THE ARGENTINE SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030035-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: April 12, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For lease 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP79WO937A000500030035-7
April 1957
REVISED STAFF CHANDUM Nom 22-57 (supersede= 22-57 of 11 Apr
SUBJECTS The Argentine Situation
Conclusions
Thus far the Provisional Government of the armed ?or7ees headed
by General Aramburu5 has demonstrated a rem ?l ble capacity to survive
periodic crises during the 17 months of its existence,, However, as t:l
-regime approaches the last year of its temporary receivership and prepare*
gT.~Verament
to transfer power to a duly electesj, it is likely to become it reasingly
vulnerable to overthrow,, particularly as political and Military maneuvering
increases in connection with revisioci of the Constitution aid subsequent
national elections scheduled for 23 February 1958. The regime's pr:i.rr"? pal
problem with regard to elections is to head off Radical Party leader Arturo
Frondizi, still the chief contender for the Presidency,, Unless the
regime is able to reduce Frondizils chances of election by tactical
maneuvers in the Constituent Assembly and unless there e.rierges by th
end of 1957 a strong party or coalition with which the 1xumbents are in
closer sympathy, there is a better than even chance that anti-exec ion
DOCUMENT No A
d
.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Q
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED To: T9 8 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 12 10
Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDMA9F, 0&3 A00050003 7C
OATS: 2 REVIEWER:
 Approved For (lease 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP79937A000500030035-7
army elements will attempt to depose General Aramburu and forestall
elections. If successful, Argentina Would then be ruled by an increa-
singly authoritarian regime,, which would eventually have to give way to
one commanding mass support. On the other hands, antagonism among civilian
and military elements to the regime ?s efforts either to blatantly rig
elections or to delay them further might precipitate Aramberu rs overt aff'.
V. The Aramburu regime, which inherited a prostrate economy from
eron has thus far been unable either to increase agricultural produc -
%ion for export, to attract foreign capital, or to halt Argentina4s
deteriorating financial situation. Largely for political reasons, it
recently abandoned a proposed austerity program in favor of minimal
remedial actions designed merely to stall off the impending financial
crisis until after the presidential. elections. Assuming these economic
policies continue and that elections are actually held,, any new government
will almost certainly be faced immediately with a seriously weakened f1rran-
vial position and a balance of payments crisis.,
Diacusaion
1, Since it assumed per in November 1955, the stability of the
i`rovisional Government has been threatened by interservice rtvaJ y, fac-
tionalism within the army, subversive Peronist activities, and labor
discontent. However, the regime has shown a remarkable capacity for
Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : C - DP79T00937A000500030035-7
MMNMPIMT~
 Approved For Reese -2000/08/07 CIA-RDP79T0
'A000500030035-7
survival, chief ]y due to two factors : (1) Aramburu i s role as that. of
compromiser anong and spokesman for the military junta which exercises
the real political power; (2) a general fear among the military supporting
the regime of the capabilities of the leftist forceso The regime,, in its
battle for self-preservation, has attempted to reduce factionalism within
the military,, It has undertake periodic purges of dissident military in,
order to achieve a greater measure of unity within the regime,'thus
providing the younger officers important in, Peransa ouster with increased
opportunity and influence. At the same time, it has thwarted the ambitions
of over=zealous younger officers by sending them abroad to attache posts.
Recently the regime survived crises precipitated by first the Under,
Secretary of the Navy,, and then the Air Minister, which threatened to
undermine the government.
5,, Moreover, the regime has not flinched from dealing firmly With
the subversive apposition, It has summarily arrested Peronist., Comets ti.
and nationalist elements whom it.A s ?.~. i t t'af r to be intent M'.1.
t tlnf r I . ?, overthrow tY,res gt, ` rlT3aFsti~ "W t ,1 i k'e . . an,". ,,;ubverai or, E. , c r o
the eg4cn'.' hz,F a, atte,,,Ij;'ied to placato Iat5xn< vr, a e incre ce nd
rCIL`
eg a shaa not s w,-, feedE;- :v g.,vJ ..,.t{.; to at:tivo "-wgpport of t lac
still parity-less Peronists,,
GS 3
yM. a~ 53
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000108/07 CIA-RDP79T00937AO00500030035-7
 Approved For lease 2000/08/07 CIA-RDP79 937A000500030035-7
SECRET
5. The Aramburu government is committed to the re-establ.ishv. ent,
of a democracy and a free econoii Although its achievements have beer,
notable, it has thus far been generally unable to broadly implement itcs
basic program, The government has recently annourw?ed its election time-
table. Elections for a Constituent Assembly are to be. held 28 July 1957
with revision of the Constitution. of 1853 to be undertaken in September c
General elections are scheduled for 23 February 1958 with the tranefe r
of pager. to be effected on 1 ~'ay 1958, Although 40 parties have been
recognized to compete in the elections;, no party or coalition of moderate
conservative orientation has yet appeared which might be able to contest
the candidacy of Arturo Frondizi., leader of the dominant 11ef 1st faction
the Radical Party and still the chief contender for the Preaidenr: yv
Army anti-election elements within the regime are strongly opposed to
Frondizib who they believe would head a natioralistic, labor oriented
government?
6 The Aramburu government is likely to become Increasingly
vulnerable to overthrow as the election date approa;hes,, Unless t:k
regime is able to reduce Frondizi gs chances of election by ta,f.ti:va1 maneuvers
in the Constituent Assembly and unless there emer. es by the end of 1957
a strong party or coalition with which the incumbents are in closer
sympathy, there is a better than even ahanre that anti-election army
elements will attempt to depose General Aramburu and forestall el.eotionr
Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030035-7
 Approved For ease 2000/08/07 CIA-RDP79937A00'0500030035-7
SECRET
On this other hando antagonism among civilian and military elements (
the regime's efforts either to blatantly rig elections or to delay
them further might precipitate Aramburu?s OVerthr r,,
7. Implewntation of the regime's economic program has been
hindered by political considerations, particularly by political leaderrts
whoa although initially united by their anti.Per onist orient Lions
continue to disagree regarding the solutior-m to Azrgentlna basic etoncni ;
problems a The economic situation has shown virtually no improvement
since the Arambr u regime carne to power, The regime has failed to
raise production for export and to attract foreign private investme t
Its financial position is precarious A $211 mill ;an balance of p:i ezttc
deficit is anticipated in 1957. ''official ;old and dollar ?reserves at, V-e
nd of Fetsuary 1957 totaled $225 million, compared to $438 million at the
time of Percrn's ousters In order }o "stave off national bankruptcy"
former. Finance Minister Verrier recently proposed an austerity program
designed to free the economy; however, the strong opposition ;of civ'ili *
cabinet and political leaders,, nrabah`.y with ti, z.;^ military support
the regime ti set aside this program in favor, of t .ppirg t1ne 1W arx'_ c th r
Credit .sources in Western Europe in order to stall off the imp? r dire
financial crisie until aft e elections b
Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030035-7
 '*Approved For Reuse 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP79T00 7A000500030035-7
Validity of NIE c TIAL
84 We believe that NIE 9156 is still basically valid. Self-
preservation is still the immediate problem of the present govarnment:,
Serious armed forces dissension still persists, The regime oontin &
to be unable to broadly implement, its basic program... It still. has not
resolved the dilemma of satisfying the aspirations of the laboring 11asses,.,
while at the same time attacking Krgentina t s pressing economic probe' C.m
Virtually no progress has been made toward assuring an orderly trans.,er
of power to a duly elected civilian government with which the incumbent
regime is in sympathy.
6.
25X1 A9a
Approved For Release I T00937A000500030035-7