STAFF STUDY ON PUBLICITY WITH RESPECT TO NOVEL WEAPONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400180020-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 14, 1951
• Content Type: STUDY

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11101) SE01113T
Sertwitz2gforatiaa
pacuomoica STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
19
Copy No. of 50 Copies
PSD D.17
14 Levember 1951-
Pat STUDY ON PUBLICITY lam marrilost TO vont, UF-,APONS
FROMM.
1* To deternine basic policy Guidance for the content ef Governnental
statements 7ith respect to the existence, development of, and contemplated
purposes of nor or "novel" type.veapons.
2. To establish a General procedure for the release of inforraation
ulLth respect to novel ueapons*
Depormaa
3. For the purpose of this study* novel mapons are considered to in-
clude all weapons usinG atomic paver for propulsion or explosion, Guided
missiles, neubioloGical, radioloGical and chemical veapons, and any other
novel weapons that nay appear in the future*
ADIALYSIS
4* There is need for broad policy Guidance for all appropriate execu-
tive departments and aGencies on the release of informtion regarding neu
weapons, based on considered appraisal ofthe relative advantaGes and die.
advantaGes,of the release of any particular item of information in the
light of the followinG fUndokiental principles:
a.- Public resonzribilities -
The very basis of our system of zovernment requires that the
people must be kept informed to the broadest extent consistent vith the
'national security. 3ach department and aGency has its ovn peculiar responsi-
bilities, sone of -which are statutory, for reportinG to the ConGress and the
people, for justifyinG requests for appropriationsp?for the advancement of
the public telfare? and for ether- purposes.
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b. kcuriti
Security considerations require that certain weapons inforna-
tion must be kept secret, but this category should. be Impt to an absolute
c. International re-eercussions
The present international situation requires that the effect
upon foreign countries, whether allies, neutral or potential (monies,
should be taken into account with regard to the tininG, place of release,
and source of any public stntenents regardinG new weapons.
Fact and.
Uith respect to fact and conjecture, or even delierate fantasy,
there is clearly need for a concerted governmental effort to carefully cal-
culate the desirability of any departure fro n fact in the release of
weapons information in order to overcome the inevitable confusion which re-
sults from independent report, denial, inspiration and elaboration by
various. officials.
DISCUSSIOH
5. a.. The fact of American atonic superiority undoubtedly has a
deterrent effect on Soviet loaders. nether indiscriminate statements about
atomic and other novel weapons produce any worthnhile effect on the Kremlin
nay be doubted.. .
Such indiscrininate statements do, hot/ever, reduce hcrneul
effects in the free world and imnode our efforts to Inula a healthy inter-
national community. They weaken confidence which is needed for recovery.
They encourage neutralisuand stirulate the urne to stay out of the 2ast-
Vest conflict, They identify the U.S. with war and destruction and hap
Communist propagandists to fasten the "war.monser? label on us.
b. A totalitarian nation like the ussn may effectively use terror
as an instrmeent of national policy, nut terror cannot be used effectively
by the U.S. if it desires to retain moral leadership over the free peoples
and build a better world.
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c. Within the U.S. itself, ill-considered statenents about novel
weapons may create a false sense of security, make it difficult to get
support for conventional forces, lead to expectation of miracles in war and
undermine public willingness to face casualties and sacrifice.
d. It follows that U.S. statements on novel weapons must be care-
fully considered, must be based upon basic U.S. policies, and must take into
account the possible and probable effects upon critical world audiences.
We, should therefore seek to exercise a deterrent effect on the
Kremlin by methods as discreet as possib/e without involving our national
leaders in a policy of terror.
We should also present information on novel weapons in such ways
that it will strengthen, not shake, the confidence of the freo peoples,
THE POLICY BASIS
6. a. Our national objectives, which basic policy guidance must support
are:
(1) To build a healthy free-world community capable of its own
defense.
(2) To deter the USSR from
(a) undertaking general war,
(b) undertaking further aggression short of war.
(3) To reduce Soviet power..
b. More specifically, basic guidance on all armaments must be
governed by the tripartite disarmament proposal made before the UN General
Assembly. The President's speech on this proposal emphasized:
(1)
(2)
(3)
the good faith of our proposal;
the interdependence of novel-weapons and conventional
weapon disarmament;
our intention to build strength while always continuing actively
to seek the reduction of armaments under propersafeguards.
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(4) Responsibility of the Soviet leaders for continued increase
in world armaments.
It is dear that our statements on novel weapons must be consistent with
that proposal. Therefore, all high level statements on novel weapons should
hereafter be consistent with the four points above. Emphasis should be
varied by the several media to fit specific target audiences; in accordance
with policy guidance to be prepared by the Department of State.
7. Gloal_Ioatamt
a. Before public statements are .made on novel weapons; these
questions should be answered.
(1) Does the American Congress or public need this information?
(2) Will this information really help deter the Kremlin?
(3) Will this information strengthen or weaken the morale of
the free world?
(4) Are these weapons important enough, and is their completion
date near enough, to justify a statement?
b. High-level statements, as contrasted with media play, have a
global audience. The content must therefore either represent a compromise
between the requirements of different audience groups, or be chosen with the
most critical audience group in mind. The primary audience group is the
strategically important, potentially neutralist group: West Germany, France,
Italy, and the Middle East. Additionally, such statements must be based
upon the policies indicated in the Prosidentls reduction of armaments speeeh.
c. Taking the above factors into consideration, the following is
recommended as interim basic guidance:
?
(1) Maphasize the peaceful purposes of novel inventions, and
the uses to which we are putting them,
(2) Novel weapons are being developed for defensive purposes)
we continue actively to seek ways of reducing armaments
and controlling armament production.
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(3) Novel weapons control and conventional weapons control
must go hand in hand.
(4) De-emphasize the mass effect of novel weapons and
emphasize the developments in the characteristics of
the weapons permitting greater target selectivity.
(5) We are for control of novel weapons and against city-
bombing in principles but do not make statements which
amount to a commitment not to use strategic A-bombing or
which night give Soviet loaders assurance of immunity
from strategic attack.
(6) Shift the moral blame to the Soviet leadership for the
continued uncontrolled development of strategic novel
weapons.
(7) Emphasize that manpower inequalities between the free-
world and Soviet blocs will be greatly minimized by the
development of tactical novel weapons; and that the free
world cans when tbese weapons become available, oppose
with novel weapons Comnunist peripheral (cold war)
applications of strength without the need of bringing on
general war.
BAD The above guidance is not to be construed as
absolving officials of their responsibility for obtaining
security clearance for statements prepared in-conformity
thereto,
8. Area Media Treatment
Specific areas require special emphasis in media treatment. The
basic effects sought are indicated in Tab C. Department of State should
prepare detailed guidances to achieve these effects.
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. The Reduction of Panic Effect
a. Under nornal conditions, panic effect is controllable by
adherence to the guidance of paragraph 7, In addition, wide publicity in
optimistic tones should be given to the state of our air dofenses.
b. When war-crises occur, panic tendencies will probably occur.
A guide to treatment at such times is attached so Tab B.
10. Evaluation
The systematic revision of basic guidance requires continuous
evaluation of the effects abroad of public statements on novel weaponst
Such evaluation should be undertaken by the Psychological Strategy Board.
11. Mechanism for Novel-Weanon Guidance
a. There are at present nany mechanisms for coordinating the
release of information. None has, however, proven adequate for effective
guidance and control of public statements on novel weapons.
b. Policy guidance should be produced by a mechanism which can
take into account the responsibilities of the President and of the heads of
the departments and agencies concerned and which may thus assure the
effective implementation of approved policy. Such a mechanism, furthermore,
should be a continuing medium for timely, constructive policies made in an
atmosphere of careful deliberation of all factors involved insofar as
posnible, rather than merely for meeting emergencies or for censorship.
c. Guidance requires continuing revision, to fit:
(1) Special cases.
(2) Changes in the facts about novel woapons.
(3) Changes in security restrictions,
(4) War-crises.
(5) Basic changes in U.S. policy.
(6) Types of novel weapons. A separate guidance for each
(7)
may become necessary.
Deception purposes.
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d. There should be constituted a Novel Weapons Information
Guidance Committee to be charged with providing the information indicated
in sub-paragraph c above, as well as with revising, keeping up to date,
and issuing national policy guidance on publicity with respect to novel
treapons. This committee should be chaired by a member from the White
House Staff and should include members from the Department of States the
Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and the
Staff of the Psychological Strategy Board, with the latter member acting
as Executive Secretary. A representative of the Federal Civil Defense
Administration should sit as appropriate with the clommittee for informa-
tion of interest to that agency.
e. Although individuals on the highest level of government are
engaged in operations of world-wide significance the great majority will,
because of immediate pressures, desire, or lack of competent advice, usually
discuss novel weapons in the context of the impact upon the domestic
audience. Statements made for political or budgetary purposes or under the
exhilaration of an audience have been and will continue to be the source
most of the unfortunate effects on our psychological operations.
Practice has shown that few individuals can be expected con-
sistently to seek advice from any designated source. No mechanism for clear-
ance of public statements ever has been satisfactory. Consequently, it
should be the constant charge of the Novel Weapons Information Guidance
Committee to remind officials that plans for psychological operations do
exist and that their public statements have an important bearing on those
plans. By this means it may be possible to prevent harmful statements and
to encourage helpful ones.-
f. Department of State should prepare detailed policy guidance in
conformity to the PSB guidance included herein or to be issued hereafter*
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g. High-level statements on novel weapons should be prepared in
conformity to Department of State guidance. It is desirable that the
Director of the Psychological Strategy Board be informed in advance of
pending high-level statements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
12. a. That Tab A, B. and C be approved f',)r issuance to appropriate
departments and agencies.
b. That the coordinating mechanism roconnonded in su-paragraph
11 d above be approved, organizing action to be undertaken by
the PSB staff.
c. That the Department of State be assigned the task of preparing
Tab B
a detailed interim guidance in conformity with Tab A/and Tab C.
d. That the mentors of PSB authorize the Director to conduct an
evaluation of the effects abroad of public statements with
respect to novel weapons, using the facilities of the depart-
ments and agencies responsible for the conduct of psycholoLical
operations.
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