SYNOPSIS SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800140001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
September 1976
SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN COMMUNISM
Note: The author is grateful for the many comments and
suggestions which were received from other CIA offices
during the preparation of this study. Comments and
questions will be welcomed by the author
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This Synopsis presents the main conclusions of a longer
study, published separately,* of the state of relations between
the Soviets and the most significant West European Communist
Parties--the Communist Parties of Italy, France, Spain, and
Portugal. Of these, the Italian Communists have just registered
new gains in national elections, and have obtained a greater
voice in the national government. In France, the Communists
hope to win a clear legislative majority in conjunction with
their Socialist allies in the national elections now scheduled
for 1978. The Portuguese Communists, having failed in their
bid for power in 1974-1975, retain considerable organizational
strength and are biding their time in hopes of a better day.
And the Party in Spain, though still officially illegal, hopes
to take advantage of the transition from Francoism to build
a solid base-for the future:
* Ref.
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The growth in the prominence and political potential of
these Parties obviously holds the promise for the Soviets of
increased influence in an area of major interest. But these
developments occur at a time when Moscow's relationship with
West European Communism is in a state of transition. It is
a relationship marked by considerable tension, and, in general,
by declining Soviet authority. And, in the near term, at least,
the principal objective of the West European Communists--the
acquisition of political power--does not fully mesh with Moscow's
interest in developing a pattern of political detente and eco-
nomic cooperation with the West.
The paper is concerned with what these underlying contra-
dictions mean and may come to mean for Moscow. Do the Soviets
still have ways to induce or compel the Western Communists to
act: in accordance with their desires? Are they right in thinking
that, despite the existing divergencies and frictions, the
rising stature of West European Communism will be beneficial
to them in the longer run? And, if not, how important are
the doctrinal and political problems which West European
Communism might come to pose for the Soviets?
The Western Communists can generally be counted on to
staunchly support the main pillars of Soviet foreign policy--
"peace" and disarmament proposals, "national liberation" in
Third World areas such as Southern Africa, and the like. They
will even accept Soviet policies which they find quite distaste-
ful, such as Moscow's heavy-handed domination of Eastern Europe,
provided these do not harm their own interests. Despite occa-
sional critical allusions to the occupation of Czechoslovakia,
both the Spanish and Italian Communists have accommodated
themselves to the Soviet occupation.
However, the major Western Parties are no longer willing
to sacrifice their own immediate interests--specifically, their
hopes for the acquisition of political power or at least a share
of power--for the sake of furthering Soviet policy objectives.
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The unwillingness of these Parties to subordinate their
interests to Soviet policy poses a potential danger to some
important short-term Soviet policy objectives. The Western
Communists are preoccupied by the pursuit of power on the
national level, but Moscow presently gives priority to con-
solidating a pattern of economic and political cooperation
with the Western powers. The Soviets have been sensitive to
the possibility that a role in government for any of the Western
Parties would cause deep anxiety in the West and might trigger
a reaction against the Soviet Union, threatening Moscow's
access to Western technology and undermining its diplomatic
initiatives.
The Soviets have demonstrated by their actions that they
believe that their immediate interests will not be furthered by
aggressive action on the part of the Western Communists.
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At the same time that the immediate interests of the Soviets
and the major Western Parties are becoming increasingly divergent,
Moscow's ability to impose its will on them has declined. The
causes of the decline in Soviet authority are manifold, but two
fundamental reasons can be cited.
--Moscow's moral authority within the movement
has been eroded by the successive traumas of
de-Stalinization, Hungary, the Sino-Soviet
quarrel, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and
persistent suspicions of Moscow's interest in
striking a "spheres of interest" deal with
Washington which would leave Western Europe in
the American zone.
--The prospect of political power has both given
the major Western Parties the incentive to put
their own interests over those of the Soviets
and increased their ability to do so, as their
domestic political and economic resources have
increased.
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determined effort to shunt aside leaders closely identified
with the Soviet Union, although they have not been purged and
retain some responsibility.
The Soviets have more support among the rank-and-file than
ariong the leaders of these Parties.
The ideological bond which unites the Soviets with the
Western Communists, while the least tangible instrument of in-
fluence, is arguably the most important of them. Even the most
nationally-minded of the Western Communist leaders sees himself
as, a member of an ideological community in which Moscow is the
most senior and powerful member, and Sees a corresponding gulf
between himself and the most leftist of socialists. The power
of this sentiment is best demonstrated, even though in a somewhat
different context, by Yugoslavia's Tito, who despite a running
quarrel of almost three decades' duration, has been unable to
separate himself from Moscow once and for all.
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Strategic Policy Objectives. There is no evidence that
the Soviets have altered the main objectives of their post-war
European policy: the displacement or diminution of US influence
and the prevention of the establishment of a rival power center
in Western Europe. Similarly, there is no indication that they
have altered their conviction that the accession to power of
any of the Western Parties will facilitate realization of these
objectives. All of the Western Parties, even the Italians
who have disavowed any plans to bring about a unilateral with-
drawal from NATO, support "the dissolution of military blocs"
in Europe. This is also an objective which the Soviets support
and originally formulated, since it would mean the end of NATO,
while permitting Moscow to rely on the network of bilateral
military agreements it has built in Eastern Europe.
't'here is also no sign that the multiplication of points of
friction between the Soviets and the Western Communists has
altered the perception of Soviet leaders that the advance of the
left in Europe is a development which, however troublesome the
problems it poses at the moment, is something which is in the
long-term interests of the Soviet Union. (Some Soviet commentators
at lower levels of the hierarchy, however, have questioned this
assumption in oblique terms.) Moscow continues to extend support
to Western Communism both in word--via propaganda pronouncements--
and in deed--via subsidies.
Ideological Impulses. The stubbornness with which Soviet
leaders have clung to their assumptions cannot be fully appre-
ciated without taking into account the ideological underpinnings
of their perceptions of the world. They function not only as
national leaders and practical politicians, but as convinced
Communists. Clearly, the fervor with which these convictions
are held may vary from leader to leader. Some party ideologues--
Mikhail Suslov, for example--may lend a relatively high priority
to the advancement of the Communist cause abroad, both for emotional
reasons and because of a long-standing bureaucratic involvement
in the affairs of the Communist movement. Others--Brezhnev,
perhaps--who have a broader or more mundane orientation, may
accord ideology a relatively lower priority. None, however,
can ignore it.
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Domestic Political Constraints. To do so would be to under-
mine their own political base and claim to leadership of the
Soviet Party and the international movement. No Soviet political
leader can lightly risk leaving himself open to the charge that
he has been indifferent on matters of ideological principle,
particularly not in the environment of political balance
which prevails within the Soviet leadership. The importance
of this factor has been demonstrated repeatedly, most reveal-
ingly in the care with which Brezhnev and others have taken to
justify detente as an aid to the cause of revolution abroad.
--Their argument is that detente by easing East--
West tensions makes it more difficult for the
bourgeois rulers to rouse public hostility
to the Communists, and by committing them to
the maintenance of good relations with the USSR,
makes it more difficult for them to forcibly
keep the Communists from power.
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situ are i e y to continue to shape Soviet policy. Moscow
can therefore be expected to lend consistent but cautious support
to the Western Communists. It probably will continue to:
--Extend covert financial support and low-key
public support to the general cause and
ultimate goals of the European Communists,
but trying to avoid open--and risky--
intervention on their side.
--To take full advantage of the organizational,
ideological, and financial levers at its dis-
posal, to try to curb the tendency toward
doctrinal and tactical independence among the
European Communists.
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At the same time, Soviet policy will be sensitive to the
specific features of the political situation as it evolves in
Italy, France, Spain, or Portugal. One of the most important
constraints on Soviet support for any particular Party is Moscow's
interest in avoiding serious damage to its political and economic
relations with Washington and the other major capitals of the
West. A major consideration from the Soviet point of view is
whether a Party's approach to power is pursued cautiously and
with an eye to minimizing the risk of domestic or international
upheaval, or whether it proceeds recklessly and in disregard
of the potential international consequences.
This inhibiting factor can have the ironic result of
putting the Soviets at cross purposes with "orthodox" Parties
whose doctrinal positions are close to their own, and aligning
them in support of the tactics pursued by the "revisionist"
Parties with whom they have the most philosophical disagreements.
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A final factor will be the state of their relations with
the Party in question. Where these are bad, the Soviets will
be disposed to limit their support. This factor may become sig-
nificant in France, where the Soviets have reacted bitterly
to the French Party's effort to compensate for the belatedness
of its show of independence with attacks on the internal
policies of the Soviet Party, something from which the more
committedly "revisionist" Italian Party has shied away.
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Whereas the central question for the West is the extent to
which Communist participation in the government of a Western
country would threaten the bases of that country's constitutional
system and alliance commitments, the central question for Moscow
is essentially the opposite. To what degree has Communist involvement
in a constitutional system weakened the commitment to force funda-
mental changes in domestic and foreign political alignments, and
would this commitment be further weakened by participation in govern-
ment? Would, in fact, a Communist Party strengthened by participa-
tion in government serve as a channel for the intrusion of "subversive"
Western ideas into the Communist movement or into the Soviet Union
itself?
Moscow's conviction that its long-term interests are served
by the advance of Communism in Western Europe is reinforced by
it.s judgment that its differences with the Western European
Communists are manageable. The Soviets are encouraged to be-
lieve that these differences do not affect the basic affinity
of purpose and inspiration which they share with the Western
Communists and their common views on a broad range of world
issues. These include opposition to US "imperialism"' and support
for "national liberation" movements in the Third World and for
leftist political causes in general.
Moreover, although they are becoming increasingly more
difficult to deal with, the Western Communists are reluctant
to become totally estranged from the Soviet Union. The inter-party
negotiations which paved the way for a conference of European
Communist Parties in late June were a good measure of the present
state of relations between the Soviets and the Western Parties.
According to the available evidence, the talks were difficult
but both sides made compromises in the interests of maintaining
at least the appearance of solidarity. As long as the Western
Communists are reluctant to go into schism within the international
movement, the Soviets can entertain the hope that they can be brought
back into line.
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This is not to say that the Soviets are correct in their
perceptions of the situation. To the contrary, a persuasive
argument can be made that the differences between the Soviets
and the Western Communists will become more serious, rather
than less, with the passage of time.
--Any accretion in the power of the Western
Communists will add to the incentives for
them to put their own interests ahead of
those of the Soviets, as well as adding to
their ability to resist Soviet pressure.
--If they win a role in government in any country,
the Western Communists will perforce be driven
by considerations of electoral expediency, which
in many cases will lead them to put national
interests over Soviet interests.
--Given their historical and cultural affinities,
the feeling of a regional community of interests
quite alien to those of the Soviet Union is likely
to grow among the Western European Communists.
--The lessons of the Soviet experience in China,
Yugoslavia, Romania--in fact, in almost all
Communist countries free of a Soviet troop
presence--is that Moscow has been unable to
maintain its authority in the absence of a
military occupation.
The post-war history of Eastern Europe has demonstrated the
past vulnerability of these countries to Western ideas, and they
might prove equally susceptible to the more "democratic" version
of Communism advocated by the Western Parties. If so, the Soviets
might confront a situation in which their position in Eastern
Europe .is threatened by ideological erosion.
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--Over time, a successful and independent Western
variant of Communism could aggravate the problem
of dissidence in the Soviet Union. Some Soviet
reformers and dissidents already lean heavily on
the experiences of Western Communism for the
legitimization and inspiration of their ideas.
In fact, the most likely source of an open schism between
Moscow and the Western Communists would be a threat to Soviet
authority in Eastern Europe or the spread of dissidence within
the Soviet Union. In this event, the most likely Soviet action
would be to act decisively to cut off every source of "infection."
This would certainly affect Soviet relations with the Western
Communists, and might well spill over to affect Soviet relations
with the West in general, if Moscow perceived the threat as serious.
Other factors wnich could contribute to a deterioration of
relations between the Soviets and the West European Parties would
be a situation in which the Soviets were compelled to use force
to maintain their position in Eastern Europe or a Soviet effort
to intervene in Yugoslav affairs after the death of Tito.
Either development would inevitably bring Moscow's relations
with the Western Communists to a new pitch of tension, and both
are quite conceivable. Similarly, the behavior of these Parties
in power--if they should become too much a part of the system--
would add new strains to their relationship with Moscow, as would
a fundamental alteration of their presently hostile relations
with Washington.
However, any fundamental restructuring of this relationship
will have to await a new point of crisis--such as those suggested
above--or a change in the Soviet leadership. A new leadership,
whatever its composition and priorities, would be certain to
bring changes in style, and possibly in tactics, which might
affect Moscow's relations with West European Communism.
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Moreover, at least in its initial period in power, it will enjoy
even less claim to leadership within the international movement
than the present Soviet leaders, thus opening the way to further
self-assertiveness on the part of the Western Parties.
A change-over in Moscow, as well as some of the other potential
turning points cited above, can be expected to take place within the
next five years. In particular, the ability of the major Parties to
convert their stance of "moderation" and "independence" into political
gains will be tested, in France by the 1978 legislative elections,
and in Italy by the ability or inability of the PCI to continue expand-
ing its influence in the face of a weak and demoralized opposition.
The success or failure of the PCI and PCF will affect their determi-
nation to persist in their present course. This period, therefore,
is likely to be crucial to the changing relationship between Moscow
and the European members of the Communist movement.
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