THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300060024-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: March 5, 1953
• Content Type: NSPR

-Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300060024-3-
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, March 5, 1953
G
15 if.
Today And. Tomorrow. ? By Walter Lippniann
The Succession to Stalin
THE SOVIET regime must
now meet the test of succession
-,-of how the power which has
been concentrated in Stalin's
hands is to be exercised after
his death. Next only to a de-
cisive defeat in a great war,
this is the severest test of a
regime like this' one. For it
has no principle of legitimate
succession.ti No one can in-
berit 'Stalin's power.. There is
no line of heredity in the Soviet
Union, No one can be elected
to Stalin's power. There are no
elections. Stalin's successor,
like Stalin himself, will have
what power he can take and
can hold against his rivals.
It is, therefore, most im-
probable that there is any man,
say Malenkov, who can surely
take Stalin's place and carry on
as before. The struggle in
which Stalin made himself the
successor of Lenin lasted more
than 10 years. We may count
on it that Stalin's true succes-
sor, if there is one will not be
established certainly for some
considerable time, perhaps for
many years. It could turn out
that Stalin has no successor.
through. his henchmen at the
key points beneath them and
around them. If his successor is
to take over Stalin's power, all
these powerful men, except the
one who is to rise to the top,
and all henchmen at the key
points must accept the. new
supreme ruler as their personal
lord. It is hard to believe that
this can happen ,easily or
quickly. If it does, it will be the
greatest surprise, and the most
disconcerting, that has yet come
out of Soviet Russia.
EVEN IF we assume that
there has been worked out dur-
ing Stalin's lifetime substan-
tial agreement inside the Polit-
buro about the succession,
there is every prospect, we may
suppose, that at the least there
will be a period in which the
new regime is preoccupied in
consolidating itself. It is prob-
able, however, that there, will
also be a struggle for power.
And it is possible that this
struggle may be severe and pro-
longed and momentous.
The stakes are immense for
0*9
THE KIND of power that
Stalin has exercised cannot be
transferred intact. It is a kind
of power that has to be grasped
by the new pretender and
made his own by his own
actions. For the power of Ii
Stalin is?iot.in an office which, !a
if someone ocCUpies it, carries
with it all the prerogatives and A
powers. The nature of Stalin's c'
n is
n
io
power in the Soviet U
more like that of the old po-
litical city boss, only of course
on an imperial scale..
It is a power based on the
fact that in a long struggle with
his rivals over the years-by
promotions, demotions, purges
and liquidations- he has suc
ceeded in putting his own men,
subject to his own will, in all
the key points of the regime.
In the end Stalin made himself
the boss of the party organiza-
tion, of the bureaucracies, the
secret police, the armed
forces. The real power of Sta-
lin has resided not in his titles
and his office but in this ma-
chine.
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THE PROBLEM of the suc-
-session in the USSR is the
problem of this in a chin e
through which Stalin has gov-
erned the great organizations
of which the Soviet regime is
composed. They are the Com-
munist Party, which has been
Malenkov's, the Secret Police,
which has been Beria's, the
Bureaucracy, which, it would
appear, has been Molotov's, and
the armed forces, which, at
last accounts, seem to have
been Bulganin's.
Stalin has exercised all the
ultimate power by ruling over
these owerful men and
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the world and for ourselves. So
much is at stake that it is im-
possible to say too emphatically
that this is the time of times
when public men and all who
speak and write should hold
themselves to the highest rules
of responsibility-avoiding all
loose talk and all loose ges-
tures, all threats, promises,
prophecies, and provocations,
until this country and its allies
can judge soberly and seriously
the new danger and the new
prospects.
If there is a struggle for
power inside. the Soviet Union,
there may be an interval when
the Soviet Union appears not to
be reacting to the outer world.
There may be imprudent men
who think this means ' it can
never react. In such 'an interval
we should listen to the counsel
of our wisest men here and
abroad. For in that interval it
may be that good things can
be done that would give life and
hope to mankind, or that foolish
and thoughtless things would
be done which might bring
catastrophic consequences.
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