'69 REPORT TO NIXON WAS SPLIT ON WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300170013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 25, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

",i~-;; inlN POST
1.4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :2dIA $0-03fA11MD.'
L t 91- (0).
on,
CIA "decidedly more skeptical about the' in-this study, '"although his.'
!"Tone P ~ ~ ~ ~~ These are some of the major dis- actions have reflected more,
closures in the summary: - of what the optimists were
?
"Sound Analysis" of the 'effectiveness claiming in 1969.
By Murrey Marder of American B-52 bomber strikes against In the process, the Presi
Washington Post Staff writer enemy forces (B-52 strikes are currently dent cut U.S. forces in
President Nixon received "profoundly being conducted for the first time against South Vietnam from over a
different" judgments from key govern- the North Vietnam heartland and on a half million at the time he:
ment agencies at the start of his adminis. different strategic rationale) was rated took office to about 80,000.
... .. _ ..?_-._ ..' ,.4h. 9n(lOI ;:
nam, the consequences of a Communist, consensus is that some strikes are very While the NSC summary
effective, some clearly wasted, and a discloses sharp disagree-
takeover, and the actions he was urged majorit
with indeterminate outcome" meats three years ago on
y
to take.
This is disclosed in the summary of a -
mists concluded that on the the current battlefield situa-
government survey ordered by the Presi- basis of programs then in tion in Vietnam is much dif-
`dent on Jan. 21, 1969, the day after his in? existence, it would take "8.3 ferent from the situation in
=auguration. The study was National Sc- early 1969 and U.S. airpower-
curity. Study Memorandum No. 1, as years" more to. pacify the is being applied in different
sembled by the National Security Coun- remaining contested and ways.
ell staff headed by presidential adviser Vietcong controlled popilla- In contrast to the guer
tion of South Vietnam. The rilla attacks, or hit-and-run.
Henry A. Kissinger. pessimists estimated it would actions by larger units
Many - of the conclusions and recom- take "13.4 years" more to which have dominated the.
? rriendations in it have been altered or achieve that goal. enemy's strategy until now,
overtaken by events in the intervening ? In "sharp debate" over the current Communist of-,
three years of U.S. troop withdrawals the validity of the "domino fensive is much more like a
theory" consequences of a conventional battle with
:from South Vietnam .and international takeover in Viet- tanks, artillery and massed
shifts of position by China and the Soviet t troop concentrations stand-"
Union in their relationships with the nam, military strategists
United States. But some of the findings generally accepted that re- lag and fighting.
'shed light on new actions now unfolding, bounding principle, but Thus, it is reasoned offi=
, such as the current Communist offensive most civilian experts con- cially, bombing now is more
~;ind the, renewed U.S. bombing of North . eluded that while Cambodia imporatant and potentially
Vietnam's heartland. and Laos could be endan- more effective because big
One -of the most striking disclosures in gered fairly quickly, the loss conventional battles need
the study is the evidence it contains of of Vietnam "would not nec- large quantities of fuel and
great 'splits inside the federal bureau- essarily unhinge the rest of ammunition to be sustained
cracy between optimists and pessimists Asia." for more than a few weeks.
in assessing what had happened in Viet- ? On Soviet and Chinese The NSC summary out-
nam up to early 1969 when the survey military aid to North Viet- lines sharp differences of
was completed. While some of these dif- nam, the Joint Chiefs and opinion in early 1969 over
ferences have become public knowledge, the U.S. military command the fighting capabilities of
especially with publication last year of in Saigon said that "if all Saigon's forces, the import-
the Pentagon Papers, which carried the imports by sea were denied ance of the Cambodian port
war history up to 1968,'this study reveals and land routes through of Sihanoukville as a major
how these differing viewpoints were ex- Laos and Cambodia at- entry point for enemy sup-
tended into the Nixon administration. tracted vigorously," North plies, and the overall effec-
Two broad schools of assessment Vietnam "could not obtain tiveness of U.S. bombing.
emerged among the policy planners. In enough war supplies to con- To a surprising extent, the
the first group, more optimistic and tinue." But CIA and the Of- document portrays the Pen-tagon' "hawkish," were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fice of Defense, "in total dis- withins civilian heirarchy
the U.S. military command in Vietnam, agreement," concluded that withi the Office of the Sec-
the Commander in Chief of Pacific forces, "overland routes from China retary of Defense as more
and the' American Embassy in Vietnam alone" could supply North cautious and skeptical in all
headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Vietnam with sustaining of the major assessments af-
Often conflicting with the judgment of war material, "even with an feeling the future course of
the fighting than the U.S.
-those advisers was a second grouping unlimited bombing cam- Military -Command in Sai-
composed of the Office of the Secretary paign."
gon or the Joint Chiefs of
of Defense, the State Department and President Nixon's subse'- Staff.
the Central Intelligence Agency. quent actions in Vietnam The document also seems
The first grouping, the -summary of have been more in accord
the study i fv R6 ~f&le 2001/0304 tGdAPRD 0IW&W em
-view of cttrtee!'fi all future prospects -in d b
il
l
t `
s
s.
t
Vietnam," with State, Defense and the rase tle y >~, pessm