CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001900280002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 14, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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NOFORN
Chinese Affairs
Top Secret
Handle via COMINT Channels i
October 14, 1975
SC No. 00524/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL.. . - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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O,CQN(N000NT1,CT
CHINESE AFFAIRS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
CONTENTS
October 14, 1975
Divorce, Chinese Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Taipei Tries Another Tack . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Day in the Provinces . . . . . . . . . 13
China's Aluminum Purchases. . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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Divorce, Chinese Style
It has long been an open secret in China that
Chiang Ching is not popular with most leading party
Oofficials. This year she has finally been dealt a
series of especially staggering blows that have left
her virtually powerless in the cultural field she has
dominated for nearly a decade. Her recent misfortunes
also raise serious doubts about her present and fu-
ture role in politics. Significantly, Mao himself has
been personally associated with these moves against
g,q his wife, and it is now widely accepted in China that
/ Lfthe Chairman has all but washed his hands of her.
Madame Mao's star has dimmed since her failure
Qto win a government position at the National People's
Congress in January. This failure has been attri-
buted to Mao, who reportedly vetoed her nomination to
3),4 more than one government job. Moreover, throughout
the year, Mao has apparently stepped into the cultural
arena to mediate disputes, in each case siding with
beleaguered artists accused by his wife of political
errors. For example, he added to the list of people's
congress delegates the name of a performer purged
during the Cultural Revolution and nipped in the bud
a potential witchhunt of artists whose paintings al-
legedly contained political errors.
This summer, Mao lifted a ban imposed by Chiang
Ching on the distribution of a documentary film on
J the life of China's model worker. Madame Mao claimed
the film contained numerous political flaws. Mao,
after reviewing the case, reportedly said the film
had been unfairly criticized and ordered that it be
widely disseminated. A document to this effect is
currently circulating within China.
Most importantly, Mao personally authorized the
rehabilitation of several leading cultural officials
October 14, 1975
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who were among the earliest purged and most viciously
f attacked during the Cultural Revolution. These offi-
cials stood directly in the way of Chiang Ching's at-
tempts to revamp the cultural sphere, and their return
cuts sharply into her influence in that area. These
lge' people have not yet appeared in public, but a large
number of their associates appeared for the first
time since the Cultural Revolution at National Day
celebrations on September 30.
The Mao-endorsed rehabilitations are the latest
9 in a series of signs that Chiang Ching is being
nudged out of her cultural role. The propaganda has
not mentioned her in a cultural context since last
April; Peking has sponsored numerous theatrical fes-
tivals highlighting the appearance of new cultural
~" works, thus diluting the impact of the handful of
"model" works produced under Chiang Ching's auspices;
and evidence is mounting that the cultural portfolio
now belongs to Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao.
Chang has hosted several cultural delegations since
this summer, and officials in the Ministry of Cul-
ture reportedly have admitted that he is in charge
1 of culture.
Mao and his wife have evidently crossed swords
on issues other than culture. The Chairman reportedly
chastised her for trying to make a full-scale cam-
paign out of the "back door" issue, i.e., pulling
strings to obtain favorable jobs. For the second
time in as many years, in fact, Peking issued a di-
rective deferring action on the back-door problem
until an unspecified later date.
Chiang Ching's behavior when left alone with
foreign visitors seems to be an especially sore
point. Mao reportedly was outraged when he read the
transcripts of his wife's interview in 1972 with
American sociologist Roxane Witke. Chiang Ching told
Ms. Witke at the time that the transcripts would not
be released until the Chinese leadership had approved
them; Ms. Witke was officially informed some months
later that she would not receive the transcripts.
October 14, 1975
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Madame Mao's last solo outing with an official
visitor was a year ago, when she hosted Mrs. Marcos
of the Philippines. That incident ultimately caused
the Chinese some embarrassment. Mrs. Marcos was ap-
parently led to believe that Chiang Ching would be
Mao's successor, and, after the establishment in June
of diplomatic relations between Peking and Manila,
the Philippine government apparently tried to show its
appreciation by naming an orchid after Chiang Ching.
1-3 Peking had to politely request that the orchid be re-
named to commemorate Sino-Filipino friendship.
Incidents such as these may have been behind the
six prohibitions on Chiang Ching's political activity
that Mao reportedly set out in a document recently
circulated within China. The document allegedly pro-
hibits Madame Mao from meeting with foreigners alone,
from making speeches without prior party approval--and
from meeting with Mao.
In an apparent variation on this theme, stories
have been making the rounds in China that the Polit-
buro wants to reactivate its resolution of the 1940s
that approved Mao's marriage to Chiang Ching on the
condition that she not be allowed to participate in
politics. Rumor also has it that Mao wrote his wife
a harshly worded letter early this year in which he
suggested they go their separate ways.
In any case, the word is out to the Chinese
people that Chiang Ching does not have Mao's support.
This deprives her of a powerful weapon that she has
used in the past and could have been expected to use
after Mao's death, namely that opposition to her is
tantamount to opposing Mao, that she is the sole
repository of Mao Tse-tung thought, and that others
in the leadership have distorted Mao's policies. She
cannot credibly make that claim today, and, more im-
portantly, she will not be able to do so in the post-
Mao era. Thus her hands are tied politically, for
now and in the future, unless she manages to find
another avenue to promote her ambitions.
October 14, 1975
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Ironically, it was just a year ago that Madame
Mao, using historical analogy, seemed to be making
a case that she was the logical successor to Mao. She
has come a long way down since that time. This is not
to say that the left wing of the party, which she rep-
resents, is politically dead. Chiang Ching's views
have a constituency throughout the country, and she
personally may still have supporters in the cultural
field. Given Mao's disassociation from her, however,
it appears that her personal political future is
very bleak and that the party's left wing will have
to find another spokesman, one who is more adept at
playing the political game than Chiang Ching has been.
(SECRET NOFORN/ORCON/NO CONTRACT)
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Taipei Tries Another Tack
Taipei has decided to alter its tactics for
dealing with the latest batch of Nationalist pris-
oners released by Peking. The move is primarily an
UI attempt to avoid the bad publicity generated after
the Nationalists refused to accept a similar group
earlier this year.
When ten released Nationalist soldiers captured
in the late 1940s arrived in Hong Kong last April
announcing their desire to join relatives on Taiwan,
Taipei refused to have anything to do with them and
described the event as a "united front trick." Taipei
took a propaganda beating for its stubbornness, es-
9
suicide. Several of the group eventually returned to
the mainland in September, and Peking deplored Tai-
pei's callous disregard" for its old soldiers, a
charge that must have stung the Nationalist leaders.
Peking announced last week that nearly half of
the 144 "US-Chiang agents" released in September
would be permitted to return to Taiwan. The group
pecially after one frustrated ex-prisoner committed
to Taipei's decision to treat the freed "agents" with
greater compassion.
Taipei's new approach came in the form of a
non-official broadcast to the mainland announcing
that reception centers would be established on
Nationalist-controlled offshore islands to handle
those who wished to return. The broadcast pointed
out, however, that the released agents would be
is made up of persons who had participated in Na-
tionalist raids against the mainland in the early
1960s. Most of them have close relatives still liv-
ing on Taiwan. Moreover, they are closely linked
with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, who was in charge of
the raids. These factors almost certainly contributed
October 14, 1975
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screened carefully before being allowed to proceed
to Taiwan proper. Peking responded, announcing that
60 "agents" had departed for the islands. They now
are being screened at the reception centers.
rremier uniang mace the decision to accept the
prisoners in early October at the strong urging of
his top intelligence and security officials. They
recommended that those prisoners considered "reliable"
should be allowed to proceed to Taiwan and that the
main criterion should be their anti-Peking propaganda
value. Those who have no such value will be required
._, to remain on the offshore islands. In this way,
Taipei hopes to be in a better position to counter
the propaganda advantages that Peking seeks to gain
by manipulating the release of Nationalist prisoners.
At the same time, however, the Nationalists
remain extremely sensitive about the possibility
that Taiwan residents--or friendly foreigners--will
interpret acceptance of the prisoners as a sign of
weakness in their attitude toward Peking. Taiwan's
;p newspapers waited until after National Day celebra-
J tions on October 10 to report the government's will-
ingness to accept the released "agents" and, for the
home audience, announced that they had "escaped" from
the mainland. The reports included no indication
of when the released prisoners might come to Taiwan.
The Nationalists have their work cut out for
them in this attempt to steer a middle ground that
will avoid both the appearance of a flirtation with
Peking and the adverse publicity that would result
from another cold-shouldering of freed prisoners.
In the end, Taipei will probably attempt to play
down the whole affair and hope that it blows over
quickly. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT)
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National Da in the Provinces
China's restrained celebration of National Day
in Peking was mirrored in the provinces. Although
only one provincial first secretary failed to appear--
Inner Mongolia's Yu Tai-chung---one or more secre-
taries were missing in most provinces.
One first secretary thought to be missing, Chou
Hsing of Yunnan, was actually gravely ill. He died
on October 3 in Peking. His replacement is Chia
Chi-yun, a veteran civilian who headed neighboring
Kweichou Province from July 1965 until his purge
Oin the Cultural Revolution. Peking's uncharacteristic
swiftness in naming Chia fits with the continued
emphasis on unity and stability, but the national
eadership is still nervous about minority problems
n the area in recent months. Tsinghai and
Heilungkiang have lacked first secretaries for
months.
There were some reappearances, the most sur-
prising of which was the return of former Shanghai
first secretary Chen Pei-hsien. Chen was not given
a title, but he was listed with members of the party
c standing committee. Ironically, party vice chairman
Wang Hung-wen headed the turnout--Wang was one of
Cthe leaders of the leftist forces that ousted Chen.
a Wang's presence in Shanghai did not appear to be
related to Chen's reappearance, but resulted from
Wang's continuing efforts to restore order and
production in Chekiang.
Also of note was the reappearance of three
former Peking municipal party secretaries who were
colleagues of former Peking party boss Peng Chen.
Peng has been rumored as slated for rehabilitation.
In Honan Province, a new deputy secretary was named.
(SECRET NOFORN)
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NATIONAL DAY IN THE PROVINCES
Province Turnout Headed by
Anhwei First sec Sung Pei-chang
Chekiang No names given
Fukien First sec Liao Chih-kao
Heilungkiang No names
Honan
First sec Liu Chien-hsun
Hapeh First sec Liu Tzu-hou
Hunan No names
Hupeh No names
Inner Mongolia Second sec Chih Pi-ching
Kansu First sec Hsien Heng-han
Kiangsi No names
Kiangsu First sec Peng Chung
Kirin First sec Wang Huia-hsiang
Kwangsi First sec Wei Kuo-ching
Two secretaries missing. Record Jan-Sept in-
crease in industrial output value claimed.
Provincial broadcasts emphasize contribu-
tions of the PLA, an obvious reflection of
the troops that were sent into the province
in July.
One secretary missing. Two Foochou MR of-
ficers transferred to Peking.
First secretaryship vacant
Two secretaries missing, (Wu Li-chiao) newly
identified as a dep sec.
One dep sec missing
First sec Yu Tai-chung failed to appear as
did three other secs.
One sec missing
No other names listed. Several secs have
been out of sight for several months.
One sec missing
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Kwangtung
Kweichou
Liaoning
Ningsia
Peking
Shanghai
Shansi
Shantung
Shensi
Sinkiang
First sec Chao Tzu-yang
Second sec Li Pao-hua
Politburo member and MR
commander Li Te-sheng
FBIS did not monitor
Municipal leaders appeared
as part of national
celebrations
Politburo member
Wang Hung-wen
First sec Wang Chien
First sec Pai Ju-ping
First sec Li Jui-shan
First sec Saifudin
One sec missing
First sec Lu Jui-lin appeared in Peking.
First sec Tseng Shao-shan was the only other
leader listed by title.
Three former Peking municipal party secre-
taries reappeared.
All secretaries appeared as did Chen Pei-
hsien, former first sec who was purged in
the Cultural Revolution.
Two secs missing
Two secs missing
One sec missing
Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien and central
delegation sent to celebrate 20th anniver-
sary of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region
continue their activities.
First sec Liu Hsing-yuan and ranking sec Li
Ta-chang appear in Peking.
Taiwan
No turnout
Tibet
First sec Jen Jung
Three secs missing
Tientsin
FBIS did not monitor
Tsinghai
Sec Sung Chang-kung
First secretaryship vacant, second sec Chang
Chiang-lin failed to appear.
Yunnan
Second sec Wang Pi-cheng
First sec Chou Hsing died on October 3, re-
placed by Chia Chi-yun.
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China's Aluminum Purchases
China has contracted to purchase some 350,000
tons of aluminum for delivery this year, a huge in-
crease over the 1971-1974 annual average of about
90,000 tons. Almost all of the deals have been
made since June, apparently as an outgrowth of a
Chinese metals delegation tour through Western
Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
China's Aluminum Imports
Amount Value
thousand Metric Tons Million US $
1965 5 2
1970 20 13
1971 75 33
1972 90 37
1973 110 57
1974 75 67
1975* 350 260
"Approximate amount from contracts arranged through
September 1975.
Since many of the purchases are through third
country brokers or international companies, the
country of origin of the aluminum is not always
clear. At least five of the contracts apparently
include US-origin aluminum totalling perhaps 60 to
80,000 tons. Other major sources are France, Norway,
Japan, Bahrain, Canada, Iceland, and Eastern Europe,
particularly Hungary and Romania.
The Chinese are buying at discount prices in
many instances--an average of less than 34 cents
per pound, 2 to 3 cents below the free market rate
--but, the total cost still will run from $250 to
$300 million. Peking's willingness to spend this
October 14, 1975
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ities is continuing. The low level of aircraft pro-
duction also may be increased.
China is unlikely to continue importing such
large amounts of aluminum. Domestic capacity--
perhaps 320,000 tons--is expanding at a steady
rate and the Chinese have made good progress in
utilizing their low-grade ores to expand output.
Imports are likely to fall back at least to the
levels of the past four years.
The sales to China come at a time when Western
dealers are faced with huge inventories following
the world-wide drop in demand. Sales are small in
comparison to the size of total inventories, how-
ever, and as one-time purchases, the impact on
aluminum producers will probably be minimal. The
/ present low level of capacity utilization in the
aluminum industries probably will not be appreciably
d. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON/NO CONTRACT)
much of its scarce foreign exchange would seem to
indicate that the purchases go beyond a simple
economy measure. China's nonferrous metals sector
reportedly is falling short of production goals, and
some of the imported aluminum may be making up for
these shortfalls. Much of the aluminum, however,
apparently is going into stockpiles. Almost all is
in ingot form requiring further processing; the
Chinese do not have the capacity to process this
much aluminum over a short period of time. Some
of the stockpiles may be replacing depletions over
the last year or so when world prices were high.
The stockpiles probably are being increased
in preparation for expanded aluminum consumption
during the 1976-80 plan period. The Chinese re-
portedly are planning to expand their power network
and large-scale construction of communications facil-
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September
18 - 28
September 29 -
October 8
September 30 -
October 1
October 2
Japanese delegation visits Peking for
discussions on long-term oil imports
from China. (U)
Delegation led by Communication, Min-
ister Yeh Fei makes "friendly visit"
to North Korea. (U)
Sudanese military delegation led by
the commander of Sudan's armored
forces arrives in Peking. (U)
China and Finland sign civil air
agreement in Peking. (U)
Peking and Dacca establish formal
diplomatic relations, agree to ex-
change ambassadors. Communique
signed by foreign ministers Chiao
Kuan-hua and Abu Syed Choudhury in
New York. (U)
China and Bangladesh issue joint com-
munique announcing establishment of
diplomatic relations. (U)
Japanese Prime Minister Miki meets
in Tokyo with visiting delegation of
the China-Japan Friendship Associa-
tion. (U)
Yugoslav President Dzemal Bijedic in
China on official visit; meets with
Mao Tse-tung on October 8. (U)
Delegation of leaders of US World
Affairs Organization arrives in
China. (U)
October 14, 1975
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October 8 Peking announces the death of Yunnan
first secretary Chou Hsing and his
replacement by Chia Chi-yun, a re-
habilitated civilian who headed
Kweichou before the Cultural Revolu-
tion. (U)
NCNA announces departure via Amoy and
Hong Kong of 65 recently released
"US-Chiang agents," all of whom hope
to return to Taiwan; Taiwan press re-
ports on October 11 that the prisoners
"escaped." (U)
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua de-
parts New York after attending cur-
rent UN General Assembly session.
(U)
October 13 China issues Foreign Ministry state-
ment protesting US government toler-
ance of "Tibet Office" in New York.
(U)
October 14, 1975
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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