10
Suslov
4
3
Kirilenko
4
3
Andropov
2
1
Grechko
2
1
Gromyko
2
1
Grishin
2
1
Kulakov
2
1
Kunayev
2
1
Mazurov
2
1
Pelshe
2
1
Polyansky
2
1
Shcherbitsky
2
1
Shelepin
2
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Soviet Official Discusses European
Security Talks
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev last
week complained to the US ambassador to the Euro-
pean security talks that the US had switched from
a policy of cooperation to confrontation on con-
ference issues. Kovalev's statements betray Mos-
cow's desire for a quick conclusion to the confer-
ence, and its anxiety that the remaining substan-
tive issues could delay their schedule.
Kovalev was particularly critical of US be-
havior on "Basket III" (human contacts) issues, ac-
cusing the US of suddenly taking a tougher position
than that of its allies. He also complained about
US lack of support for the Soviet concept of pro-
viding advance notification of military maneuvers
only on a voluntary basis.
The Soviets are concerned that the US will,
in concert with the other Western participants,
push for meaningful Soviet concessions on such is-
sues as journalist's rights, the establishment of
reading rooms, and the unimpeded broadcasts of
radio and television into the East. So far, So-
viet concessions have been sufficiently vague as
to have little binding effect, or as in the case
of the so-called "confidence-building measures,"
have been explicitly labeled as "voluntary."
Other items on the conference agenda have been
resolved favorably for Moscow. The list of prin-
ciples of interstate relations, including a state-
ment on the inviolability of frontiers that the
Soviets sought, is now virtually complete.
While the Soviet-proposed date of June 30 for
the final stage of the conference has not been for-
mally accepted, there is general agreement that
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the present working phase of the conference should
end this summer. There is also a growing consensus
that the final meeting should take place at the sum-
mit level, as the Soviets have long desired. I
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Bosnia-Hercegovina Party
Divided on Cominformists
The politically sensitive issue of how to
punish some prestigious war veterans who have be-
come entangled with Cominformists is plaguing the
party leadership in Sarajevo.
The veterans involved include an ex-member of
the Council of the Federation, Pasaga Mandzic. There
is a great reluctance among older Communists to
blacken the reputation of these old comrades-in-arms.
Tito, has personally
intervened with republic party lea er Branko Mikulic
to keep a tight lid on the Cominformist investigation.
Mikulic is caught in the middle. Some officials
argue for a "humane" treatment of Mandzic and com-
pany, while others want severe punishment. So far,
Mikulic appears to be following Tito's orders, but
not without risks to stability in the Bosnian party.
A plenum in Sarajevo on April 18 heard Mikulic's
deputy, Hasan Grabcanovic, attack the Cominformists
as a "Trojan horse" within the organization. Grabcanovic
also taunted Mikulic by expressing mock regret that the
republic's leadership was not sufficiently "mobilized"
to "chase into the open" the Cominformist faction.
The partisans are particularly strong in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Mikulic, already under fire for his
earlier plans to try Mandzic, must find a way to
mollify them without having the Sarajevo party
labeled "soft" on Cominformists. One military of-
ficer who recently visited Sarajevo said the situa-
tion there is "very bad," and there are rumors that
the federal party leadership views the Mikulic regime
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