STAFFING PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A002700040002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 88
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 May 1963
STAFFING PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN THE SOVIET UNION
CIA Contribution for Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations to the Committee
on Government Operations, United States Senate
When This Cover Sheet is Removed the
Paper is Unclassified. CIA should
Not be Identified as the Author
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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1 May 1963
STAFFING PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN THE SOVIET UNION
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STAFFING PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN THE SOVIET UNION
Table of Contents
Page
INTRODUCTION .
Chapter I. RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING . . . ,
... 3
Chapter II. STAFFING MACHINERY. ?
A. Party Agencies . . . ?
Presidium . .
The Secretariat 10
The Central Staff of.the.Party . . 12
Subordinate Secretariats and Staffs . . ? . . . 14
. ? . . 16
B. Government Agencies . .
Chapter III. STAFFING FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES. .
? ? 21
A. Staffing for National Security Policy
Maki ng _
The Party Presidium
The Secretariat . ?
The Government Presidium. .
B. Staffing National Security 0Dern+i-
22
27
29
National Security Departments and
Agencies.
.
. . ? ? ' ? ? ? 31
Soviet Missions Abroad,
Career Development in the National. ? ? ? ? ? 33
Security Field. . Incentives for National +__ ?T.T . 35
C. Staffing for Scientific and Technological
Research and Develoumen+..
38
Chapter IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . 5.
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Table of Contents (continued)
Annex: EDUCATION AND TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Introduction. .
Page
59
59
B. The Regular School System . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Primary-Secondary Schools . . . . . . . . . . 6o
Selection for Higher Education. . . . . . . , 6o
Access to Higher Education and Choice
of Specialty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Higher Education. . . . . . , . . . . 64
Post-Graduate Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
C. Special Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Military Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Intelligence Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Training for Service Abroad . . . . . , 71
Party Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
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The signal importance of effective and orderly staffing
procedures and criteria in the operation of the state has been
recognized by Soviet leaders from very nearly the beginnings of
Soviet power. The early view that any worker or housewife could
easily handle the affairs of government was quickly discarded
when the new regime in 1917 and 1918 sought to cope with the
complexities of state administration. From that time the Soviet
leaders have concentrated heavily on a search for more effective
organization and functions and better training and deployment
of personnel.
This study focuses on the machinery and procedures developed
for staffing for national security policy making and for the
execution of national security operations. It leans heavily on
an earlier study of the Soviet system* which may be consulted
for a fuller discussion of the Soviet policy-making machinery.
The present study, however, is complete within itself, and
brings up-to-date some of the material in the earlier study.
The following description of the state system of the
U.S.S.R., taken from the earlier study, provides a useful
preface.
The Soviet system is a dictatorship in which ultimate
power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist
Party. While the government apparatus is patterned
after that of a Western political democracy, there
is no system of checks and balances, and any concept
of the separation of powers is definitively rejected.
The functions of the government are dictated by the
party, whose hegemony is explicitly acknowledged by
the Constitution. The prerogative of the party to
make state policy and supervise its implementation
without direct popular controls or checks is unques-
tioned, and party influence and power pervade all.
phases of life from the lowliest private dwelling
to the highest councils of state.
*Soviet Policy Making Machinery. Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, U.S.
Senate. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
(1)
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This description needs augmenting, however, for it omits the
fact that the party no less than the government is under the
dictatorial control of a self-perpetuating body of men who in
a corporate sense are not answerable to any other group or
force in Soviet society. Moreover, it suggests an alien-ruler
role for the party, whereas in fact the party machinery is an
integral part of the Soviet governing mechanism performing
many functions that in the West are the normal prerogative and
responsibility of government.
Party and government in the Soviet Union though structurally
separate, are actually part and parcel of a single state system.
The Party Presidium, formally a part of the party structure, is
the governing head of the entire system, and its power and au-
thority are exercised through its two executive-administrative
arms, the government bureaucracy and the professional. party
machine. The Soviet state system, moreover, is a totalitarian
system embracing virtually every activity in the country. Except
for a few minor jobs, all positions -- from minister to party
clerk; from research scientist to street sweeper; from party
secretary to lathe: operator -- are parts of a single mammoth
staff at the service of the Soviet rulers. Thus, the men who
bear ultimate responsibility for the national security of the
Soviet Union have the full manpower resources of the country
at their disposal. How these resources are organized and used
in carrying out the national security responsibilities of the
Soviet leaders is the central problem of this study.
Where possible an attempt has been made to relate the
staffing procedures to the achievement of objectives in policy
making and administration and a few conclusions as to the effec-
tiveness of the system have been hazarded. Chapter I attempts
to give some idea of the scope of the staffing problem and an
appreciation of the human resources available. Chapters II and
III then take up the staffing machinery and the way in which it
functions. Chapter IV presents an overall appraisal of the system
and touches on a few special problems. An appendix deals with
education and training programs for developing the talent, knowledge.,
and ability necessary to meet national security needs.
(2)
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Chapter I. RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING
Official secrecy in the U.S.S.R. puts the Western student
of Soviet politics and public administration at a great disad-
vantage. Practically nothing is being written in the Soviet
Union, for instance, on how the governing organs of the party
operate or how national policies are formulated. In this sit-
uation, there is no public discussion of staffing at the high-
est levels and we can only guess at what proportion of the
manpower pool the Kremlin would consider critical for the execu-
tion of national security operations.
If they elected to speak on the question, however, the
Soviet leaders would probably present a rather broad estimate
of their manpower needs in this field.. The fact that the entire
administrative mechanism -- political, military, industrial,
etc. -- is closely woven together at all levels and operates as
a single system makes it difficult to determine at what point
the staffing function loses its critical importance. Only a
small portion of the total manpower pool, however, is crucial
for making and executing national security policy. Soviet popu-
lation figures will illustrate this point. (See Figure A).
Figure A
Manpower Resources in the U.S.S.R. 1959
Number of
Persons
Total Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109,100,000
Workers and Peasants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,600,000
Intelligentsia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,500,000
of which:
Managerial and Professional Personnel . . . 7,467,000
It is within the intelligentsia category that the people
essential for national security functions will almost certainly
be found. However, the intelligentsia includes not only manage-
ment and professional personnel but also technicians, secretaries,
typists, sales and restaurant employees, barbers, and other white-
collar workers. The notion of the intelligentsia as a highly
select, tightly knit group of intellectuals -- as was the case
in Russia in the years before the Revolution -- is now almost
entirely gone.
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Figure B
Managerial and Professional Personnel in the U.S.S.R.
1959
Number of
Persons
Managerial and Professional Personnel (Total) 7,467,000
Managerial Personnel (Total) 2,221,600
Heads of state administrative organs and
their structural subdivisions 246,600
Heads of Communist Party, Komsomol (Young
Communist League), trade union, cooperative,
and other social organizations 145,500
Directors of enterprises and their immediate
subordinates (excluding foremen) in industry,
construction, transportation, communications,
and agriculture
955,200
Directors and managers in other sectors
economy (excluding health, education,
research)
of
and
the
874,300
Professional Personnel (Total)
5,245,400
Engineers
834,300
Agronomists, zootechnicians, veterinarians,
and foresters
367,400
Physicians (including heads of hospitals)
381,900
Teachers (except in higher educational,
institutions)
2,519,200
Scientific Personnel*
316,400
Teachers in higher educational institutions
127,400
He`l.ds
of scientific research establishments
32,700
Other
scientific personnel
156,300
Writers,
journalists, and editors
73,100
Library heads and librarians 239,000
Lecturers, propagandists, and other "cultural-
enlightenment" personnel 47,000
Judges, public prosecutors, and lawyers 36,000
Marketing specialists 122,800
Economists, planners, and statisticians 308,300
*A Soviet occupational category that has no U.S. counter-
part. Includes faculty members at higher educational institu-
tions, heads of scientific-research establishments, and selected
individuals from all fields of learning who are engaged in research
and have been awarded the title "scientific worker" by the state.
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Out of this category -- the intelligentsia -- it is possible
to isolate 15 broad occupations in which about 7.5 million per-
sons were employed in 1959. This group -- the managerial and
professional personnel -- of course contains elements critical
to national security staffing. The occupations represented, all
of which generally require a college education or its equivalent,
encompass about one-third of the members of the intelligentsia
and one-sixteenth of the total labor force. The occupations
selected and the number of persons employed in each of them are
shown in Figure B.
The nucleus of leadership in the U.S.S.R. is provided by
the 390,000 persons who direct the Soviet government, the
Communist party and the various auxiliary organizations -- such
as the trade unions and the youth group, the Komsomol. Within
the party side, there are the Presidium, the Secretariat, and
the administrative organs of the Central Committee. On the
government side, there is the Council of Ministers with its
variou.s ministries, state committees, and chief directorates.
Also to be included are the leading party and governmental
offices at the republic and regional levels. At the next stage
are the nearly two million directors and managers of individual
enterprises, including those who head bureaus and branches
within factories. Leading. members of this group are often pro-
moted into policy making positions--to the Council of Ministers,
for example.
The professional personnel listed in Figure B, numbering
some 5.5 million in 1959, are those persons who through educa-
tion, experience or a combination of both have mastered a
critical specialty. This includes heads of scientific research
establishments and other :Leading scientific personnel -- groups
having a particular bearing to this study; it also includes
physicians, lawyers, teachers and librarians -- occupations gen-
erally outside the area under discussion.
This information from official Soviet statistics helps in
drawing an outline of the overall staffing problem but it falls
far short of providing a yardstick of personnel needs in the
fields most closely identified with national security. Assuming,
however, that the areas of critical national security need in
the U.S.S.R. are similar to those in the United States, the
following have been chosen for investigation in this study:
1. The organs of leadership (The party Presidium, the Secretar-
iat, the Council of Ministers, etc.)
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2.
The Military High Command
3.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the diplomatic service
4.
The Intelligence Services
5.
The organizations for foreign trade and aid.
6.
The major scientific research and development organizations
Staffing needs in these six areas are probably somewhere in the
order of half a million people.
There is, however, one aspect of the Soviet manpower
situation outside this framework which has special interest
for the future and should not be overlooked -- the important
role of employed women in Soviet society. A larger proportion
of women is employed in the U.S.S.R. than in almost any other
industrial country in the world. In 1959, for example, 76.4
percent of the females 16 through 54 years of age in the U.S.S.R.
were in the labor force, compared with 42.2 percent in the
United States.
The relatively high proportion of women among graduates of
higher educational institutions in the U.S.S.R. during the last
two decades led inevitably to an expansion of their role in the
major professional occupations. By 1959 about 80 percent of
Soviet physicians and almost 75 percent of teachers, economists,
and planners were women. (See Figure C)
Figure C
Proportion of Women in Selected Managerial Positions
and Major Professional Occupations, January 1959
Managerial positions
Heads of government departments and their
Percent
subdivisions 28
Heads of party, Komsomol, trade union, cooper
ative, and other social organizations and
their subdivisions 21
Heads of enterprises (industrial, construction,
agricultural, forestry, transportation, and
communications) and. their subdivisions 12
Chief physicians and other heads of medical
establishments 52
School principals (except 4-year elementary
schools) 23
Heads of publishing houses and their subdivisions 24
Heads of trade organizations and stores 49
Heads of public dining enterprises 53
Heads of material and technical supply organi-
zations 26
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Professional Occupations
peicc_,nt
Engineers
32
Agronomists
41
Physicians
79
Faculty of higher educational institutions (VUZ)
38
Teachers (except VUZ)
73
Lawyers
37
Economists and planners
74
They played a much smaller part, however, in managerial
occupations than in the professional occupations from which
the managers normally are drawn. Although women constitute 32
percent of all engineers, they hold only 12 percent of the high-
level positions in industrial and other enterprises where almost
all such positions are held by engineers. Similarly, women
hold far fewer managerial posts in schools and hospitals than
their relative numbers among teachers and doctors would dictate.
Moreover, although women make up about one-fourth of the govern-
ment and party leadership, only one woman -- Yekaterina A. Furtseva,
the Minister of Culture -- currently holds a position of prominence
at the national level.
At least part of the explanation is that in 1959, almost
twice as many men as women over 40 had graduated from higher
educational establishments. On the other hand, women constituted
56 percent of the graduates who were less than 40 years of age
in 1959. Thus the relative supply of qualified administrative
personnel among men and women older than 40 rather than the rel-
ative supply of professional graduates of all ages probably has
been a key factor in the continuing predominance of men in
management posts and other positions of leadership during the
postwar period.
During the next 20 years the graduates who currently are
less than 40 years of age -- among whom women are a majority --
will reach "management age," and the U.S.S.R. will be increas-
ingly dependent on women to fill positions of leadership. A
recent decline in the proportion of women enrolled at Soviet
higher educational establishments -- from 52 percent in 1955
to 42 percent in 1962 -- may reflect concern over this impending
development.
In order to meet its staffing needs, the Soviet government
has provided for the orderly supply of graduates of higher edu-
cational institutions. It is this category of personnel that
generally is cited as representing the professional manpower
resources of the country. These are the persons who have
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completed a formal training program designed largely to prepare
them for positions of prominence and leadership in the various
sections of the economy, Moreover, they were selected for such
training by the state on a highly competitive basis, and their
education was subsidized by the state. Finally, included. among
these graduates are persons who have received advanced degrees
and make up the nucleus of the Soviet Union's efforts in scien-
tific-research,
There still are many, persons in managerial and professional
positions who have less than a higher education, but they are
gradually being replaced by highly educated individuals,
In December 1961, according to official Soviet statistics,
there were 3,824,000 graduates of higher educational institutions
employed in the civilian economy. It is estimated that an addi-
tional 350,000 graduates were in the armed forces and that about
500,000 were outside of the labor force,
of graduates of higher educational institutions inethtotal number
e U.S.S.R.
in December 1961 was about 4,700,000.
A. distribution of the graduates employed in the civilian
economy in 1961 is shown in Figure D
Figure D
Graduates of Higher Educational Institutions Employed
in the Civilian Economy of the U.S.S.R.,
by Field of Study, December 1961
Number of
persons
Percent of
Total
Total
Agricultural specialties 3,824,000
100.0
Economics and statistics 243,800
6.4
Engineering 218,300
5.7
Marketing 1,236,000
32.3
Law 21,600
0?6
Medicine 74,000
1.9
424,200
Education, cultural enlightenment
11?1
,
library work, and specialties (including
the natural sciences) in universities
not elsewhere classified
1,473,800
Unspecified specialties ~inc
lu
din
38?5
.
.
g art
and physical culture)
132,3.00
3?5
(8)
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According to this data, almost one-third of the employed
graduates had. majored in the field of engineering. Somewhat
more than one-third had majored in education'.and related fields,
including roughly 150,000 who had majored in the natural sciences
at universities.
Because the U.S.S.R. has no higher educational institutions
that offer general education programs comparable with those
offered by colleges and universities in the United States, the
professional specialist has completely overshadowed the general-
ist in the UOSO.S.R. Soviet specialists are employed not only
in the occupations for which they were trained, but to a degree
unknown in the West, in managerial and administrative positions
in the economic, social, and political affairs of the nation.,
Soviet engineers manage industry; physicians run hospitals and
public health services; teachers are school administrators;
agronomists administer agriculture; and scientists guide the
research effort. In addition, a large and growing number of
high-level positions in the Communist Party and the various gov-
ernment agencies are held by graduates who majored in engineering.
The graduates listed in Figure D not only concentrated on
a specialized field of study, but also received little formal
training in "management" as it is taught in the West. Schools
of business administration. in the American sense do not exist,
and much less attention is paid to training in the managing of
production as an overall process than to training in the techni-
cal aspects of creating the product. From the time of the
closing in the early 19308s of the Moscow Institute of Manage-
ment Technique and the Leningrad Institute for Raising Qualifi-
cations of Administrative Personnel and until very recently,
the view prevailed that purely technical production problems
could not be separated from those of administration.; the prob-
lems of administration -- whenever discussed in journals and
newspapers -- were treated in close connection with production
problems in specific industries.
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Chapter II. STAFFING MACHINERY
A. Party A?encies
Presidium
Nowhere are the staffing functions of the Presidium spelled
out but as the supreme policy making body in the U.S.S.R., un-
fettered by constitutional restraints and unaccountable except
in the most formal ritualistic sense to any other body of indi-
viduals in the country, the Presidium is the ultimate authority
on selection, assignment, promotion, and training of personnel;
career-development programs and criteria; incentive systems --
in fact, all phases of the staffing process. The Presidium is
not only the final arbiter on these matters but an active parti-
cipant in the day-to-day operations of the.staffing mechanism,
as well. This is s.o because power in the Soviet Union, since
it depends not at all on legal conferment and is only weakly
buttressed by constitutional tradition, must be wielded daily
to be maintained. Direct absolute control over the staffing
of key positions is therefore an indispensable condition for
the exercise of supreme political power.
In the staffing field the Presidium:
1) Establishes basic personnel policies for all
elements of the state service (Party, Government, and quasi-
independent "mass" organizations);
2) Determines the personnel needs of the state in
the aggregate and for critical, national security key positions
in particular;
3) Establishes basic criteria for staffing state
service positions;
4) Develops programs for creating a reservoir of
personnel with talent, training and experience in an assort-
ment geared to the present and anticipated future needs of the
state;
5) Monitors the operation of the staffing mechanism
with particular attention to the performance of personnel as-
signed to key trouble spots, national security operations and
high priority programs;
6) Selects key administrative and political personnel.
in the upper echelon of the state service, including the re-
plenishing of its own ranks.
In the performance of the above functions, the.Presidium,
of course, relies heavily on other elements of the state,, both
party and government, for information and recommendations.
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YeGem ?'~ +~~naem
5hchcrhit.ky ^~ +a'~ .m e<
Grishin
Mewl.,
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE - USSR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
1 MAY 1963
all Member, Presidium, Soviet Common isr Parry Condidote
'PARTY
?PRESIDI.U[M, OF
:CENTRAL COMMMITTEE +
Kozlov -~~
Kuus nen
?** Suslon
Demichev >.
Ilichev
Polyakov
Rudokov
Titan
Andrapov
Ponomarev
,A> Khrushchev n ? < Raw,:
Talstikov
4 Others
Potty-Note
Control
Committee'
Steel eplw,
COUNCIL OF' MINISTERS SUPREME: ;SOVIET ,
49 Other Mi nisrers or Officials
of Ministerial Rank
Members E. Officio (The 15
Republic Premiers)
Voronov
CHAIRMAN (CEREMONIAL
HEAD OF STATE)
(The Chairmen ofthe
Supreme Soviet Presidiums
of the 15 Republics)
"?" Mazurov
$Abromov
t ^*Demichev
50tTelstikov
10 Others
SECRETARIAT OF BUREAU FOR THE RSF$R
CENTRAL=COMMITTEE -- OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
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Presidium members, however, involve themselves in great detail
in the whole range of staffing activities. There are, in fact,
few of the governing functions in which they show such daily
personal interest or to which they consistently devote a greater
share of their time. It should be noted, however, that this
concern stems in part from the fact tiht Presidium members not
only determine policy but also supervise the execution of that
policy in considerable detail. This gathering of the policy
making and the policy implementing functions in the hands of a
few men --r.and ultimately one man -- is one of the hallmarks of
the Soviet system and nowhere is the merger more clearly evident
than in the staffing field.
The size of the Presidium is not fixed in statute nor
established by custom; but since it is a real working group
practical considerations have dictated that it remain fairly
small and compact. Currently it consists of 12 members who
exercise the full prerogatives and responsibilities of the
office, and 6 candidate members of lesser prestige and. authority
who participate in varting degree.
The influence of individual Presidium members in the
formulation of policy in the staffing field, as in other
spheres of national life, varies with their training, experience,
and current administrative duties, as well as with the political
weight they carry. The concept of the Presidium as a committee
of equals, espoused so strongly in the early years of the post-
Stalin period, was so clearly invalidated by Khrushchev`s victory
in 1957 that Soviet propaganda has long since dropped any pretense
to the fiction. In fact, Khruehchev is frequently referred to
as the "head" of the Presidium, although formally no such position
exists.
In dealing with broad questions of personnel policy, Khrushchev
appears to rely most heavily on First Deputy Premiers Kosygin
and Mikpyan, "President" :Bre.zhnev, who despite the political
insignificance of the "presidency" is a strong figure in policy
councils, and Party Secretary Kozlov.
Although Mi.kQyan, Kosygin,.and Brezhnev, with wide-ranging
experience in supervising government operations, have great
influence in national security staffing; the man whose voice is
most often heard on staffing problems is probably Kozlov. As
second ranking secretary he acts as Khrushchev?s "political"
deputy, exercising general supervision over the professional
party machine with particular attention to the allocation of
the manpower and resources of the party. In this capacity he
has had the opportunity to develop an intimate knowledge of the
broad sweep of personnel problems and a keen awareness of the
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resources of the country for staffing the upper level executive,
administrative, scientific, and engineering posts. In the
last analysis, however, the decisions are Khrushchev's; no
truly important assignments can be made without his personal
knowledge and approval,,and the top leaders of.the party and
government are probably chosen directly by him.
The Secretariat
The selection, assignment, and training of personnel for
virtually all positions of responsibility in Soviet life, be
they in the party, the government, or in the-quasi-independent
specialized or professional organizations, is one of the major
functions of the professional party machine or apparatus. This
machine, which equates roughly to the full-time paid party
officials, includes in addition to the Central Committee Secre-
tariat and its executive staff, a highly disciplined hierarchy
of subordinate secretariats and staffs corresponding to the
republics, oblasts, and lesser administrative divisions of the
country. Collectively and through the individual activities of
its members, the secretariat provides day-to-day executive
direction for the entire party machine and in so doing, administers
the whole range of the party's responsibilities in the staffing
field.
The vast majority of proposals for new policies in the
staffing field or modifications of existing ones either originate
in the secretariat or elsewhere in the party machine, or at
least funnel through the secretariat at one point or another.
The secretariat prepares policy proposals for Presidium con-
sideration, or, in the case of those formulated elsewhere,
reviews and gives recommendations.
The, secretariat through its executive staff checks on the
staffing of.key positions, recommends release or reassignment of
individuals whose performance fails to meet desired standards,
and selects suitable candidates for vacancies. Approval of
the secretariat is a necessary condition for all appointments
to upper echelon positions. A list of the positions requiring
secretariat approval would include all the important."national
security" positions, the upper executive positions in the gov--
ernment apparatus, the leading party positions down to the
oblast or provincial level, and a vast array of others which
for one reason or another are deemed politically sensitive or
are of critical importance in some other respect. In addition,
the secretariat develops criteria for the staffing of. party
positions at all levels and. oversees their application.
(12)
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In trying to sztisfy the virtually insatiable demands of
the Soviet ,state system for more and better qualified executives,
administrators, managers, scientists, and engineers, the secre-
tariat's executive staff actively seeks out promising candidates,
and supervises their careers to give them the range and depth
of experience and training needed for the more, and more complex
and exacting upper echelon positions.
The central personnel records of the party are maintained
by the executive staff of the secretariat. These records include
basic party information on all party members. Complete dossiers
are maintained on all men assigned to key positions and also on
those who show promise for eventual upper echelon responsibilities.
On occasion the responsibilities of the secretariat in the
staffing field are pre-empted by the Presidium. There is little
chance of serious conflict, however. The nature of the inter-
locking directorate of the Soviet state system tends to keep
the two bodies in concert. Moreover, Khrushchev, "Head" of
the Presidium, and First Secretary, would probably resolve any
disagreements that do arise.
The administrative duties of the secretariat are divided
among its members, currently 12, four of whom -- Khrushchev,
Kozlov, Kuusinen and Suslov --:are also members of the Presidium.
Each secretary has a specific set of responsibilities. Khrushchev,
as First Secretary, is of course head of the secretariat. As
noted above Kozlov is the second ranking secretary with respon-
sibility for general supervision of the secretariat and its
central staff. The other duties are arceled but among the
remaining secretaries [see chart 2_ The number of secretaries
with responsibilities in the field of relations with foreign
Communist parties is unusually high, undoubtedly a reflection
of the challenge to Soviet hegemony in the Communist world
posed by the rift with China and Albania.
Prior to November 1962 each secretary had responsibility
for the supervision of one or more of the departments in the
executive staff, with considerable authority to make decisions
in the fields of his department's responsibilities. Although
Khrushchev, Kozlov, and the secretariat as a whole gave some
overall supervision to the work of individual secretaries and
took'note of complaints and criticisms, on the bulk of issues
the secretary's decisions were for all intents and purposes
final. There is reason to believe that in this situation the
individual secretary tended to lose sight of the legitimate
interests of other elements of the state machinery and missed
valuable perspectives which a wider range of view points might
have afforded.
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PARTY SECRETARIAT
SECRETARY
Khrushchev, N. S.
Kozlov, F. R.
Suslov, M. A.
Kuusinen, O. V.
Andropov, Yu. V.
Ponomarev, B. N.
Demichev, P. N.
Ilichev, L. F.
Polyakov, V. 1.
Rudakov, A. P.
Titov, V. N.
Shelepin, A. N.
1 MAY 1963
PROBABLE FIELDS (obviously incomplete)
1st Secretary: head of the Secretariat
2nd-in-command; general supervision
of the Secretariat and its central staff
CPSU relations with foreign Communist
parties; coordination of the world
Communist movement
CPSU relation with foreign Communist
parties
CPSU relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc
Communist parties
CPSU relations with non-bloc Communist
parties
Chemical and Light Industry
Ideological Questions
Agriculture
General Industry and Construction
Organizational-Party Questions
Party-State Control
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In November 1962, as part of a broad restructuring of the
party machine, work in the secretariat was reorganized and new
units set up. This change was seemingly designed to provide an
orderly and continuing mechanism for ensuring that a wide variety
of.professional viewpoints were brought to bear in making basic
decisions.in the various broad fields of secretarial responsibility
and that decisions in one field were adequately coordinated with
work in other fields. rsee chart 3-7
Primary responsibility in the staffing field had been
centered in the Party Organs Department,* which was also respon-
sible for overseeing the internal operations of the Party, the
Komsomol (Communist youth organization), and the Trade Unions.
Supervision of its operations was the direct concern of.Kozlov
who performed that function along with general supervision of
the secretariat.
In the new scheme of things Kozlov is relieved of direct
responsibility for supervision of the department but presumably
he will continue to keep a close eye.on its operations.. Secre-
tariat level supervision has been retained but instead of the
full responsibility being vested in a single secretary, it is
to be exercised at least part~ally by a Commission for Organ-
izational-Party Questions set up in November 1962 under the
chairmanship of Vitaly Titov, who was simultaneously made a
member of the secretariat. Titov was head of the Party Organs
Department for the Union Republics at the time of his new
assignment. It seems a slightly better than even bet that he
will continue in that capacity as well as chair the commission.
The membership of the commission has not been made public
so there is little basis yet for an estimate of the extent to
which Titov will be able to control its deliberations.. Presumably
the commission is intended to bring a missing element of "collective"
leadership and provide wider political experience in staffing
matters. It is probably intended to perform the functions of a
policy planning committee as well as.to provide guidelines for
the implementation of policy laid down by the Secretariat and the
Presidium in the organizational and personnel field.
The Central Staff of the Party
Most of the departments of the executive staff of the central
party organization are supervised by one of the commissions or
*There were two "party organs" departments in the executive
staff, one for the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and one for the Union
Republics. The Union Republic one was the more important since
it had broad, nation-wide responsibilities f -see below p.15 7
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(11+)
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THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE
FIRST SECRETARY
N. S. Khrushchev
COMMISSION FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL-
PARTY QUESTIONS
CHAIRMAN
V. N. Titov
MEMBERS
PARTY ORGANS
V. N. Titov ?
IDEOLOGICAL
COMMISSION
CHAIRMAN
L. F. Ilichev
MEMBERS
S. P. Pavlov
V. P. Vepanov
P. A. Sotyukov
A. 1. Adzhubey
A V. Romenov
V. L1-ti.
D. A. Polike,pov
A, G. Yegorov
IDEOLOGICAL
L. F. II'rchec
PRAVDA
P. A. Sgtyukov
KOMMUNIST
V.P. 51eoanev
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
I- D. 5 bin
CHAIRMAN
V. G. Lomonosog
PARTY-STATE CONTROL
COMMITTEE
A. N. Shelepin
SECRETARY
F. R. Kozlov
L P. N. Demichev
BUREAU FOR CHEMICAL
& LIGHT INDUSTRIES
CHAIRMAN
P. N. Demichev
MEMBERS
LIGHT & FOOD
INDUSTRY
P. I. Maksimov
j CHEMICAL INDUSTRY1
TRADE, FINANCE &
PLANNING ORGANS
B. P. Miroshnlchenko
ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS
K. P. Chernyoyev
r CHAIRMAN
N. S. Khrushchev
BUREAU FORTHE
MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY
CONSTRUCTION
RSFSR
CHAIRMAN
LIAISON WITH COMMUNIST
& WORKERS PARTIES OF
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
Yu. V. Andropov
SECRETARY
M. A. Suslov
BUREAU FOR INDUSTRY
& CONSTRUCTION
CHAIRMAN
A. P. Rudakov
MEMBERS
HEAVY INDUSTRY
MACHINE BUILDING
V, S. Frolav
TRANSPORT &
COMMUNICATIONS
K. S. Simonov
BUREAU FOR THE
MANAGEMENT
OF AGRICULTURE
RSFSR
CHAIRMAN
L. N. Yefremov ?
SECRETARY
B. N. Ponomarev
BUREAU FOR
AGRICULTURE
CHAIRMAN
V. I. Polyakov
MEMBERS
AGRICULTURE
V. 1. Polyokov ?
CHIEF POLITICAL DIRECTORATE
SOVIET ARMY & NAVY
A. A. Yepishee
CHAIRMAN
G. N. Bochkorev
FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, CPSU
CANDIDATE MEMBER,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,:CPSU
MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING
COMMISSION, CPSU
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BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR
1 MAY 1963
1ST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
A. P. Kirilenko
MEMBERS
V. M. Churayev
N. G. Ignatov
BUREAU FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF
INDUSTRY & CONSTRUCTION, RSFSR
CHAIRMAN
A. P. Kirlleoko ?
CHAIRMAN
N. S. Khrushchev
V. I. Stepakov
probably several others
CHAIRMAN'
L. N..Yefremot
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
?
V. F. Promyslov -
probably several others
IDEOLOGICAL
M. A, Khaldeyev
CONSTRUCTION
A:; V, Glodyrevsky
PARTY ORGANS
N. A. Voronavsky
MACHINE BUILDING
HEAVY INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT
& COMMUNICATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE, TRADE &
FINANCE ORGANS
PARTY ORGANS :"
M. A. Paleklsit,
AGRICULTURE.
!..~ Ponkln
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
K. I. Zarodov
1ST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
L. N. Yefremov
V. S. Tolstikov
M. A. Yasnov
BUREAU FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, RSFSR
IDEOLOGICAL
Y ! Stepakov
PARTY-STATE CONTROL COMMITTEE
RSFSR
G. V. Yenyutin
CENTRAL ASIAN BUREAU
I MAY 1963
CHAIRMAN
V. G. Lomonosov
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
V. K. Akulintsev
MEMBERS
Sh. R. Rashidov
T. U. Usubaliyev
D. R. Rasulov
B. Ovezov
FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, CPSU
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
S. M. Veselov
V. A. Liventsov
S. I. Kadyshev
A. A. Sarkisov
V. M. Gushchin
V. N. Kulikov
TRANSCAUCASIAN; SUREAU,
1 MAY"1963: .
CHAIRMAN
G. N. Bochkarev
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
O. D. Gotsiridze
MEMBERS
V. P. Mzhavanadze
Ye. N. Zarobyan
V. Yu. Akhundov
CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, CPSU
DEPUTY CHARIMAN
MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING
COMMISSION, CPSU.,. ,
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bureaus set up in November 1962, or by the "Bureau for the RSFSR,"
established in 1956. A few departments appear to be directly
subordinate to the Secretariat, [see charts 3 & 2-._7
The RSFSR Bureau corresponds somewhat to the party presidiums
in the other 1i republics, but differs in the method of its
selection, i.e., it is confirmed by the all-Union Central Committee
instead of by the Central Committee?s republic counterparts.*
The exact relationship between the Secretariat and the Bureau for
the RSFSR is not completely clear, but the bureau seems to function
rather like an independent subcommittee of the Secretariat for
dealing with RSFSR problems. A close working relation is main-
tained between an RSFSR department and its central counterpart.
The new Central Asian and Trancaucasian Bureaus appear to
be super-republic coordinating agencies but not enough is yet
known of their organization and functions to clarify their relation
to the Secretariat or to the party organizations of the republics
they encompass Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenia and. Tadzhikistan
(Central Asian) and Armenia, Azerbaydzhan and Georgia
(Transcaucasian).
The fields of responsibility of most of the staff departments
are generally reflected in their names. The "administrative
organs" departments, however, cover a potpourri -- the courts,
public prosecutor?s office, organs of state control, and police
and security forces, and health, social welfare, and physical
culture agencies; ideological" covers the fields of mass com-
munications, education, science, propaganda, literature and art.
The publishing houses Pravda and Kommunist function as separate
departments but maintain close collaboration with the Ideological
Department. Although each department is supposed to be consulted
on personnel assignments in its functional field --- the Defense
Industry Department, for example, on the assignment of a director
for a munitions plant -- the primary responsibility and. ultimate
authority, as noted above, is lodged in the Party Organs Department.
A deputy head of the union-republic Party Organs Department
in 1955 described the encompassing nature of the department?s
responsibilities in the staffing field in the following terms:
He said that the department handled all questions relating to
the assignment of personnel in party, government, and elsewhere --
that even the appointment of functionaries in the other departments
of the central staff had to be passed upon by the Party Organs
Department. Control over the activities of central, interregional
*Unlike the other republics, the RSFSR does not have its
own Central Committee but is administered directly by the central
party organization.
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and-republic party schools which prepared personnel for responsible
assignments in the party, government, and trade unions was a
function of the department, as well as the .selection of students
for those schools. Also, the department maintained the personnel
records of the party. Thus, personnel selection, training and
assignment responsibilities were centered in this department;
available evidence indicates that this is as true today as it
was in 1955.
The staffing function is centered in two of the approximately
nine sectors into which the department is divided rsee chart 5-7.
The Cadres (personnel) Sector is the operating sector; the
Single Party Card Sector is essentially a support group, main-
taining the personnel records. The territorial sectors also
play a role in staffing for they maintain field agents who
along with their other responsibilities check on the quality of
personnel in key positions and presumably recruit for vacancies.
One other department enters the staffing picture when the
assignment in question is to a post abroad. The Department for
Travel Abroad rules on the political reliability and suitability
for a foreign assignment of individuals proposed by any Soviet
agency for posts in foreign countries.
Subordinate Secretariats and Staffs
The restructuring of the party machine, begun in November
1962 and not yet complete,,-is the most ambitious reform of the
Party structure since the early days of the Cormnunst regime.
Although there are a few local variations,. the general plan
involves dividing the Party into two locally separate segments,
one concerned with industrial (urban) areas and activities and
the other concerned with agricultural (rural) areas and activities.
Each segment has its own secretariat and appropriate staff
.departments, including Party Organs Departments. The staffing
of lower level positions in rural areas has thus been separated
organizationally from the staffing of positions of comparable
importance in urban areas. Since control over the staffing of
upper echelon positions is exercised by the central staff in
Moscow the urban-rural division of the party machine will have
little immediate effect on the staffing of national security
positions. On the lower levels, however, the new arrangement
will probably make transfers from rural to urban (or urban to
rural) posts more difficult than heretofore.
The primary contribution of the lower echelon departments
to the staffing of national. security positions lies in the function
they perform in improving the manpower pool. This includes the
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PARTY. ORGANS FOR THE UNION REPUBL[CS
PROBABLE ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF
HEAD
V. N. Titov
1st DEPUTY HEAD
P. F. Pigalev
DEPUTY HEAD
FUNCTIONAL SECTORS
STATUTORY QUESTIONS
V. A. Lorin
TRAINING & 'RETRAINING
Z. I. Ki-ucheva
TRADE UNION &
KOMSOMOL ORGANS
G I. Fedatov
UKRAINE- MOLDAVIA:
& ;BELQRUSSIA.
TRANSCAUCASUS
V, P. Shimansky
KAZAKHSIAN. &
CENTRAL ASIA;::
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initial selection of promising young men and women for responsible
local posts, helping them develop experience and competence, and
recommending. capable individuals to the attention of the central
authorities.
For carrying out the staffing function, the lower echelon
Party Organs Departments are organized in much the same way as
the Central Party Organs Department described above. Each has
a Cadres Sector and a Party Card Sector. Their functions and
activities in relation to the positions -- party, government,
or other -- which they control are essentially similar to those
of the department in Moscow.
B.. Government Agencies
Despite the crucial role of the party apparatus in supervising,
controlling, and administering the regime's policies in the staffing
field, the major share of work in staffing?government operations
is performed by the government bureaucracy, itself. Special
government agencies develop tables of organization, job classi-
fications and salary scales for all government agencies, activities,
and installations. They administer personnel policies, and
collect, process, and maintain statistical data relevant to the
staffing process.
The government machinery, as a whole, shares in highlighting
problems in the staffing field, and develops information reports
and policy proposals for consideration by the Party Presidium.
These functions channel through the Presidium of the Council of
Ministers, the executive head of the government, which, within
the framework of.policies established by the Party Presidium,
makes decisions governing the operation of the government, inter-
prets state policy, assigns tasks for its implementation, and
resolves conflicts arising in the course of government operations.
The Government Presidium supervises the staffing of upper
echelon positions down through heads of the major subdivisions
of a ministry or state committee -- and monitors the operation
of the. staffing mechanism throughout the government bureaucracy.
Its decisions are normally final, just as if made by the Party
Presidium. The latter probably would take up a problem only if
major policy shifts were at issue or if the problem cut across
into spheres of interest and responsibility of the top leaders
not on the Government Presidium.
(17)
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Each government agency recru.ts for positions in its own
organization, and trains, assigns, promotes, transfers, or dis-
misses its personnel. Personnel actions in regard to all positions
of responsibility within the agency require the express prior
approval in each individual case of the appropriate party unit.
For upper echelon positions, including all key "national security"
positions the approval must come from the central secretariat in
Moscow. The top 15-20 percent of all government positions are
in this manner directly "controlled" by the party machine;
assignments to the remaining 80-85 percent of the positions are
"uncontrolled," i.e., are completely within the purview of the
employing agency, subject to compliance with existing classi-
fication schedules, tables of organization and service regulations.
The Council of Ministers is composed of a Chairman (Premier),
First Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen, heads of various Ministries,
state committees and other agencies, and certain other individuals
included on the Council because of either their position or their
responsibilities. The Council is charged by the Soviet Constitution
with directing the work of ministries and other governmental bodies,
executing the national economic plan and the State budget, strengthen-
ing the monetary system, conducting foreign affairs, and super-
vising the general structure of the armed force. It is far too
large -- on 1 Ma`y. 1963 there were $2 members -- for effective
decisionimaking. The actual decisions are made by the much
smaller Presidium of the Council of Ministers, with the full
council, which meets only rarely, giving pro forma approval.
The Presidium is the executive head of the Council of Ministers.
Its position and role in the government structure are thus some-
what akin to that of the party Secretariat in the party hierarchy.
The government Presidium consists of the Premier, the First Deputy
Premiers, and the Deputy Premiers plus other "individuals personally
designated by the Council of Ministers." The Minister of Finance
is almost certain to be among these others. As Premier, Khrushchev
is head of.the government Presidium. Mikoyan and Kosygin, the
two"senior First Deputies, divide the major responsibilities be-
tween them and substitute for Khrushchev when he is absent. Mikoyan
is, concerned more with foreign affairs -- including foreign economic
relations -- while Kosygin _is primarily concerned with domestic
matters. Ustinov, appointed First Deputy in March 1963, is
supreme coordinator for economic activities. The Deputy Premiers
are assigned special responsibility for certain key fields
(Dymshits -- industrial management; Lesechko -- foreign economic
relations; Lomako -- economic planning; Novikov -- capital con-
struction; Rudnev -- coordination of.scientific research; Smirnov --
defense production; Shelepin -- government control and inspection; Polyansky -- agriculture).
(18)
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1049AO02700040002-6
rsid(OA Comm;:,i,;
MAOueshionsl
t EN Reseoreh.__i
m-Commineel J
duals personal Iy deslynared by the Counci Is of Mlnirfers
COMMISSIONS OF THE PRESIDIUM
RENT QUESTIONS COSTS.QUESTIONS~ r'
STATE COMMITTEES
CINEMATOGRAPHY LABOR & WAGE MATTERS
A. V. Romonor A. P. Volkov
CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH
FOREIGN COUNTRIES
S. K. R.--k,
FOREIGN ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
S. A. Skoohkov
ER COMMITTEES ADMINISTRATEQNS, ETC,
COMMITTEE OF FSTATE MITTEE OF
APARTY N ShSTATE CONTROL
SECURITY
elep n
semtchosmy
CENTRAL STATISTICAL
ADMINISTRATION
V. N. Srorovsky
RADIO BRO ADCASTING
& TELEVISION
M. A. Kharlamov
PROCUREMENTS
L. R. Komiyess
USSR COUNCIL
RAILWAYS
P. Beshch
ION-REPUBLICAN
T I
SEA FLEET
V. G. Roknyev
FINANCE
V. F. Gorbuzov
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A. A. Gromyko
HEALTH
S. V. Kurashev
HIGHER 8 SPECIALIZED
SECONDARY EDUCATION
V. F. Yelyutin
SERVICE UNIT
MINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS
(Housekeeping Funcrio, )
SUPREME COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
COMMISSION (GOSPLAN.
P. F Lomoko
STATE COMMITTEE FOR
COORDINATION OF
3 STATEPRODUCTION
COMMITTEES
A F Dio,ditso (MoIdovicn SSR)
E. N. Alikhanov sAzerbaydzhan SSR) D. A. Kenaye, (Kazakh SSR)
F MINISTERS
DEPUTY CHAIRMAI -?.
A. N. Shele?i0
(CHAIRMEN OF REPUBLIC COUNCILS
OF MINISTERS)
G. I. Voronov (REFER)
A. Kokho,ov (Tadzhik SSR)
A. A. Annoliyev (Turkmen SSR)
V. V. Shcherbirsky (Uk,oinlon SSR)
R K ,bunov (Uzbek SSR)
MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING COMMI5510N CPSU
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SUPREME COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
L A. M. Tarasov
COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
(Sovnarkhoz)
'So ua Ikhoz)ekhMka"
A. A. Yezhevaky
STATE PRODUCTION COMMITTEES
. MEDIUM MACHINE BUILDING
PROFE55IONAL&TECHNICAL EDUCATIONG.I. Zefenko
INVENTIONS & DISCOVERIES
A. E. Vyarkin
POWER & ELECTRIFICATION
INSTRUMENT MAKING, MEANS
P. S. Neporozhny
CIF AUTOMATION & CONTROSYSTEMS
LIGHT INDUSTRY
M. Ye. Rakovsky
N. N. Torasov
GAS INDUSTRY
LUMBER,CELLULOSE-PAPER &
WOODWO
MOTOR VEHICLE TCTOR &
A. K. Konunov
RKING INDUSTRYS
FORESTRY
AGRICULTURAL MACHINE
BUILDING
N. I. Srroh.e
TECHNOLOGY
STATE PLANNING COMMISSION
(Gosplan)
r
FIRST DEPUTY hiy...
A. A. Erinakd zhiyon
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
N. A.-..Tikhonav
AUTOMATION&
MACHINE BUILDING
A. 1. Kos/ausov.
CHEMISTRY
N. K. Roybkov
CENTRAL ASIAN
COTTONGROWING
V. N. Kulikov
EL
ECTRICAL ENGINEERING
N. A. Obolensk
US TNON-FERRMETALLURGY E
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
S. A. Zverev
RADIO ELECTRONICS
V. D. Kalmykov
FULLMEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEECPSU
FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
V. M. Ryobikav
STATE COMMITTEE FOR CONSTRUCTION
(Gosstroy)
L MACHINE BUILDING
A. V.
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY
A. I. Sh.kin
COOTION
ARCHITECTURE
M. Vhin
CONSTRUCTIONROAD, &
COMMUNAL MACHINE BUILDING
Ye. 5, Noofa
ASSEMBLY & SPECIALCONSTRUC"ON WORK
TRANSPORI CONSTRUCTION
Y..F. Toxhevnike
CONSTRUCTIOHCENTRAL-ASIAN ECONOMIC
CHAIRMAN '
UTY CHAIRMN.
GrNIrnianae
STATE COMMITTEES
BUILDING MATERIALS
INDUSTRY
REGION
M- Gashehin
STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE
COORDINATION OF SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH WORK
GEOLOGY
A. V. Sidorenko
STANDARDS, MEASURES & {r
MEASURING INSTRUMENTS I
Yu. Ye. Moksorev L
. CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
UTILIZATION OF
ATOMIC ENERGY
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Just as the party secretariat is represented in the ruling
party Presidium by three secretaries (in addition to Khrushchev)
so the government Presidium is represented by three officials in
addition to Khrushchev -- Mikoyan, Kosygin, and Polyansky. Thus
the views of the government executives on staffing matters are
assured a respectable hearing in the party Presidium.
None of :the members of the government Presidium are personnel
specialists, but throughout their careers all have had to devote
a large share of their time to staffing problems and several of
them have been involved in the staffing process not only as offi-
cials responsible for the managerial functions of the government,
but also, at one time, or another, as party executives.
The government Presidium does have a staff to assist it in
the personnel work incident to the operations of the Council of
Ministers. Little is known about the scope of authority or range
of responsibility of this staff but it probably exists primarily
to coordinate the work of the personnel departments of the in-
dividual agencies, ensuring uniform interpretation and application
of existing regulations, and to keep the Premier and Deputy Premiers
informed on the state of personnel work in the government. In
addition, it would handle the paper work on those personnel
actions which are formalized by decree of the ,Council of Ministers.
Functions related to staffing procedures are spread among
several government agencies. The state budget, prepared by the
Ministry of Finance, establishes the wage fund of the various
ministries, state committees, officers and enterprises. The
Central Commission on Staffs, an agency of the Ministry of Finance,
is responsible for ensuring that the table of organization and
salary schedule of each agency or institution meet the require-
ments of sound administrative practice and accord with existing
legislation. The commission conducts an annual review of all
staffing schedules and, if they are satisfactory, registers them
for the coming year. An organization cannot draw upon its salary
account in the state bank_1ua.til the staffing schedule it has sub-
mitted has been approved. Approval of the commission must also
be obtained for any changes in the table of organization or salary
schedule desired by an organization during the year. The Control-
Auditing Administration of the Ministry of Finance checks on
all departments, offices and institutions for adherence to
authorized personnel staffs, salary rates, and wage funds.
The State Committee on Labor and Wages is responsible for
working out uniform salary scales and preparing job classifications
for all government positions. It is also charged with preparing
drafts for government legislation in the salary and wage field.
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The Central Statistical Administration gathers, collects,
and disseminates manpower statistics, and it maintains the govern-
ment's central personnel file. The latter includes information
on all leading personnel and specialists, gathered by means of
special censuses. A major census taken on 1 December 1.956 by
this administration listed a little over nine million persons
in the "leading personnel and specialists" category.
The Party-State Control Commission, a joint control agency
of the party and government, is charged with detecting violations
of established laws, government regulations and party directives.
In the staffing field it duplicates some of the work of the Control-
Auditing Administration of the Ministry of Finance, but, the party-
State Control Commission has much broader responsibilities and
it can levy administrative penalties for violations.
The Department for Planning the Training and Placement of
Graduates, a department of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized
Secondary Education, collects requests from government agencies
for graduates of the higher educational institutions operated
by the ministry. It matches the requests with the expected out-
put of each educational institution and allocates the filling of
the requests on the ba~..s of priority need among the various
educational institutions by means of a placement order. The
responsibility of the department then ceases. All further con-
tact is between the educational institution and the agency
requesting graduates.
Each government agency has a personnel department to handle
the routine functions involved in the staffing process and to
advise the minister, chairman, or other head of agency on personnel
matters. These departments maintain the records on personnel
whose appointments, promotions or transfers are.the direct respon-
sibility of the top officers of the agency. The personnel depart-
ment also supervises the work of the personnel units in the
various offices and enterprises under the jurisdiction of the
agency and works out plans for alloting new graduates among the
agency's components.. The head of the personnel department is
usually one of the top officers in the agency oftentimes one
of the deputies to the chief. Formal education in personnel admin-
istration has been conspicuously lacking; most personnel specialists
have learned the work on the Sob. An effort has recently been
made to improve the quality of personnel administration by as-
signing to personnel work graduates of juridical faculties who
have concentrated on labor, civil and financial law.
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Chapter ICI. STAFI.F'ING FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES
A. Staffing For National Security Policy Making
In theory, the apex of the Soviet policy making machine the leadership of the Communist Party and hence of the nation is staffed. democratically through a system of indirect election.
The formal process begins with the party rank and file, which
elects delegates to rayon party conferences; these delegates in
turn meet to elect delegates to a conference (or congress) at
the next higher echelon and so on to the national party congress
held in Moscow approximately every four years. The party con-
gredd chooses a central committee to govern the party in the
interval between congresses, and the central committee in turn
elects the ruling Presidium and secretariat.
In reality, however, Soviet party elections are totally
devoid of choice and the election process has no relevance to
the staffing of the top Soviet leadership. Since the defeat of
the anti-party group (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, et al) in
June 1957, Khru.shchev has determined who will be brought into the
Presidium and Secretariat and has made the final decisions as
to how these bodies will operate.
This fact,, plus the absence of any regulations governing
the size, terms of office, or division of effort within the
ruling group, makes for considerable flexibility of operation;
Khrushchev can adapt the -top leadership to fit the changing
needs of national security as circumstances dictate.
Perhaps the most troublesome problem in the process is
deciding who is to be brought into one of the ruling bodies once
the need for additional personnel has been determined. However
broad it may be, the previous experience of any prospective
newcomer is certain to fall short of matching the complexity,
magnitude or multiplicity of the problems with which he will
have to cope as a policy maker. He must be able to participate
in the formulation of policies affecting the entire scope of
Soviet national and international life; and, if he is a
Presidium member, also to hold at least one collateral -- and
usually full-time -- post in the party or government bureaucracy.
To a large extent,, then, the severe demands of high office
in the Soviet Union themselves limit the number of candidates
available. No serious consideration is given to the official
who rates less than outstanding. He need not have a higher
education -- or much formal schooling at all, for that matter--
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if he has all or most of the.other qualifications on which
Khrushchev puts a premium. In addition to such obvious
prerequisites as considerable experience and demonstrated
managerial-administrative ability, these include initiative,
drive, imagination, resourcefulness, and perhaps even a
judicious amount of audacity.
The precise degree to which Khrushchev`s closest colleagues
are involved in the selection process cannot be determined, but
it seems certain that they participate at least in an "advise
and consent" capacity. Khrushchev very likely solicits their
opinions as to who best fills the needs of the moment and he may
rely somewhat upon their personal knowledge of and experiences
with the men being considered for the job. But Khrushchev is
jealous of his power and prerogatives. Mindful of the abortive
machinations of the anti-party group, he is sure to veto any
candidate whom he regards as remotely capable of similar. political
opposition;. Thus, in addition to possessing those qualities
enumerated above, any newcomer to the top leadership can generally
be presumed to be a "Khrushchev man" in the sense that he is in
fundamental agreement with Khrushchev's policies and methods and
is unlikely to side against his mentor in the event of a new
show-down.
This, of course, does not mean that Khrushchev has
surrounded himself with a, group of "yes men." In marked. con-
trast to Stalin, he prefers to rule more by persuasion than
by diktat. While there is little doubt that he has the final
say whenever he wants it, he listens to his colleagues, is influ-
enced by thEir opinions, and on occasion has deferred to their
judgment. In short, he expects sound advice from those around
him and his expectations are reflected in the staffing of the
three bodies primarily responsible for making and executing
national security policies -- the party Presidium and Secre-
tariat, and on the government side, the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers
The Party Presidium
Although the subject is clearly of more than academic
interest, a discussion of Khrushchev's own rise to predominance
in the Presidium is beyond the scope of this paper. For our
purposes here, it is sufficient to recall that he was a member
of the hand-picked Politburo before Stalin died and that his
leadership therefore was not thrust upon his colleagues from
without; it was carefully and thoroughly developed from within
the ruling clique. Thus, post-Stalin changes in the composition
of the Presidium -- particularly until June 1957 - - may well.
reflect Khrushchev?s political maneuvering and the counter-moves
of his opponents as much as they represent the attempts of a new
and untried "collective leadership" to adapt to the complex tasks
of running the country.
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It is one of the peculiarities of the Soviet system that
these two factors cannot be divorced. Although additions to
or deletions from the leadership are ostensibly made only in
order to effect a redivision of labor among its members,
political considerations are ever present, and any change in the
membership of the Presidium (or the Secretariat) inevitably
alters the balance of power in the hierarchy. After his victory
over the anti-party group left him as the unchallenged leader
of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was faced with a two-fold problem
in assembling his policy making machine. He had first to draw
the best available talent into the Presidium and to dispose it
so as best to realize the goals which he envisioned. Secondly
and of equal importance at least at that juncture, he had to
staff the leadership with men about whose personal allegiance
he had few doubts.
In order to satisfy these needs, Khrushchev has brought
three groups of men together to constitute the full (voting)
membership of the Presidium. He had retained (or brought
back) men who like himself, were originally selected as members
by Stalin (Mikoyan, Suslov, Kuusinen, Kosygin, Shvernik); he
has added men who were already high-ranking leaders under
Stalin (Brezhnev); and he has brought up men of his own choosing
from the lower echelons of the party (Kozlov, Kirilenko,
Podgorny, Polyansky, and Voronov). The political factor in
staffing the Presidium is readily apparent in the last group;
of the five, Kirilenko, Polyansky, and Podgorny came up through
the Ukrainian apparatus, which Khrushchev bossed from 1938 until
1949. Brezhnev too is one of the old retainers from the Ukraine.
Indeed, those who served there under Khrushchev appear to form
something of a clique, and throughout the years, Khrushchev has
understandably tended to favor them in making appointments to
high office.
It has never become clear whether Khrushchev first selects
a new Presidium member and then assigns him to an appropriate
collateral duty, or conversely picks a man for the collateral
post and then, because of the importance of the post at the time,
adds the appointee to the Presidium. Some collateral positions
-- notably the party first and second secretaryships, the
pre-
miership and the "presidency" -?- are always held by Presidium
members; the two appointments seem to go hand-in-hand. But
Presidium members are often shifted around'in collateral assign-
ments without automatically losing Presidium status. Brezhnev
who was a, member of the Secretariat when elevated into the
policy making group in 1957, was transferred to the "presidency"
in 1960. Kozlov provides an even better example. He has'also
been a full member of the Presidium since 1957. At that time
he was party boss in Leningrad, but was shortly named. premier
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of the RSFSR; he became U-S4S,R. first deputy premier in 1958,
p
and is now arty second secretary and Khrushchev's heir apparent.
In all likelihood, there are no hard and fast rules determining
whether Presidium membership or collateral assignment takes pre-
cedence, and each case Is probably decided on its merits.
There is, however, some basis for speculation that assignment
to certain collateral posts is now automatically accompanied by
candidate (non-voting) membership in the Presidium Presumably
in order to introduce a measure of stability into the leadership,
Khrushchev has, since 1957, conferred candidate status on repre-
sentatives from several of the Soviet Union?s national minority
areas. In the current Presidium these areas are represented as
follows: Central Asia by Uzbek party chief Rashidov; the Trans-
eaucau.s by Georgian party boss Mzhavanadze; Belorussia by repub-
lic party chief Mazurov. Since its
party
overlord a full Presidium member, the Ukraine pisrepresented ?amongythe
candidates by the republic premier, Shcherb.itsky. In addition
to these men, the chairman of the U.S.S.R.'s Central Council of
Trade Unions is traditionally a Presidium candidate.
At least in terms of size and of the men who have served
on it, the Presidium as a whole has tended to relative stability
since 1957. Eleven of the 18 present members have served since
that time. Nevertheless, the attrition, additions, and changes
in collateral assignments which have taken place have profoundly
altered many of the political relationships which once charac-
terized Khru.shchev?s system of .ru.1e,
Following the downfall of the anti-party group, the Presidium
was heavily weighted with party officials
assignments lay primarily in the field of mn wmoni coalaoral
At the time, 17 members were party admiistration~
party officials while only seven
were engaged in supervising the government machinery. This exper-
iment in policy making with party parochial:'-interests so heavily
represented lasted less than three years. The first steps to
reduce the preponderance of party professionals in the policy
councils of state were taken in May 1960, and at the 22nd Party
Congress in October 1961 a new pattern emerged. It is character-
ized primarily by a better balance between party and government
institutional interests in the policy making function, and includes
a reduction in the size of the Presidium.. This shift has been
accomplished largely at the expense of the Secretariat; whereas
all eight secretaries were Presidium members in June 1957, only
four of the current 12 are formulators as well as executors of
state policy.
In shifting to this new tack in staffing the .P.residium,
Khru.shchev has not, of course, had any intention of curtailing
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the power and authority of the party machine. Rather, he seems
to have concluded that although the policy maker should ideally
be a broadly based generalist whose advice and opinions transcend
departmental interests, few men can in fact resist the tendency
to parochialism engendered by daily responsibility for a segment
of the governing and administrative machinery. He evidently
believes that some balancing of departmental interests is
necessary in order to avoid a lop-sided approach to critical
policy problems. Khrushchev's continued prediliction for the
"party" point of view and a legacy of fears and prejudices left
by his struggle to achieve and maintain power have, however,
kept him from applying the "balance of interests" principle with
logical consistency. For example, none of the three principal
Soviet "national security" agencies -- defense, foreign affairs
and the intelligence services -- is represented, and among the
full members, party functionaries outnumber government adminis-
trators by six-to-five (Khrushchev not counted) whenever Podgorny who is normally resident in Kiev -- is-.cAlled up to Moscow for
an important session,
The "balance of interests" principle seems most usually to
apply when the full Presidium is called upon to consider the
adoption of certain policy initiatives. In-,;these cases,
Khru.shchev clearly wants to insure that all the ramifications
of his policies are thoroughly examined. from differing points of
view, and he particularly wants to hear the opinions of those
whose collateral duties involve the implementation of the deci-
sion at hand. Thus, when such matters as the allocation of
national resources, major party or governmental reorganizations,
or fundamental shifts in the Kremlin line are under considera-
tionr,_ Khrushchev will very likely summon all full and candidate
members of the Presidium to Moscow to thrash. out both the details
and the implementation of the new policy. Since, however, the
collateral assignments of the Presidium candidates lie primarily
in the field. of domestic affairs, they would not necessarily
attend, meetings devoted, for example, to Soviet foreign relations,
trade and aid, or the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Presidium as a
whole, then, cannot be considered as a formally constituted 'na-
tional security council" which meets regularly to deal with all
matters affecting the vital, interests of the nation:,
On the contrary, it is possible to distinguish within the
Presidium several "teams," each headed by Khru.shchev, which are
probably the primary policy formulators in various spheres
fee chart 92. Although he expects his colleagues to function as
generalists, Khrushchev has nevertheless staffed the Presidium
in such a way that men with long experience in relatively narrow
fields are at his immediate beck and call, and he draws heavily
on their specialized knowledge in developing the policies he
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PROBABLE PARTY PRESIDIUM POLICY-MAKING
"TEAMS"AND PRINCIPAL ADVISORS
I May 1963
National Security Issues
Part
Issues
y
Domestic Economic Issues
Military &
Diplomacy &
International
Domestic Part
I
Intelligence
Trade
y
ndustry
Agriculture
Khrushched
Khrushchev
brush
Khrushchev
Khrushchev
h
u
Kozlov
ozlov
n
S
l
r
K
shchev
Khrushchev
K
n
8rezhnev
us
ov
Kozlov
Kosygin
Voronov
Ko
i
Kuusinen
Suslov
Kirilenko
syg
n
Kosygin
Mikoyan
Bre
h
Polyan
k-y
8rezhnev
Gromyko
Kozlov
z
nev
Sh
Po
lyansky
n
ny
Groin k
vernik
an
Mikoy
o
y
Patol i chev
AndraP ov
Kiil
r enko
Yefrem
efrem
ov
Malinovsky;
Grishin
Polyakov
Semi chastny
Ponomarev
Podgorny
Demichev mic
Demi chew
Ilichev
Ustinov
Yefremov
Rudakov
Shelepin
Presidium, Central Committee, CPSU ? Candidate Mbr, Presidium, Central Committee, CPSU
Key to Advisors
Andropov Secretary, CC, CPSU; Head, Department for Liaison with Communist and Worker's Parties of
Socialist Countries
.
Demlahev Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Bureau, CC, CPSU, for Light and Chemical Indu
Gromyko Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Ilichev Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Ideological Commission.
Malinovsky Minister of Defense .
Patolichov Minister of Foreign Trade.
Polyakov Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Bureau for Agriculture.
Ponomarev Secretary, CC, CPSU; Head, International Department (relations with Communist Parties of non-bloc countries)
Semichastny Chairman, Committee of State Security (KGB).
Shelepin Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Committee of Party-State Control.
fitoY Secretary, CC, CPSU; Chairman, Bureau for Organizational-Part
y Questions.
Usfinov 1st Deputy Premier; Chairman Supreme Economic Council.
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introduces. Agricultural matters, for instance, appear to be
assigned to Polyansky, Voronov, Yefremov, and Podgorny is
sometimes included, whereas policies affecting the international
Communist movement are probably worked out by Su.slov and Kuu.sinen.
Whether or not the policies evolved by these teams are brought
before the full Presidium is solely up to Khru.shchev. There are
no rules binding him to do so, and he does not need the approval
of the "collective" leadership in order to put his policies and
decisions into effect. Any attempt to lay down immutable laws
for determining which issues will or will not be discussed at a
meeting of all the leaders is, therefore, risky indeed and is
probably foredoomed. Only one generalization seems safe to
hazards domestic political or economic matters -- and especially
the former -- are much more likely to come before the full
Presidium than are problems of Soviet foreign policy.
This became particularly apparent during the Cuban crisis
in the fall of 1962. The extreme gravity of the situation
between 22 and 29 October would seemingly have necessitated a
virtually continuous emergency session of the entire Presidium.
But nothing of the sort took place. The Presidium candidates
were not summoned to Moscow, and Podgorny -- the only full
member not resident in the capital -- apparently remained in
Kiev. There are, in fact, several indications that Khru.shchev
failed even to call in all. of the Presidium members who do live
in Moscow. Instead, when faced with a clear and present danger
for the first time in his administration, he fell back on those
leaders who, with a single exception, had served with him in
high office during Stalin's last years.
Khrushchev made the decision to withdraw Soviet offensive
weapons from Cuba in consultation apparently with Mikoyan (until
his departure on the mission to Havana), Kosygin, Suslov, Brezhnev,
and the heir apparent, Kozlov. These men appear to form a kind
of "presidium within a presidium," an inner cabinet which at
least in this case functioned as a Soviet national security coun-
cil. It is tempting to view their participation as resulting
from their collateral assignments and thereby to suggest that
the group enjoys a quasi-legal existence. It is, after all, com-
posed of the party first secretary (Khrushchev) and his two prin-
cipal deputies, the premier (again Khrushchev) and his two first
deputies, and the "President" of the U.S.S.R. Such an approach
might, however, serve to obscure the obvious. The plain fact
seems to be that when the chips are down, Khru.shchev relies on
those Presidium members with the greatest experience for the
problem at hand.
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The Central Committee Secretariat has often and aptly been
described as "the party's powerful executive arm." It is the
apex of the professional party machine, the principal executor
of the party~s policies, and, as was pointed out in the preceding
chapter, it supervises and directs the entire Soviet staffing
process. The Secretariat is, then, concerned less with national
security per se than it is with daily political life. Yet it is
precisely from the latter concern that its vital importance
derives, for the Secretariat is the organ through which the top
leader dispenses political favor, maneuvers his candidates into
the key posts in party and government, and. builds the powerhouse
of political support which, in essence, enables him to run the
country.
The mechanism for staffing; the Secretariat is the same as
that for the Presidium -- formal "election" by the Central
Committee once Khrushchev has made his choice for the job. The
man or men chosen must have the same general qualifications for
Service at the top as do the Presidium members. In making his
selections for the Secretariat, however, Khru.shchev will in
almost all cases give priority consideration to those candidates
who have had, long service in the professional party machine in
preference to men -- however outstanding -- who have come up
through the government bureaucracy. Furthermore, because of the
vast political powers inherent in a central party secretaryship,
he is likely to rely considerably more upon his own judgment than
on thecadvice of his colle;a,gues, and if anything, to place an
even higher premium on personal loyalty to himself. Here again,
his proclivity to draw on the Ukrainian party apparatus emerges
clearly. Two of the four new secretaries elected. in November
1962 worked. with him there after World War II.
There are no regulations governing the size of the
Secretariat, and it has fluctuated. more widely than has the
Presidium. From February to July 1955 three secretaries --
Khrushchev and. two others -- bare full administrative responsi-
bility for the operation of the central party machine. The num-
ber of secretaries was gradually increased. to ten and. then
dropped, to five after the shift away from preponderant represent-
ation of party officialdom on the Presidium had begun to take
shape. The number was raised to nine following the 22nd Party
Congress in October 1961, and. at the central committee plenum a
year later was increased. to the present twelve. Political factors
certainly played a major role in these fluctuations. But unlike
those in the Presidium, where up to 1957 the active opposition
of the anti-party group was involved, they seem more to reflect
Khrushchev's experimentation in adjusting the Secretariat so as
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best to fulfill its missions, and his elimination of those who
aroused his displeasure, either through serious on-tie-job blunders
or inability to stand up under the severe demands of the position.
Although the Secretariat is not formally a policy-making
body, its work is intimately and inseparably connected, with that
of the Presidium. Four men -- Khru.shchev, Kozlov, Suslov, and
Kuu.sinen -- are currently members of both bodies, and there is
little doubt that other secretaries often participate in the
Presidium's work on an ad hoc basis.
There is, however, one aspect of the Secretariat's regular
work which-has a direct bearing on national security: it conducts
the Soviet party's relations with the other parties in the
international Communist movement. This function is divided
between the central committee department for relations with non-
bloc parties and the department for relations with bloc parties,
headed respectively by Boris Ponomarev and Yury Ad3d.opov. Both
men are members of the Secretariat. In addition, Kuusinen and
Suslov - and of course Kh.ru.shchev -- appear to have secretarial
responsibilities concerned with world communism. Since all three
of the latter are also Presidium members, it would seem likely
that they constitute the Presidium "team" which formulates policy
in this field and that they directly supervise its implementation
by Ponomarev and Andropov. In any event, it is these five men
who are primarily involved in passing Moscow's orders, instruc-
tions, and advice to Communist parties throughout the world,
coordinating the movement's activities and developments and for-
mu.lating the Russian side of the argument in the continuing
Sino-Soviet polemic.
The evident duplication of effort between Sus.lov and Kuuusinen
on the one hand and Ponomarev and Andropov on the other suggests
that the Secretariat as a whole may be informally divided into
two teams in t kind of "first and second. string" arrangement.
Khru.shchev seems obviously to have an understudy in Kozlov, his
heir apparent. If Ponomarev and Andropov are similarly under
studying Suslov and Kuusinen, it may will be that Khrushchev
has deliberately brought some of the relatively junior members
of the Secretariat into that body to groom them for eventual
succession. In the absence of any method for ensuring the orderly
transfer of political power, Khru.shchev might regard such a sys-
tem as. one means of seeing to it that the mainstream of his
policies continues after he himself is gone. At least, a replace-
ment system of this sort -- if indeed there be one -- ensures that
the lower-ranking secretaries have a good deal of experience
before they. are promoted into the realm of policy formulation or
are assigned a larger portion of secretarial responsibility.
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The Government Presidium
Unlike Soviet party bodies, the government of the U.S.S.R.
is formally constituted once every four years. It is appointed
by the legislature -- the Supreme Soviet -- at the first session
after national elections and is theoretically responsible to the
Supreme Soviet for all its policies and actions until the next
election four years later. At that time, and in keeping with
the facade of democracy which the Kremlin so carefully maintains,
the premier and his government present their "resignations" to
the incoming legislature, and a new government is formed. Any
interim changes of government ministers or cabinet portfolios
are effected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (which acts
for the legislature when it is not in. session) and must be
ratified at the next regular sitting of the Supreme Soviet.
Approval of such changes is, of course, ro forma and unanimous;
in actuality, the Soviet legislature has nnoo control over the
staffing or the actions of the executive branch.
Responsibility for carrying out the work of the government
is centered in the Presidium of the U,S,S:o;R,
which is made u of the Council of Ministers,
p premier (chairman of the Council of
Ministers), his deputies, and certain other members of the "cab-
inet." The government-.:Presidium is thus the primary executor of
the national security policies which are enunjiated by the party
Presidium. It has, however, a vital role in the process of
policy formulation and it passes up to the party Presidium its
recommendations, opinions and advice on such top priority matters
as national defense, foreign policy, and allocation of national
resources. At least in the initial stages, new policies in these
fields are almost certainly originated and worked out on the
government side.
As is the case with the top party bodies, there are no
statutory limitations on the size of the government Presidium,
although Khrushchev has tended to keep it relatively small.
From the summer of 1960 until the end of 1962, for example, there
were two first deputy and four deputy premiers. Following the
November central dommittee :plenum, however, the top levels of the
government were reorganized and the number of deputy premiers
working under Khrushchev was raised to nine. In March 1963,
deputy premier Dmitry Ustinov was promoted to a first de ut
mi.ership. Unlike Mikoyan and Kos o m de
a member of the Ygin, however, he was not made
party Presidium and there is as yet no indication
that he will join in their function of deputizing for Khrushchev
as government chief when the latter is.away from Moscow.
In all likelihood, the party Presidium staffs the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers directly; Khrushchev, Kosygin. and
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Mikoyan certainly work closely together in choosing the men they
want as their subordinates in the government. Ultimately,
Khrushchev himself decides who will get a deputy premiership,
but .n making his choice he probably relies on the advice and
recaMendations of his colleagues to a much greater extent than
he dies in staffing the top levels of the party hierarchy, This
would seem to be true first because the government Presidium is
more an administrative than a political body and thus personal
allegiance to Khru.shchev is not as much a priority qualification
as it is for candidates to high party positions,. Secondly, the
burden of Khrushchev's own experience has been in the professional
party apparatus; his surprisingly detailed knowledge of the per-
sonnel assets available there does not extend to the government
bureaucracy.
In seeking candidates for service in the government Presidium,
Khrushchev and his colleagues will give first consideration to
men whose records clearly indicate the ability to oversee a spec-
ific field of the national government's activities without fall-
ing prey to the narrow parochialism. so often characteristic of
Soviet bureaucracy. The man chosen for a deputy premiership is,
therefore, certain to be outstanding in his field, and he will
very likely be a career civil servant whose managerial-adminis-
trative experience includes previous service as a government
minister or deputy minister, In contrast to some of his superiors
in the party Presidium and Secretariat, he will also probably have
a higher -- most likely technical ?-- education. Certainly he will
be a member of the Communist Party who is relatively active in
party affairs, and he may be a member of the central committee.
His experience need not, however, include service as a professional
party worker. ct,.off'the nine deputy premiers now serving in
that body, only Polyansky and Shelepin have substantial backgrounds
in party work, and both men have also held top level government
assignments. Polyansky was chairman of the Council of Ministers
in the RSFSR and Shelepin spent four years as head of the State
Security !ommittee
Just as in the party Presidium, there are very probably
substantive teams or "task forces" in the government Presidium.
They may not be formally constituted entities, and depending upon
the job assigned them, will:.be headed by a deputy premier, by
one of the first deputies, or by Khrushchev himself. In the case
of a problem affecting Soviet national security, for example,
Khrushchev might call together a committee composed of himself,
first deputy premiers Kosygin, Mikoyan and Ustinov (a specialist
in problems affecting defense industries) and the heads of the
three "national security" agencies -- defense, foreign affairs
and the intelligence services. Such;.a task force might also
include members of the collegiums of these three agencies, The
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members of the team report on the given situation, offer
suggestions and advice, and discuss various alternative solutions
to the problem at hand. To that extent, they participate in the
formulation of Soviet national policy. Their primary function,
however, is not to recommend policy decisions but to examine
how best they can execute the policy once it has been decided
upon by the party Presidium.
B. Staffing National Security Operations
National Security Departments and Agencies
The head of a ministry or state committee enjoys fairly broad
discretionary powers in hiring, assigning, promoting, and trans-
ferring the rank and file personnel of his department or agency.
However, his power to pick his immediate subordinates the posi-
tions of his greatest vital concern __ is far more restricted.
While recognizing that meaningful executive responsibility requires
correspondingly meaningful authority, including that of selecting
the subordinates upon whom the effective operation of an organ-
ization depends, the top Soviet leaders are reluctant to let
direct control of important positions slip from their fingers.
They are, moreover, concerned that the solution of large problems
of national security, including the allocation of scarce executive
talent, be decided at a level relatively free from departmental
rivalries, The result is clearly a compromise. The views of the
departmental head are given considerable weight in the selection
of his deputies, the heads of the more important divisions of
his organization, and other key personnel but the final decision
is made in either the party or the government presidiums
All such appointments require prior approval
t party
secretariat, but since the final decision on the apf the
t
is
made by the party Presidium or the government Presidium, with
Khrushchev participating in either case, the action of the secre-
tariat is largely pro-forma. The secretariat (more properly, the
appropriate elements in its executive staff) supplies personnel
records and other pertinent reports when an appointment is under
consideration but is not likely to take a stand on the issue.
Once a decision has been reached, the appointment is formalized
by decree of the Council of Ministers.
There is a second, somewhat larger, group of positions in
the ministry or state committee, which, although still requiring
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prior party approval, are not normally the subject of personal
attention by the top leaders. These include the lesser division
chiefs, their deputies, and most of the positions in which tech-
nical control functions are vested, e.g. comptroller and inspector.
The agency has a relatively free hand in staffing the
remaining positions. Assignments, transfers, promotions and
removals at the lower levels do not require prior party approval.
(Assignments to overseas posts are an exception. See below under
Staffing Overseas Missions).
Soviet national security agencies are strongly career-
service oriented. Most upper level positions are staffed by per-
sonnel promoted from within the agency. Routinely when a posi-
tion is vacant or soon to become vacant the top executive of the
organization, presumably after consultation with his staff, picks
a candidate from within the organization and forwards his name
for the party approval. Occasionally, however, the executive or
the party unit "controlling" appointments to a particular posi-
tion finds a better candidate outside the organization.
Agreement is supposed to be reached between the agency and.
the party unit before any personnel action affecting "controlled"
positions is made. What happens when they are unable to reach
agreement on a suitable candidate is not entirely clear. There
is little doubt but that a supervisor has a strong voice in
selecting his personnel. There is equally little doubt that
the party unit can, and on occasion does insist on its candidate,
even when he is strongly opposed by the supervisor. This latter
happens most often when the subordinate is assigned for the pur-
pose of checking on the supervisor. When a deadlock is reached
the party Presidium settles the issue.
Very little is known about the inner workings of the party's
stuffing units. As noted earlier they maintain personnel files
on all party members in their Jurisdiction -- the central files
in Moscow containing data on every Communist in the country --
as well as full dossiers on personnel (party members or not) in
"controlled" positions. 'From these records they may find likely
candidates. Moreover, party units in all parts of the country
can be checked for individuals with the desired qualifications.
If the priority need of the national security agency is high,
the party unit can arrange to transfer a qualified individual
from an agency with less critical need.
Scrutiny of the candidates qualifications by the party agency
is apt to be more thorough when the Presidium is not directly
involved in making the appointment. One fairly common requirement
is that the c ud.idate be personnally interviewed by officials at
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party headquarters in Moscow. Although one of the purposes of
the requirement for party approval of upper echelon appointments
is to provide a mechanism for securing the most effective deploy-
ment of the party?s personnel resources, there is some evidence
that the party review is often limited in ensuring that the
minimum requirements for the position under consideration, as set
forth in legislation or in party decrees, are met. One of the
frequent complaints about the staffing procedure voiced in the
party press:'-is that party officials too often base their deci-
sions about personnel on formal records and do not evaluate
the individual ;s performance in actual working conditions.
The requ.irement for party approval of upper echelon
personnel actions appears, nevertheless, to be the major limit-
ation on the agency head?s exercise of executive authority in
the staffing field. Government service regulations, to be sure,
prescribe staffing preocedures and set some limits to the arbi-
trary authority of the top executive in each agency, and he,
like all other government executives, must operate within budget-
ary ceilings, tables of organization, and salary schedules over
which he has no direct control. These limiting factors, however,
do not appear an undue restriction on his executive authority,
The government service regulations set minimum. qualfications
(higher education, for example), for particular jobs and provide
an orderly system for advancement within the organization, but
they grant only minimal protection to the employee against the
exercise of managerial power. In the Soviet system individual
rights are strictly subordinated to the operating needs of the
state machinery, The Soviet executive, therefore, in attempting
to improve the quality of his organizations performance does not
have to wrestle with such knotty problems as veterans preference
or "bumping" rights. There are few administrative obstacles to
removing incompetent or mediocre performers from "uncontrolled"
positions, which even in the national security agencies, may run
as high as 80 percent of the total. It is the dearth of compete
tent individuals and an endemic unwillingness to delegate size-
able chunks of authority to lower echelons that has led most
top executives to accept,. if not prefer, the dispersal of func-
tions among a number of mediocre employees rather than concen-
trating them in the hands of a few, more competent, officers
closer to the top of the organization.
Soviet Missions Abroad
Soviet foreign missions are formidable establishments with
large numbers of regular diplomatic personnel and a spate of
assigned representatives of other Soviet national security agencies,
The size of the staffs reflect not only the Soviet penchant for
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER
V. V. Kuznelsov
SECRETARIAT
B. F. Podrsarob
COLLEGIUM MEMBER
1 ?Lnrv
DEPUTY MINISTER
N. P. Firvabin
MINISTER
A. A_Gromyko
I
DEPUTY MINISTER
V. A. Zorin `t.
DEPUTY MINISTER
DEPUTY MINISTER
A. A. Selsolev
COLLEGIUM MEMBER
M. N. Smirnovsky
COLLEGIUM MEMBER
SK. Tsoropkin
PROTOCOL
F. F. Molochkov
TREATY & LEGAL
G. I. Tunkin
PRESS
L. M. Zomy
CONSULAR
A. P. V1-
PERSONNEL
N. P. Vozhnov
SERVICING THE
DIPLOMATIC CORPS
D. A. Zhukov
ARCHIVES
I. N. Zemskov
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
S. K. Tsorapkin
USA
M. N. Smirnovsky
IST EUROPEAN
V. F. Grubyokov
3rd EUROPEAN
Ilichev
1. 1.
5TH EUROPEAN
S. T. Asravin
IST AFRICAN
D. P. Pozhidayev
NEAR EAST
COUNTRIES
A. D. Shchiborin
SOUTH ASIAN
COUNTRIES
V. I. Likhachev
DEPUTY MINISTER
A. L. Orlov
COLLEGIUM MEMBER
B. F. Podlserob
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS
G. P. Arkadyev
LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES
V. I. Bozykin
2ND EUROPEAN
V. S. Lovrov
4TH EUROPEAN
Ye. 1. Gromov
SCANDINAVIAN
COUNTRIES
A. Ye. Kovolev
2ND AFRICAN
M. D. Syr-k.
MIDDLE EAST
COUNTRIES
G. I. Zayrsev
P SOUTH-EAST ASIAN
COUNTRIES
A. S. Chistyakov
NDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL
'OMMLTTEE, GPSU
ADMINISTRATIVE FAR EAST
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COLIEGIUM MEMBER
I. I. TaooaEnoo ' '
UNITED NATIONS
N. T. Fedorenko
71 EMBASSIES
10 AMBASSADORS
5 AMBASSADORS
2 LEGATIONS
(1 posy vacant)
*FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, CPSU
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bureaucratic double-checking but also the wide range of fronts
on which Soviet national security interests are pursued abroad.
The typical mission includes representatives of the Ministry
of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the State Committee
for Foreign Economic Relations, and, in addition, one or more
Party officials to maintain checks on the political orthodoxy
of staff personnel.
All of these people are nominally subordinate to the
ambassador, but in most cases he has little or no authority
over any except the personnel of his own ministry and even
among them he may not always be the real executive head. Each
special group in the foreign mission maintains direct contact
with its home organization; it receives its instructions direct
from Moscow and reports back through its own departmental chan-
nels without the necessity of checking with the ambassador or
coordinating with other elements of the embassy. The various
programs carried out by the different groups are planned and
coordinated in Moscow rather than in the field; there is no
concept of the foreign mission as a "country teams" Not only
are the foreign mission personnel thus excluded from the day-
to-day planning and coordinating function, but the areas in
which they can exercise discretion are sharply circumscribed.
They apparently have no authority to deal with new points that
arise, however. trivial, without instructions from Moscow.
In general, each ministry and state committee staffs its
own overseas posts. Ambassadors and other chiefs of mission
are probably among appointments passed on by the top Soviet
leaders, with the other senior officers abroad coming within the
purview of the appropriate staff unit in the party secretariat.
Since ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary are legal repre-
sentatives of the state, their appointments are formalized by
legislative decree. In addition, every individual of whatever
rank who is proposed for an overseas assignment must be cleared
by the Department for Travel Abroad in the party secretariat.
This is primarily a security clearance involving Judgments on
the suitability of an individual for foreign assignment as well
as on his political reliability.
The effect of this system on the quality of overseas
personnel is difficult to assess. On the one hand the strict
limitations placed on the exercise of authority and initiative
tend to obscure many of the qualities normally associated with
effective performance of overseas missions. By the same token
the system places fewer demands on the staffing mechanism for
highly competent people. Not only is there thu.s a tendency to
accept run-of-the-mill performers, but the restricted scope of
the Soviet diplomat's authority and responsibility abroad would
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seem to inhibit his development eventually into the top quality
leader needed for posts of real authority in the ministry. The
Soviet diplomatic environment, however, has produced several top-
notch foreign affairs officials who have risen to places on. the
ministry's directing team, so compensating factors may be found
in other phases of diplomatic work.
Career Development in the National Security Field
As a general rule each national security agency seeks to
develop its own executive personnels The talents, skills, and
experiences required tend to be specialized and are not normally
developed in other areas of Soviet national life. Similarly,
there is little demand elsewhere for personnel developed in.
national security operations so promotion opportunities tend:;to
be limited to the employees own agency. The Ministry of Defense
is most "closed' in this regard, with the Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, both of
which make considerable use of engineers, technicians, and man-
agers developed in other government operations particularly
in the industrial sector -- allowing for somewhat greater inter-
agency mobility. The Committee of State Security and the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs lie somewhere in between. In the diplo
matic field, for example, it has been the practice for a number
of years to staff a little under a third of the ambassadorial
posts with individuals drawn from executive positions in other
government departments or from high party posts. The ambassador-
ial posts in the Sino-Soviet bloc countries are clearly reserved
for such persons, and there appears to be some tendency to use
them in staffing the posts in countries on. the periphery of the
U.S.S.R, Some of these "outsiders' are retained in foreign
affairs work after their ambassadorial assignments are terminated.
The selection process for career service in the national
security agencies starts early. The educational system provides
the initial screening. Higher education, which is rapidly
becoming a requirement for advancement to upper echelon positions
throughout the entire state service, has been firmly established
as a requisite for professional advancement in the naticnal
security field:. Except for bhy:sibian,g and: a few other'.specialists
who can be granted direct commissions, entry into commissioned
military service can be gained only by graduation from the various
officer candidate schools which give college level academic edu-
cation in addition to military instruction. Entry into the other
national security career services -- trade and aid, intelligence
and security, and foreign affairs is not so rigidly and uniformly
controlled. Many new recruits come from the several higher edu-
cational institutions operated by the agencies concerned, such
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
MINISTER
R. Ya. Malinovsky
FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER
A. A. Grechko
DEPUTY MINISTER
1. Kh. Bagramyan
DEPUTY MINISTER
A.-V. Geraslmov
CHIEF POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE
A. A. Yepishev
CHIEF INSPECTORATE
K. S. Moskalenko
CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF THE REAR
1. Kh. Bagramyan
DEPUTY MINISTER
V. I. Chuykov
DEPUTY MINISTER
K. A. Vershinin
GENERAL STAFF OF THE
SOVIET ARMY & NAVY
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATE
I. A. Serov ?
CHIEF OPERATIONS
DIRECTORATE
N. P. Dagayev ?
GROUND FORCES OF
THE SOVIET ARMY
V. I. Chuykov
AIR FORCES OF
THE SOVIET ARMY
K. A. Vershinin
FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER
S. S. Biryuzov
DEPUTY MINISTER
N. I. Krylov
DEPUTY MINISTER
K. S. Moskalenko
DEPUTY MINISTER
V. A. Sudets
AIR DEFENSE FORCES
V. A. Sudets
FINANCE
TYPES OF OPERATIONAL FORCES
? FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
SEPARATE ARMIES
& CORPS
DEPUTY MINISTER
S. G. Gorshkov
DEPUTY MINISTER
A. L Shebuntn
PERSONNEL
MILITARY EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
NAVY
S. G. Gorshkov
AIR DEFENSE
DISTRICTS
STRATEGIC ROCKET
FORCES
N. I. Krylov
FLEETS &
SEPARATE FLOTILLAS
CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
& BILLETING
A. I. Shebuntn
PHYSICAL TRAINING &
SPORTS
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as the Higher Diplomatic School (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
or the Institute of Foreign Trade (Ministry of Foreign Trade).
In addition, graduates of other instituions of higher learning
are also accepted?
There is an elaborate system for the initial placement of
graduates of Soviet: higher educational institutions. The current
procedures are spelled out in a directive issued in June 1960
by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education.
The procedures,pare intended to assure. that trained specialists
are employed a$ quickly as possible after graduation and that
priority is, given to vacancies in critical sectors of the nation-
al ecmom ' ` gene x l,, the student who. has been accepted: by one
of the special military or foreign service schools has already
been earmarked for entry into the career service of one of the
national security agencies If not, he will be assigned by a
procedure similar to that used in placing graduates of the gen-
eral education institutions of higher learning.
Several months before the end of the school year, a placement
commission is set up at each of the higher educational institutions.
This commission,, which 4a: the ultimate responsibility for placing
the graduates,.consists of school, and local government officials,
representatives of.the trade unions and. Party,, and often repre-
sentat ves from offices., agenciesp or institutions seeking to
"recru.it" new graduates.
The placement plan for the indi'idual school, consisting of
a roster of jobs to which graduates from this particular school
are to be assigned, is.provided the placement commission by the
Ministry'. off ii ;gyr.e' ' and Specialized Secondary Educations. Depart-
ment fob a g the Train tug and -placement of Graduates,, t x h_
w1ni funnel all requests from government agencies for new grad-
uates. The commission then attempts to match the available candi-
dates with the jobs to be filled. The commission is instructed
to consider the personal preferences of the graduates insofar as
possible and to make allowance for factors such as family respon-
sibilities, The commission's decision, however, is final, and
each graduate is legally obligated, to serve for three years at
the job to which he is assigned..
In the diplomatic service, the KGB, ahd the military
establishment, degree of authority, assignments and promotions
are regulated through a system of personal ranks or titles, (The
trade 'and .aid organizations may not employ the personal rank sys-
tem, but full details on their promotion and grading systems are
lacking). ThaKGB uses a system of ranks comparable to that of
the military, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses graded
diplomatic ranks and titles. After entering the career service
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of the ministry or committee the new officer is rotated through
a variety of assignments intended to provide broad experience,
advanced training, and scope for the development of his capabil-
ities. The military program of career development includes tours
of troop duty alternating with schooling and staff assignments.
Recently political officer positions have been added to the list
of assignments in the normal rotation sequence. Officers in the
foreign relations field alternate desk tours with foreign assign-
ments, and also include periods of course work in higher educa-
tional institutions.
Promotions in all the career services'are normally based on
a composite of criteria. Minimum time-in-grade, performance
ratings, achievement in service schools or training courses,
existence of a vacancy, and the candidates "political" record
are factors governing promotion. Although seniority as such is
not a basis for promotion there is some evidence that length of
time-in-grade figures heavily, at least in the lower grades or
ranks. The requirements are strict and the examinations uniform
and highly competitive.
Political qualifications are important criteria for promotion
to any position of responsibility in the Soviet Union. In fact,
Party literature on the subject of personnel selection gives the
political element equal billing with job competence. In the
national security field political attitude and reliability are
undoubtedly primary. However, it is difficult to know precisely
what this means in practice. Party officials would like to make
it mean at least some minimum understanding of the currently
accepted official interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and
a degree of active participation in after-hours party work. Most
professionals, however, view after-hours party work as an onerous
duty and find the study of Marxism-Leninism exceedingly boring.
The result is that in a large percentage of cases the "political"
qualification consists of little more than party membership --
which except for a few top scientists is'an absolute requisite
for upper echelon assignment -- and an absence of derogatory
information.
The minimum time-in-grade requirements act as a brake on too
rapid advancement but do not prevent the assignment of outstanding
individuals to more responsible work. A person can usually be
assigned a position two or three grades above his current rank.
He is then promoted just as rapidly as the minimum time-in-grade
requirements permit and in the meantime he is paid the salary
that goes with the position.
Thus far there appears to be no serious regulatory impediment
in the way of better-than-average individuals rising to upper
echelon positions and responsibilities. In the military establish-
ment, however, and possibly also in other national security agencies,
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ceilings are imposed on the number of individuals in each rank.
No individual can be promoted unless there is a vacancy in the
next higher grade in the overall grade or rank structure. This
restriction, although ensuring a proportionate distribution
among the various ranks tends to block the promotion of younger
officers*, Boom can usually be made for the really outstanding
individual but full utilization of many of the better-than-aver-
age is hindered by the retention of older officers whose qualifi-
cations may not be as good.
Incentives for National Secur.it~ Work
Staffing in the national security field, as in other areas
of Sov&et life, is accomplished through a mixture of direct
allocation procedures -- assignment and draft -- and incentives.
During the Stalin era the emphasis in all fields was on direct
allocatior4,rand restrictive control over job mobility. In recent
years, however, the regime has shifted to greater dependence on
incentive evidently believing that this gives better results in
morale and efficiency than authoritarian placement. The state
now depends on manipulation of incentives, coupled with extensive
use of propaganda and indirect pressures, to take care of the
greater part of its manpower allocation problem. Assignment still
plays an important role, however -- in the initial placement of
most graduates of higher educational institutions, in filling
"undesirable` positions, and in staffing executive echelons and
critical functions. Information on the relative weight of
assignment and incentive in staffing the.natinnal security field
is lacking but it is clear that motivational factors are impor-
tant considerations whether an individual is assigned a position
or seeks it on his own.
Psychological incentives for work in the national security
departments and agencies appear to be quite strong in the Soviet
Union. The diplomatic, intelligence, and military (officer
level) services have an aura of status and prestige, and they
offer the lure of intrigue, travel, and stirring achievement,
and a sense of close participation in the most important and
critical of state functions. Patriotic motivations are strong
and are assiduously cultivated.
High material rewards buttress and reinforce the psychological
incentives. For comparable work, salaries in the national secur-
tiy field may run as high as 20 :p(brcent greater than in less cri-
tical fields. This advantage is shared with a number of other
agencies -- such as Gosplan, for instance -- which are also con-
sidered of "exceptional significance." Although comparisons
are difficult due to the different nature of work, some fields --
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the scientific and the creative arts -- may even offer material
advantages in excess of those enjoyed by the strictly national
security agencies. Nevertheless, the professional entering the
national security field can look forward to a life relatively
free of the financial worries that plague most Soviet citizens.
A career in the national secu.r.ity field offers other
material advantages as well. Assignments within the Soviet
Union are likely to be in or near Moscow, Leningrad, or the
other urban centers where amenities.and cultural advantages
are to be found and where food and consumer goods are in
greater supply. Another strong incentive is the likelihood of
foreign assignment and the opportunity for obtaining Western
goods. Other benefits include prospects for better housing
and educational advantages for self and children,
Sharply differentiated salaries within the agencies provide
strong motivation for job performance and improvement of qual-
ifications leading to promotion. A Soviet graduate beginning
a career in one of the national security agencies, for example,
has an opportunity for a salary increase of nice or ten times
his entrance salary. Salaries for most officials in national
security work, scientific research and development, and a few
other fields as well consist of two elements. There is rank
pay, intended as compensation for education, experience, etc.,
and appointment pay which varies according to the specific type
of duty performed. The income is the sum of the two. In the
military and possibly also in the other services, pay is also
given for length of service. In addition, recognition of ppe-?
cific personal qualifications can be made in the form of a
"personal salary" determined on an individual basis by the
appropriate department or agency with specific approval of the
Council of Ministers. The personal salary is a major source
of the largest wage differentials, and can mean an increase of
up to 50 percent of salary.
Moreover, upper echelon positions carry perquisites which
may mean more than salary increases. Preferred, housing, exemp-
tion from restrictions on the amount of living space allowed
per person, a dacha (country house), greater op ortunity for
vacations at lavish, resorts, chauffeur driven limousine or
private car, prefe:ured medical care, and priority rights for
scarce consumer goods are among the more important of these
rewards. The net result is a fiercely competitive situation
between individuals for advancement.
Orders, honorary titles, and other signs of official
recognition are also used to reward outstanding public servants.
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Security requirements, however, by restricting publicity tend to
reduce the effectiveness of this type of incentive.
C. Staffing For Scientific And Technological Research
And Development
Prior to April 1960, when the State Committee for the
Coordination of Scientific Research was established, adminis-
tration of scientific research and ievelopment activities-,:was
diffuse and coordination difficult. The U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences, directly and through the quasi-independent academies
of the various Soviet republics, supervised or coordinated the
work of less than a third of the Soviet establishments engaged
in scientific research. Research carried out at higher educa-
tional institutions was only loosely coordinated by the Scien-
tific-Technical Council of the Ministry of Higher and Special-
ized Secondary Education. The remaining research and develop-
ment establishments -- almost half the total ,.)- were engaged in
narrowly departmental or special research and were widely
scattered among state committees, ministries, and other admin-
istrative agencies.
An attempt was made in 1957-1958 to provide some measure
of unified control over these latter by transferring many of
the major industrial reasearch and development institutes to
the jurisdiction of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan),
which was in the process of becoming ore an industrial coord.-
inating body than a planning agency. Gosplan, together with
the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, was also given authority to
participate with the branch-of-industry state committees, such
as Aviation Engineering, and Defense Technology, in setting
areas of research responsibility and coordinating objectives.
Still another agency figured in the regimes efforts to
make more effective use of research and development activity.
In 1955 a State Committee on Science and Technology (renamed
State Scientific-Technical Committee in 1957) was created to
push the use of new technological and scientific discoveries
in industrial and economic activities. The committee was an
*This is not intended to imply that formation of the
committee automatically changed this situation.
**The development of state plans was assigned to the State
Economic Council (Gosekonomsovet). In November 1962 Gosekonom-
sovet was reorganized somewhat and renamed Gosplan, and. the old
Gosplan was reorganized and titled U.S.S.R. Sovnarkhoz.
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attempt to bridge the serious gap that existed between discovery
and utilization, but its powers were not equal to the task. It
had no authority over research carid development institutions and
could not of itself more than scratch the surface in searching
out applications for new technology. Moreover, it had only
limited powers of persuasion in trying to get technological
advances adopted by industrial managers who were all too reluc-
tant to experiment with anything that might possibly disrupt
production.
Fhru,shchev had told the 20th Communist Party Congress in
February 1956 what had to be done:
The separation of the research activities of the Academy
of Sciences, the departmental research institutes and
higher educational establishments can no longer be tol-
erated. This separation and lack of coordination pre-
vent the concentration. of rgsearch activity on the sol-
ution of major scientific and technological problems,
lead to duplication of effort and wasteo5f resources,
and slow up the introd.u.ction of research and technolog-
ical achievements into production.
It was clear five years later that only limited progress had been
made. There were stillccortsiderable duplication of effort and
significant gaps in research and development. Much research
potential was being dissipated on projects not'directly related
to tasks of greatest practical importance to the natiDn.1 econ-
omy, while massive high-priority national security programs,
such as atomic energy, space research, and missile development,
were consuming research and development resources at an alarming
rate.
The pre-1961 institutional set-up posed still another, though
related, problem. Scientific research and development was playing
an increasingly crucial role in policy making, not only in the
immediate area of national security but also in other fields of
national life. Yet there nowhere existed a source of information
and advice on scientific-technological matters which could focus
perspective on the whole of Soviet scientific capabilities and
achievements. Each of the existing institutions, with possibly
one exception, had parochial interests of a nature -qhich made the
dispassionate objectivity of advice emanating from them open to
question. The burden of achieving an overall view of the scien-
tific research picture was thrust upon either the government
Presidium or the party Presidium, bodies which in view of the
range of their responsibilities were ill-suited to perform that
function.
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The possible exception referred to above was the Department
for Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools in the
executive staff of the Party Secretariat. This department was
responsible inter alia for checking on the operations of the
scientific academies and institutions of higher learning, gather-
ing and processing information, preparing reports and staff
studies and recommending courses of action in the scientific
field. The department's responsibilities, however, do not seem
to have extended to the research and development establishments
maintained by the state committees or industrial undertakings.
The staff department -- Defense Industry, Machine Building,
Planning, Finance, and Trade, etc. -- responsible for the oper-
tions of the parent agency in each case, presumably checked on
its research institutes, as well. There were other reasons,
too, why the Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools
Department was not wholly adequate for assisting the top Soviet
leaders in making decisions in which science and technology
were intimately involved. Among these were the limited size of
its staff, and its primary orientation as an investigative-con-
trol agency. Moreover, it was an agency in the Partyc.chain of
command which made for an awkward administrative situation when
a particular question was being discussed in the government
Presidium.. The department nevertheless played a crucial role
in advising tnd helping carry out the reorganization and restaff-
ing of Soviet scientific and technological research and develop-
ment activity.
The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences was a troublesome problem
from the very beginning of Khru.shchev's campaign to centralize the
administration of Soviet research activity. Several factors
seemed to make the academy the logical choice for the "general
staff" of Soviet science. It had a prestige and record of accom-
plishment unmatched by any other institution in Soviet society.
Among its members were the brightest stars in. the Soviet scienti-
fic firmament, many of them with international reputations. It
had many year's of experience in both pure and applied science.
Mt seems doubtful, however, that Khrushchev ever seriously
considered the academy for the centralizing role. It-was too
independent, for one thing, too detached and relatively immune
from normal political and administrative pressures, The U.S.S.R.
*The department was apparently reduced in status in the
November 1962 reorganization of the Party Secretariat and made
a part of the new Ideological Department. Nothing is known of
any changes in function which may have accompanied that move.
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Academy of Sciences, in :fact, is a real anachronism in Soviet
society. It is nominally accountable to the Council of Ministers
but adds to its membership and chooses its officers and directing
boards by election which, though by no means free from external
political pressures, have been nevertheless about the only
elections in the country with any real substance. These factors
did not make the academy particularly appealing as an agency
for interdepartmental coordination and control. Also, the
academy for many years enjoyed the privilege of Independently
preparing and carrying out its own plan. of work and Khrushchev
was apparently convinced that research scientists when, left to
their own dstrices tended to go off on tangents of their own,
that their interests often bore little or no relation::to the
immediate needs, aims and objectives of the state, and that they
were therefore poor choices for determining what direction
research should take o One academician was probably echoing
Khru.shchev?s point of view when he wrote-
I have in the past compared some of our institutes to
states of the early feudal epoch, consisting of separ-
ate small feofs m? .laboratories In a laboratory of
this kind, the director and. all the scientists, too,
live very comfortably. Each-works on his little indi-
vidual scientific garden and. his biggest fear in the
world is that someone will force him to change his
program..
A quiet and peaceful life in the conditions of extremely
narrow specialization with a complete lack of interest in
what his neighbor is doing - that, unfortunately, repre-
sents a fairly widespread picture in some of our institutes.
In these conditions, to make great discoveries is about
as difficult as to buy, shall we say, Aladdin?s lamp or
a manic wand in a Moscow' store o In such. cases,, one can-
not expect people willingly to take the risk of broadly
selecting a new theme or even to display sufficient
steadfastness to make a path for his own p:ropoition if
its scope goes beyond the framework of his own laboratory.
Yet it was precisely because the solution of the great research,
and development problems confronting the state required the
The overall economic plan for the country, of course,
placed some broad limits on the academ 4s freedom in this regard,
and the academy's program was subject to the approval. of the
Council of Ministers, but this latter tended to be largely a
matter of form-
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coordinated and integrated activities of many scientists,
engineers, and designers in many different types of activ-
ities, that the regime sought restru.ctiring and restaffing in
the research and development fields
On the other hand, the regime realized that any precipitate
attack on the traditions and prerogatives of the academy ran
the danger of creating serious dissention in the scientific com-
munity and of weakening and research and development effort. It
took five years of discussion, and pressure before the regime
felt confident enough to establish a coordinating and controlling
authority.
Khru,shchev apparently assigned the task of working out and
carrying through on the reform to an able team of party, indus-
trial, and scientific-rgs?earch administrators which included
V. A. Kirillin, the head of the Department for Science, Higher
Educational Institutions and. Schools, and A. V. Topchiyev, then
the chief Scientific Secretary of the Academy of Sciences.* Both
of these men had solid scientific achievements to their credit,
they were clever organizers and exceptionally competent proponents
of regime policies in the scientific field. In late 1957 or 1958,
Presidium member A. N. Kosygin#* was added to the team and the
final shape of the reform probably owes.much to his influence.
Kosygin was probably selected for the job in order to bring the
industrial manager point of view to bear on the problem and to
give the tea=,the added weight and prestige of a top leader. His
whole career had been concerned with Soviet industry and since
19+0 he had dealthwith a broad spectrum of industrial planning
and administrative activity as one of the top industrial executives
in the country. He was made a candidate member of the Party
Presidium and a Deputy Premier in mid-1957, in March 1959 he
assumed charge of the State Planning Committee (Cosplan)a
The basic work of the team finally reached fruition when on
8 April 1961 the State committee for the Coordination of Scien-
tific Research was created. The new Committee absorbed the func-
tions and staff of the State Scientific-Technical Committee, and
at the same time was given broad responsibilities for supervising
and planning the whole of the Soviet scientific effort. For the
'Topchiyev was promoted to Vice President of the Academy in
1958, He died in December 1962 and Kirillin was elected to the
vacancy in February 1.963
**Kosygin became a Candidate Member of the Party Presidium in
June 1957 and a full member if May 1960.
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first time in Soviet history a central agency was in existence
for coordinating scientfic research and development activity
throughout the entire country.
The State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific
Research was made responsible for
1) Determining the key areas for research and development
work and defining the most important Problems for immediate and
for long-term research;
2) Drafting an overall plan for scientific research and
development;
3) Supervising the implementation of key problem research
regardless of the subordination of the institutions involved;
4) Coordinating research and development activities in
regard to major projects of all institutions or agencies engaged
in scientific research;
5) 'introducing new technology throughout the country;
6) Authorizing establishment of new scientific research
institul n1w, regardless of subordination.;
7) Coordinating international relations of all governmental
and scientific bodies in the scientific field;
8) Supervising the dissemination of scientific and techni-
cal information;
9) Advising the Council of Ministers on all problems and
issues which in any way involve scientific research and develop-
ment work.
The committee thus was given broad executive and advisory
functions but it was not to perform any of the actual research
or development work. To buttress the committee's authority in
interdepartmental coordination and supervision and to ensure
that the committee?s views were brought to bear in d$cision-mak-
ing at the highest level of government, the committee was given
inner-cabinet status, i.e., its chairman was simultaneously
appointed Deputy Premier, thus giving him a seat on the govern-
ment Presidium.
Some idea of the approach to staffing an.agency which not
only has broad authority but also must deal with a great variety
of complex technical problems cutting across established depart-
mental lines can be gleaned from an examination of the way in
which the coordination committee was staffed.
The an chosen to head the new committee, M. V. Khrunichev,
was an able administrator with experience In the defense indus-
try and atomic energy fields where'-cooperation between science
and industry had been conspicuously successful. He was well
known to Kosygin, with whom he had worked closely at various
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times. Since March 1959 he had been Kosygin's deputy in Gosplan,
Khrunichev died of a heart attack only two months after his appoint-
ment and was succeeded by K. N. Rudnev, who has seen the committee
through nearly the first two years of its existence. Rudnev had
been chairman of the State Committee for Defense Technology and,
like Kh.runichev, had been a Deputy Minister of Defense Industry.
He appears to have been involved in the guided weapons and space
research programs.
The committee, itself, is something of an administrative
hybrid. The enacting legislation designated a number. of ex
officio members -- the Presido-nt.;of the U.S.S.R. Academy -of
Sci en s, the Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Edu-
cation, the Chairman of the State Committee on Automation and
Machine Building, the Chairman of the State Committee for Chem-
istry, the Chairman of the Committee 02i Inventions and Discoveries,
a deputy chairman* of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and
a deputy chairman4 of the State Economic Council (now defunct) --
and there.may from time to time be other similarly "outside" members
not directly subject to the chairman's administrative control.
In addition, the committee in usual Soviet fashion includes
the chairman's deputies and the heads of tbe:::tore important
departments of the committee's permanent staff. These latter
positions were staffed for the most part with scientists,
engineers and technologists who had had previous experience in
administrative positions in other government agencies. Kosygin
obviously bad a strong voice in their selection. His son-in-law,
G. M. Gvishiani, has been a member of the committee since its
creation, first as head of its foreign relations department --
a quasi-diplomatic post -- and then as a deputy chairman.
The exact size of the committee is not known so no estimate
of the relative balance between the "outsiders" and the "staffers"
?A.possible. There would seem to be little likelihood, however,
of much community of interest among the outt>iders which would
unite their votes against the others. The main purpose in con-
stituting the committee in the above fashion seems to have been
to afford a respectable hearing for departmental points of view,
but in a forum where those points of view could neither-dominate
not for long delay the reaching of decisions.
*The chairmen of Gospl.an and of Gosekonomsovet, like the
chairman of. the Coordinating Committee, were Deputy Premiers.
Their presence on the coordinating committee would have tended
to weaken the authority of its chairman.
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The committee has a permanent staff of 400 to 500 people a
good many of whom came to it from the State Scientific-Technical
Committee when it was abolished. A considerable amount of work,
however, is done through ad hoc commissions and councils com-
prised of scientists, engineers and technicians drawn from var-
ious sectors of the scientific community and "loaned" to the
committee for a specific task. These commissions and councils
study particular scientific and technical problems of fields of
science and technology and make recommendations to the appropri-
ate departments in the staff of the State Committee for Coordin-
ation of Scientific Research.
Individuals to staff the ad hoc committees and councils may
be requested by name from various scientific institutes, tht
Academy of Sciences or educational institutions, or such organ-
izations may be asked to name their own representatives. The
secretariats for the ad hoc commissions are provided by the per-
manent staff of the coordinating committee.
More fundamental problems are tackled ley relatively permanent
"scientific councils" whose members are nominated by the various
agencies engaged in scientific research and development work.
About fifty key problems for nation-wide coordination and inclu-
sion in the national plan for scientific research have been
selected and assigned priority ratings. Among the subjects spec-
ified as being of major importance for the development of science,
technology and industry are. solid-state physics; the creation
of new methods of mining coal, ore, and other useful minerals;
the scientific basis of planning and organizing production;
cybernetics; and study of the oceans and seas and utilization of
their resources. The scientific councils for coordinating
research on these problems on a national scale are staffed on an
interdepartmental basis. A little over half of them are super-
vised directly by the State Committee for the Coordination of
Scientific Research. The remainder are supervised by the Academy
of Sciences.
By early 1962 there were in these councils about 2,000
scientists, including over !100 Academicians and Corresponding
Members of the various Academies of Sciences, more than 800
Doctors and Candidates of Science, the top officials of the prin-
cipal scientific research establishments and representatives of
the planning agencies, ministries and other government depart-
ments. Altogether about 7,000 scientists and specialists were
involved at that time in the councils, their sub-sections and
commissions.
The regime?s choice to replace Nesm.eyanov was M. V. Keldysh,
a member of the Academy?s Presidium since 1953 who like both
Khrunich.ev and Rudn.ev, the successive heads of the new coordina-
tion, committee had had wide organizational. experience with the
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large-scale research and development effort outside the Academy.
Keldysh, in fact, had worked. in research organizations headed
by Khrunichev and he seems to have worked with Rudnev on the
guided weapons program. Moreover, he had done his major research
work in institutes outside the Academy's jurisdiction. The death
of one of the Academy's Vice Presidents in January 1960 cre-
ated the opportunity and Keldysh was maneuvered into the"post of
Vice President of the Academy in February 1960 in apparent anti-
cipation of his assuming the presidency when Nesmeyanov's term
ended.
The Academy, as mentioned earlier, had achieved. and maintained.
a considerable degree of independence from the usual administra-
tive pressures and restrictions. Its independence in coordination
and planning functions has been restricted by the superior author-
ity of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific
Research and the Academy is subject, of course, to governmental
budgetary controls, but it determines, within broad limits, its
own internal organization and procedures, and its administrative
and policy making personnel, instead of being appointed by the
government, are with one exception elected by the General Assembly
of the Academy from among its members. The Academy also exercises
wide freedom of choice in adding to its own membership.
The main administrative and policy making body of the
Academy is the Presidium, consisting of the President of the
Academy, the Vice Presidents, the Chief Scientific Secretary,
the Academician Secretaries of the Academy?s departments, and
a few other members who may be heads of departments or insti-
tutes of the Academy or important scientist-administrators (but
academy members) from other government agencies. The size of the
Presidium is determined by the General Assembly; currently it is
set at 28 members. The one officer not elected by the General
Assembly is the Chief Scientific Secretary. He is the official
representative of the Party and his position is formalized by
the Presidium rather than the General Assembly of the Academy.
The Chief Scientific Secretary, assisted by five assistant
secretaries is responsible for looking after the Party's inter-
ests from within the Academy. The Scientific Secretariat for-
merly worked in close conjunction with the Party's Department
for Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools and
presumably will maintain a similar relationship with the successor
unit to that department. The division of function between the
Scientific Secretariat and the Party unit is not clear since there
appears to be considerable overlap. In the staffing field, for
example, both groups pass on the security and political reliabil-
ity and general suitability of an individual for membership in
the academy or for a position within any of the Academy's organ-
izational components including research institutes.
(1i8)
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Soviet scientists become members of the U.S.S.R. Academy
of Sciences through election held annually by the General Assem-
bly of the Academy. Nominations for membership are made by
organizations and by fellow scientists presumably with some prior
assurance that the nominee will not be rejected by the Party.
Soviet scientists are urged to join the Party but Party member-
ship is not a requirement for advancement to leading scientific
positions. Normally each nominee will be "sponsored" by a number
of organizations and individ.uall;most of the time there is more
than one nominee for each vacancy. The members of the Academy
presumably choose among the nominees on the basis of personal
acquaintance and professional reputation. The most outstanding
Soviet scientists and scholars in all fields of knowledge,
whether working in the Academy's institutes or elsewhere, are
selected for membership. Occasionally outside political pres-
sure will be brought to bear to ensure the election of a scien-
tist favored by the regime. This does not ordinarily create
serious dissention because the academicians are used to and
expect some amount of pressure, particularly in the social sci-
ence and biological science fields where doctrinal orthodoxy is
an ever present problem.
There are two classes of membership) academicians and
corresponding members. The number of each is set by the Coun-
cil of Ministers. Currently there are 176 academicians and.
364 corresponding members. Election as academician is the
higher honor and carries with it full voting rights. Members
enjoy certain perquisites and emoluments which, added. to the
honor, make election to the academy a much coveted distinction.
Among these are preferred housing, a chauffeur driven automo-
bile, special commissary privileges and a substantial stipend..
The membership is about equally divided between research insti-
tutions of the Academy and outside research or educational
institutions on the same basis as other staff personnel, i.e.,
by competitive examination, and. they are paid the established
salary in addition to their stipend as a member of the acad.emy.
Membership in the Academy is for life unless terminated by
action of the General Assembly. This provision affords a mem-
ber considerable security since the Academy has been noticeably
reluctant to eject members. Shepilov, who was politically d.is-
graced and publicly vilified as a member of the anti-party
group in July 1957, was not deprived, of his membership until
March 1959. This "protectionist" attitude also finds expression
in the operation of the advancement and promotion system within
the scientific community.
The Academy, like other national research organizations, has
been faced for some time with the serious problem of rejuvenation.
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A predilection to promote on the basis of seniority rather than
merit has permitted older scientitsts to monopolize senior-level
positions, even after their health had failed or they had lost
touch with the mainstream of scientific advances. An attempt
to solve the problem by instituting regular competitive examin-
ations for occupied posts failed because scientists generally
took the view that it was unethical to try to displace a
colleague in this way, and. consequently only the incumbent
would apply.
The continued reliance on older scientists_for staffing the
higher positions does not mean that younger men are not avail-
able. As a matter of fact, the steadily increasing supply of
competent young scientists in relation to the limited number of
vacancies occurring in the more responsible positions has made
the problem of creating opportunities for advancement particu-
larly acute. The average age of all scientists has dropped from
41,5 years in 1950 to 38 years in 1960, and the ratio of junior
research scientists to others increased from 2 out of ever 3 in
1955 to 4 out of every 5 in 1960?
Awareness of the seriousness of the problems of advancing
young scientists led the Soviet leaders to take several measures.
a Joint?Party-governi.eit decree promulgates,, in-May 1962"sets'
65 as the compulsory retirement age for senior supervisory pos-
itions in academies of sciences, research institutes and higher
educational institutions. The positions affected include those
of directors and deputy directors of institutions, rectors and
assistant rectors of higher educational institutions, deans of
faculties, and heads of departments and sections. Authority to
exempt individual scientists from mandatory retirement is vested
in academy presidia and ministerial collegia. This measure
could help alleviate the promotion pressures but only if the
exemption provision is not abused.
The decree also dealt with the problem of how to utilize
the capabilities of senior scientists who reach the retirement
age. It provided for the establishment of positions of "senior
scientific colleague-consultant" at rp,search institutions, to
be filled from among scientists with a doctor?s degree or title
of professor who are eligible for retirement. The efforts of
scientists assigned to these positions are to be devoted primar-
ily to the training of new personnel. According to Topchiyev,
who had earlier proposed creating such positions, they would
help "to combine properly the activities of deserving elder
workers with the timely advancement of talented young ones and
to develop from the energetic organizers of the latter group a
truly efficient scientific body."
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The regime has also sought to increase the number of
responsible positions available by attempting to curtail the
practice of multiple-job-holding, whereby one scientists holds
several positions simultaneously. Last year, 103 academicians
held 1,037 jobs. This practice developed at a time when there
were not enough experienced scientists in the U.S.S.R. to pro-
vide leadership for the rapidly expanding number of research
and higher educational institms. It has continued for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which are inertia and the
reluctance of established scientists to give up the added in-
come, pr?est3ge and power which the practice affords them, A.
growing number of eminent scientists in the Academy, however,
have been criticizing the practice on the grouids_that it forces
them tb spread themselves too thin and that they are
overburdened.
The case of Doctor Anatoly A. Dorodnitsyn, an eminent
aero and gas dynamics specialist, clearly illustrates the sit-
uation. He has held the following full and part-time positions
sumultaneou.slyo
1) Head, Department of Gas Dynamics, Moscow Physico-
Technical Institute;
2) Member, Zhukovsky Central A.ero-Hydrodynamics Institute;
3) Director, Computer Center, U.Q'aS.R. Academy of Sciences;
4) Chairman, Commission on Computing Techniques, U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences;
5) Member, Committee on Lenin Prizes in the Field of Science
and Technology, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers;
6) Vice Chairman, International Computer Federation, spon-
sored by UNESCO;
7) Chairman, Committee on Automation and Instrument Construc-
tion, Higher Certification Commission;
8.) Senior Scientific Associate, Stek.lov.Mathematics Institute;
7) Chief Editor, Journal of Computer Mathematics and Mathe-
maticalPhysics.
In 1959 the payment of basic salaries to the same man by
more than one institution was prohibted and rules governing the
amount of pay for additional part-time work were established.
The 1962 figures cited above, however, indicate that multiple-job-
holding is still a major factor in the staffing of scientific
research and development activities. The regime, although deplor-
ing the adverse effects of the practice, recognizes that it does
provide a means of cross communication that is essential for
today?s complex inter-disciplinary, inter-departmental research
and design programs. Through judicious use of the "multiple-
hat" system scientists can coordinate isolated elements of research,
development, training, and engineering, and mobilize scientific
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manpower into task forces for the solution of special problems.
The regime seems at the:present to 'be concerned, more with control-
ling multiple-job holding than with eliminating the practice
altogether.
Personnel "hired" to staff research institutions are selected
by competitive examinations. The appointments are for five years
(three years for junior researchers). The ineffective periodic
competition for occupied posts has been dropped in favor of a.
new procedure for taking stock of research personnel. At the end.
of each period. of appointment the researcher must be "re-elected"
to his position by the council of the Institution. the decision
is reached by secret ballot. If an individual fails of re-elec-
tion his post is declared vacant and filled by competitive exam-
ination.
An ad.ditional::means of selecting capable young scientists
by research institutes and institutions of higher education was
approved, by .the May 1962 decree. These institutions are now
allowed, with the approval of the State Committee for the Coor-
dinational of Scientific Research, to add research trainees to
their staffs within the limits of the general personnel schedule.
The trainees, who must have had a higher education, may be
appointed for terms of up to two years. Those who excel in scien-
tific activities maybe selected for permanent work in the research
institution. The others are returned to their former places of
work or assigned. to government agencies in accordance with the
established rules for placing graduates of higher educational
institutions.
The reorganization of the Soviet scientific research and
development effort clearly owes much to the outstanding successes
scored in the fields of atomic energy, guided missiles and space
research -- success attributed to the pooling of resources and.
the combined efforts of scientists, engineers, and designers.
The emphasis on high level coordination, close correlation of
research with production, and on organizing-managerial talent
for staffing the controlling echelons clearly reflects experi-
ence gained in the massive national security development pro-
grams. Unfortunately, the regime has enveloped those programs
in a policy of strictest secrecy. Stringent security measures
have formed a barrier to information on the staffing of the
programs as well as other aspects. Only a few key personalities
have been indentified and little is known of the quantitSr or qual-
ity of manpower involved nor of the way the massive effort is
organized for the accomplishment of its mission.
It is apparent, however, that a major portion of the total
Soviet research and development effort is being devoted to the
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c3omplex high-priority scientific-military-industrial programs
$u.ch as space research and guided missiles. These areas of
research receive the best resources in terms of manpower, fac-
ilities and. equipment. Basic overall coordination among the
various programs is probably performed by the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers, with the immediate responsibility for
implementation of the programs vested in one or more of the
Presidium members. What role the new scientific research
coordination committee will play in the military oriented pro-
rams is not yet clear. The signs at present do not point
to more than a "participating"' role in the coordination and
direction of tl%e work.
Executive authority for research, development, production
and construction is probably exercised.by a special inter-
agency commission composed of representatives of the. Ministry
of Defense, relevant state committees;(e.~. Aviation Technology,
Defense Technology, Radio-Electronics, Coordination of Scientific
Research, etc.), planning organizations and the Ministry of
Finance. The commission presumably provides overall management
for the program with authority to marshall the scientific and
industrial resources required.
The U.S.S.R.'s space program and military missile program
have been closely linked from their inception and it is probable
that many of the scientists, engineers, and technicians work on
both. According to Soviet Academician L. I. Sedov, a leading
scientist and spokesman on aerospace matters,.'IThere is one
large team Russia that handles all space projects. The same
key men are in charge of guidance, tracking, and other segments
for each of the projects. It is a very large team and it can
well take care of several projects in parallel. . . . We
have no distinction between military and civilian projects."
Below the level of central executive control and coordination
a wide variety of organizational components probably handle
assigned portions of the work. There are undoubtedly a number
of research-design institutes working exclis.ively on space
vehicle and guided missile design development and fabrication.
In addition, supporting projects are carried on iacclassified
project sections of research establishmelrts"'of the Academies of
Sciences and higher educational institutions. The Chief Artillery
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense probably establishes mil-
itary specifications for advanced weapons systems and overseas
the launching and testing of vehicles.
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Chapter IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM - AN APPRAISAL
Judgments as to the effectiveness of the Soviet mechanism
and procedures for staffing-national security functions must
necessarily be heavily qualified. Despite the undoubtedly
freer atmosphere developed in the post-Stalin period, the relax-
ation-of many controls, and the opening of the country to foreign
visitors, a curtain of secrecy still shrouds most of the system
and is, of course, most dense about the agencies and functions
that are closely corrected with national security. The situa-
tion is further complicated by the fact that Soviet authorities
have only recently begun to exhibit interest in the idea of
teaching government administration and management. They have not
in the past considered these important subjects for study and
investigation, and as a result have developed very little liter-
ature detailing and anylyzing their own administrative princi-
ples and procedures. Some of the basic features (as outlined
in the preceding chapters) can berpieced together from the
scraps of information available but- these are insufficient for
any real depth of understanding of the system. Nevertheless,
a few observations may be in order.
The strength of the Soviet challenge in the wo?ld today,
when the complexities of national and international life are
greater than ever before, is in itself a measure of the effec-
tiveness of Soviet staffing. The papr"National Policy Machin-
ery in the Soviet Union" reached the conclusion that.l
he machinery on which the Soviet leaders depend for
policy formulatioj appears to provide well-defined
and clearly structured processes for getting policy
questions before the Presidium in digested and manage-
able form, and to combine with this a degree of flex-
ibility which prevents these processes from becoming',
a limitation on the Presidium's own initiative. The
success of the system appears to depend less on its
machinery, however, than on the capacity and energy of
the men who run it.
The Soviet system appears to have been generally successful
in developing and raising competent, often superior, individuals
to positions of leadership. The top leaders in Khrushchev's
regime are a shrewd, tough minded bunch, experienced over a
wide range of subjects and capable of handling complex problems
of national policy with reasonable foresight and despatch. Each
man on his way to the top has had to prove his worth in the
crucible of deadly competition and is under continuing challenge
to perform at peak capacity. The price of "failure" is no longer
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death or imprisonment, but in a society where private employment
is almost non-existent loss of high level position with its per-
quisites and privileges would appear to be a heavy enough price.
The nature of power in the Soviet Union -- constantly subject
to challenge, requii~ing daily maintenance, and shared only at
great risk -- create a serious problem, however, in securing the
most effective staffing of national security functions. The job
of running the country is becoming increasingly complex and
difficult. The alternatives in policy issues are more numerous,
and the interrelation of functions so intimate that decisions in
one field have effects, often deadly serious, extending into di-
verse other fields. The problem of making intelligent choices
is beyond the ability of any one man; it requires the combined
efforts of many. Although Khru.shchev uses the talent and experi-
ence of his top lieutenants to a far greater degree than Stalin
did, it may be that that is not enough. Yet more effective use
of these men would seem to require a delegation of power and
authority that might ultimately endanger Khrushchev's own position.
On the positive side, however,. the state has a virtual
monopoly of employment and a highly centralized mechanism for
selection and assignment of personnel. It can thus direct to
the solution of critical national security operations the best
the nation can produce in the way of superior, talented., compe-
tent and experienced individuals. It is, of course, quite
another problem to identify these individuals, to select the
best man for a given job, to motivate him to superior perform-
ance, and to create organizational arrangements that will enable
the greatest possible use to be made of his capabilities.
For identifying talented and capable individuals, providing
the education, training, and work experience necessary for devel-
oping their abilities, and assigning them so as to make efficient
use of their talents, skills and experience, the staffing machin-
ery appears to provide reasonably adequate processes. The qual-
ity of staffing in the middle and lower echelons and in the low
priority fields is rather spotty and probably rates only poor to
mediocre, but in respect to the upper echelon positions and the
more critical national security functions, areas which receive the
closest high-level attention, the staffing appears generally
good.
Even in these areas, however, there are signs of weakness
and. ineffective techniques. The Soviet High Command, for
example, is overage by U.S. standards. Eight of the twelve top
military leaders are over 60 and the average age of all
twelve is 61. The U.S. "High.C.ommand" averages about five
years younger, and only two have reached 60. As a group, the Soviet
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Marshals tend to take conservative positions on the question of
new types of warfare and other problems in military doctrine.
The retention of these older men in the leading positions blocks
the promotion of the vigorous younger officers upon whom the
country would probably have to rely in the event of global con-
flict, .d presumably denies the younger men a fully effective
voice in shaping the Soviet Armed Forces to meet the demands of
tomorrow's war.
Lack of field coordination appears to be a serious weakness
in the operation of Soviet missions abroad, since this places a
heavy burden on communication facilities and headquarters staffs
and occasionally leads to conflicts in activity. The constant
need to check with Moscow on even the most trivial and mundane
matters turns competent, knowledgeable diplomatic officers into
little more than errand boys. And although the diplomat may
later use his field experience at the policy desk in Moscow,
there would seem to be considerable waste of talent involved.
Trade and. aid officer's seem to have somewhat greater freedom
than other foreign mission personnel in making field decisions,
probably because of the more technical nature of much of their
work.
The extent of multiple-job holding -- because it stretches
the scientist too thin -- may indicate some dissipation of
resources in the scientific research field, and there is reason
to question whether there is not a larger number of laboratory
assistants and other support personnel than is altogether desir-
able. The Soviet scientist of rank is spared physical work --
handcl:ing instruments, putting plugs in sockets, etc. -- the per-
formance of which is looked down upon as being an evidence of low
station. The presence of technicians to perform the routine and
manual work in the laboratory facilitates the work of the scien-
tist, and permits him to concentrate more exclusivb.ly on creative
work rather than on details and procedures. For the scientist,
however, there is a potential loss of insight that comes from
working directly with instruments, animals, or data. In addi-
tion, a large staff has many problems related to spervision,
direction, discipline and morale. There may well be a critical
point in the size of the laboratory support staff beyond which
the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.
The U.S.S.R. still la.cka.enough generally capable individuals
for staffing the middle andwi,ower echelons of the administrative
apparatus. The situation...in_this regard is improving with the
steady expansion of education ,facilities and the efforts of the
regime to promote promising young people to positions of respon-
sibility but the needs of the state are far from being satisfied.
The question might be raised, however, whether the Soviet regime
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is making most effective u.se of the able people it produ.ces. There
is little doubt but that it has been quite successful in concentrating
its most capable individuals in the key leadership, national secur-
tiy and other priority areas; but it may be that the effort to
ensure adequate staffing in these areas has led to the assignment
to them of more of the highly talented and capable individuals
than they can use effectively. There is at least a hint that a
number of individuals are being used in positions that do not per-
mit full utilization of their capabilities, with promotions
blocked by the presence of experienced personnel above them.
Overstaffing,. a chronic problem in most bureaucracies, is
expecially marked in the Soviet Union. Nicholas DeWitt in his
monumental study Education and Professional Employment in the
U.S.S.R.* notes that:
On the eve of Stalin?s death, one of every seven Soviet
workers and employees was administering or managing some-
thing or someone. During Khrushchev?s administration,
the managerial apparatus declined in size . . and the
proportion of managerial elite was reduced to one out of
every ten workers and employees.
Even this sharp improvement leaves the Soviet Union saddled with
proportionately one of the largest bureaucracies in the world.
Figures on which to judge the extent of overstaffing in the
national security agencies are unaanailable but there is no reason
to assume that those agencies are wholly free of something that
so clearly afflicts other agencies of the state. When the eminent
Soviet engineer=physicist P. L. Kapitsa a few years ago returned
to the Soviet Union from Great Britain and a new institute was
established for him he was assigned four bookkeepers for his
staff, although the institute was relatively small. Exercising
his authority as director, Kapitsa dismissed three of them. On
being queried about his action, Kapitsa replied: "I would have
dismissed more, but unfortunately a bookkeeper, like an integer,
is indivisible."
The causes of this overstaffing are too complex to be
completely sorted out here. Many are common to bureaucracies
the world over; others are groinded in the nature of the Soviet
political system. One of the continuing factors has been the
National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1961
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short supply of competent; individuals and the uncertainty of
replacement which has led administrators to hoard personnel like
other resources. Then, too, the lack of an individual competent
enough to do a particular job has forced the supervisor to
parcel it out among two or more persons to get it done. The
administrative attitudes and habits which these factors have
engendered over a long period of time continue, even though,
as in some areas, there are now enough generally competent
personnel available.
This last point is part of a broader problem of re-vitalizing
the government and party to meet the growing complexity of today's
problems. Overcoming the bureaucratic stagnation that had devel-
oped during the Stalinist period was the main thrust of the de-
Stalinization campaign launched in 1956 and pushed in varying
degree since then. Old attitudes and habits die hard, however,
and. the ultimate solution to the problem of overcoming the
Stalinist legacy probably demands the replacement of the older
generation of state officials with younger, more imaginative
and dynamic ones. The regime has been reluctant to tackle the
problem in such a radical fashion, however, being clearly
unwilling to accept the full implications of such a move and
fearful of its own ability to control the rate and direction
of the change it would engender.
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Annex: EDUCATION AND TRAINING
A. Introduction
The Soviet regime, from its earliest days in power, realized
that political, economic, and military goals would not be reached
unless it had a highly trained manpower pool from which to draw
specialists for staffing its national security machinery. To
train the specialists needed to bring about rapid industrialization,
it was necessary to develop a broadly based education system,
heavily oriented toward science and technology. After a short
experiment with "progressive education," a conservative and
highly competitive educational system began to emerge in the
early 1930's. It remained substantially unchanged'ttntil the
educational reforms initiated by Khrushchev in 1958. In addi-
tion to the regular educational system, there are a number of
"special" schools (military, diplomatic, etc.) which train
personnel for specific areas of national security.
Soviet education has a number of distinctive features, the
most prominent of which is its specialized and utilitarian
character. Education in the Soviet Union is conceived as a tool
for training .a person to perform a specific and fairly narrow
function in the national economy; in return for the training he
receives, a graduate is-under an obligation to serve the state
in whatever capacity it sees fit. The concept of liberal edu-
cation as it is known in this country does not exist. (European
education in general is of course more specialized than it is
in this country, but nowhere to such a degree as th the Soviet
Union).
Another characteristic of Soviet education is the centralized
control which the regime exercises over all facets of educational
policy, from the size of graduating classes down to textbooks.
The regime uses the numerous controls and incentives at its dis-
posal to attract needed talent to various specialities, and by
virtue of its control, can use the entire educational .system as
a flexible instrument for achieving its national goals.
By the same token, the regime attaches great importance to
education and gives it generous financial support. Advancement
through the Soviet educational system, in theory, and by and
large in practice too, takes place solely on the basis of aca-
demic achievement. Tuition is free at all levels. Beyond the
secondary school level, the large Viajority of students are given
adequate, though not generous, stipends to cover living expenses.
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B. The Regular School System
Primary-Secondary Schools
Soviet children start school at the age of seven and must
complete at least eight years of schooling. (Until 1958 only
seven years were required). Continuation of.schaoling beyond
the eighth grade is not automatic, but pupils who aspire to
higher education and a specialist status must pass through
general secondary or eleven-year schools. After the eighth
and eleventh grades, students must pass comprehensive written
and oral state examinations; a pupil who failsat either level
i~ removed from the academically oriented schools and is chan-
nelled into one of several alternatives: the labor force, a
factory school, or a specialized secondary school (ttkhnikum).
Only the most academically able are permitted to.continue gen-
eral education. Approximately one-third of those who finish
the eights-?year school continue on through the generalsecondary
school (grades eight-eleven), while one-fifth of those who
graduate from secondary schoolcontinue to full-time higher
education.
With the exception of some experimental schools to be discussed
below, the basic curriculum inall generalsecondary schools is
the same; although the quality of teaching varies tremendously.
Scientific and technical subjects are heavily emphasized and the
curriculum includes eleven years of mathematics, five years each
of biology and chemistry, and six years of physics. Foreign
langugg.e st*dy is mandatory beginning with the fifth grade. The
mo*t widely studied languages are German, English,. and French
in that order. Recently educational authorities have substituted in selected schools -- the study of such "exotic" languages as
.Chinese, Hindi, and Arabic beginning in some cases with the second
grade. Teaching in Soviet secondary schools is done. principally
through lectures. Much emphasis is placed on repetition,. drill,
and review; homework assignments-are.heavy.
The 1958 educational reform brought one major chang in the
secondary school system, the full effect-s of which cannot yet
be assessed. Labor training was introduced in the top three grades
thus reducing by-one-third the'Ltirrie devoted to academic subjects. ,
Many Soviet educators feel that this has already lowered the
quality of secondary school graduates.
Selection of Talented Students fair Higher Education
The problem of selecting the most capable and talented
secondary soehool graduates for higher education -- and ultimately
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for national security functions -- is in some respects a new one
for Soviet authorities and one to which they are currently giving
much thought. In the past, virtually all ten-year school graduates
were accepted into higher education institutions (VIJZes).* By
1958, however, only one out of five could hope for admission to
.a VEJZ. The.pressure of applicants, as well as certain problems
raised by the 1958 reform, have made the selection and training
of talent an urgent question.
In addition to the introduction of labor training in secondary
schools and the corresponding decrease in the time allotted to
academic subjects, the 1958 reform made it mandatory for secondary
school graduates to work at a job for two years before admission
to the VTJZ,. Moreover, a student once admitted toa VUZ must spend
a certain amount of his first two yeirsworking in production.
The reform also gave greater weight to extra-academic criteria
in admissions policy -- Komsomol recommendations, character ref-
erences, work experience -- than had been the case in the past.
Although a certain percentage of the most talented students in
scientific fields are exempted from these requirements, many
Soviet educators feel that the level of preparation of an entering
class has become noticeably lower over the past few years.
Both to combat these problems and to improve selection
1rocedures, Soviet authorities have conducted a wide variety of
pedegogical experiments, some of which may be adopted on a
wider basis.
One such experiment was the establishment of several secondary
schools with differentiated curricula. Beginning, with the ninth
grade, these schools offer. students an opportunity to specialize
in one of three fields: physics and mathematics; chemistry and
biology; or the humanities. Students are thus given more intensive
.training in the field of their future specialty-.. These experi-
mental schools have apparently found wide approval among educators
and there is evidence that more may be set up.
Various other experiments are intended to.provide training
in mathematics and science to supplement the regular secondary
school curriculum. The Matt-amatical Youth Schools, for example,
which are sponsored by the VUZes, conduct two-hour evening
classes in advanced mathpmati?cs twice a week.. Eventuglly, they
will provide a reservoir of mathematical talent from which uni-
versities and institutes may draw the most promising. for further
study..
*VIJZ is the common Russian abbreviation for "Higher Educational.
Institution."
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The so-called "science circles" (extra-curicular clubs)
perform a similar function, particularly the mathematics and
.physics circles, which attract the scientifically gifted and
to which Soviet authorities attach great importance. In addition
to providing supplementary training in scientific topics, the
circles also sponsor annual scientific contests (olympiads)
which are open to pupils in grades seven through eleven. By
means of the contest, talented students are.spotted early and
are encouraged to continue their studies,in mathematics and the
sciences. Some are selected for additional out-of-school
study under the guidance of a university student and are later
tapped by the universities for higher education.
An interesting experiment connected with the olympiads
was initiated last year by the Siberian branch of.the TLS,S.R.
Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. The winners and runners:-up
of the Siberian Olympiad in Mathematics and Physics were
brought to;a summer school organized by the Academy, where they
attended lectures given by scientists from the Academy and worked
in the research laboratories. Some students who showed promise
but had been poorly prepared were thus enabled to enter Novosibirsk
University at the end of the summer. Other younger students
were admitted to a special four-year boarding school under the
auspices of the Academy where they are being given intensified
training in physics and mathematics. By the time they enter
the university, it is hoped that they will have attained the
level of a graduate student; by the time they graduate, they
will be full-fledged scientists. Judging from the success of
this experiment, similar schools providing highly specialized
and intensified training for a potential scientific elite may
be established elsewhere.
One.other type of specialized school which deserves.mention
is the special language school where instruction in some subjects
is conducted entirely in a foreign language -- usually German,
French, or English. At one such school in Moscow, for example,
one-fifth of the total instruction is given in English. These
schools, which now number between 20 and 30, are apparently
considered to have been quite successful. Many of the students
who graduate from these schools are apparently recruited sub-
sequently for further language study at a higher educational
institution or at a special diplomatic school, and ultimately
may end up in work connected with Soviet operations abroad.
Access to Higher Education and Choice of Specialty
In seeking admission to a higher educational institution,
. Soviet secondary school student applies to a particular depart-
ment within the institution (e.g..the department of chemistry at
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Moscow State University) rather than the institution. itself.
Consequently, his specialty and his future profession must be
firmly decided on by the time he enters a VUZ. His choice
will be influenced by a variety of.factors,..ma_ny'...of which
are carefully manipulated by the state. Since many national
security positions require personnel with scientific or
technical training, recruitment and selection procedures for
higher education reflect a definite.. scientific and technical
bias.
Operating from estimates of the state's future needs,
each VtZ and each department within a VUZ sets up a quota
for accepting new entrants. A student, in making his choice
of specialty, considers the quota system and applies for the
faculty where he believes his chances for acceptance are
greatest. In addition, the entrance exam, which is Made up
by each VUZ ensures that the better students are channelled
into the needed specialties and the better VUZes. Stipend
rates are manipulated to channelstudents into specialties
needed by the economy. They are higher, for example, for
scientific and technical students, than for history or
philosophy students. The regime, in extreme cases,,uses
more direct methods of placing. students in specialties,
such as transferring an entire class of students from one
department to another. Authorities have also used military
draft exemptions and deferments to lure students into needed
faculties. Even during World War II,..s.tudents in some 85
high priority specialties were given draft exemptions as long
as their academic work remained satisfactory.
Access to higher education in the Soviet Union and choice
of specialty are dependent to some extent on sociological
factors, such as place of residence and nationality. Because,
for instance, the level of secondary school education is far
lower in rural areas than in the cities, most VUZ students
tend to be of urban origin. Higher educational opportunity
is greater in the Russian republic (RSFSR) than elsewhere; in
1958, for example, Moscow and Leningrad alone accounted for
20 percent of that year's graduates. Despite impressive pro-
gress over the past 20 years, few Soviet nationalities have as
high .a percentage of VUZ graduates as do the Russians, although
Armenians, Georgians, and Jews are as well or better represented.
Many Soviet VUZes, particularly the older ones, have nationality
and geographic quotas based on population. Although nationality
may be one of several factors affecting a student's access to
higher education,. discrimination as such cannot be.,seid to exist
,at the VUZ level. However, because it-does exist at.a career
level., nationality may influence a student's choice of specialty;
for example,.many Jews are to be found in scientific and academic
fields largely because there is less discrimination in those areas
than in party, government, or managerial jobs.
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Despite official policy, social origin is to some extent a
limiting factor. During the early Soviet period, the .regime made
extensive efforts to enro_Ll students of proletarian (.g..worker
or peasant) origin, and applicants Howe On-proletarian
origin
were Often discriminated against. However, in 1
restrlnns Were abolished and b 935 t:ese
of the VUZ students were children o
y f workers or apeao nt$. excent
The
1958 reform is attempting once again to increase the
of proletatian. enrollment. percentage
Access to higher education in the U.S.S?H;.. is no
by a person's sex. In 1960 43 t influenced
in higher educational institution
percent of s were womene- a hstudentsigher per-
centage rnolled
than. in any other country. discrimination exists at the career rather thanatheof nalevnality, VUZ women are rarely found in to btvnl;
than their U.S. counterparts. Tpositins eaching~and although
medicine are ftradi-
tionally women?s fields in the Soviet Union partly because the
low wages fail to attract men and ;partly because tend
to be more convenient and compatible with famil
y obligations.
suk JHi er Educ:ation
Higher education is offered at two types of institutions:
institutes and universities. A secondary to a department within the institution ads-isor squired atakees
a competitive entrance examination which is rewired th take
institute or university. made up by the
graduates were exempted from the xhonors secondary school
be supplemented b exam) The exam results .must
by recommendations from the teachers and . omsomol
organizations. If accepted, the student will probabl be
a stipend to defray living expenses 80 y given
f
ent of all VTTZ
students are so subsidized); tuition ( is free.
rThe institutes, which are far more numerous than the
universities, usually consist of four or five closet
departments and 'Offer highly specialized training ofYan relatli
nature. Such specialization has always been a training afpaed
of Soviet education, and in the `prominent feature
was partly due to the re.quirementssofwrapidrindustrializati This
in the early Soviet period ors
other specialists were badly neededrowly trained engineers and
specialization has been found to be somethinowof a i dabil ity
since 1957 the specialties have considerably br ad ne, although
tagthey-remain narrow compared with higher eduationint this country.
University programs, as opposed to institute trainin
always been broadly conceived. For example, it is onl g' have
y in the
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40 universities that a student can major in physics, chemistry,
mathematics,. philology, etc. Though the institutes often offer
excellent training in these subjects, theyare taught as "tool"
subjects and not-as major disciplines.
VUZ training lasts from five to six years, depending on a
student's specialty.. As in the case of the lower schools) emphasis
is on the memorization and absorption of facts and figures. In
their final year all students must prepare a thesis, known as a
"diploma project," and students must undertake a "practice assign-
ment in a factory,, laboratory, or school for six months to
collect data for the diploma project. The projects afford staffing
authorities with information about the student's abilities and
interests.
The quality of training in the Soviet Union varies greatly
according to the individual institution and the field of specialty.
University training is generally of good quality, and as a rule.,
the older established institutes in the big cities (Moscow, Leningrad,
Kiev, E arkov) offer training of high quality. VUZes devoted to
high priority subjects (machine building, chemical technology)
are usually superior to those with a low priority specialty (food
technology) textile design).
Post-Graduate Study
Although graduate study in the Soviet Union -- as in this
country -- is geared primarily to the training of advanced
research and academic personnel, an advanced degree is needed
for certain national security positions, particularly in
scientific and technical areas. Although Soviet graduate training
is in some respects similar to that in this country, there is
one important difference. Advanced degrees are not a prereq-
.uisite for teaching and research slots.in the Soviet Union, but
are frequently awarded after appointment to academic rank or to
a teaching position; consequently, Soviet graduate students
tend to be older than their U.S. counterparts. (In the post-
war period, the median age of degree recipients was 38). Advanced
degrees may,. in some cases, be confered in recognition of out-
standing research accomplishment and thus serve as supplemental
criteria of performance.
There are two graduate degrees in the Soviet union: the
kan ddida.t degree, which is .awarded after athree-year training
program known as the a irantura; and the doctoral degree ---
usually awarded at a consider y later point in the career,
following defense of a doctoral dissertation, which, .at least in
theory, should represent a major research contribution. Graduate
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training is offered only at.dertain approved VUZes and at research
institutes connected with economic ministries, sovnarkhozes
(national economic councils) and the academies of science.
Competition at the graduate level is stiff. All applicants
for aspirantura training must take an entrance examination and
their past academic records are reviewed. Extra-academic
criteria, such as Komsomol recommendations, are also given some
consideration. Until last year, only students who had completed
two years of work in industry or teaching were accepted for
advanced training, but this requirement has now been abolished.
As in the case of undergraduate training, tuition is free and
students are given a stipend of up to 100 rubles per month.
In theory,,aspirantura training, leading to the award of
the kandidat degree, lasts three years., but in practice, it
often takes considerably longer. Students are not required to
pursue a standard program of courses,, but instead work out an
individual study program with their academic advisors. After a
year and a half of studying,his specialty, an aspirant takes
qualifying examinations (kandidat minimum) in his specialty, a
foreign language, and Marxism-Leninism. When he has passed the
examinations, a student is considered to have finished his
aspirantura training, and many terminate their graduate studies
at this point. Ih order to obtain the.'ormal degree of .kandidat,
however, a student must write and defend a dissertation, which
usually takes at least a year and "b,..hnif longer.
Formal enrollment in a VFJZ is not required to obtain the
k&ndidat degree. Many students proceed independently, at
their place of work. When they feel prepared, they take
the qualifying exams at an approved VUZ, and then prepare a
dissertation.
In the physical and mathematical sciences, the kandidat
degree generally compares favorably with a Ph.D. in this country.
In engineering, the quality of training is uneven; in some cases,
the degree is equivalent to a Ph.D. while in others, it rates
no higher than an M.S.
Holders of the kandidat degree in science are absorbed into
national,--security operations in various ways . A student who
has demonstrated excellent research potential is often retained
by the institute where he earned the degree and frequently con-
tinues to work under the aegis of bi.s3scientific advisor. Other
kandidats may be given research jobs in industrial institutes,
partic+uia rl.y if their dissertation research had been sponsored
and subsidized by the institutes either directly or under contract,
or they may be recruited into military research establishments.
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Of particular.imports.nce to Soviet national security
operations in the foreign field are the area institutes under
the Academy of Sciences., which are devoted to study of the
underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The Soviet Union's increasing interest in these areas in recent
years has been reflected in a corresponding expansion of the
institutes. In addition to the previously existing Oriental
Institutes: and the Institute of Sinology,, an African Institute
was established in 1960 and a Latin American Institute the
.following year. Their primary function is research) but in
addition they train an impressive body of area sp'ecial._is.te
on which the regime can draw both for information and personnel.
C. Special Schools
In addition to the regular school system described above,,
there are a wide variety of special. schools which provide
specialized training for personnel in various national security
operations, be it military, intelligence, diplomatic or simply
agitation and propaganda functions.
Apart from their general function of training personnel
for specific national security positions, these schools have
certain common features which distinguish them from the
'regular" schools.
First and foremost is the importance attached to political
reliability in selecting students for special schools. Although
a candidate?s ability is certainly taken into gonsideration,
political loyalty and seal count for at least.as much, if not
more. Party membership is frequently a prerequisite for
admission and a student must almost always be nominated by his
party or Komsomol organization. (Political reliability is
also a factor for admission to a regular VUZ, but it carries
far less weight).
In?addition, experience in party work is the channel through
which many students apparently gain admission to the special
schools although it is a prerequisite only for the party
schools - and this inevitably affects the composition of the
student body. It has frequently been noted that the party and
Komsomol activists in the regular VUZ form a group quite distinct
from the academically talented. This does not mean that the
party or.Komsomol workers are not able, but rather that their
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talents tend to be administrative and organizational rather
than scholastic., Although there are undoubtedly many bright
students in the special schools, the academically talented
t6nd as a group to gravitate rather towards the regular educational
system.
Considerations of political reliability exclude almost all
Jews and members of minority nationalities.,
up an insignificant prop Women also make
portion of the total student body. In
addition, the students in the special schools receive considerably
larger stipends than their counterparts in the regular V[es.
Finally, the special, schools are an important part:of
selection and promotion procedures. Many of the schools p
pre-career training; in many areas of national security, aprovide
attend-
ance at special schools of a higher level is often a requisit
for further advancement. prerequisite
Military schools
The Soviet military establishment maintains. its own network
of educational institutions from secondary school through advanced
degree training; all are subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.
At the.s.econdary school level, the Suvorov (army) and
Nakhimov (naval) schools provide Preparatory training for
future applicants to the officer-training schools. The
cuculum includes some military training and places great
emphasis on science and mathematics. Access is largely
reserved.to sons of officers.
At the next level are the officer-training schools
(voenno e,uchilishche). Admission is largely by special
appointment, except that graduates of the Suvorov and Nakhmov
schools are admitted automaticall
three y? Those who complete the
year course are commissioned in the armed forces. Training
is considered equivalent to that obtained in a specialized sec-
ondary school or the first years of higher education in the
"regular" system.
At a higher level, the military academies (believed to
number about 20) offer professional military training, of four
to six years duration which is considered fully equivalent to
higher education in the regular system.. Company-grade officers
are eligible for admission and are almost automatically. promoted
.to field-grade rank on graduation. At the top is the Voroshilov
Higher Military Academy, a joint service academy somewhat similar
to the National War College.
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Unlike their Western counterparts
train not , Soviet military academies
only command.1nd staff officers, but also engineers and
scientists to work in military research and development. This
latter training in some cases is superior to that in civilian
institutes.
Inte.li ence Schools
The Chief .Intelligence Directorate of the Ministr
(G) conducts operations y of Defense
against
economic, technical, scientific, and litica
countries of strategic importance pt~
ls.ttargets inlallry?
It is also concerned
establishing deep cover network for future activities of aith
stay_b hind nature, including economic or industrial sabota e
guerilla-type operations, or other special missions. g
operations call for a variety of Th
well-traied staff officers and support personnel, and the aGRU nd aintfins
various schools to train officers inall aspects of clandestine
operations..
The elite basic training school for officers being sent
abroad under Soviet official cover is the Military Academy of
the Soviet Army, more Popularly known (within as Military- Diplomatic Acaem the GRU) as the
officers are recruited d
i em ,theDA). bAlmost all operdtional
who have not graduated from the three-year course riise aboveeW
the rank of major. The MDA is an elite institution because of
its entrance requirements as well as its objectives. All of
its students are graduates of an institution of higher learnin
preferably a military academy. The selection committee take g~
into consideration a man's service record s
his social background and his part ' which must be excellent,
officers are eligible, y record. Only commissioned
and most are of Great Russian nationality.
Over the last several years, the classes which have entered the
MDA annually have averaged about
are supplemented by 75 students. Poliocal courses
instruction peculiaratointelligence studies) language training, technical
microdots,. concealment devices,etc.)wand (use
perationalrtra ecraft
(acquiring, training, and running agents, etc.). dcraft
The Military Institute of Foreign Lan ua es
is maintained by the Army, provides the g (VIerpre which
translators, and many with interpreters and
y MDA students have graduated from this institute.
The GRU maintains several se
illegals -_ officers who
go abroad under parate schools for training
Posing as citizens of some country other than Sthee- inn
addition to Providing some of this training at the U.S.S.R. a
These special schools in
are scattered about Moscow and
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Special technical schools of..the.GRU offer short courses
to officers who need supplementary training in subjects such
as agent communications using.secret writing, microdots, high-
speed radio transmitters, and similar device's. They also train
specialists who will become agent instructors abroad or who
will themselves use these technical means.of communications,
The GRIT also utilizes selected. trainees from the armed
services schools as support personnel. Thus cipher-clerks
and communications personnel (not agent communications) assigned
to the GRU are usually graduates from army training schools.
Typists, clerks, and logistics officers are also supplied by
the armed forces.
All GBUtraining establishments, including the MDA, are
"wider cover" and are not known to the general public, not
even to the non-intelligence military personnel, as intel-
ligence training centers. Although most every military attache
abroad. today has graduated. from the MDA, his cover story, which
details his military career and education, omits any reference
to it.
Basic professional schooling in the Committee of State
Security (KGB) is provided by the Higher School (also known
as the KGB Institute), which combines a number of previously
independent training establishments of the KGB. The largest
faculty of this school is the Juridical Institute, which pro-
vides a four-year course in internal security with emphasis
on legal aspects. A graduate from this faculty receives the
equivalent of a degree of law, but may not overtly aecnowledge
receipt of a diploma unless he is separated from the KGB and
requires proof of a higher education. Short courses are also
offered by the Higher School. The Higher School also has a
faculty of foreign languages, which was formerly the Leningrad
Institute of Foreign Languages, and probably still has a three-
year course for interpreters.. Other faculties teach surveillance,
military subjects for KGB uniformed forces, technical subjects,
security and counterintelligence for Shtellite personnel, and
various other short courses.
Members of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)
are trained by the Higher Intelligence School of that directorate,
which provides a two-year course in operational tradecraft and
allied intelligence subjects. While a First Chief Directorate
employee may have attended the Higher School, the Higher Intel-
ligence School is restricted to members of the First Chief
Directorate only. No diploma or academic credit is given for
attendance at the Higher Intelligence School..
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In addition to the Higher School and the Higher Intelligence
School in Moscow, the KGB also has training institutions scattered
throughout the U.S.S.R. Among them are republic KGB training
facilities, which provide primarily counterintelligence instruc-
tion, ;and several schools, :including officer candidate schools,
for training KGB Border Guards personnel.
Training of Personnel for Service Abroad
The Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
operate. schools for personnel who are to serve abroad. in some
capacity. The curriculum in all these institutions emphasizes
area and language training rather than narrow professional
training (e.g. in military subjects or diplomacy). Although
these schools theoretically train personnel for the particular
ministry to which they are subordinated, in actual fact the
graduates, may go into other ministries and organizations as needed.
(To a.limited extent, the area institutes under the Academy of
Sciences-and various universities also provide a reservoir of
area specialists tri which the government may draw, although in
general these institutes have more of a research and academic
orientation).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates two schools:: the
Institute of International Relations and the Higher Diplomatic
School. The Institute of International Relations operates a
six-;year program equivalent to full h,~gher education primarily
for the training of diplomatic personnel. It is ann only to
secondary school graduates who have shown outstanding ability
in party or Komsomol work, or to outstanding students who are
also completely politically reliable. A student does not apply
for admission himself, but is recommended by his party or Komsomol
organization. Some of the students are apparently sponsored by
the military or the KGB.. Reportedly many students are the
children of high government and party officials. There are few
women or representatives of minority nationalities,.
After passing an entrance examination, a student is assigned
to study a language, the selection of which depends both on his
own abilities and on the government's current need for specialists
in certain areas. In addition to intensive language study, the
six-year curriculum includes training in the history, culture,
and economics of a student's special country or area. By the
time he graduates, a student will have in addition an impressive
knowledge of world culture, history,. international law and
economics. Great emphasis is also given to political subjects
Marxism-Leninism, history of the CPSU.
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In the last half of .their sixth year, students are given
practice work assignments related to their speciality. The large
majority (7o percent) are assigned to organizations within the
Soviet Union, where they will work pa.nently after graduation;
the rest -- future diplomatic or foreign trade personnel - are
assigned to embassies abroad.
After graduation, about one-fifth of the
sent
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ultimatelyuassigne.d
abroad; about one-third go to other ministries and organizations
with foreign depa*tment.s as interpreters or cons] tents. The
rest are assigned., _.n varying proportions, to the propaganda
field (journalism, radio and TV); to the military servi.ces;
to:the KGB; or to the Institute in a research or teachin,9
capacity.
At a higher level the Higher Diplomatic School provides "
"in-service" training for diplomatic personnel. Little is known
about the kind of training provided; admission is reserved
largely, although not exclusively, for people already in the
diplomatic services.
Little is known about the Foreign Trade School, which is
operated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Its curriculum is
probably similar to that in the Institute of International
Relations -- e.g. intensive language and area training with more emphasis on trade and economic subjects.
The Military Institute of Foreign Languages, under the
direction of the Ministry of Defense, offers a five-year course
in language training for military personnel. Company grade
officers and enlisted men are eligible. In addition to
language study, students also receive a certain amount of area
training as well as the usual courses in Marxism-Leninism and
other political subjects. Graduates are assigned to duties as
military interpreters, to work in intelligence, in high govern-
ment or party organizations, or to posts abroad.-
Party Schools
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union operates an extensive
network of schools. As reorganized in 1956, the system includes
three-year middle-level "Soviet-party" schools for training
government and party workers at the village and tiistr:lct (rayon)
.level; four-yeas inter-regional higher party schools; a two-year
Higher Party School in Moscow, and at the graduate level, a
four-year Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee.
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The inter-regional schools offer what is essentially
"in-service" training to party officials or journalists with
several years of experience in party work,Ighp have proved
themselves efficient and able., and who seem likely candidates
for. promotion.. Applicants must be recommended for admission
by the regional (oblast) or republic party committees. T;ey
must have completed secondary education and be under 35 years
of age..
The bulk of the four-year course is('.devoted to 1' logical
training in Marxism-Leninism, philosophy, political economy,
and party history. However,.since 1956, economic, managerial
and technical training has been given a greatly increased share
in the curriculum. This was designed t6 raise the technical
qualifications of party cadres, but the training is in no
way comparable to the training in a VJZ.. At the end of four
years, a student is considered to have complete "higher party-
political education",.nd is technically on a par with graduates
of a "regular" higher educational institution.
The Higher Party School. in Moscow accepts applicants who
are earmarked for administrative and staff positions in the
regional or republican party or government apparatus. Applicants
must be recommended for admission by the regional or republic
party committee; they must in addition have completed higher
education and be under --0 years of age.
The two-year program of the Higher Party School is devoted
largely to.fui'ther ideological training, with some emphasis on
economic subjects.. After it was reorganized in 195:6, one of the
stated purposes of the Higher Party School was to raise the
ideological qualifications of the large number of technical
specialists who had entered party work in recent years but who
had little knowledge of Marxist-iLeninist theory.
The highest educational institution operated by the party
is the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.
The Academy offers a four-year course for the training of high-
level ideologists and theoreticians. A student may write and
defend a dissertation leading to the k4Lndidat degree.
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