TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA SUPPLEMENT THE FIFTH NORTH KOREAN PARTY CONGRESS: STRESS ON INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: December 28, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

An r(]~ For Release 2 _ / 1 }R t851 7 - f ROtlY ~0u' .,
- ''{ _~rp. j~ .J _. i.Y f t =~N? N P Hj ?N j "
t>,; O N
 d ~~kLe-v
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
Confidential
4
STATSPEC
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICEI
~~Illllllliimuiiiillllllll~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
SUPPLEMENT
THE FIFTH NORTH KOREAN PARTY CONGRESS: STRESS ON INDEPENDENCE
Confidential
28 December 1970
(VOL. XXI, No. 51)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/0O,~ri,A,, .Q~~5T00875R000300030057-0
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
OUP I
taclud.d f,om euieinelic
dornpredinp end
d~tle~~ifitelion
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
THE FIFTH NORTH KOREAN PARTY CONGRESS: STRESS ON INDEPENDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), held from
2 to 13 November 1970, was the first since September 1961 although
the party constitution stipulates that congresses are to be held
every four years. A party "conference" was held in October 1966.*
According to one line of speculation at the time, Pyongyang resorted
to the device of calling a "conference" in lieu of a congress in
order to avoid the complications in the communist movement that
inviting foreign delegations might have caused, particularly at a
time of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations. But the Sino-Soviet
dispute is now in a relatively quiescent phase, and foreign
delegations were still not invited to the recent congress, at
which Pyongyang again made clear the paramount value it attaches
to autonomy in the communist movement.
The convocation of the congress had originally been announced for
October 1970 at a KWP Central Committee plenum in December 1969.
The postponement until November may have been due to dissensions
within the party as well as to administrative or economic
difficulties. The congress enacted changes in the top leadership
of the party which resulted in a narrowing of membership of the
ruling organs. Half of the 10 members of the Political Committee
were dropped, icing replaced largely by former candidate members,
and the ranks of the candidate members were reduced from 13 to
four. Members with close personal ties with Kim I1-song, including
two members of his family, were among those elevated tc full
membership.
The KWP Central Committee's report to the congress, delivered by
Kim Il-song, reflected the past year's improvement of relations
with the PRC and stressed Prongyang's call for an Asian "united
front" directed against the United States and Japan. On
ideological issues, the report reaffirmed the KWP's independent
stance and expressed confidence that the party had been cleansed
of alien influences. At the same time, it included a hardline
attack on "revisionism" reminiscent of the affinities with
* See FBIS Radio Propaganda Report CD. 271 of 18 November 1966,
"North Korean Policy Lines Formalized at Party Conference and
Plenum."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAT, FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
Peking's position shown by Pyongyang before the vagaries of the
Chinese cultural revolution soured Sino-Korean r,:lations. A
greetings message to the congress from the CCP Central
Co=.;"tee, paying warm tribute to Kim I1-song personally,
was read at the opening session; the message from the CPSU
Central Committee, couched in less effusive language and
containing no mention of Kim by name, was not read until
the third day of the congress--after a number of greetings
from other communist countries and third-world groups.
Regarding economic matters, Kim's report conceded that heavy
defense burdens had impeded economic development, and it
cautioned against hopes for a significant improvement in
living standards. While expressing satisfaction with the
achievement of goals in the defense buildup, Kim pressed
the line on developing unconventional warfare capabilities,
avoiding dependence on foreign military aid, and not trying
to compete with developed countries in advanced military
weaponry and equipment.
Ii. line with the apparent economic and military retrenchment,
the report's discussion of the South Korean "struggle" and
unification seemed to indicate a lower North Korean profile.
It stressed that the South Koreans must take the responsibility
for their own revolution, played down the North Korean role,
and suggested no particular haste in achieving unification
of the country.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/ SArM tDP85T( 7 3 1 O
28 DECEMBER 1970
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: CALL FOR ASIAN UNITED FRONT
The discussion of international affairs in Kim's report reflects
the past year's improvement of relations with the PRC based on a
community of interests among the Asian communist countries that
implicitly excludes or plays down the role of the Soviets.
Pointing out that Asia has become the "main arena of the anti-
imperialist revolutionary struggle today," Kim delivered a
standard indictment of the United States for intervening in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, for persisting in provocation
against Korea, and for continuing to "occupy" Taiwan while
"incessantly stepping up their aggressive acts against the
Chinese people." He also delivered a standard warning, with
anti-Soviet overtones of opposition to detente politics, that
"there can be neither vacillation nor passivity" in the
struggle against the United States.
Stressing the theme of Asian solidarity, the retort repeated
Pyongyang's insistent call in recent months for the peoples
of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "and all other
revolutionary countries in Asia" to develop "the anti-U.S.
united front." The formulation, introduced by Kim at a
15 June banquet for the visiting Prince Sihanouk, has been a
prominent peg for Pyongyang's efforts to associate its interests
with those of Peking and the Indochinese communists. The theme
figured prominently in statements by both the Chinese and the
Koreans on the 20th anniversary in June of the outbreak of the
Korean War. It also appeared in Korean comment on the
25 October anniversary of the Chinese entr;r into the Korean
War; however, it was not echoed on that occasion by the
Chinese, who were by then exhibiting caution in spelling
out their commitment to the North Korean cause and in
treating issues of mutual security.* The Koreans have
sought to play up themes linking the two countries' vital
interests and portraying a common U.S. threat to the security
of the DPRK and the PRC, as exemplified by charges in Kim's
congress report that the United States is committing
aggression against the Chinese while conducting provocations
against Korea.
In the report Kim addressed himself at length to the dangers
of "revived Japanese militarism," thus stressing another
major element in the propaganda campaign for Asian revolutionary
See the FBIS TRENDS of 28 October 1970, pages 25-29.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/0p~99 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
-4-
unity. Ir so doing he again expressed Pyongyang's misgivings over
Soviet dealings with Japan, warning that "one must not har,)or any
illusion in the Japanese ruling circles or pin any hope on them."
He "'urta?r warned that "if one refuses to see the aggressive nature
of Japanese militarism and fight against it and eulogizes Japan's
reactionary government or gets on intimate terms with it," the
result will be to increase the danger of war in Asia and consolidate
the U.S. position there. Like the Chinese, the North Koreans have
expressed concern lest Japan play an increasingly important role as
a stabilizing force in Asia that will serve U.S. interests and
frustrate vital Pyongyang and Peking objectives.
GREETINGS The tres.tment of CCP and CPSU greetings to the congress
MESSAGES and to Kira on his reelection as General Secretary also
reflects the current state of Pyongyang's relations
with its big communist neighbors. The message from the COP Central
Committee, dated 1 November and carried by NCNA on the 2d, warmly
greeted the congress, noting that the KWP, "founded personally by
Comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader of the Korean people," guides
the Korean people to victory in their revolution. It expressed
"support" for the Koreans' struggle against "U.S. imperialism,
Japanese militarism, and the reactionary Pak Chong-hui clique"
in defense of the fatherland's independence and for "peaceful
unification."*
The CPSU Central Committee message, dated 2 November, was summarized
by TASS that day and carried in full in PRAVDA on the 3d. Couched
in somewhat cooler language than the Chinese message, it failed to
mention Kim by name, merely noting that the congress was summ_ng
up the results of work carried out by the people of the DPRK "under
the leadership of the KWP and its Central Committee."** The message
* On the 25 October anniversary of the Chinese entry into the Korean
War, Peking propaganda repeatedly called for "peaceful unification"
of Korea, using the characterization "peaceful" for the first time
since 1966. This change seems to accord with the recent caution
shown by Peking in defining its commitments to Pyongyang.
** Soviet leaders' messages to the DPRK on state occasions, such as the
9 September national day and the 15 August liberation anniversary,
customarily do not name Kim when referring to the KWP's leadership of
the Korean people. But the CPSU Central Committee message on the 25th
anniversary of the KWP, published in PRAVDA on 10 October, named him
as the head of the KWP and warmly praised the party for attaining a
"high level of authority as the militant vanguard of the Korean
people and as the organizer of all their victories."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
followed routine lines in expressing solidarity with the Korean
people's struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and in wishing
them success in the "peaceful reunification" of the country. The
message added a standard call for "unity and cohesion" of the
socialist countries and the international communist movement.
The Koreans read the Chinese message first at the opening session
of the Congress on 2 November; the one from the Soviets was not
read until the session of the 4th, after a number of greetings
from other communist countries and various third-world groups.
A 4 November KCNA report of a number of greetings received from
communist countries listed the Soviet message second, after the
one from the Chinese.
The Soviets barely observed the amenities in congratulating Kim
upon his reelection as KWP General Secretary at the conclusion
of the congress. On 14 November NCNA reported that the CCP
Central Committee sent a message to the KWP Central Committee
and Kim Il-song extending congratulations on the election of the
new Central Committee "headed by Comrade Kim Il-song, founder
of the KWP and its great leader." KCNA reported the message the
next day. On 19 November KCNA reported that on the 17th the
Soviet ambassador called on Kim Tong-kyu, a new member of the
party Political Committee, and "conveyed the warm congratulations"
of Brezhnev to Kim Il-song upon his reelection. There is no
indication that an actual message was delivered, and there is
no available mention of the congratulations in Soviet media.
IDEOLOGY: KWP'S AUTONOMY REAFFIRMED, REVISIONISM ASSAILED
The report's discourse on ideological issues, while predictably
stressing the importance of the KTIP's autonomy within the conraunist
movement, is notably different in emphasis from the corresponding
section of Kim's report to the October 1966 party conference. The
current treatment of ideological matters, expressing marked
confidence that the party's independent line has been consolidated
and cleansed of alien influences, :uggests that the polemical
disputes generated by the Sino-Soviet conflict no longer have
the resonance they have had in the past in a party such as the
KWP. Significantly, in his Fifth Congress report Kim simply
ignored the role of "the socialist camp." In his report to
the 1966 party conference, registering concern over the crisis
of disunity in the socialist camp at a time of confrontation in
Vietnam, he took the Chinese sharply to task for pressing their
ideological contest with the Soviets rather than closing ranks
behind the embattled Vietnamese brethren.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
-6-
In the congress report Kim acknowledged the "very difficult and
complicated" conditions of the past in which "revisionist
ideological trends" penetrated the party as a result of
ideological confusion within the international communist
movement. But he claimed that the KWP "thoroughly exposed
and smashed" the revisionist elements and that "a great
victory of historic significance" has been won by the party
in raising its unity and cohesion to a new level. Coming doom
hard on the crucial importance of the "chuche" principle of
autonomy within the communist movement, he declared that
"flunkeyism, national nihilism, and dogmatism as ideological
trends have been eliminate) in the main among our party
members and people."
In another passage Kim inveighed against revisionism in
hardline terms long associated with Chinese criticism of
Soviet policies and reminiscent of the period. in the first
half of the 1960's, when the North Koreans indicated their
ideological affinities with the Chinese. He defined
revisionism as
a trend of counterrevolutionary opportunist ideology
aired at emasculating the revolutionary quintessence of
Marxism-Leninism. The greatest harm of revisionism
lies in denying the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist
party and the dictatorship of the proletariat and
opposing the class struggle, in obscuring the line of
demarcation between friend and foe, yielding to U.S.
imperialism, scared at i,s policy of nuclear blackmail,
casting sheep's eyes'at the imperialists while paying
lip-service to an anti-imperialist position, giving up
the struggle against imperialism and compromising with
it, disarming people ideologically b;, spreading war
phobia, bourgeois pacifistic ideas and illusions about
imperialism and reaction, and in abhoring and hindering
the revolution of the oppressed peoples.
Kim's insistence here on a "line of demarcation" is somewhat
ironic. In his October 1966 report he deplored the Chinese
demand for a line of demarcation to exclude Soviet-lining
elements in the international communist movement and called
for enhanced unity in the socialist camp despite ideological
differences. At that time he was concerned to rebuke the
Chinese for accenting the ideological conflict and laying
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
claim to purity of doctrine. Kim had put a gloss on the standard
formulation--dating from the 1960 Moscow statement--which termed
revisionism the "main danger" in the communist movement while
acknowledging that dogmatism could become the principal danger to
an individual party at a particular stage of development. He
declared that modern revisionism was "a big menace" but that
"when 'left' oppo~tunism is aggravated, it too can become as big
a threat as modern revisionism both to individual parties and to
the international communist movement."
The report's current discussion thus registers satisfaction over
Peking's shift, particularly in the past year, away from an
intransigent sectarianism to a search for a community of interests
among small and medium powers in opposition to superpower dominance.
It also reflects Peking's success in repairing its relations with
Pyongyang by stressing common opposition to the United States and
such allies as Japan which are regarded as hostile to the vital
interests of the PRC and the DPRK. Kim's failure to find a place
for the socialist camp in his discussion accords with Peking's
rejection of this notion and points up tht. role of Asian
"revolutionary" unity as the focus of the current North Korean
line.*
ECONOMY AND DEFENSE: MILITARY SPENDING SLOWED ECON'MY
Kim's report conceded that the defense burden has been a heavy
one and has impeded economic development. Hr: defended as
"very wise" the decision made at the KWP cor.ference in October
1966 to postpone for three years the comple?.ion of the seven-
year plan in order to concentrate on the defense buildup. He
also claimed that the DPRK has now become a "socialist-industrial
str.te" which has "joined the ranks of the advanced countries of
the world as a full-fleged member." Implying that there will now
be a period of retrenchment and consolidation, the report defined
the new six-year plan as designed "to further cement the material
and technical foundations of socialism and free the working people
from arduous labor in all fields of the national economy by
consolidating and carrying forward the successes gained in
industrialization and advancing the technical revolution onto
a new, higher plane."
* It is noteworthy that the North Vietnamese, with their overriding
concern to maintain neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict while
enlisting support from both sides, continue to define their place
in the socialist camp. Thus, Hanoi's 10 December party-government
appeal for anti-U.S. struggle declared that the DRV is an independent
and sovereign state and "a member of the socialist camp."
Approved For Release 200069/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
FIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
-8-
Kim's report praised the implementation of the party's policy on
fortifying the nation's defenses, stating that one of the "most
significant" achievements is the fact that "the entire people
have been placed under arms and the whole country fortified."
It claimed that "the entire people know how to fire guns and are
carrying arms with them. Further, we have built iron-wall
defenses throughout the country and even fortified all the
major production installations." It also stressed that the
defense industry can now manufacture its own weapons and
equipment, "as a result of the establishment of firm bases
of an independent national defense industry." Thus, Kim
claimed fulfillment of the goals--outlined in his October 1966
report to the KWP conference--for which the seven-year plan
was postponed.
At the same time, the report pointed to the burdens that
attainment of these goals imposed. Conceding that the
defense buildup was gained "at a very large and dear price,"
it acknowledged that spending on national defense has been
"too heavy a burden for us in the light of the small size
of the country and its population." The efforts to augment
defense power "greatly impeded the economic development of
the country and the betterment of the people's living," Kim
admitted. In another section of the report he cautioned that
there would be a continuing need to give priority to defense
preparations at the expense of living standards, saying that
under conditions in which the United States still occupies
half of the country and unification has not yet been achieved,
"we can never live in luxury but must always lead a frugal
life befitting the people in the era of revolution."
The report emphasized a need to improve unconventional warfare
capability, calling for the KPA to make use of the topographical
conditions of the country and employ mountain warfare, night
actions, and guerrilla operations. It cited the experiences of
the Korean War and Vietnam to justify these tactics. Stressing
the line of self-reliance and warning against dependence on
foreign aid, it said that modernization of the army and development
of military science and technique must be based on "the specific
conditions of our country" and that the defense program may be
hindered "if we try instead to mechanically copy or dogmatically
bring in foreign art of war and foreign weapons." Kim added that
the DPRK, a small country, "is not in a position to compete with
developed countries in military technical equipment, nor are we
required to do sc." War is not decided by "modern weapons or
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
military technique," he said, and the KWP has "politico-ideological
superiority" over the imperialists. In this context the report
warned that "we must never be captivated by a pacifistic mood"
and must guard against the "revisionist ideological trend to war
phobia."
The report's emphasis on unconventional warfare and its warning
against dependence on foreign military aid could have been
designed as a rebuttal to advocates of military modernization
and hence of greater allocations to the military or of greater
reliance on a Soviet supply of advanced equipment. Policy
differences on these issues may have caused purges among the
military leadership, including replacement of the minister of
defense and chief of staff, in late 1968. The report seemed
to allude to this in recall:.i past tendencies in the army--
which it claims have now been overcome--to deny the party's
"leading role" and to neglect political work as well as toward
"hampering proper military training and breeding military
bureaucratism."
CADRE PROBLEMS In addition to claiming that improper
tendencies within the military have been
overcome; Kim's report registered satisfaction that the alien
tendencies of "opportunism, flunkeyism, dogmatism, and
factionalism" have all but been eliminated from the party.
A less confident tone marked his October 1966 report's warnings
against the "survivals of outdated ideas" and the continued
existence of "a handful of hostile elements." Alth.)ugh in
the congress report Kim strongly criticized the performance
of some cadres, his complaints seemed directed at administrative--
rather than ideological and political--shortcomings. He
complained that some cadres "avoid their work, ignore advice,
* The report's strictures against relying on foreign aid and
against emphasizing modern weaponry came against the br.ckground
of a new Soviet-DPRK aid agreement, signed on 15 September, which
was given minimal publicity by Pyongyang. That agreement did not
specifically mention military aid. (See the FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT,
"DPRK Aid Agreements With PRC and USSR," 26 October 1970.) In
May 1965, a Soviet-DPRK military aid agreement was publicized, and
in March 1967, when First Vice Premier Kim 11 visited the Soviet
Union, an agreement was announced which included cooperation on
raising the DPRK's "defense potential."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
28 DECEMBER 1970
behave bureaucratically, and become arr,:,gant," some of them being
so corrupt that they "drop out of the ranks of the revolution."
As a remedy, the report recommended a "tightening" of party
discipline, improvement of criticism and training, and "correct
selection" of cadres emphasizing their "political" and "business"
qualifications.
North Korean leaders rarely discuss internal party difficulties
so outspokenly, although they allude on occasion to insufficient
revolutionary fervor among party members and working people.
One relatively strong reference of this kind appeared in a
22 April 1968 report on economic construction by First Vice
Premier Kim I1, delivered at a KWP plenum. Kim I1 complained
that implementation of the party's line on economic and defense
building in parallel, put forth at the October 1966 party
conference, hal been hampered by "passivism and conservatism"
among some party zembers and workers who feared innovation and
clung to old ideas bout norms, science, and technology.
UNIFICATION: STRESS CN SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRUGGLE
North Korea's shift over the past two years away from terrorism
against South Korea and toward political subversion there was
confirmed in Kim's Fifth Congress report, which stressed that
the South Korean people must take the responsibility for their
own revolution. Kim did not call for any particular haste in
attaining the "liberation" of South Korea or unification of
the country; he conceded that the South Korean revolution "still
has a thorny path ahead," and he made only bland, generalized
promises of North Korean support for the southern struggle. The
relative lack of bellicosity may be traceable to the domestic
economic situation and the slowing of the defense buildup as
well as the failures of the more militant tactics used in the
1966-68 period when Pyongyang intensified incidents along the
demilitarized zone and stepped. up guerrilla activity in South
Korea.
SOUTH KOREAN The leading role in the South Korean "national
"STRUGGLE" liberation struggle and people's democratic
revolution" was ascribed to the Revolutionary
Party for Reunification, the vanguard "Marxist-Leninist party"
said to have been formally established in August 1969. Kim
had been callin6 for the formation of such a party since his
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 200b9dt)b-*T A-RDP85TO?8ThR OO 3DQ57-0
28 DECEMBER 1970
speech at the Fourth KWP Congress in 1961, and in his Fifth Congress
report he portrayed it as the culmination of long revolutionary
development in South Korea, investing it with a more extensive
history than past p-opaganda had done. He recalled the founding
in December 1955 of the Progressive Party, a "legal political
party of the South Korean revolutionaries" with a program of
anti-imperialism, antifascism, and peaceful unification, which
was suppressed in 1958. The uprising of April 1960 which overthrew
Syngman Rhee, according to Kim, was "the first victory won by the
South Korean people in their anti-U.S., national salvation
struggle after the war," and it was followed by the founding
of the Socialist Mass Party advocating "a Minified democratic
state based on the line of national independeYr'e." This party
was destroyed, Kim said, after the 16 May 13;l coup which brought
Pak Chong-hui to power.
In the report Kim reaffirmed a view of the historical experience
of the South Korean revolutionary mo?ement as proof that "there
can be no peaceful transition in the struggle for power and
that no revolution can be led to victory by a mere mass movement"--
a line he had used in a 1968 national day speech. He also repeated
the stock formula that "counterrevolutionary violence" must be
met with "revolutionary violence." Events, he said, showed the
need for a vanguard "Marxist-Leninist party" and it was in response
to this need that the manifesto and program of the Revolutionary
Party for Reunification were made public in Seoul in August 1969.*
Kim claimed that "organizations of the Revolutionary Party for
Reunification" had taken an active part in the 3 June 1964 uprising
against the ROK-Japan talks, the August 1965 struggle to reject
the ROK-Japan agreements, the struggle against the "puppet"
elections in 1967, and "many other struggles." Similar claims had
been made for the "United Revolutionary Party," apparently a
forerunner of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification. A
29 January 1969 KCNA commentary alleged that it took part in
the 1967 struggles against the elections and against U.S. Vice
President Humphrey when he visited Seoul for President Pak's
inauguration.
* A speaker identified as the head of the delegation of the
Revolutionary Party for Reunification, who addressed the 4 November
session of the congress, repeated the claim that the party's "local
bodies," as distinguished from the central committee, dated back to
March 1964. The existence of the party was first publicized in
North Korean media in June 1970 when Pyongyang carried its "program"
and "manifesto." See the FBIS TRENDS of 24 June 1970, pages 11-12.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000Mgffigg NCI A-RDP85TON7 MD8=30W-0
28 DECEMBER 1970
PEACEFUL The report routinely restated North Korea's
UNIFICATION dedication to the notion of "peaceful unification,"
reiterating willingness to "negotiate" with
"democratic personages with national conscience" if they come
to power in South Korea. It again denounced the "so-called
'peaceful unification program"' of the South Korean "puppets"--
an allusion to Pak Chcng-huff's comments on unification in a
liberation anniversary speech last August, which Pyongyang
promptly rejected in editorial comment at the time. Kim's
report reasserted that unification cannot be discussed with
those "traitors" nor while U.S. forces remain in South Korea.
In the report he reviewed the DPRK's proposals on unification,
including the reduction of armies to 100,000 each, a nonaggres-
sion agreement, free North-South elections, an interim
confederation, and the like.
NORTH KOREAN ROLE The report played down the North Korean
IN ROK "STRUGGLE" role in the South Korean "struggle," merely
repeating bland, generalized expressions of
support. It sal". that the South Korean people are "not alone,"
that they have a "powerful revolutionary base" in the noruLern
half, and that the North Korean people have the "obligation and
responsibility for actively supporting and encouraging" the
South Korean people. fit there was no expression of a determina-
tion to help "liberate" the South Koreans--a feature of propaganda
in 1968 and earlier. Kim's report emphasized that "the South
Korean revolution is a struggle of the South Korean people them-
selves for their liberation" and that the masses "can win freedom
and emancipation only through their own revolutionary struggle.
Therefore the South Korean revolution should, in all circumstances,
be carried out by the South Korean people on their own initiative."
TIMING OF Commenting on the timing of unification, Kim's
UNIFICATION report did not go beyond the usual vague
assertion that the solution of the problem
"brooks not a moment's delay." It did not make the common
assertion that unification must be comc,i~'ted "within our
generation." Political Committee memb:-'r Kim Ching-nin,
however, speaking at the 5 November session, did say that the
North and South Korean people "hope to make the 1970's a decade
of glorious victory in which the independent unification of the
fatherland will be achieved," the first reference to such a
specific time period for unification on Pyongyang's own authority.*
* On a few isolated occasions in late 1969 and early 1970
Pyongyang media attributed to South Korean spokesmen a desire for
unification in time for Kim I1-song's 60th birthday, which falls
in April 1972. See the TRENDS of 12 February 1970, pages 17-18.
Approved For Release 200pp D TCIA-RDP85TOO875R000300030057-0
 Approved For Release 2000&MgEkg.& RDP85T%9?7 0g, , ,#7-0
28 DECEMBER 1970
That the North Koreans do not in, fact harbor ideas about imminent
revolution in the South is indicated by Kim's remarks on the
future tasks of the southern patriots, whom he urged to continue
to strengthen the Marxist-Leninist party, rally the workers and
peasants around it, and continue to set up "mass organizations in
various forms." In this context Kim warned that the South Korean
revolution "will not achieve victory easily" and "still has a
thorny path ahead."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030057-0