SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1928-1954 PART II: MANPOWER AND PHYSICAL PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01149A000500010007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 26, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 -00,
6-))'k,
US DOC. No. S-2 111110m mm
Copy No. 39
SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 192?3-195]+
PART II: MANPOWER AND PHYSICAL PRODUCTION
This report was prepared as part of the
US contribution to a NATO study comparing eco-
nomic trends in the Free World and in the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. The other two parts of the study
which relate to the Soviet Union area Part I,
National Accounts Analysis, and, Part III, Sov-
iet Foreign Trade.
1It 1C~ NT NO.
0
NO 4GE It' CLASS
ECL FiEO
UASS, CtsA~.GED TO: TS S C
NU 'f R DA E.
RUTH: M HR 70-2
a3JUN1980
July 26, 1955
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Table of Contents
Prefatory Note
I. Population and Labor Force -
Population- - - - - -
II. Agriculture
III. Industrial Production - - - - - - - - - - - -
IV. Transportation - -
V. Education and Training -
A. Past Trends - - - - -
List of Tables
i. Population of the USSR, by Age Group and Sex
2. The Soviet Labor Force by Economic Sector - - - - - -
3. Soviet Agricultural Production - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1+. Soviet Industrial Production - - - - - - ` - - -
5. Soviet Transportation and Communications -. - - - - - - - - -
12
6. Educational Attainment of the Soviet Population: Number and - 15
Percentage of Persons between 15 and 59 Years of Agy by Highest
Educational Level Reached, Selected. Years, 1697-1955
Soviet Education, Selected Years, 1928-1955- -
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SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 192$?1954
Part II. Manpower and Physical Production
I. Population and Labor Force.
A. Population.
Table 1 shows the growth of the Soviet population since the
census year 1926. This growth has averaged only 1.3 percent a year in
spite of the addition of over 20 million persons in acquired territor-
ies. These represent over 40 percent of the increment of the Soviet
population from 1926 to 1954.
Direct losses resulting from World War I and. II, repressive
goverment measures against farmers and other groups, urbanization, and
general social and economic insecurity during the 1930's have been re ..
sponsib.ie for this slow growth.
The 1945 population was estimated at 7 million less than the
1940 population, while actual losses were substantially higher, since some
natural population growth continued during the period. The excess of fe-
male over males in the 15-59 age group grew to very large proportions.
This is illustrated by the following table which shows the proportion of
males to females in these age groups in certain years:
1897 129k 1939 1950 1222
98 9U 89 77 78 82
This disproportion, due to predominantly male losses during the
two world wars, undoubtedly reduced the birth rate. The extremely rapid
rate of urbanization in the USSR during most of the period but especially
during the 1930's has been another factor contributing to the decline in
the birth rate. Finally, the speed and violence of the collectivization
movement of the First Five-Year Plan caused both direct losses and pro-
bably lower birth rates. This is reflected in. the drop in the 0-4 age
group from.1926 to 1939, which occurred in spite of considerable improve-
ments in health care-, and in the drop in school enrollments since 1947.
In the postwar period, population growth has been more rapid,
between 1,7 and 1.8 percent a year. Economic and social conditions have
been more. stable, death rates have fallen rapidly, and the ratio of males
to females of marriageable age has been increasing gradually. In addition,
the rate of urbanization has been slowing clown. These trends indicate a
retardation in the long-range decline of the rate of growth in future
years.*
B. Labor Force
In terms of the number of persons employed, the Soviet labor
force increased by only 18'percent from 1928 to 1954, very much more slowly
than the population. The labor force declined slightly from 1928 to 1937,
grew fairly rapidly from 1937 to 1940, and has risen slowly by about one
million a year since 1948. About half (7 million of the increment in the
Soviet labor force since 1939 has been due to territorial acquisitions.
From 1928 to 1940, the non agricultural. labor force tripled.
The number of persons employed in agriculture fel.l.by 4O percent, However,
* The projection of the Soviet population is explained. in a separate ap-
pendix.
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in terms of man years, the decline was only 25 percent because of the large
number of underemployed workers in the 1928 figures. Outside agriculture,
average weekly hours declined from 47 in 1928 to 40 in the 1930's. Ad-
justed for changes in hours of work the total labor force increased by 21
percent from 1928 to 1940, and by 40 percent during the 1928 to 1954 period.
Since 1948, the agricultural labor force has declined very .
slowly, However, this trend was reversed in 1953.1954 when increased em-
phasis on agricultural production and, in particular, the "new lands" pro
gram, caused agricultural labor requirements to rise. The industrial la-
bor force rose by almost 50'percent, more than twice as fast as the labor
force in Other non agricultural occupations,
Nearly 40 percent of workers and employees in non agricultural
occupations are in industry. There has been no significant change in aver-
age weekly hours since 1948. A 48 hour week has been in effect.
Estimates of the Soviet labor force are subject to a wide mar-
gin of error. This is due to the difficulty of defining employment in
agriculture during a period when shifts of labor from. agriculture to other
economic sectors were extremely rapid. The reported agricultural labor
force in 1926, for example, was over 74 million. This number, however,
includes persons who cannot be considered employed. on a full time basis.
It is also due to the exclusion of certain categories of labor from Sov-
iet data. Starting with a known total labor force for certain years, it
was necessary to estimate a certain percentage relationship between popu-
lation and total.labor force based on the age-sex distribution of the popu-
lation and other data. The "unallocated" labor force is the difference be-
tween the estimated total labor force and announced or estimated employment
in individual sectors. It includes forced labor, artisans and other per-
sons engaged in the village economy but not in agriculture as such, and
persons in school but probably employed on a part time basis. None of
these could be allocated to the individual economic sectors. It is pro-
bable, however,that most were employed outside agriculture.. Estimates
of the agricultural labor force'are designed to be comprehensive while
available data cover only selected-parts of the non agricultural sector.
The great majority of forced laborers are believed. to work in dining,
transport, and construction. Transfers from the unallocated labor force
to specified occupations have occurred on several occasions. The increase
in the industrial labor force in 1954, for example, may be partly due to
the freeing of slave labor.
II. Agriculture.
The slow growth of Soviet agriculture contrasts sharply with the ex-
tremely rapid growth of industry. Agricultural production rose only 15
percent between 1928 and 1940 and It was nit until. 1952 that the prewar
level was regained after the severe setback experienced during the war.
In 1954 overall agricultural production of the larger territory is esti-
mated to have been some 30 or 40 percent above that of 1.928 (precollec-
tivization), The population of the present territory was 45 percent
larger, with a tripling of the urban population, which normally has a
higher per capita consumption in terms of value,
Total grain production on. a larger territory in 1954 was roughly 20
percent above the 1928 level, with wheat showing an increase by as much
as two-thirds, rye production about equal to 1928 and a decline in other
grains. Livestock numbers were also less. In the case of industrial
crops alone was there a. very large rise in output.
The lag of agricultural production is due partly to institutional
factors and to governmental policy, and partly to limitations of soil and
climate. Severe set backs were also experienced as a result of forced
collectivization of the early thirties and the destruction during World
War II.
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In the 1928"to 1937 period, Soviet agriculture was transformed, from
a small peasant economy of some 25 million households, to one characterized
by the largest scale farm units in the world. However, per capita food
consumption. other than cereals and potatoes, remained a long way below
those of Western countries. By the middle of 1938, 2+2,000 collective
farm units incorporated 99.3 percent of the total sown area. Members of
the farms were allowed to retain plots averaging one half hectare and a
limited number of livestock. Within the last half decade collective farms
were further enlarged and the number of farms reduced by two-thirds. Soviet
farms are almost 25 times larger than American farms on the average. The
collective depends on a government-owned and operated machine tractor sta-
tion for'suppiles of power machinery and skilled manpower. State farms
have generally been used. for special kinds of high cost farming or for
"crash" programs such as the present "new lands" expansion.
Although the collectivization program freed a large mount of agri-
cultural labor for use elsewhere, it did relatively little to increase the
level of agricultural production. Because of low state procurement
prices and high delivery quotas, wages (remuneration in cash and kind) in
collective farms have been low. It has been profitable for the peasant
to work on his own small plot as much as possible, and to sell his produce
on the free market. This results in considerable inefficiency of agricul-
tural labor. In addition, collective farms have had to finance the bulk
of their investmefts other than power machinery out of their own meager
savings.
During the early 1930vs, peasant resistance to collectivization re-
sulted in a wholesale destruction of draft and other livestock. The re-
duction in the number of draft animals was gradually offset by the in-
crease in. the number of tractors and combinese Livestock herds were fur-
ther severely reduced during World War II and the postwar recovery has been
relatively slow.
Apart from political or institutional factors, Soviet agricultural
production has been limited by a scarcity of arable land and by the low
productivity of much of the arable land as a result of climatic conditions
and low fertility. Nearly all the untilled land Is in unfertile forest
areas, in the Arctic, or in areas of very inadequate rainfall far removed
from sources of irrigation. Although mechanization of agriculture on
land already in use displaced a large amount of labor, it did not increase
productivity per acre, and its effectiveness in new areas is limited by
the quality of the land itself or by the climate, Most of the increase
in agricultural production has been the result of an increase of acreage
rather than of yields per acre. Productivity of animal husbandry also
did not increase, Very little fertilizer has been used, except on a few
industrial crops, mainly cotton, sugarbeets and flax; the amount of agri-
cultural capital, other than tractors and combines, is still small; farm
practices, such as crop rotation, are often rudimentary. Improvement of
yields is certainly a possibility. The expansion of acreage however requires
extremely costly irrigation and drainage projects or involves great uncer-
tainty as to yields because of limitations of soil and climate.
The seriousness of the agricultural problem has only recently been
publicly recognized by the Soviet government. The post-Stalin government
has Initiated a series of reforms designed to bring about a rapid'increase
in productions Without changing the institutional structure as embodied
in the collective farm, state farm and ms.ehine tractor station, the gov-
ernment increased incentives by raising procurement prices and reducing
taxes, reducing delivery quotas, and relaxing the pressure against the
private economy of kolkhoz members; increased investment in the state sec-
tor (state farm and MTS),; and embarked on a huge expansion of sown acreage
in the semi-arid region..
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As Is indicated in Table 3, the large increase In output projected
for 1955 is a function of the large increase in grain acreage scheduled
for this-year in the new lands of Siberia, Urals, and Kazakhstan. A four
fold increase in corn acreage was also planned for 1955. The virgin land
programmay, bring rapid- though temporary results with relatively moderate
labor requiremennts, but-as-accumulated moisture and fertility is used up
in the new lands, a decline in production is likely to take place. The
vast expansion under a labor intensive crop like corn is bound to increase
the work load greatly and is likely to affect unfavorably per acre output
of corn as well as other crops,
III. Industrial Production.
Industry has been the focal point of the Soviet Union's economic ef-
fort and the most dynamic element in its economic development, Industrial
production tripled during the ten years 1928-1937 but was lagging far be-
hind the Western industrial nations in total as well as per capita output.
During the following three years the rate of industrial growth declined--
averaging 14 percent per annum--probably as an aftermath of the extensive
purges and also because of concentration on armaments production. Soviet
industry sustained severe war damage, but its postwar recovery was rapid;
the level of industrial output by 1950, the end of the Fourth Five-Year
Plan, was 35 percent higher than in 1940, and it is expected to exceed.
the 1940 level by 125 percent in 1955 bringing it to about one-third of
United States production;
Soviet industrial production has been heavily concentrated on the
output of capital goods, as shown in table 4. During the 1928-1954 period,
the production of machinery and equipment increased 16 times, production
of chemicals 25 times, and output of fuels and metals more than 10 times.
On the other hand, production of processed foods by large-scale industry
only tripled. If the decline in home and small-scale local processing is
considered, the growth in output of processed foods was very much smaller
yet.
Substantial effort has been made in the USSR to expand the output of
fuel and energy. Production of coal, which has been the dominant source
of power in the USSR, has kept pace with the overall industrial growth
since 1928, Petroleum output lagged in the prewar period, but has made
rapid. strides in recent years through the discovery and exploitation of
new fields east of the Volga. Production of electrical energy has grown
at a steady, rapid pace, and has increased by almost 30 times since 1928.
Most of the electric power output is based on coal.
The domestic supply of basic industrial raw materials has grown very
substantially since 1928, but some shortages, particularly in the field
of non-ferrous metals,, still persist. Crude steel output has risen about
10 times since 1928 to reach a level of almost 41 million metric tons in
1954. Production of non-ferrous metals, which was negligible in 1928 ex-
cept for copper, has grown rapidly since that time, particularly in the
case of aluminum. Output of cement and other building materials has in-
creased about ten times over the same period. As in most other industrially-
developing countries, chemicals have been producel in large volume for a
multiplicity of new uses.
Perhaps the greatest strides in the field of Soviet industry have been
made in the production of machinery and equipment. The country's vast in-
vestment program has required large and increasing amounts of machinery.
In addition, it was a policy of the Soviet government to eliminate the eco-
nomy's dependence on imports which had comprised a large part of available
machinery supplies in the 1920's. The growth in the output of all machinery
items has been extremely rapid. In general, the machinery industries have
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received sufficiently high priorities in the procurement of capital, mate-
rials and'skil ed labor to insure the fulfillment of production plans.
In addition, machinery production has probably benefited more from techno-
logical improvements than any other area. of the economy. Although Soviet
production methods are considerably more backward. than US methods in many
sectors, techniques in the machinery industries are,, in most cases, up to
date,
IV. Transportation.,
From 1928 to 1954, freight turnover increased even faster than indus-
trial production. The bulk, over 80 percent, of Soviet freight is carried
by rail Inland.shipping has some importance in the hauling of bulk items.
Although truck transport is growing very rapidly,, it is limited almost ex-
clusively to city and suburban distribution by the very small. number of
all-weather roads.
The growth of railroad freight turnover has slowed down sine 1910; it
was more than four-fold-from 1928 to 1940) and only two-fold from 19+0 to
1951+. Freight turnover in inland shipping has more than doubled since
191+8, and has almost tripled in motor transport during the same period.
In the case of railroads, the increased turnover has been due much
more to the improvement and more intensive use of existing facilities
than to the construction of new lines. From 1928 to 1932, according to
Holland Hunter, the number of freight cars in service rose 44 percent, the
number .offreight- locomotives 26 percent, the length of road operated 7
percent, and freight traffi.ec 82 percent.: Large backlogs of unshipped
freight accumulated during this period as the production of industrial raw
materials grew at a tremendous rate in widely dispersed regions. Such new
developments.. as the "Ural-Kuznetsk Kombinat" which required long distance
transport of iron ore and coal placed a heavy strain on existing facili-
ties. Investments in railroads were not sufficient to relieve the strain.
They represented only about 13 percent of total investments in the First
Five-Year Plan, compared to about 18 'percent in the mid-1920'x.
Investments in railroads increased substantially in the period 1933-
1935 in response to failure to meet transport planar but were designed in
large part to improve the quality of road and rolling stock. From 1932
to.l910, the number of freight cars increased by 12 percent., the length
of track about. 10 percent, and the freight turnover 11+0 percent. There
were also considerable improvements in operating efficiency.
In the postwar period, (1948-1954) the growth of trackage and of the
number of locomotives was small, freight cars in service increased about
15 percent, while freight turnover about doubled.:
V. Education and Training.
A Past Trends.
When the communist government came to. power in the USSR, a sub-
stantial part of the adult population (probably about 60 percent) was il-
literate; over 85 percent lived in rural areas and were engaged in work
requiring little formal education and training. Less than 15 percent of
the population had completed primary school., and only 1- percent. had a
secondary education or higher.
No substantial progress appears to have been made during the
early 1920's except in reducing adult illiteracy, expanding university
enrollment to provide more specialists--often graduated from special
high schools (workersT faculties)--and creating technical high schools
(technicume) for the training of specialists.
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The start of the First Five-Year Plan as the signal for an ex-
tremely rapid expansion of all schools, both general and specialized. La-
bor had to be trained-for industrial jobs concurrently with growth of the
capital plant. Four-year primary education became compulsory in 1930; and
seven-year-(intermediate.) education, by 1949. Ten-year (complete secon-
dary) education although interrupted by World War II and still little
developed as late as 1949-1950, is to become compulsory by 1960. Techni
cums graduated 100,000 tb 200,000 persons a year, and higher educational
institutions are currently turning out engineers, teachers,. doctors, and
other professionals at the rate of nearly 2501OOO'a year..
In order to meet current industrial needs more rapidly, the gov-
erment founded factory schools (Fzu) largely for the purpose of technical
training; Nume=rous evening courses and on-the-job training courses, on
which there is unfortunately little statistical information, were also
given. Illiteracy was reduced to below 20 percent by 1939?
World War II caused a fall in enrollments of nearly all schools
as its pressing industrial needs gave rise to a draft of children into
the labor reserve (FZO), an organization which is still in existence and
has graduated between 300,000 and- 1 million skilled workers a year. The
labor reserve differed from.the factory schools in that it was centralized
and generally took in. students who had completed at least 4 years of school.
Between 1927 and 1939, full-time enrollments in Russian. schools
increased from 11.5 million to 34 million: (about the same number as in re-
cent years). Excluding elementary and 7-year schools;, enrollments went
from 750,000 in 1927 to 3.8 million in 1939 to 7`I
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Table 6'
Educational Attainment of the Soviet Population: Number and Percentage of
Persons between 15 and 59 Years of Agp by Highest Educational Level Reached
Selected Years, 1897`1955
Millions
1897
1913
1926
101
0
1955
Higher education
0.1
0.3
.
0.4
1.0
1.5
2.4
Technicums
1.0
2.6
3.6
10-year schools
0.2
2.3
4.4
7-year schools
o.6
1.1
11
6.9
21.1
34.7
Labor reserve
5.7
8.0
4-year schools
649
13.6
22.0
32.7
37.7
34.3
Factory schools
2.0
2.1
2.1
Literate
9.7
20.6
24.2
4o.6
4o.6
36.9
Illiterate
51.9
53.3
34.5
14.9
4.7
3.9
Population 15-59
69.2
88.9
82.2
99,3
118.3
130,3
Percent
Higher education
0.1
0,3
0.5
1,0
1.3
1..8
Technicums
1_1.0
2.2
2.8
10-year schools
0.2
1.9
3.4
7-year schools & labor reserve
0.9
1.2
1.3
6.9
22.6
32.8
4-year schools & factory reserve
1010
15.3
26.8
34.9
33.6
27.9
Literate
14,0
23.2
29.4
40..9
34.2
28.3
Illiterate
75.0
6o.o
42.0
15.0
4.0
3.0
Population 15-59
10010
100.0
100,0
100.0
100.0
100.0
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Notes to Table 6.
Table 7 shows the number of Russians (aged 15-59) having graduated
from the principal types of schools during selected past years and every
5 years to 1955
The method of computation is as follows: (1) the years during which
each 5-year age group of the population in given years is of age to gra-
duate.-Prom 14-, 7, and 10-year schools are determined; (2) the percentages
of the population of these ages actually graduating for appropriate 5-year
periods are averaged outs (3) actual population for each 5-year' age group
is multiplied by these percentages, giving the number of graduates alive
in the given year; (4+) to obtain the highest educational level reached,
graduations from higher schools are subtracted from graduations from low-
er schools in the following manner: higher education, all graduates;
technicums, all graduates minus 5 percent assumed to have later graduated
from higher educational institutions; 10-year schools .arid workers'.`facili-
ties, all graduatgp minus higher education graduates (after adjustment
for 5 percent of technicum graduates); 7-year schools, all graduates minus
10-year school graduates, and technicum graduates; labor reserve, all
graduates; 14-year schools, all graduates minus 7-year school graduates
and labor reserve graduates; factory schools, all graduates; and literate,
but without further formal education, residual; total population 15-69
minus illiterates, minus all graduates of above schools.
Although part of the labor reserve graduates did complete 7-year
school, it is believed that the large majority completed only I-year
school. Factory schools are believed to have been parallel to 14-year
schools and to have recruited few 1=year graduates.
The estimates of Soviet educational attainment are probably fairly
reliable because they are based on a substantial amount of data and be-
cause the effects of errors in estimates of graduations for particular
years are very small. The projections could be thrown off substantially
only by a major change in educational policy. Certain types of training
such as on-the-job training, evening courses, and the like, are excluded
for lack of adequate times series.
Although such training is to some degree necessary for any new em-
ployee and is used widely in the USSR for the purpose of up-grading
existing 3'orkers, its omission is not likely to bias greatly the measure
of educational attainment except perhaps during the 1930's when longer on-
the-job training was designed to compensate for deficiencies in formal
education.
Educational attainment in the Soviet labor force may be somewhat
greater than in the total adult population and may have increased more
rapidly. Compared to the educational attainment of'the 1.5-59 age group,
however, differences are probably rather small, particularly in view of
the large growth in the education of women.
- 16
S-E-C-R-E-T
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9
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rd CC) Lr" H
to m d)
18
.S-E-C-R-E-T
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5-E-C-R-E-T -- N-Q-F-O .R-N
Appendix A
Notes to Table 3 and 4
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Notes to Table 3
Wheat, R.e Corn, Rice
192 Official Soviet Statistics. Prewar territory.
1932 Official Soviet Statistics corrected as per Jasny, The Social-
ized Agriculture of the USSR, Plans and Performance 1949.
p. 793, difference between official total and corrected total
applied to each grain.
1937-38 Estimates. Prewar territory.
1938-53 (Postwar territory) IM-395, Estimate of 9 232-rain Production
in the Soviet Bloc, 13 Sept. 19 5., S+
Potatoes
11-37 Official Soviet Statistics, Prewar territory, Jasny.
Cotton ginned
192b-32 Ocherki Ekonomiki Tekstil'no- Prom sh]'_ennosti,, SSSR, Khromov,
P.A. Moscow, 1946, pp Z4-148.
1937 SoVietskiy Khlopok, Vol. 3, 1938, pp 120-22 and Itogi
V olneni a Vtoro o P tiletne o Plana Razvitiya Narodnogo
Khozyaistva Soyuza SSR, Moscow, 1929, -- -----~ r--_____ ~ 9 P 95. The first figure
apparently represents output of the ginning industry during the
calendar year 1937; the second is that, of raw cotton produced
(but not necessarily ginned) in 1937 expressed in terms of
ginned cotton, on the basis of a ginning yield of 32 percent.
Wool Grease
1928-40 Official Soviet Statistics
Natural Rubber
1978-T3 -53 CIA/RR 19, The Rubber Position of the Soviet Bloc, 19 Jan 1953. S.
Estimates based on methodology presented in CIA RR 19, S.
and information gleaned from interviews that the Soviet rubber
program is far behind Plan.
Cattle Ho s Shee Goats Horses (winter livestock numbers)
192 -52 CIA RR PR 28, Livestock Numbers and Meat Production in the USSR,
17 June 1953. S.Only summer livestock: numbers available for 1928..)
1953-55 Estimates based on methodology similar to that contained in CIA/RR
PR 28; IM-397, The "New Course., ,r and the Livestock Industry in the
Soviet Bloc, 17 Sep. 1954, S.
Total Sown Area
1928`x" prosy Ekonomiki No. 5, 1954, P- 5-
1932 Socialist Construction in the USSR 1936, U.
1937 Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, UN, 1953.
191+0 Rastenievodstvo p.. 5.
1948 Total on acreage in 1949 was 6 million hectares above 191+8..
Pravda 18 Jan. 1950-
1949 Total sown acreage in 1950 was laid to be 6,6 million hectares
above 1949. Izvesti , 27 Jan. 1951.
1950 Total sown acreage in 1950 was 13% below 1954. Pravda, 7 Nov. 1954.
1951 Total sown acreage in 1951 was 2.8 million hectares1es than 1952.
Pravda, 23 Jan, 1953-
1952 Total sown acreage in 1952 'Was 5.3 million hectares more than 1940.
Pravda, 8 Aug. 1953,
1953 Total sown acreage in 1953 was 6.8 million hectares above 1940.
Pravda, 6 March 1954.
1954 Total sown acreage in 1954 was 8.9 million hectares above 1953.
Selskoe Khozyaistvo, 21 Jan. 1951-.
Estimate. ,
1955
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Notes to Table 4
Coal (hard), Lignite
1953-5 ` Projection of the 1952 production estimate. Revised goal
1955 determined from 12 Jan. 1955 announcement of the Deputy
Minister of the USSR Coal Industry that miners must produce
13% more coal this year than last.
(FBIS Nod 9, 13 Jan. 1955, p. CC-15) Official Use Only)
Electric Power
1928-32 Socialist Constructibn in the USSR, 1936.
1940-55 Estimates determined by applying announced percentage increases
to the firm 1940 estimate of output.
Manganese Ore.
1928-40 NIS 26, Chapter VI, Section 63, Mineraals and Metals, Dec. 1949, C.
1948-55 Contribution to NIS 26, Chapter VI Section
Metals, 1955. 63x Minerals and
Crude Steel
1928-39 SDS69, The Iron and Steel Industry of the USSR, 1943. S.
1940 Plan, hpz, Feb. 9953?
1948-55 Estimates.
Finished Steel
1929
a32 Socialist Construction in the USSR, 1936.
1937-40 Large Soviet Encyclopedia, -1947-
1948-54 Estimates based on Soviet Central Statistical Administration
announcements.
1955 Projection.
Primar Co er Lead Zinc
192 0 Minerals Yearbook, 1940, 1846, Bureau of Mines
1948 55 Estimates based on plant studies, plan fulfillment information,
and percentage increase figures which are published quarterly
and annually in the Soviet press.
Aluminum (primary)
1932-55- Estimates.
1958-53 Interpolations between 1951 estimate and an estimated under-
fulfillment of the Fifth Five Year Plan
Ammonia) Synthetic
0-55 CIA PR-115, The Synthetic Ammonia Industry in the USSR, 21
June 1955. S. US Officials Only.
Synthetic Rubber
1932-52 CIA/RR 19, The Rubber Position of the Soviet Bloc, 19 Jan. 1953, S-
1953-55 Estimates based on similar methodology as presented in CIA/RR 19, S.
Cement
19237 Socialist Construction in the USSR, 1936.
1940-55 CIA RA-1, Cement Production in the USSR 1..45-b0, 20 July 1955, S.
.Bricks
173-2 --TO Soviet Plan Fulfillment announcements
1948-55 CIA/RR PR-11OSi nificant Developments in Soviet Building
Materials Indus- , Apr. 1955, C,
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Sawn Timber
1927/28-46 Prices of Fuelwood and Wood Products in the USSR, 1928-1950,
RAND, RM-1 21, 1 Feb. 1955, U-
1948 Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production,,_ 1928-1951,, 1954.
1950, 52, 53, 55 - Computed from production estimates of round wood and
industrial wood.
1951, *54r. Interpolated.
Steam Turbines and Motors and Generators
1928-32 Socialist Construction in the USSR 1936.
1940, *48-54 NIS 26,, Section 64 CIA ORR Project 30.414) S.
1955 Estimates--extrapolation of series presented in NIS 26,
Section 64 (CIA/ORR Project 30.414) S.
lain ne-Ipcomatives (Electric, Diesel, Steam), Freight Cars
19 -55 Estimates based on a study of the Soviet railroad equipment
industry, plant capacity and output studies, plan fulfillment
information and percentage increase figures which are pub-
lished: quarterly and-annually. Merchant Ships (tankers, cargoes & other S..P. N.E.C., tugs, barges & other N.S.P.)
1950-55 CIA/ORR Project 30.570, Shipbuilding and Repair for the Bloc and
Uses of Acquired and Repaired Vessels by the $loc, 25 Aug. 1954, S;
and CIA/ORR Project 35.51, 20 Feb. 1951, S.
Trucks
1928- Official Soviet data,
1948-55 Estimates determined from plant studies, serial number analysis and
applications of Soviet announced changes in the rate of output.
Passenger Cars
1937 Official Soviet data.
1938-55 Estimates based on officially announced Soviet percentage
changes in annual production using 1950 as a base year. The
1950 absolute figure for passenger car production is derived
by a calculation which employs an officially announced rela-
tionship between truck output and passenger car output in 1950,
using the absolute value of truck output which was determined
.for 1950 from-serial number data.
Tractors
1928--55 CIA/RR 37, The Role of the Tractor Industry in the USSR, 1940-54,
16 Aug. 1957. S.
Flour
1928 Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR, Plans & Perform,=
ance, 1949.
1937 1938 estimate) Jasny, estimate.
1940-55 Estimates determined by applying annual grain consumption rates
per capita to population estimates,
Su ar' ;refined
192 .1930 estimate)
1932-40 Donald R. Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production, 1928-1951, 1954.
1948-55 Estimates.
Meat (dressed weight including fats) excluding canned meat)
1927 Nifortor, 1932, p. 154.
1932 S.S, Kh. 1939, p. 73,
1937 Estimate, Third Five-Year Plan, p. 218..
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Butter (large scale industry)
192970 Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production, 128-1 '1. 1954.
19.8-55 Estimates based on milk production available for government
processing into butter.
Vegetable Oils (total large scale and small scale industries)
1928 1928/29 figuhe.
19+8-55 Estimates,
Cotton, Woolen and Silk Cloth
1548-55 CIA RR Project 2 ,207 (RA) Statistical Data on the Production
of Nonfood Consumer Goods in the USSR, 19 0 and 19 5-55, 10
Dec. 1954. C.
Boots and Shoes
1928-37 NIS 26, Section 64, Chapter VI, (Dec 1949)
1938-55 ORR Project 28.207, (RA) Statistical Data on the. Production
of Nonfood Consumer Goods in the USSR 1 O and
~ 10
1945-55Y Dec 195 -C.
1932 Socialist Construction in the USSR 1936.
Paper
1928-51 Donald R. Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production 1928-1951. 195+
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