INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE FRICTIONS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010064-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: July 3, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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Am All. 01 n VA " MIN. ~ WL WIN
SE URITf IN DRPi TICN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3 , UIT 1952
STAFF I PROR&N1IJM Na. 25C
SUBJECT: Indications of Possible Frio.Uonac in S'sno-So et Relations
14 A Sher of developments in the pact six months
indicate certain frictions in the Sinn-Soviet relation ship. Wbi.1t*
cautioning against ovrex eati ting these scattered indicati on 5, we
nevertheless feel that they merit, notice, particularly Insofar &is
they might affect our existing eats tte of geniez 1 unanimity '.iai the
Sim-Soviet relationship.
2. Indications, suggest that within Chi there ins conaideraab.?lo
sensitivity concerning tbo need to "iean to onus side" and the
existence and iat1uence of Soviet advisors. There is insuffic ie t
evidence on which to eattrate in what el nts within China this
sensitivity is centered
a o In Januauy-February 19523 on the occasion of the
second anniversary of the S o Soviet Treaty of
195OO, newspaper articles by Li Chi- shsl tr q vice-
Clair n of the Central People's Goverrmutj
, mar~ber of the Chinese People's
S -t "u Mei-tiamp
Politicllc1 Consultative Conference-, and Chang Lan,
chairman of the Guinan ?r oaritiu Igue., all either
openly admitted or cle* r3y ImpUe d the eradstenoe
of anti-Sovi l sentiments within China and all
justified the regimes a s policy of "leaning to one
aide" as a necessary concomitant of re andiation of
the West T It is intemesti : rther to note that,
s pri s1ngly3 none of these articles wan reprinted
in the Stzazn Pai Ne ap. tglis e-i nguage organ of
the Can rte. Z e s Cover .en in at China.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Q
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S CC~
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 201 ?
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be A 2 June 1952 Peiping broadcast critioiaing
"bouz'geeoiss thought" admits considerable resistance
aarozag Chinese engineer and administrative personnel
in the coal and petroleaam indaatries to govern-
ment measured taken on the recomsendation of
Soviet advisors. It may be of interest that in
each case cited the Soviet advisors z
against developing new mines and oil fields*
o. In the considerable =amber of references to
Soviet advisors and delegates attending recent
conferences in Peiping, there is an apparent
effort in Chinese domestic broadcasts to voice
the regime e s approval mead appreciation of the
Soviet nationals' presence, and an inference
that this a pprovaal is meant to counter. public
uneasiness.
The'. above ecatnplees suggest only the necessity for da:raestio 3ust1-
fieation of China Is ..policy of "leaning to one sidve#" and do not
constitute open official criticism of the USSR. On the contrary,
there is abundant evidence that, at least. ostenaib1y,, Peiping does
not question Soviet advice and indeed insists to its people that
Chinas met lease from the USSR and from Stalin.
3. While there is no evidence of Chinese criticism of the
USSR, there have been Indication recently vhic*i suggest possible
rivalry between Moscow and Peiping for prat influence over
the rest of Aeiao
a. The circumt woos surrounding the recent note
(11 June) of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo to the
Japanese 0overwmt -- the manner of its press
tation, its tone, and Moscow t s and Peiping' s
reactions to it -- an suggest the possibility
of a unilateral wooing of Japan ter the USSR that
thus far has not had the approval of Comunist
China. The note. vas delivered to the Japanese
Foreign office not by as Soviet occupation officer,
but by the Soviet Vice Coml. The note vas con-
ciliatory in tones Spoke of "the Japanese Govera?-
ment," and aurprisingly wade no reference what-
soever to Chino Since 11 June, R&dio Moscow has
Sl
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9I=
given wide publicity (21 broadcasts bunted to the
Iran East) to this Soviet mate. Radio Peiping, on
the other hand, has ignored the subject oomp] tely,
even on the new-item level,
b. Radio Peiping' a eminent on the recent paratory
session of the Asian Peace Conference (saheedal.d
for late Seepteember, 1952) provides frequent testi-
mon.n_fas to: (1) Commtulist Chtna' a preponderant role
in the pe ,ce struggle, and (2) the Chinese revo-
lution an the principal source of inspiration to
the liberation and peace movements of Asia, The
leading Moscow commentary an the one event,, how'
ever, claims similar honors tar the Soviet Union.
An I2NISTIA editorial cites the Rueesian Revolution
as the source of inspiration for Asian liberation
movements and mares the rout of aermaW and Japan
In World War 11 as providing the second major
impetus to these n ve te, The results of the
preparatory session of the Conference are construed
by Moscow an a coition of the fact that in
their struggle for peaces the peoples of Asia are
"inspired tr the precepts of the standard-bearer
of peace, Comrade Stalin." Although acknowledging
Chins":e position as a powerful factor of peace and
democracy in the East, the =MM article treats
it as part of a series of aahievra is (including
the gosean, Vietnamese', and other Southeast Asian
liberation mole rents) made possible by the October
Revolution and the defeat of Cdr and Japan.
Alludions to the Soviet role in tho struggle for
peace are almost absent from Peiping cotta
The only reference noted praises they policy of
China and the Soviet Union In stopping American
aggression in Korea and true preventing a third
world war. Otherwise Peiping does not Involve the
Soviet Union in comment on the confevrence, rot
even ae the familiar ""leader of the camp of peace."
b. Another Issue in Siso~-Sovieet relations is the future stags
of the now 3oint2yy-adminieteered Manchurian railways, It will be
recalled that in Februarf 1950 the USSR obligated itself to
transfer without compensation to the Oovrernmexrt
of the People's Rgxbl.i.c of China an its rights
-3-
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to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun
Railway with all property belonging to the Rail-
way. The transfer shall be effected immediately
no er the end o
There have been indications suggesting the continuance of Russian
participation in the railways, possibly beyond 1952. A number of
recent Peiping broadcasts laud the gains made by the Changchun
Railway as a result of Soviet participations and do not mention
the Soviet obligation to return its rights in the railway to China
by the end of 1952. An 11 June Peiping broadcast further clouds
this question by announcing the appointment, under the "rule of
rotation," of new joint directors "for the current years" without
referring to the future status of the railway or without even
defining what is meant by "the current year."
5. The recent naming of Pax ushkin as the new Soviet
Ambassador in Peiping may have no major significance so far as
Far Eastern affairs are concerned. On the other hand, if there
is Indeed some pattern of Sino-Soviet frictions behind the indi-
cations discussed above, then the appointment of Pargrushkin, a
Far &stern expert and former major-general, may have been at
least as significant as the moving of OronVko to London.
6. There is not sufficient evidence upon which to base any
firm estimate concerning the possibility of significant Sino-
Soviet friction, The strongest theses that can be advanced are:
(a) that there possibly is considerable resentment within China
concerning the extent to which the regime is "leaning to one side;"
(b) that although there is no open Chinese criticism of the USSR,
there may be competition between. Peiping and Moscow for predominant
influence in Japan and the rest of Asia; (a) that the future status
of the Manchurian Railway may not have been as yet actually deter-
mimned; and (d) that the appointment of Panyuahkin may reflect
Soviet concern for its relations with Peiping. Having thus stated
the maximum interpretation possible from existing indications, we
should now point out that these scattered developments may, on the
other hands have,no significance whatsoever, As between the maximum
and minimum possible interpretations, we must lean toward the latter.
We do not believe, therefore, that there exists any basis in fact
for altering our existing estimate of relative harmony in 53na
Soviet relations. We do believe that the developments discussed
above merit continued watching.
25X1A9a
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