CIA/OPC'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100170064-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: November 26, 1951
• Content Type: REGULATION

25X1C
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to a
nar soon ask XC to su t to it isTortant olovonts of ozt
1 neional stratpgy. fOr t conduct of U. 3 affairs during
voral years his quirnt inelndas
opinion of th feaibU1ty ane destrtbi1ity of
rt suooessfu/ revolution in one or mere of the
ies
risme for t1 ?uaeeii deta*m1
tnict Chinn, wtth or vithout e?itttion
=oh plans to
ptity, Mit race; (2) nanpwer 41.
Ibility;
retO
(2) nu..
non-
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25X1C
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dt
2, Asetwits this task ia offielally 1
is first reusti draft att., st establishing the framsetrYrk Lfl
hi the -1.oblem *tett be solved
bj
Oleo-
basis
is
2, The pitch tban. leould swear to be ss folloost
a prim about a short-ream basis ezumgh defection
pros tion to keep the Politburo so off ?
Immortal,* that they' dare not dean*.
DIIth this flefection so thst it readily may be converted
ose -term estulyst
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bItt
a. Arilitary Pomander places the bulk of his arti1l,W7
on tiv, tarots which vial be metrernmerative in overel
noe of his battle,
all our Paye (cold uar) obleew
seatter our shots', ries the primary **votive; try
ha bai*
front,
tho? *L
on of war or Rano
tes weaknesses
te3titteeerdina
b* The current situation to eherester
or II* 1* Paler Inds likeviset Soviet
WW1 tit
zero tav rearming, at an se
ig to *maids** their (iireetion or
their control oreIlte4 with
The American paity
eeite WI or peel
2, 'TS t
Cnn the U.S, eeeert the rresent Unita of the ,oviet
emrire alloutnr the Soviets to develop e-rplete control and
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41,41, 3 NIP
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b. Can the U.
of the U.
Wire
the royjt thdail soon*
vent of infltssnow
CPYRGHT (4164._39046,
U.
ible with the tIrvival
loviet rover
our:
then all-oat ver
ostivotesin
out an asoo
vith the ,flovj
not been seriously ten.t.
onsidered suosessful only if our
Soviet expansion, it not to
214.4.4gotet. roass ifseee4)
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444te-ericrandinver?
and detee elements of
control of the Xvemlin
in the eviet
quor7)
O tiona/ psycholINgy seemsto
.tion that Site3 will take
ed in an, netieval policy papers( but
a atof tho actions undertaken se
at tb. departmental and lover level
oash anxr test bet sne mevo stead
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b$
'UM 11-
regions vith the atm or
-!iberatten,
eventual
xteiUt?
mit a serious
1.di:solution
Wry on
P be
represents tho
*Meaty reeernimes thftt
to Soviet Aminettion.
:lel a ....tery. is to be
1e4sor 1 than
IV/Y.14M
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
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If the nen.cfalraudet tr14 adopts a
mai takes the initgative In carrying
sts will be thrown back on the political
T1 or their apparent advantages would be turned
Their nae, deperaient on the seam of
*tit, would be turiernined. The politicei
they 'tear pear wild be filled frau the
ioarls of their strategic tan
int tow /is =eh because or tho
.a*s4itht 411 fre0 StVerigth4tht,wealaa begin.
errnble."?a. )
t aro Um en
eejective
questions *set
1htthead 114 the Ilediti tenet7
went a direct attack en thm :Itadnant
bhtn the UR ox th(lowinesit groupthin the satellitat
b.
tay t? t
a
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CPYRGHT
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Soviet sphere who most
thee" have rid themselves
will find it tow
riddle of show te
d.
only when
tors, we
iiwerabis
(
downfall by fighting amongst *a
*. Should we ale to a lit thedlle
and separate then from th
mit eadership or should we
*ateiiite or Soviet people to anti
Comma
6.
the
a. Which satellite states are
eporsereci narversion?
b. Which satellite states night he detached free the Soviet
sphere without the risik of ear?
e. When might ft satellite eountry be de0.ehed 'roe the Soviet
we with the least risk of war?
d. The detaehment of which satellite state Mill promote a
spotazwins ohain reaction within the Soviet yitem2
e. Gen preparetiono for the detechmertt of e given satellite be
ortRkAn r (IOWA IMMO alone or must they be geared vith a
rrehcn?tveovert paynhamien1 nd cel rejttoa,
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7.
h de' iled plans for the intervention of external
alit ry forces,.
how essential is s
armed forceel
Hw ynical can we be in
en we snsourae Tito to borate Albania
psripe expand Titoism iit
If tee?nia&Uy feasible, such
cattle
aubvar-
- range
Saria and iiumania;;
?ration might have
regard to * long
tern &zeroes
chances of developing a
tri Gi4t during the next two or three years?
at are our chances at promoting defection 4thin the
upation force& in }stern Germany and tale:
ble are we of
troit the outside
t itlelenkov by planned. pa terns of di
pon
et suspic
We
e. operating almost entirely f
e* .ow prolensod-s
within the polit aro
JaUns death or renewing
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ide
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
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fiSliclitambe
"The gulf between the C
and its own Central Committee
that the last party congress
in 1939, twelve years ago, whereas
neld every two or three years. It 57 Cl
exaggeration to say that the gulf between the party aai the
Kremlin is greeter now than the gulf between the
the people. And it is increasing. For another complaint
of the Central Committee, growing in volume and intermit'',
is that the children are no longer joining the Young
Communist League, the Komsomol, in sufficient numbers;
ibrd too great a proportion of those who do join regard it
only as a kind of social privilege.
"For thirty years first Lenin and then telth have
governed the 5oviet Union through the party, backed by all
the power of the police. If the party becomes an unreli-
able instrument that leaves only the police." ( efxua..1'4?ae.0
I are the
within the r.ZnR
or significant subversiveoperations?
to tell haw rnuoh the Russian people can stand
without breaking down; certainly they can stand more than the
minority nationalities of the Union. These are now troubling
the Kremlin so deeply that the radical dilution of these
nationalities is being pushed forward at greet speed, the
natives of the various republics, from Ukraine to Kazakhstan,
being moved about and nixed together with the object of destroy-
ing eech and every focus of national spirit." OPliee.444144ne0
ant is he fricti
within the Communist party
-oiia and the Soviet Arpy.
ough people be found who will take the risk involved
reing out a theoretical feasible subversion campaign
I the USSR?
s the boiling point of Russian resistance to harsh
authority; in other words, how much can the Russian people
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take before they will aettvely engage in political
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
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erical roe
d be clear by now that the Russian unthink-
deprivations of liberty which we will not
opt, and that he can live and flourish nditions
of hardship thinkable to us. It is also true to say
that after so maw years of life at its harshest he will
accept worse evils than he was ready to accept in 1917.
,ilen we are thiaking of the appalling conditions of the
labor camps, for example, we should remember the appall-
ing conditions of the average Russian village." (4aaaaaja:Laall)
j. What
25X1Alefections
thers still ask why, if things are as bad as I
have iaId, there are not nore refugees, more desertions
from the Soviet army and missions serving abroad. I
have tried to show that hatred of the regime is not a
new thing to the Russians, and does not lead to immediate,
reasoned action. Love of country, too, runs very deep,
and this we should understand.
"Those who try to areas the frontier are shot
those soldiers who are tempted to desert while servi
Germany and Austria have perpetually before their eyes the
decree or the Supreme Soviet, 'which tell, them in the
simplest language that the whole family or any soldier
who deserts while serving abroad will be sentenced to five
years corrective labor in the remote regions of aberial.
4
k.
the signific
of an overall U.3. political
the success of our o
25X1A
alturnham-a-
"The lock-bolt of the entire structure of coaunist
plans is political. For them, everything depends on
their continuing to have political superiority and to
maintain the political initiative. If they do, they win
either way, war or no war, war soon or war delayed. Whet-
ever happens, their policy, with its fixed goal of world
compost, will be steadily advancing." (7
c"44"4".:73
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roved F
r Re
eas
20
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