NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT ON KOREA- - COMMENTS BY THE SENIOR CIA PARTICIPANT (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 2, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
2 September 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT National Intelligence Situation Report on Korea--
Comments b the Senior CIA Participant
OPR)
Facts
The first interagency task force to produce a "national intelligence
situation report" was set in motion on Thursday morning, 19 August by
the Director of Central Intelligence. The task force, managed by
(Vice Director for Production
DIA)
,
issued eight sitreps --at:
0200 EDT 20 August 1200 EDT 24 August
1400 EDT 20 August 0900 EDT 25 August
2400 EDT 20 August 1000 EDT 26 August
0500 EDT 23 August 1200 EDT 27 August
Task force activity was suspended at noon, Friday, 27 August.
Task force members (and other interested parties) first assembled
at the Pentagon's National Military Intelligence Center at about 1300
Thursday, 19 August. At 1500, DIA (as the DCI's "Executive Agent")
chaired a free-wheeling organizational meeting of representatives from
CIA, NSA, State/INR, and DIA--with observers from the IC Staff and
from a number of DOD components. It was decided that the task force
would commence a 24-hour operation without delay and, at Lt. General
Wilson's instruction, prepare a "base-line" sitrep for distribution
very early the following morning. At the meeting, which lasted a few
hours, the INR representative announced that INR, short of qualified
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analysts, could not participate further in the exercise. Thereafter,
INR had no role in the production or (to my knowledge) coordination
of the sitreps. Nor did INR respond on the one occasion (on 27 August)
when the task force made a specific request..
A major portion of the organizational session was devoted to
varying degrees of assurance from high-level military officers--includ.-
ing General Wilson and Rear Admiral Robertson, DDI (N MIC)--that the
task force would-have a reasonably complete flow of information on
Korea-related US military plans and operations. It was emphasized,
however, that material on plans or "options" could not be placed in
the sitreps.
Hour-to-hour management of the task force was in the hands of-two
alternating members of General staff. Routinely, action at
the assigned NMIC office picked up a Pout four or five hqurs prior to
publication--reviewing the mail, phone calls to parent agencies, prep-
aration of drafts. Generally, the DIA specialist on Korea collaborated
with his NSA counterpart on the military input, while the CIA specialist
prepared political and international portions of the sitrep. (All this
in contrast to the earlier assumption by DIA's task force managers that.
members would act mainly as f i els dra:t"roy4ded by parent organ-
izations.) A paragraph or so on US military actions ongoing in the
Korean area was put together by the DIA manager after conference with
operational elements. Task force drafts were not much changed by higher
military authority; nor was the required coordination of text with
parent agencies any problem.
Comments
Quality. The od." Allowing for the
newness soof tie interagency process, the product reflects credit on the
DIA managers. There are (to my knowledge) no important mistakes of
fact or significant omissions in the eight, reports. There is one
"assessment," in the third sitrep, that the task force would like to
buy back.
Process. The strong points of the operation:
1 - While only four or five specialists were made available
to the task force, they were able to carry 95 percent
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of the production burden over the week. Each proved
knowledgeable on Korea and capable of writing well.
Mutual trust and easy teamwork prevailed within 36
hours of beginning operations.
2 - Support from parent agencies (DIA, NSA, CIA) and
their respective task forces--each agency (and State)
hadone, at least until Saturday the 2lst--appeared
to be excellent. The CIA task force on Korea re-
sponded well to my request for a written contribution
to the initial sitrep, and to my frequent phone calls
for information. On occasion, I visited the CIA Ops
Center to review material not readily available at
the Pentagon, especially maps and photos. OCI analysts STATSPEd
and NID editors responded to my frequent calls on an
individual basis after the CIA task force was dis-
banded.
1 - The
flu a of
back roun in Matlnn on US -Djan-s and o erati -is .
I the DGI gave the sitrep action to IA in order to
complete this (often lacking) piece of the intel-
ligence puzzle, it didn't work! Indeed, at the
moment of maximum tension--at 1800 EDT, Friday the
20th--the DCI's personal effort to secure details
of the tree-cutting operation exposed the J-3
area's clear unwillingness to cut the intelligence
community into the action. Persistent effort by
CIA's representative at J-3-did not change this
situation through the week. It should be noted
too that CIA and NSA task force members had no
unescorted access to the hyperactive NNCC area
through the entire week.
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Now for the bad news:
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2 - The operational information problem was compounded
by the abi .
Stat D
-
Korean plans an.d activit ' e 4prepared perhaps in
connection with SA discussions) . The CIA task
force received it. IINR received it. The JCS re-
cieved it. The task force managed to acquire one
or two rather stale issuances.
3 - The flow of intPiiicF-nre infnrmation for _the task
force was not managed well by nfA__ aper ow was
sporadic; some pieces available to other agencies
were totally absent or appeared late; non-coms in
charge of the paper flow seemed generally unaware
of task force needs, or even of its existence.
4 - The paper o
physica setup Provided by -UIL. Room an d sk space
were a premium in the Pentagon basement area.
Phones were inadequate-at--some-points---e.g.; only
one gray line. Secretarial help and general cler-
ical assistance were not always available. Some
personnel handling Xerox and LDX work seemed indif-
ferent to task force requests for speed.
photos, and other graphics were sparse,
5 - Maps
I WPM
y Inadequate to TaSK ce nee cis.
6 - Other "housekeeping p
com la s
i it
our : na
escort, a c
to enter th
ded the usual
oad and beverages
ersc nnel,
ss, an par king pro 'ems. The same problems
would probably be encountered at McLean.
7 - Finally, all task force members agree that there was
' ive need for ""s after Monday morning,
tFi d; the task orce should have been Terminated
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Recommendations
The national intelligence sitrep system adds another to the long
list of task forces which emerge in crisis situations. At the Pentagon
last week, there was a DIA task group, a Crisis Action Team, the usual
N MC mechanisms--and our own task force. The competition for military
information was lost by the National Intelligence Situation Report Task
Force. Intelligence, in my view, will always lose to operational sup-
port in the Pentagon. Perhaps the DCI should review the idea of casting
DIA as "Executive Agent" for future sitreps.
JCS unwillingness to provide information to intelligence operators
in time of crisis is an old story. I despair of "solutions."
The new sitrep system adds another element of competition to the
usual interagency struggle for area specialist personnel in time of
crisis. In this case, two of the three CIA bodies provided the task
force were not up to the mark on Korean affairs.
"National" intelligence sitreps--could- reasonably be expected to
reflect awareness of all important aspects of a developing situation;
the name certainly conveys such an impression. The interagency task
force, lacking information on planned US military moves and lacking
information (from State) on evolving US political strategies (e.g.,
our posture at upcoming Panmunjom sessions, results of private Chinese
contacts), could not properly sharpen its focus on North Korean
actions and statements in preparing certain of the sitreps. For a
truly "national" intelligence product, for a report that takes account
of the "real world," the customary DOD and State barriers would have
to be lowered, at least for task force participants.
CIA Representative on the
National Intelligence Sitrep Task Force
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CONFIDENTIAL
27 August 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence
FROM .
SUBJECT The Korea Task Force of 19-20 August
Mission
1. With military alerts on both sides of the Korean
DMZ following the murder of two American officers on
1T August, the Korea Task Force was given the general
mission of concentrating the assets of the agency to be
ready as needed. It was specifically admonished, however,
not to write and disseminate a situation report under its
own name--this being the responsibility of the National
Sitrep Task Force in the Department of Defense.
2. The task force nevertheless prepared itself to
provide written and oral briefings'by the afternoon of
19 August. Each eight-hour shift produced an in-house
situation report which was made available to the Operations
Center senior duty officer, as background for CIA personnel
assigned to the task force in the Department of Defense,
and as a contribution to the National Intelligence Situation
Report. These informal sitreps were also made available
to a few agency personnel who requested briefings on devel-
opments in Korea.
3. This production helped exercise the analysts and
established a record of events and nonevents. It also
helped prepare task force officers to brief senior agency
visitors on short or no notice.
4. The task force also coordinated some work on the
Korea problem produced by other offices in the agency, and
it maintained liaison communications with the Department of
State task force and the Department of Defense task force.
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Core of the Task Force
5. The main core of the task force consisted of four
three-shift rosters of personnel from OCI and OSR. The
four rosters kept a round-the-clock watch on Korean military
developments, Korean political developments, and on possible
Soviet and Chinese reactions to Korea-related developments.
It was necessary to find officers who knew the territory
and''have them assigned to the task force without seriously
damaging the work of the contributing offices. In assembling
the task force, an attempt was made to avoid excessive staf-
fing while assuring that the force on hand-would be adequate
to work on a really serious crisis should one develop. The
limited supply of Korean talent was stretched thin. When
the shift chief on duty was well versed in Korean affairs,
it was possible to use analysts with less background. From
the outset, shift hours were set to permit each officer to
remain in good health while working under heavy pressure
through an extended period, if necessary.
three-shift roster was provided by
cle...to
OSR,
-A-sub-sequent-- .-nterview indicates
personnel-who appeared also had a very vague
idea of what their function should be, and they decided on
their.own initiative,to make an Order of Battle map and to
make available other military background information-
good rapport developed.
did produce a good order of battle briefing board, which was
badly needed by the task force early on. It-remains
however, whether the s ecial__talem_
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at task torce needs for military information could
have-been met by the OSR team alone. The role
needs further clarification. - statemen o i s 25X1A
activities with the task force is attached.)
Support
7. The task force chief was most importantly assisted
by his able branch secretary, who works well in flap situa-
tions. Both the senior'duty officer provided by the Opera-
tions Center and the DDS&T psychologist assigned to observe
crisis management in the Task Force Center were extremely
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valuable sources of advice for the task force. The support
of such assistants makes a great deal of difference to the
new task force chief, particularly during the first hours
of the group's constitution and operation.
8. In addition to the round-the-clock teams, contri-
butions from many offices in the DDI assisted the task force.
The Intelligence Analysis Staff sent a small team with a STATSPEC
variety of briefing boards showing North Korean order of
battle and selected military positions. Task force analysts
own initiative, OER prepared a paper on North Korean sea
and air transportation. Cartography worked long and hard
on a variety of briefing aids, some which in the final event
were not used by the task force but which are being held in
9. Round-the-clock liaison teams were staffed at State 25X1A
by and in the NMIC by officers from OPR,
IAS, and OSR.
In view of the competing demands for DDI
people familiar with Korea to work on the agency task force
and at the Department of Defense, the offer to 25X1A
take care of the liaison staffing problem at t e a e policy
task force was particularly welcome. The arrangement seemed.
to work very well.
from all agency offices was very good.
it would
nut
adequate for the work of the Korea Tas ___orce.
Facilities
11. The s
10. Cooperation
nter. T ere would no a eno
space to co officers sent from DIA, NSA and
12. The separate office provided the task force chief,
which also served as a briefing room for senior agency
officers, is extremely important for the effective function-
ing of the task force. In the confusion that inevitably
attends the constitution'of the new task force, the avail-
ability of a separate room allows the chief to determine his
priorities, delegate tasks to others, and monitor the work
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with some protection from the constant tugs and pulls of the
main work room.
Senior Officers Present
13. The interest shown by the DCI, the D/DCI/IC, and
other senior CIA officers in the crisis occasioned special
opportunities and problems for the task force. Visits by
senior officers of course facilitated task force briefings
for those same officers. These senior officers also stood
ready to assist in the task force's work, manned telephones
during the critical period, and helped acquire information
not readily available from the Department of Defense.
14. The presence of senior officers sometimes in large
numbers can occasionally distract analysts engaged in digesting
reports and preparing written and oral briefings. To provide.
orderly briefings in an appropriate atmosphere, briefing
facilities were maintained in the separate room. The Deputy
Division Chief of.EAPD/OCI assisted the shift chief by keeping
himself available to work with the visitors and to see that
they were briefed as approp i.ate,___.___ ,------ .____ -
15. Had the cutting of the tree at Panmunjom been
followed by really serious developments, the presence of the
large number of agency officers not directly engaged in the
task force work or being supported by it would have made it
difficult for the task force to do its work.
Coordination Problems
16. As perceived from the vantage point of the Korea
Task Force, activity by the National Sitrep.Task Force at the
NMIC began rather slowly. The agency liaison representative
suspected that the NSTF would have difficulty meeting its
deadlines in the early hours of 20 August and issued a call
for help. The evening shift of the Korea Task Force sent its
own in-house situation report to the liaison officer who
made it available for the use of the NSTF, and much of it was
incorporated into the first National Intelligence Situation
Report published. A draft of this Sitrep was received by
the Korea Task Force and coordination was effected. The
following afternoon additional material was sent to the agency
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CONFIDENTIAL
representative at the NSTF. The leadership of that task
force, however, apparently then forgot that national intel-
ligence by definition must be coordinated, and no draft of
the second NISR was provided to the Korea Task Force for
coordination purposes. This lapse suggests that some fur-
ther education is needed in the community on the need for
coordination in the production of national intelligence.
17. It should also be noted that, although the Depart-
ment of State sent a representative to the organizational
meeting of the NSTF, it did not maintain a liaison officer
at that task force. As far as we know, State did not par-
ticipate in that task force's work or coordinate its product.
tant part of-the picture, the intelligence
As is frequently the case