NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 'COLD WAR' OF THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100170067-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: May 3, 1951
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release 1111ff8f*AgkljURDP80-01065A000400170067-6
r argoirt.
3 May 1951
TO: CHIEF, pa
SUBJ: National Strategy for the "Cold War" of the United States:
This paper offers a very provocative and stimulating approach
to our major strategy problem; namely, how to terminate the present "cold
war" without either provoking a general war or without suffering defeat
in the "cold mar" itself.
A nation's strategy must bear some relation to a nation's funda-
mental policy. Although US policy, if it is anything, is to maintain the
"peace," it has progressed to the point that it now recognizes that it is
wiser to run the risk of war than to seek peace by avoiding all risks.
The US has recognized that the Soviet leaders cannot be deterred from
their parth of action by any concessions we may make. At the same time,
there is no way of knowing whether or not the Soviets will initiate a
"hot war" or prefer to continue with the "cold war."
Notwithstanding, H.S. National strategy appears to be based on the
assumption that a general war is almost inevitable. The unprecedented
$60,000,000,000.00 FY 1952 Defense budget is a straw in the wind. History
records few instances when a progressive mobilization of the relative mag-
nitude of the current U.S. effort has not been terminated in war. Although
the inevitability of war may be argued, there is universal agreement that
U.S. mobilization is the prerequisite to the continued maintenance of the
present "peace."
Approved For Release 2pep3/SalitIpP80-01065A000100:13M;,,..
69,.7761 ?Aav ILL-1404%
Approved For Relew 2oo1iQ811 Itrp!80-01065A000490170067-6
The subject paper states that, "We are very apt to be con-
fronted for nann
world in which we
years with the same sort of dangerous uneasy
live." Once our mobilisation is achieved the
prospect of maintaining a constant war eeonomy will not be very inviting
to the American people. The cost of our naintaining the military build-
up of the Western world is likely to be prohibitive after a certain point
in time. They may press for action to settle the stale-eate and bring
about the very war which our mobilisation is designed to prevent. The
paper postulates that war may be the only genuine way of putting an end
to the "cold war" within any considerable period of time. Although the
proponente of preventive war will always be vocal, it will be impossible
for any administration to start one.
There is another factor, however, which the paper neglects to
discuss, and that is the possibility that the Soviet Union may achieve
some sort of atomic equality prior to the time that the US and its allies
achieve an adequate military posture in land and tactical air forces.
Because this possibility exists the deterrent value of the A-Boab may
be lost before the conventional rearmament becomes adequate, the "cold
may come to an unfortunate end for us, rather than dragging on in-
definitely.
To surmise these proceeding points, (1) a "cold war" may be ended
by the US initiating a "hot war" during the period of its atomic ascendancy,'
or (2) the Soviet Union may end the "cold war by initiating a "hot war"
after it attains atomic equality and before the US achieves adequate
strength and conventional forces.
As it is unlikely th-A the 113 will_take the,
Approved For Release 2001/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-ww6omuOrdIrdbt171Weel. of action,
it faces a catastrophic showdown unless it can prevent the
oreLvidoe
Approved For Release 2001/081erlUk Epreflpfp1065A0004.00170067-6
r oLutra
of 'mitten*
is lists adds all the more signifioanoe to the oonolusion
he per that, 'the only weapon short of' war or the genuine
which has any real chancre of being sive in the *cold"
ble length of time is that of the underground and
in Commaaist countries*
nas of large numbers of disoontented people an
140
The
it of potentialresistance is eertainly fundamental to the success
forts to overthrow the present Soviet regime. Passive resistants.
unorganised basis, coupled with, for ezanpl1 a split of the
e Party, or a split is the elite whether seared to Stalin's
not might bring about the result aw went* The difficulties that
? path of activating 'active resistanee on a particular
Sd out in the paper and they are of such a magnitude that
yea of the sort suggested should be fully explored and tried
d reeistanee per se is wholly relied upon
The per exphasises the fact that *most no eoordinat.d planning
empliehed in the CS goverment to terminate the 'ool war
tag the Soviet regi. It expresses in different; words the
in eonlunotion with the 'Save and Magnitude more that
I of our conventional governmental departments and agencies
the Stat. Lepartmen and ECA) are either (1) oambettiag
emergenotes or *lee 2)1seking preparations m the assumption
general war (Defense 14partment)*
gte
Approved For Release 2001/08/16 :
0-01065A000100170067-6, ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100170067-6
4.11.
fter explaining some or the reasons 'why there has been a
failur, to plan for **old* ear and a sole war victory at the .veromeat
level the paper Implies that OPC issuitable existing vehicle for doing
the planning required for en integrated
TM ?control though developed
planning for a major stele war effort must be related to some itngl
cr ?o4' war effort
is the idea that our
1)4ay on which an integrated ?old* war offensive would take plea,.
It is the paper's position that a fixed point of departure in time
Id permit those charged with any old' war activities to separate
operations from plans and prepare one; and to permit coordinated 'cold,
war rations to unfold according to plea. The acceptant,o of a D?Pay
for neer oordlnated actions in the cold5 war would give coherence
end +lotion of concept to our p angling.
The proffered of-a *wad. war Day is an extremely useful one
sion has already marked out for itself the task ot
threegenerating general type* of plane; (1) The emergeney plan
the period red for OP 7 tore** Its mobilisation platform (approx-
instely
31 1962)o (2) The mid-range plan the period from
Leoember 81, 12 until the US and its allies reaoh an adequate mill.-
pe oymettme in 1962-64)
(6) Thic long-range plan
US has ieved adequate military posture and before the
sod our atomics superiority..
Our long-range plan should be developed in oeeordanoewith the
pt established in the subject paper. D.4,ay in this connection
?171
Approved For Release 2001/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01065e6A0.1.21:V67-
Approved For Release 2001/1
A : t 'Ilifp10-01065A000160170067-6
'bould be coo idered as the date otter which a
profitably be undrtakan. The exact date is one
in advance.. he tiias of launching must depend
nts outside he control of the U.S. The selection of the right moment
ii the most tfiOUIt teak of d2.l IO one can foresee whet might be
the consequences of a full-scale war offensive against the ovist
Th. Impact of such an offena upon the Soviet leaders would
be rily pgyehologioal and, consequently, to a degree unprediellable
he zzszimum benefit might be to Greats such a serious dislocation in
mechanism of control 40 to bring about a *allayse fres within.
desirable result might be to produce such a general
deterioration in VA0 Soviet situation as to render impotent for a long
time to coma h Soviet military threat to the free world.
A ridlk inherent in an all-out **old' wow offensive is the
poseiMitty that the Soviet regime, fighting for its life* might consider
war as the only possible means of assuring its survivals Therefore, the
wo?ld* war offensive must be very carefully coordinated with military plans
to counter any Soviet military action thus induced. Consequently, the
plan must is. two Nagler partes
(I) The initial 0oolf war uprising aimed at
disleeating the Sodet power, and
The immediate explo tation of this dislocation
whether it be by direct assistance to forces
aroused by the uprising or by direct action
against the Soviet military forces.
Approved For Release 2001/08/164?IA-RDP80-01065A000100
3
Approved For Release 2001/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100170067-6
TOP SECRET
emotion eouId * ring from p1soinsthe Soviet
en inesoapsble trap comprised,
ub
roe.
eau** of the greet pot
Mt the idea itself and
the one hand, of the r
; and, on the. other. by a eontslnthg wait of Allied
GPO
CP/
gists)!
of this appioech, I
paper be very olosely held,
lens tiLeion develop, at the earliest possible date
orderly development of the type plan required to implement
tablished in this paper*
is task is given to the Plans Division the neosetty
ee top-flight planners beomes all the more imperat
CI-1/W
sea v elan
Approved For Release 2001/08/16 ? CIA-RDP80-01065A000100M
I 1-0 tL
25X1A
--"?""--?---74--7F?Frr3pro e or e ev
,kIGNATURE REZORD A17
? For the Intraoffice Use of OSO and OPC Only?as
as zU01/013/1b : GIA-KL/1-1130-010bbAUOU1001
COMMENT SHEET
a Cover Attachment to Form No. 38-13
tillibi*OTICE
Detaching Form No. 38-13 for the purpose
of securing this form to top secret docu-
merits is prohibited.
ATTENTION.?Access to top secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant top secret
control officer who receives and/or releases the attached top secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in columns provided. Each individual
who sees this top secret document will enter date of handling and sign his full name in the proper columns. Officer designations should be used in the "To" column.
Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should sign
full name before further routing.
FROM:
C p L_
.
CONTROL NO.
TO?
ROOM
NO.
DATE
OFFICER'S FULL NAME
COMMENTS 1
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
AL-
.,
atiVil IN L
14 alimikosuAlthl
- 641?wiihowav
4.
5.
6.
ILLEGIB
7.
8.
9.
.
10.
1 1 .
12.
13.
14.
15.
? irflE ?409,. killitly ! ;
1

fitileigN4O6 38-13A
TOP SECRET
GPO 10-6170-0--1
PLEASE RETURN THIS
FORM TO REGISTRY