TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 22, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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dnidential
FR'S
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
22 FEBRUARY 1973
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This propaganda analysis report is b!sed exclusively ors material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject io
crim!nal sanctions
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FOREIGN BROADCAST IifORrATION SERVICE
27 February 1973
C 0 R R E C T 1 0 N
TO FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 22 FEBRUARY 1973
In the Indochina section, page 13, next-to-last paragraph, the
first two sentences should read: The introduction of military
personnel and armaments of "foreign countries except for those
provided for by the 1954 and 1962 agreements," is banned.
Replacement of damaged or worn out armaments and war materials
is to be discussed and agreed upon by the two parties.
(inserting dropped words)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 FEBRUARY 1973
CO dTEd IS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
PRG Anticipates, Amplifies DRV Complaints About U.S. Actions. . .
1
DRV, PRG Publicize Four-Party Appeal, Protest GVN Behavior. . . .
4
Hanoi Recounts Special Session of DRV National Assembly . . . . .
7
Peking Mutes Comment During Kissinger's Hanoi, PRC Visits . . . .
8
Moscow Calls Vietnam A Lesson for Third World, Assails PRC. . . .
10
Laos Cease-fire Agreement Signed in Vientiane . . . . . . . . . .
12
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Assesses Impact of "Triangular Diplomacy". . . . . . . . .
16
USSR - JAPAN - CHINA
Moscow Expresses Misgivings over Japanese-PRC Relations . . . . .
21
CUBA - U.S.
Havana Noncommittal on Impact of Hijacking Agreement. . . . . . .
24
LATIN AMERICA
Havana Casts Doubt on Reports of Guerrilla Leader's Death . . . .
26
Cuba, Uruguayan Communists Differ on Uruguayan Crisis . . . . . .
27
CZECHOSLOVAKIA - FRG
Husak Says Time Is Rire to Resume Stalled Bilateral Talks . . . .
29
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Podgornyy's 70th Birthday Honors Are Comparable to Suslov's . . .
31
TOPICS IN BRIEF
Journal Article Foreshadows USSR Position at Geneva . . . . . . .
32
Warsaw Pact Exercise. in Romania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
Moscow on Downing of Libyan Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
22 FEBRUARY 1973
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTEFTION 12 - 18 FEBRUAR' 1973
Moscow (2976 items)
Peking (1089 items)
I
Vietnam
(13%)
15%
Domestic Iasnes
(52%)
52%
(Kosygin Reception
(--)
3%]
Indochina
(23%)
22%
of PRG Envoy
(Vietnam
(7%)
17%]
[Pham Van Tong
(?-)
2%]
[Cambodia
(15%)
3%]
Interview
(Laos
(1%)
2%)
Monetary Crisis
(2%)
7%
DPRK Foreign
(3%)
6%
USSR-Hungary
(--)
6%
Minister in PRC
Treaty Anniversary
Monetary Crisis
(15%)
3%
China
(6%)
4%
Luna 21 Moon Mission
(1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of cot,: ment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are vat always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cas3a the propaganda content may be routine or of minor ,ignificance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 FEBRUARY 1973
INDOCHINA
Hanoi and Front media have now' specifically charged the United
States as well as Saigon with failing to implement the terms of
the peace accord. claiming among other things that there has been
a deliberate delay in the removal of U.S. mines from DRV waters.
However, Premier Pham Van Dong, in a 20 February report to a
special session of the DRV National Assembly, confined his remarks
to the more usual complaint that the United States is supporting
Saigon's "sabotage" of the accord. Propaganda on violations of
the cease-fire has included wide publicity for a 16 February appeal
by the four-party Joint Military Commission for a halt to the
fighting--an appeal which purportedly resulted from the PRG's
initiative. Sparse attention to the international conference on
Vietnam, scheduled to begin on 26 February, includes VNA's
22 February announcement that the DRV delegation headed by
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh left that day for Paris. Ha of
media are not known to have acknowledged that DRV and PRG deputy
foreign ministers departed earlier and made stopovers in both
Peking and Moscow.
Peking discreetly limited its authoritative comment on Indochina
to the two-day interval between presidential assistant Kissinger's
visits to the DRV and the PRC. During that interval a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article seconded Vietnamese communist protests
of alleged violations of the Paris agreement, and Peking played up
Sino-Vietnamese solidarity in comment marking the anniversary of
the South Vietnam PLAF's u- fication.
Moscow, like Peking, carried the text of the communique on
Kissinger's visit to Han.)i, and it has duly reported other dtvelcp-
ments, including Vietnamese communist charges of allied violations
of the cease-fire. Soviet commentators have continued to stress
that the Vietnam agreement should lead to u period of general
relaxation of tensions and cooperation, while at the same time
warning that such a development is endangered by Peking's anti-
Sovietism and its "collusion" with the United States.
PRG ANTICIPATES. AMPLIFIES DRV COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. ACTIONS
Vietnamese communist media for the most part refrained from specific
criticism of U.S. implementation of the peace accord until after
Presidential adviser Kissinger's 10-13 February visit to Hanoi.
However, the front page of the 15 February NHAN DAN carried not only
the U.S.-DRV joint communique on Kissinger's visit but an editorial
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which contained Hanoi's most detailed castigation of U.S. actions.
In addition to repeating the charge that the United States has
been "tolerating iw harboring" Saigon's "sabotage" of the peace
accord, the editorial claimed that the United States had
"refused" to inform the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) of
its troop withdrawal schedule and location,-,,* had "re.''ised" to
dismantle its military bases, and was delaying tr,3 removal of
mires in DRV territorial waters. These spocif is charges had
teen voiced the day before in a Liberation Radio commentary,
and as early as 10 February a PRG Foreign Ministry statement
had introduced the charge that the United States was unwilling
to dismantle its military bases. Hanoi had shown inconsistency
when the PRG charge about U.S. bases was echoed in a NHAN DAN
editorial on 11 February but was not repeated the next day in a
DRV Foreign Ministry statement specifically endorsing the PRG
statement.
The impression of the PRG's taking the lead in criticizing the
United States was reinforced by a 21 February LPA statement,
carried by VNA on the 22d, which elaborated on the complaints
in the NHAN DAN editorial of the 15th. For example, LPA said
that the peace agreement 'ailed for the removal of the mines to
begin immediately but that the work had not yet actually begun.
It added that "thf. United States has used false pretexts to
prolong the time for the preparation and refused to use all the
force and means at its disposal with a view to delaying and
dragging on the removal of the mines." VNA had reported on
6 February that a U.S. delegation concerned with the removal of
mines had arrived in Haiphong, but the issue had been largely
ignored in Hanoi propaganda until the 15th when the NHi.N DAN
editorial charged the United States with dilatory tactics. Also
on the 15th, VNA summarized a PRAVDA interview with a Soviet
merchant marine official which note' that "even before the Unit-::d
States had deactivated all the mines in Vietnamese ports, So'-_at
freighters had shipped the first batche3 of aid-goods to Haiphong.
On 30 Jarauary, the first ship transporting food arrived in
Haiphong."**
* Article 8 u of the protocol on the cease-fire stipulates that
"within five days after :he entry into force of the cease-fire, the
United States shall inform the four-party JMC and the ICCS of the
general '+lans for timing of complete troop withdrawals . . . ."
** The interview, published in the 13 February PRAVDA, in fact spoke
of the ship arriving at the "Haiphong roadstead" and noted that on
12 February, when it had completed unloading operations, the port
was still closed.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 FEBRUARY 1973
On the issue of withdrawal of U.S. troops, the LPA statement
vaintained that without having the United States' plans and time-
table, the JMC and ICCS cannot supervise the withdrawal and do
not have a basis to confirm whether the United States is comply-
ing with Article 5 of the agreement. The statement also noted
that "Saigon sources have disclosed that the United States has
turned thousands of U.S. military personnel into civilian
personnel, who continue serving in the Saigon armed forces,
thus seriously violating" the agreed provision. Like the NHAN
DAN editorial, LPA rejected the contention that U.S. bases had
already been transferred to Saigon, but it added that "everyone
knows the DRV and the United States have spent much time
discussing this matter and have agreed that all military bases
of the United States and other foreign countries in South
Vietnam shall be completely dismantled, as stipulated in
Article 6 of the agreement." LPA charged that the United States'
"unilateral declaration" on bases has caused the negotiations
and agreement on this matter to "lose all their significance."
In addition to demanding the dismantling of bases, the state-
ment asserted that the weapons of foreign troops must be taken
out when the troops withdraw.
As in the 15 February issue, NHAN DAN on the 16th balanced a new
attack on the United States with further publicity for Kissinger's
visit. The paper carried on its front page a picture of Kissinger
meeting with Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, and Nguyen Duy Trinh and
printed a Commentator article protesting the transfer of the U.S.
Air Force headquarters for Southeast Asia from Saigon to Thailand.
The article charged that the move constitutes preparation for a
n'aw war and "seriously endangers" the peace, independence, and
sc-ereignty of Southeast Asian countries. "The transformation of
Thailand into a war base," the paper declared, poses a threat to
the Indochinese people and "is an act of abetting the Saigon
administration in opposing peace and national concord and lays
the groundwork for the United States to resume hostilities against
the Vietnamese people when it deems necessary."
PHAM VAN DONG AT Premier Pham Van Dong, in his 20 February
? NATIONAL ASSEMBLY report to the DRV National Assembly,
routinely accused the United States of
giving "approval and support" to the Saigon administration in its
"open and systematic sabotage" of the implementation of the peace
accord, and he did not mention the alleged U.S. actions cited
in the NHAN DAN editorial on the 15th. While in discussing the
peace accord Dong generally hewed closely to the language of the
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22 FEBRUARY 1973
agreement, in dicussing U.S. aid he went beyond that language
when he said it is the "obligation" of the United States to
contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar
construction in the DRV. The Premier paraphrased the agreement
in declaring that its implementation will create conditions for
establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship
between the DRV and the United States. No Hanoi propaganda has
repeated the reference in the joint U.S.-DRV communique to
"normalization" of relations--a phrase presumably suggested by
Kissinger.
DRV. PRG PUBLICIZE FOUR-PARTY APPEAL. PROTEST GVN BEHAVIOR
Both Hanoi and Liberation Radio on 17 February repeatedly broad-
cast the appeal for a halt to military operations adopted the
previous day by the four-party Joint Military Commission. The
communists claimed that the appeal was the result of the
initiative of PRG representative to the JMC Tran Van Tra. And
the Front radio on the 16th released a statement made by Tra
at the JMC meeting on the 14th in which he called for approval
of an appeal, said to have been agreed upon at the JMC meeting
of the 8th. Tra not only touched on such matters raised in the
four-party appeal as the need to suspend military activities,
spelled out in Article two of the cease-fire protocol, but also
proposed further directives. He called for the appeal to be
disseminated in a week or less, for JMC-ICCS teams to check on
its dissemination, for efforts to achieve reconciliation and an
end to propaganda distorting the peace accord, for compliance
with Articli?. 11 of the agreement guaranteeing democratic
liberties, and for cooperation in urgently setting up the regional
and local JMC teams and relocating the communist military
delegation in suitable quarters.
The communists evidently expected Saigon to balk at approving he
appeal, since initial propaganda--including an article in the
17 February NHAN DAN--accused the'GVN of 'fusing to sign it.' In
fact, Saigon media released the-appeal.on the 17th but did not
give it as extensive publicity as the communists did. An editorial
in the 18 February NHAN DAN acknowledged Saigon's position, claiming
that the GVN's agreement to the appeal was "a positive result of our
struggle" to Implement the accord. The paper reiterated Tra's
other demands, including his call for JMC-ICCS supervision of the
dissemination of the appeal and for cooperation in the deployment of
the JMC teams.
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22 FEBRUARY 1973
ALLEGED SAIGON Communist official statements and commentaries
VIOLATIONS continue to chronicle alleged Saigon violations
of the cease-fire agreement. Tran Van Tra's
statement at the 14 February meeting of the four-party JMC Lasted
several alleged military violations, including incidents involving
the JMC. Tra also observed that the United States cannot dodge
responsibility for violations of the cease-fire on the ground-
that they are committed by Saigon, and he maintained that "it is
the United States' evasion of responsibility that has encouraged
the Saigon administration to violate the cease-fire."
Trq characterized as "particularly serious" ARVN "nibbling
operations" near Cua Viet, Quang Tri, and in Tay Ninh--both
scenes of intense fighting at the time of the cease-fire. He
also included in this category operations in Sa Huynh village,
Duc Pho district, Quang Ngai Province; Liberation Radio on the
20th charged that GVN land, air, and naval attacks on the "Sa
Huynh liberated area" continued even after the issuance of the
JMC appeal. In a list of "typical violations of a particularly
grave nature," Tra accused the GVN of attacking a village
southwest of Pleiku which had been proposed by the PRG as a
site rqr the release of prisoners, shelling the agreed site for
the release of POW's north of the Thach Han River in Quang Tri,
using JMC orange-colored vehicles to lead a military assault
on Highway 14, and attacking a site in the Can Tho area on the
day the PRG military delegation to the JMC wad to be met there.
1;a the same vein, the communists on the 21st charged that on
19 February Saigon planes had raided a PRG area in Duc Co where
workers were constructing a residence for the ICC'~.
Such actions were officially condemend in a protest by the PRG
military delegation, sent to the GVN and U.S. military delega-
tions on the 17th and publicized by Hanoi and the Front on the
19th. The protest note charged that ARVN attacks on "liberated
areas" and "systematic" attacks on sites for the pickup of PRG
delegations and for prisoner release are proof of Saigon's
"premeditated and oystematic scheme" to delay the deployment of
JMC teams. Also on the 17th, according to an LPA report the
following day, the spokesman of the PLAF Command scored alleged
Saigon actions, denied "false" Saigon and U.S. reports of
communist violations, and reaffirmed that the PLAF would seriously
implement the accord and punish actions violating it. Liberation
Radio reported on the 21st that on the previous day Than Van Tra
had sent a note to the 1CCS denouncing cease-Lire violations by
the U.S.-GVN side. The protest listed specific alleged military
violationu, leading off with a complaint about actions in the Sa
Huynh area.
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M
Broader attacks on Saigon's policies also continued, with comment
particularly scorir:g the GVN's efforts to isolate the DRV and
PRG military delegations from contact with newsmen and South
Vietnamese citizens. Such charges have been documented with
references to specifin incidents, including the refusal of Saigon
authorities to allow foreign newsmen to attend the 15 February
PRG military delegation's reception marking the PLAF anniversary.
The 21 February LPA statement included criticism of domestic
policies, charging that the.GVN has "Increased fascist measures
in a bid to prevent the realization of national reconciliation
and concord and to suppress the people's democratic liberties."
The charge that Saigon is hindering reconciliation and concord
was dealt with at some length in a 16 February NHAN DAN editorial,
which noted that there should be reconciliation not only between
the two parties but with other elements as.well. The editorial
added: "In reality there are three political forces, and it is
important to insure active participation of the third force and
equality among the three components."
PRG-GVN PARIS TALKS Hanoi and the Front provided little
information on the first five.sessions
of the preliminary PRG-GVN conference, held in Paris from 5 to
17 February. On 20 February, the day.of the sixth session,
NHAN DAN published an article by its Paris correspondent Hong Ha
which contained some details on the deadlock over selecting a site
for the official consultative.conference between the two sides.
The article observed that it was preferable to hold the conference
in South Vietnam and that it would be logical for the meeting site
to rotate between the areas of the two sides.
The -'ticle also noted the view that if the conference wets to be
held in Saigon, it would have to be held in the center of the
city and not at a military base. This point was underlined in a
20 February statement by the spokesman o#.the PRG Paris delgati'n,
carried by LPA on the'22d, which rejected a reported GVN statement
that the communists had refused to hold-the conference in Saigon.
The PRG spokesman noted that the PRG woulu be willing to meet in
the center of the capital but that.the (WN had rejected that
suggestion as well as the proposal for rotating sites. In
response to the GVN's alteinative.suggestien that the conference
be held outside South Vietnam, the spokesman said, the PRG at
the meeting on the 20th had proposed that the two sides choose a
site in an area bordering zones controlled by eiths. side or, if
that were unacceptable, that the conference.be held in Paris.
An LPA riport on the 20 February session added that the Saigon
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delegation had rejected the proposal of a site in a border area
and had pMomised to reply at the next meeting, on 23 February,
to the idea of holding the conference in Paris.
HANOI RECOUNTS SPECIAL SESSION OF DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
The "special session" of the DRV Fourth National Assembly,
convened on 20 February and announced the same day in Hanoi
media, is the third meeting of that legislature.* Perhaps
because of the return to peacetime conditions, Hanoi broke with
the precedent of recent years by allowing foreign newsmen and
diplomats to attend the session and by reporting on the two-day
assemblage as it was being held, rather than waiting-until it
had concluded. According to opening remarks by Truong Chinh,
the Assembly was meeting to hear the government's report on the
"victory" of the anti-U.S. resistance, reflected in the Paris
agreement, and to hear reports on the "new situation and new
tasks."
As usual, Hanoi media carried accounts of opening and closing
speeches by Truong Chinh and the text of the government report
delivered by Pham Van Dong. There has been no publicity for
the content of reports by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh on
the negotiations leading to the peace agreement and by Defense
Minister Vo Nguyen Giap on the military situation and tasks.
The Assembly also heard s speech by President Ton Duc Tha'g and
reports by 25 representatives of "political parties, religions,
mass organizations, ethnic minorities, the armed forces, and
the localities." On the 21st, it passed a resolution "approving
the whole diplomatic activities of the DRV Government," which
praised the party for its correct leadership and called on the
North Vietnamese people to work on restoring the economy and
building socialism in the "new situation." Following the close
of the session, Hanoi media carried the usual communique
concerning its activities; NHAN DAN on the 22d also carried a
brief editorial on the session.
* Delegates to the Fourth National Assembly were elected on
11 April 1971. The two previous sessions were held from 7 to
10 June 1971 and 20 to 25 Larch 1972, respectively; for
discussion of these sessions, see the TRENDS of 16 June 1971
and 29 March 1972.
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PEKING MUTES COMMENT DURING KISS I NGER'S HANOI 1 P!?'~ VISITS
Treading with care during the period encompassing the Kissinger visits
to the DRV and China, Peking discreetly limited its authoritative
comment on Indochina and other sensitive issues to the two-day
interval between the presidential arsistant's stays in the two
communist capitals. During that ir.cerval Peking mirked the anniversary
of the South Vietnam PLAF's unification, highlighted by an editorial
in the Chinese army paper, and issued a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article to sec3nd Vietnamese communist statements protesting alleged
violations of the Paris agreement by Saigon. Peking promptly carried
the text of the communique on Kissinger's visit to Hanoi and replavo.l
a VNA report on the DRV's release of additional American prisoners
during his stay as a good will gesture.
Peking has remained silent on its role in the international conference
on Vietnam, though NCNA's reports on the 18-20 February stopover in
Peking of DRV and PRG vice foreign ministers noted that they were on
their way to the conference. The guests had "a very cordial and
friendly talk" with Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei
on the 19th.
PLAF ANNIVERSARY Peking expanded its coverage of the PLAF's
anniversary compared with last year's, including
not only a PRC Defense Ministry "report meeting" on the 14th and a
PRG embassy film reception on the 15th, but also a 15 February
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial and a PRG ambassador's reception on
the 14th that was addressed by Chinese Politburo alternate member
Li Te-sheng. The Chinese used the occasion to reiterate their welcome
for the Vietnam agreement while underscoring Siao-Vietnamese
solidarity both during the war and in the "new period." Continuing
Peking's effort to play up Sino-Vietnamese affinities, the editorial
cited Mao's recent remark that the Chinese and Vietnamese are "of the
same family," and it invoked both Mao and Ho Chi Minh as having
personally nurtured the "longstanding, everlasting, and unbre?,Aable"
unity between the two countries. The editorial concluded by pledging
Peking's continuing support and assistance to this Vietnamese as its
"proletarian internationalist duty."
Li Te-sheng offered a similar pledge at the PRG ambassador's
reception, but the Vietnamese used the anniversary to impute a
stronger undertaking to the Chinese and to take a tougher stance on
the South Vietnamese situation than the Chinese. The ambassador
declared at the report meeting that the Chinese "have decided, in the
current new situation, to step up their support" to the Vietnamese. ,
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He mar?q a point of calling for high vigilance against violations of
the Paris agreement, adding that the PLAF would "raise its combat
effe'tiveness so as to become a powerful mainstay of the whole
peopl,N in the political struggle." At his reception the ambassador
called the PRG "the sole and authentic representative" of the South
Vietnamese people, a claim that the Chinese have been unwilling to
endorse.
VIOLATIONS OF ACCORD PeLing used the vehicle of a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article---the lowest
level of authoritative comment--to second recent DRV and PRG foreign
ministry protests censuring Saigon for "serious violations" of the
Paris agreement. The Commentator article, on the 15th, accused
Saigon of disregarding from the outset its commitment under the
agreement and of using "despicable means" to violate and sabotage the
accord. While warning that world public opinion is watching "with
deep concern" the situation since the armistice, Commentator
mentioned U.S. involvement only in the last sentence, pointing out
that as a 4ianatory the United States also has the responsibility of
"enjoining" Saigon to observe the agreement. However, NCNA's report
of the 15 February NHAN DAN editorial on alleged violations of the peace
agreement contained specific indictments of the United States,
ir?-!luding the charges that it has fa :.d to dismantle bases in S-luth
Vietnam and has deliberately delayed the removal of mines from North
Vietnamese waters.
The LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on the PLAF anniversary noted
that realization of the agreement's provisions requires "incumbent
efforts of the parties concerned," but there was no criticism of any
of the patties for violating the terms. The PRG ambassador said at
his reception on the 14th that the United States and Saigon must bear
responsibility for plots by "warlord and fascist forces" to obstruct
the agreement.
The 14 February press communique on the North Korean foreign minister's
visit to Peking cited both sides as welcoming the Vietnam agreement
while calling for strict observance of its terms in order that a
contribution may be made to easing tension in Asia. The communique
also took note of continuing U.S. "aggression" in Laos and Cambodia.
Peking's first direct reference to the continued U.S. military
presence in Thailand since the Vietnam agreement appeared in an NCNA
report on the 14th of an announcement by Pentagon spokesman Friedheim
to the effect that the headquarters for all U.S. air operations in
Southeast Asia will be transferred from South Vietnam to Thailand.
NCNA cited AP as saying that attacks against Laos and Cambodia will
be directed from the new headquarters.
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MOSCOW CALLS VIETNAM A LESSON FOR THIRD WORLD, ASSAILS PRC
Moscow has covered developments in Vietnam in the wake of the
peace accord largely through pickups of Vietnamese communist
media, and it carried the full text of the DRV-U.S. communique
on Kissinger's Hanoi visit. Some routine Moscow radio comment
has charged that Saigon is violating the cease-fire agreement,
but for the most part the United States is treat'd with relative
circumspection. In reporting the 15 February NIAN DAN editorial
on U.S. actions, TASS included the paper's charge that the
United States has failed to live up to the agreement regarding
withdrawal and the liquidation of bases but said nothing about
Hanoi's charge of s delay in removing DRV mines from U.S. waters.
The relatively optimistic, tine-marking character of Soviet
propaganda on developments in Vietnam was.illustrated in comments
by IZVESTIYA's Mikhail Mikhaylov, speaking on Moscow radio's
weekly domestic service roundtable on.18 February. He
observed that despite the violations of the cease-fire, the
machinery for implementing the agreement is being put into
motion with the control commissions beginning their work. He
went on to say that the USSR will take an active part in the
international conference and "will strive to obtain precise and
unswerving implementation of the agreement." In this same vein,
in reporting Secretary Rogers' 15 February news conference, TASS
quoted him as saying that the United States does not see signs
that any of the sides intends to torpedo the peace agreement.
Moscow's subFeantive comment related to the peace accord,
however, sustains the themes introduced by V..Kudrayavtsev in
the 6 February IZVESTIYA and followed up in subsequent press
articles: that the Vietnamese accord provid-. an illustration
of the efficacy of determined. action, with socialitc aid and
unity, against the imperialists, and that the accord should open
the way to further relaxation of tensions and international
security. While Kudrayavtsev assailed only unidentified "Maoist
groups" for opposing a postwar policy which would lead to
collective security in Asia, other press articles explicitly
attacked the PRC.* These attacks have been pursued in recent
radio propaganda. For example, a. Moscow Mandarin-language
broadcast on 19 February entitled "A Dangerous Collusion" said
that the U.S. "imperialists," in pursuing their postwar
involvement in Southeast Asia, are pinning their hopes on the
* See the TRENDS of 14 February 1973, pages 7-8.
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Chinese leaders' foreign policy. Without amplification, the
commentator claimed that "the Chinese leaders have demonstrated
in their actions on the inter.iational arena in recent days that
they are firmly opposed to an ,easing of international tension
and to any concrete action which will strengthen peace and
security." The broadcast went on. to claim that "imperialism"
long ago recognized that the major thrust of Peking's "two-
superpowers argument" in against the USSR and.tnat the criticism
of the U.S. "imperialists" is added only to make the Chinese
look good in the eyes of Third World countries. It repeated
other comment in claiming that the Chinese approve of the
continued stationing of U.S. troops in Asia, and it said that
"the negative stand" adopted by Peking leaders toward the Soviet-
proposed system of an Asian collective security system is
"another source of pleasure for the imperialists . . . who
wholeheartedly support the claim of Peking leaders that this
system is aimed at encircling China." The commentator concluded
yy saying that "the imperialists alsri support and promote
another slanderous claim by.the Chinese leaders--that there will
be the danger of.Soviet subversion of Southeast Asia following
the U.S. military disengagement."
Current Moscow propaganda hailing Vietnam as a lesson for the
Third World includes a series of four radio talks by IZVESTIYA's
V. Kudryavtsev beamed to Africa from 14 to 17 February. Kudryavtsev
reiterated the argument, which he had advanced in his IZVESTIYA
article on the 6th, that Soviet aid was effective in bringing
Vietnam victory and led to the strengthening of the recipient's
independence. He also assailed current Chinese foreign policy as
being contrary to the progress of the national liberation
movements. And he claimed that "the fact that the Maoist leaders
of the !RC have made outright anti-Sovietism a major aspect
of their foreign policy only hampers the struggle against
imperialism" and undermines the unity of the anti-imperialist
front.
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- 12 -
LAOS CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN VIENTIANE
FBIS TRENDS
22 FEBRUARY 1973
The Laos cease-fire agreement, signed on 21 February by Pheng
Phongsavan on behalf of the "Vientiane government" and by
Phoumi Vongvichit for the "patriotic forces," doss not appear
to differ substantially in its operative points from the draft
peace agreement put forward by the NLHS at the 9th session
of the Vientiane talks on 12 December. The earlier draft
had apparently been designed to bring the NLHS's stand--ancom-
passed in its 17 October peace proposals*--into line with the
draft U.S.-DRV peace agreement summarized by Hanoi on 26 October.
The agreement culminates the negotiations between the two Lao
parties that have been going on since October. Formal weekly
sessions had been hold since 17 October and at the 16th session
on 30 January--three days after the Vietna*.peace accord was
signed--it was agreed that private talks be held. The tempo
of the negotiations accelerated after the 3 February return to
Vientiane from Sam Neua of Phoumi Vongvichit, NLHS secretary
general, in the capacity as Souphanouvong'a "plenipotentiary
special envoy" and "special adviser" to the NLHS delegation
at the talks. (At the time of the opening of the talks last
fall he had spent some two weeks in Vientiane as "special adviser"
to the NLHS delegation.) Phoumi Vongvichit met with Souvanna
Phouma several times and almost daily with Pheng Phongsavan,
Souvanna Phouma'a plenipotentiary and head of the RLG delegation
at the talks. The intensified negotiations had also been
accompanied by two messages from Souphanouvong to Souvanna
Phouma: A 31 January message urging the Vientiane side to
negotiate "seriously" on a cease-fire, and another on the 18th
outlining Souphanouvong's views on a cL-ase-tire in simpler
and more generalized terms than those which emerged in the final
agreement.
PROVISIONS T_- general, the agreement appears to meet the
OF AGREEMENT wajor demands-of the NLHS and to grant only
miiui ::oncessions to the government side. The
RLG is not referred tv by its formal title, being called only
* The 17 October peace proposal, presented at the opening session
of the Vientiane talks, had been an elaboration of tho NLHS' March
1970 five-point program. Sea the 26 Octc.uer 1972 TRENDS,
pages 11-16. The ll December draft peace agreement is discussed
in the 13 December TRENDS, pages 11-13.
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the "Vientiane government," and the DRV is not named in the
accord, although the various references to "foreign countries"
can be read as embracing the North Vietnamese.
+ The "general principles" of the agreement stipulate that
the neutrality of Laos and the 1962 Geneva agreements must be
respected and observed by "the Lao parties concerned, the United
States, Thailand, and other foreign countries," without specifying
the DRV. The October proposal had called upon only the United
States to respect the Geneva agreement, but the December draft
appealed to "the various signatories of the 1961-1962 Geneva
conference on Laos as well as other countries in the world"
to respect and implement the agreement.
+ The provision for a cease-fire-in-place comprising a
cessation of bombing and military involvement by "foreign
countries" as well as of the Lao parties, seems to be a minor
concession to Vientiane as the December draft had specified an
end to "U.S." bombing as well as a halt to military activity by
"the various armed forces in Laos."
+ The agreement allows the parties to pass through each others'
zones to supply their men with food. Reprisals and discrimination
against collaborators are prohibited, as in the earlier NLHS
proposals. Assistance to refugees is provided for, but unlike
the earlier NLHS proposals, Vientiane is not now given sole
responsibility for provision of such help.
+ The introduction of military personnel and armaments of
"foreign countries except for those pr v ed for by the 1954
and 1962 agreements," 1,5 Gp ti'iYeee- 1~epp/a e M r
*74 d T r~ , ~~ tr
worn out armaments and war materials is to be d,~S0 u,S59c1 u , ?e/
agreed upon by the two parties. This provision is similar to
that of the December draft except for the reference to the
Genevd agreements. A protocol to the 1962 Geneva agreement
allowed the introduction of defensive armaments deemed necessary
by the RLG. The. December draft had also mentioned a role for
the new coalition government in requesting and distributing
replacement weapons and materials. The omission of such a
provision now may represent a concession to Vientiane.
+ Within 60 days of the establishment cf a provisional national
union government and a political consultative council, the total
withdrawal of "all military personnel, regular and irregular
troops of foreign countries, and the dissolution of military
and paramilitary organizations of foreign countries" must be completed,
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as well as the dissolution of "special forces" organized by
"foreigners" and their bases and installations. A similar
provision in the December draft had specified dismantling bases
and dissolving special forces of "the United States and of the
various countries affiliated with the U.S. side." It had not,
however, specified a U.S. withdrawal, calling instead for with-
drawal of all advisers, military personnel, and regular and
irregular troops of "foreign countries" within 90 days of
the signing of the agreement. The October pr.posal had specified
a U.S. withdrawal, but had also prohibited the maintenance in
Laos of bases or armed forces by "any foreign country." The
October plan had specified that the United States must stop
using Thai bases and forces for "aggression" in Laos, but
the December draft had not named Thailand.
4 Each Lao party shall return to the other "persons regardless
of their nationality" captured during the war, the exchange
to be completed within 60 days after the establishment of the
provisional government and the political consultative council.
Subsequently, the parties will exchange information on missing
personnel. Unlike the October and December proposals, the
current accord does not explicitly specify that the prisoner
exchange must be timed with the withdrawal of troops.
4. The political provisions of the cease-fire agreement are
similar to those in the NLHS' December and October proposals.
It provides for free and democratic general elections for a
national assembly and for an official national union government.
Pending elections, within 30 days of the signing of the agreement,
a new provisional national union government and a political con-
sultative council are to be formed. The provisional government
is apparently to be basically dual, composed of equal numbers
of representatives of the Vientiane government and the
"patriotic forces" and also including two neutralist "personalities"
chosen by the two rides. The December and October proposals bad
called for a tripartite provisional government, composed of
equal numbers of three factions: the NLHS, the Patriotic
Neutralist Forces and other neutralists, and the Vientiane
Aide. The current agreement does not name Souvanna Phouma,
merely noting that the future prime minister "will not be
included in the two equal numbers of representatives of the
two parties."
4. The political consultative council--long pressed by the NLHS
and opposed by Vientiane--apparently' retains the essential functions
provided for in the October and December NLHS proposals, but
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22 FEBRUARY 1973
presumbaly in deference to Vientiane some of the rhetoric is toned
down. Where the earlier proposals had characterized the council
as "the supreme organization for national unity,' the reference
to "supremacy" is now omitted. Like the provisional government,
the council is apparently to have a basically dual nature, con-
sisting of equal numbers of representatives of the Vientiane
government and "patriotic forces" and "a number" of neutralists
chosen by the two sides. Earlier proposals had given it a
tripartite nature like the earlier proposals on the provisional
government. The current agreement provides that the council
function on the principle of unanimity, a provision not appearing
in earlier NLHS proposals and presumably included at Vientiane's
insistence. The council's functions seem to be similar to
those proposed earlier: to consult with the provisional government
on administering the country, implementing the agreement, and
preparing for elections.
4 The current agreement adds a provision for neutralizing Luang
Prabang to the earlier call for neutralization of Vientiane.
It repeats the provision that pending elections the two parties
will continue to administer their own areas.
+ The two parties "take note" of the U.S. statement that it will
contribute to reconstruction in Indochina, and the accord provides
that the provisional government will discuss with the United
States its contribution to Laos. The October and December proposals
had demanded that the United States bear the cost of war damages.
+ The current agreement provides for a "Joint commission for
implementation of the agreement" and for the ICC, composed of
India, Poland, and Canada, to continue its activities as
provided in the 1962 Geneva agreement. The October and December
proposals had provided that the cease-fire be supervised by
a joint committee assisted by the ICC.
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22 FEBRUARY 1973
S I WO -SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW ASSESSES IMPACT OF "TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY"
The most significant nonevent in the communist world--the
14 February anniversary of the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of
alliance--has passed unmarked by either side for the seventh
consecutive year. On the day after the anniversary Kissinger
arrived in Peking for the latest round of Sino-U.S. consults-
tions, a coincidence which was surely not lost on the Soviets and
which in fact was cited by the Czechoslovak news agency in a dis-
patch on the 16th. The Czechoslovak dispatch quoted UPI for the
observation that the anniversary "has long been forgotten," a
fact ioplicitly acknowledged in a 5 January Moscow broadcast
to China noting that the Soviets had celebrated the 16th anniver-
sary of the treaty iu 1966 but failing to point out that the
event has not been observed since.
Though the anniversary is no longer observed, the Soviets--but
not the Chinese--do occasionally cite the treaty in recounting
the early development of Soviet-PRC relations. Thus Brezhnev,
recalling those "good times" in Sino-Soviet relations in his 21
December address on the USSR's semicentenary, reminded the Chinese
that the first treaty concluded by t''e PRC was the one with the
USSR and that they received tremendous aid from the Soviets
during that period. The Soviets carefully avoid implying that the
treaty is still operative but also avoid raising the question in
explicit terms. The most direct appraisal of the present status
of the treaty appeared in a compendium of treaty relations among
communist countries carried in the monthly INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
in October 1967. The journal noted that the Soviet Union and
China concluded a ..A-year treaty in 1950, "but the Chinese leaders'
present policy has largely deprived it of its meaning."
Some of the radio commentaries broadcast by Moscow in Mandarin on
14 February discussed past Sino-Soviet cooperation, a context in
which references to the treaty occasionally appear, but Moscow
did not see fit to mention the treaty on the anniversary date.
One commentary edged close, noting that the USSR became the first
nation to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and that the
new Peking regime gained a dependable ally. Reflecting the radical
transformation of the relationship since that time, the only treaty
mentioned in the commentary was the draft treaty on renouncing the
use of force which the Soviets submitted to the Chinese on 15 January
1971. The commentary concluded by citing the long-term view taken
CON IDENTIAL
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22 FEBRUARY 1973
by Brezhnev on 21 December when he left it up to the Chinese and
the 1.aw3 of history to restore Sino-Soviet friendship.
RED STAR ON CHINA The military paper RED STAR on 3 February
carried a harshly anti-Chinese article by
V. Vasin takit:.g to task the "Mao group"--a hardline formulation
introduced in a landmark policy statement in November 1966--for
its policies on such sensitive matters as nuclear weapons develop-
ment and the territorial question. However, the provenance of the
article--it was prepared by the NOVOSTI news agency in response
to readers' inquiries about the situation in China--renders it less
ominous than it might otherwise seem. Moreover, the article
observed that Peking had abandoned its "frontal attack" for more
circuitous approaches and that the Chinese are apprehensive over
trends toward detente rather than over a Soviet threat to their
security.
The article provides a commentary on the new Mao quotation, with its
clear overtoneb of Sino-Soviet confrontation, which was introduced
by Peking's 1973 New Year's Day editorial: "Dig tunnels deep, store
gram everywhere, and never seek hegemony.." The article related the
tunnel digging and grain storing injunctions to Peking's effort to
build up the country's military capability. Explaining that the
grain stockpilI.ng represents an attempt to restrict consumption in
order to free funds for military expenditure, the article pointed
out that expensive equipment is bought in capitalist countries for
nuclear and missile plants. The article was vague on the signi-
ficance of the tunnel digging, noting that the instruction means
in practice that China's national economic development is oriented
not toward improving living standards but toward a military buildup
in the interest of Peking's "hegemonic aspirations" in the worid
arena.
More significantly, however, the article proceeded at this point
to discuss Peking's portrayal of a Soviet military threat to China,
and in this context it pointed out that the Soviets, unlike the
Chinese, do not lay claim to the other side's territory and that
Moscow had offered to conclude a treaty renouncing the use of force.
After reviewing Peking's moves designed to isolate Moscow and to
thwart Soviet diplomatic efforts, the article drew its conclusion
that the "Maoists" are perturbed over tho prospects of international
detente and that their attempts to exploit tension shuw what their
disavowal of an urge to hegemony means in practice.
Other recent Soviet comment has also reflected concern over Peking's
portrayal of a Soviet threat, a concern that prompted Moscow to
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disclose its offer to conclude a bilateral treaty renouncing force
and its repeated prcposals since 1969 to undertake nonaggression
commitments with the Chinese. Columnist Joseph Alsop, a
persistent purveyor of the thesis of a Soviet mp'ace to China,
has again drawn Soviet ire after his recent trip to the PRC.
A 7 February commentary on Alsop's trip by TASS commentator
Eduard Baskakov, published the next day in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA
and widely broadcast by Radio Moscow, charged that in his dis-
patches Alsop "concentrated his entire zeal" on depicting a threat
of a Soviet nuclear strike against the PRC. In contrast to the
23 Septer.iber Ratiani PRAVDA article denouncing Alsop for disse-
minating speculation about a Soviet pi vantive strike which
Ratian?. traced to the Pentagon and CIA,* Baskakov said that
Peking "ordered" Alsop's articles and that this "inveterate
anticommunist" was trying to justify Peking's anti-Soviet:
policy.
TRIANGULAR RELATIONS Moscow has been particularly concerned
over the implications of the portrayal of
a Soviet threat to China for its position in the triangular bit-
power relationship. This showed through, for instance, in a
Moscow broadcast to China on the day after the Sino-Soviet treaty
anniversary. After welcoming the Vietnam agreement as produding
a major change in the situation in Asia, the broadcast argued that
the United States is seeking to maintain its presence in Asia
by playing on Sino-Soviet antagonism. According to the broadcast,
"American radio stations" tell Chinese listeners about the Soviet
troop concentration along the border while in programs beamed to
the Soviet Union they report on Chinese missile development and
deployment against the Soviets. The broadcast,. which coincided
with Kissinger's arrival in Peking, appealed for normalization
of Sino-Soviet relations iL order to counter the "intrigues and
tricks" being played by the United States to foment hostility
between the Chinese and Soviets.
A sophisticated and less propagandistic interpretation of
"triangular diplomacy" appeared in an article by V.P. Lukin in
this year's second issue of USA (signed to press 16 January).
The article, which offers an account of the change in U.S. China
policy undertaken by the Nixon Administration, deals mainly with
the implications of the new Sino-U.S. relationship for the U.S.
role in Asia, but it concludes with a warning against any
See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, pages 16-17.
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22 FEBRUARY 1973
temptation for Washington to seek to exploit Sino-Soviet
antagonism as a means of putting pressure on Moscow and
reducing Soviet leverage. As bef its a contribution to this
journal of Americanologists, the article is an attempt to
size up and account for U.S. calculations in the triangular
situation, and on balance it serves to offset alarmist views
of the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship by stressing objective
realities that strengthen Moscow's hand and correspondingly
dilute Peking's impact on world affairs.
In explaining how the Nixon Administration fashioned a new China
policy in an effort to preserve U.S. interests in Asia during
a period of shifting relations, Lukin argues that Washington
changed its estimate of a need for a strong, broadly based U.S.
military presence along China's borders to deter Peking. According
to the article, the "Maoists' armed provocations" on the S:no-
Soviet border in 1969 played "an extremely important role" in this
reassessment. Lukin does not dwell further on the border dispute,
but he elaborates at length on the various conceptual formulations
and calculations used by American strategists taking account of the
emergence of triangular diplomacy. He deals in particular with
the balance of power school of thought, citing the view--without
attribution--that there is a trend from an artificial postwar peace
to a classic multilateral balancing of forces. From this premise,
he says, advocates of this approach draw the conclusion that U.S.
policy must be developed on the basis of balancing between the
Soviet Union and China.
Significantly, Lukin indicates that within this school of thought
there are those who oppose an alinement of the United States with
the weaker China to counterbalance the stronger USSR, and that
"the most appreciable influence" on U.S. policy is being exerted
by those who recognize "the extreme danger" of seeking to pressure
Moscow by exploiting the Maoist leadership's anti-Soviet line.
As Lukin puts it, the United States is seeking to create a system
of "parallel and mutually conditioned relations with both our
country and the PRC." Quoting William E. Griffith, he cites the
view that Soviet-U.S. negotiations are vital to U.S. security
interests and that therefore Washington must observe neutrality
in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
After a carefully argued section on the comi,lexities introduced
into U.S. relations with Japan by the rapprochement with the PRC,
Lukin concludes with an appraisal of the near-term prospects for
Sino-U.S. relations. Though his judgment that the momentum in
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this rapprochement has flagged did not hold up long, the mood of
self-assurance he projects regarding Moscow's position in the
triangular setting serves to cushion the impact of further
developments in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Thus, he points to
the Soviet-U.S. summit as demonstrating that "influential circles
in Washington" realize the limited potential possessed by Peking
to affect great-power relations. Lukin winds up his assessment,
however, with a warning of a growth of international tension should
Washington and Peking base the development of their relations
primarily on anti-Soviet considerations. Cautiously and
tentatively, he warns about "complications" that would result from
"rash steps certain circles are possibly nurturing" in a direction
going counter to the Soviet "peace program." In effect, then, he
urges the United States to bear in mind the vital significance
of Soviet-U.S. ditente and to forego any temptation to practice
triangular diplomacy at Moscow's expense.
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- 21 -
USSR - JAPAN - CHINA
MOSCOW EXPRESSES MISGIVINGS OVER JAPANESE-PRC RELATIONS
Soviet reaction to the special relationship emerging between China
and Japan suggests that Moscow is feeling increasingly isolated
in the four-power maneuvering with China, Japan, and the United
States in the Far East. In contrast to ^gking, which now
meticulously avoids any negative comment on Japan's military
relations with the United States as well as on the Japanese
military establishment itself, Moscow is intensifying its warnings
of remilitarization in Japan. Soviet commentators are also
downplaying the possibilities of econom1c collaboration with
Japan--a theme at its peak during Foreign Minister Gromyko's
January 1972 visit to Japan--and have, since the Sino-
Japanese rapprochement late last year, increasingly pictured
Japan primarily as a powerful rival for economic and military
influence in Asia.
Typifyird Moscow's current comment, a 10 February PRAVDA article
by A. Iskenderov warned of a "new" nationalism taking root in
Japan which "serve3 as a propaganda cover to conceal the growth
of Japanese imperialism and to justify militarism and foreign
political and economic expansion." Iskenderov argued that
Japan's leaders are encouraging narrow nationalistic sentiments
in order to strengthen the self-defense forces "as an important
means of guaranteeing the positions of Japanese capital outside
Japan and, above all, in Southeast Asia."
Soviet misgivings over Sino-Japanese intentions were expressed
explicitly in an article by V. Tevetcv in Moscow's weekly ZA
RUBEZHOM for 9-15 February. Focusing on the address given by
Prime Minister Tanaka at last month's opening session of the
Japanese Diet, Tsvetov criticized Tanaka for advocating the
maintenance of the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty and charged that
budget increases for the buildup of the Japanese self-defence
forces are creating "understandable concern in the countrieti
of Southeast Asia and are in no way promoting the creation of
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22 JANUARY 1973
an atmosphere of detente in this region."* Reflecting Soviet
uneasiness over the direction of Sino-Japanese relations,
Tsvetov arguod that "the world would welcome the adjustment of
Japan-China relations if the Peking leadership did not attempt
to place them at the service of its chauvinist, hagemonist plans
and if it d1.4 not try to drive a wedge between Japan and the USSR."
Moscow has specificalYy taken Peking to task for abandoning its
tough line on the U.' Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which for
two decades was portrayed by Chinese media as an instrument of
the U.S. containment policy in Asia and,thus aimed primarily at
China. A Moscow broadcast to Asia on 12 February, for example,
noted that "up until recently the Peking.leaders spared no words
to expose the aggressive essence of the Japan-American Security
Treaty and the rejuvenation of Japanese militarism," but "then,
all of a sudden, there was an about face." According to the
broadcast, this change reflects an. effort by Peking "to provoke
a Japan-Soviet confrontation" by encouraging those forces within
Japan who seek preservation of the treaty. The broadcast
condemned Peking for helping Japanese reactionaries to revive
militarism and for aiding'-.the Japanese to carry out an "extremely
unpopular expansionist foreign policy in Southeast Asia."
Seeking to play on opposition within China to Peking's shift on
Japan's security ties with the United States, a Mandarin broadcast
to China on the 14th insisted that "Mao and his confidants" have
"endangered China's security and greatly damaged the Chinese
people's interests" by encouraging Japan to strengthen its military
alliance with the United States and build up its armed forces.
After citing several old PEOPLE'S DAILY P'atements denouncing the
treaty, and even a lengthy 1960.quote.from Mao stating that the
* Unlike Moscow s coverage of Tanaka 's Diet speech, Peking's
detailed report omitted the reference to the U.S.-Japan Secur'.cy
Treaty. In contrast, TASS reports on. the speech highlighted
criticism in the Japanese press of.Tanaka's call to strengthen the
treaty. Similar.?ly$ TASS accounts of the recently concluded 36th
congress of the Japan Socialist Party--the leading opposition
party--focused on the JSP's resolution to work "for elimination
of the military alliance with the United States." NCNA's report
on the congress failed, however, even to mention the party's
reiteration of its longstanding opposition to the treaty. NCNA
highlighted the JSP's desire to "oppose all tendencies which may
hamper Japan-China friendly relations and extensively increase
intercourse between the two countries."
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security treaty is a "treaty of aggression . . . aimed at
oppressing the broad masses of Japanese people and opposing
China, the Soviet Union, and the peoples of Asia," the
broadcast blasted the current Peking leadership for reversing
itself and "greatly damaging the Chinese people's interests"
by failing to see the treaty's basic "anti-Chinese orientation."
Similarly, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 12th claimed
that Chinese leaders had assisted Japan in strengthening its
armed forces and its military alliance with the United States
by "pretending ignorance" of Japan's "stepped-up war preparation."
Attempting to freshen Chinese memories of Sino-Japanese relations
during the 1930's and 40'b, the broadcast asked Chinese leaders
to recall and heed the words uttered by Japanese General Araki,
a World War II war criminal, who was quoted as having said:
God did not give Japan the required natural
resources, but China will divide its with us.
God has predetermined to let Japan act as an
alliance leader in Asia, and the road to this
end is through China.
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CUBA - U,S,
HAVANA NONCOI?MITTAL ON IMPACT OF HIJACKING AGREEMENT
Limited initial Havana comment on the 15 February signing of the
U.$.-Cuban agreement on dealing with hijackings has been devoid
of any suggestion that the agreement may serve as a catalyst
for improved relations with the United Staten. One of two monitored
commentaries on the agreement ignored the question of fut'ire U.S.-
Cuban relations entirely, focusing on rraisa for the accord as "a
triumph !or Cuba." The other, by the influential commentator
Guido Garcia Inclan, broached the subject obliquely and equivocally.
But Garcia Inclan's equivocation may itself be significant, coupled
with Havana zadia's failure to acknowledge and rebut Secretary
Rogers' comments, at a news conference after the signing, to the effect
that U.S. policy toward Cuba was unchanged and would remain
unaltered until there was a change in the policies and attitudes
of the Cuban Government. In response to such statements in the past,
Castro and other regime spokesmen have repeatedly denounced U.S.
efforts to attach "conditions" to improved relations and have
insisted that it is Washington which would have to accent Cuba's
conditions.*
Garcia Inclan's domestic service broadcast, on the 16th, distorted
Rogers' remarks when he alleged that the Secretary "could not answer"
newsmen's questions about whether the hijacking accord could be the
precursor of other bilateral agreements. No other monitored
Havana broadcast has mentioned Rogers' press conference. Commenting,
ambiguously, that "such major state problems are always handled by the
two countries and their heads of state," Garcia Inclan went on to cite
a Castro dictum that a Cuban accord with "any :ountry" could only be
achieved "with equal candor, face to face, without seeking petty
advantages." The net effect of Garcia Inclan's commentary was to
convey a less rigid Cuban position than has been enunciated in the
past, and to obscure a U.S. st+ttement that would tend to dampen
overoptimistic views of the ism inence of detente.
* Castro has recently :.tressed unconditional lifting of the U.S.
economic blockade of Cuba a d key prerequisite for any discussion
of improving U.S.-Cuban. relations. For an analysis of Castro's
remarks in this vein in December, see the TRENDS of 20 December
1972, pages 24-25.
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MOSCOW COMMENT Moscow's reaction to the hijacking agree-
mout, conveyed most authoritatively in a
signed article in PRl&VDA on 17 February, emphasized the Soviet
view tb : the time is ripe for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement.
Under the title "A Positive Improvement," author V. Bolshakov
observed that with the hijacking agreement the United States
had "raised the visor of the cold war a little and looked
into the eyes of ret,l!.ty." Commenting that efforts to blockade
Cuba economically ar,d diplomatically had failed, Bolshakov
cited the recent statt.went by 12 U.S. congressmen urging
a normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations and concluded that
the "recommendations are extremely timely and unambiguous."
TASS, unlike Havana media, duly noted Secretary Rogers'
press conference statement that the hijacking accord did not
presage a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba. But recent Soviet
comment has publicized the congressmen's statement as
evidence of growing U.S. sentiment favoring normalization of
U.S.-Cuban ties. Thus an IZVESTIYA article on the 14th mentioned
the statement in contrasting the position of "official Washington,
which continues to remain stubborn, trying, as before, to
pursue a policy of isolating Cuba," with "the sober voices of
senators, congressmen, and prominent public figures" who are
increasingly vocal in urging a rapprochement. IZVESTIYA
concluded that the "short-sighted policy" of trying to isolate
Cuba "is becoming increasingly hopeless." In a similar vein,
a Radio Moscow broadcast beamed to North America on the same
day lauded the congressmen's stance and forecast that "demands
for a realistic policy" toward Cuba would "no doubt gain ground"
in tins United States and "eventually win the day."
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LATId A14ERICA
HAVANA CASTS DOUBT ON REPORTS OF GUERRILLA LEADERS DEAT;1
After initially ignoring the Dominican Government's 16 February
announcement that Colonel Francisco Caamano and two fellow
guerrillas had been killed, Cuban media or. the 20th indirectly
cast doubt on the Dominican claim of Caamano's death by public
cizing a statement purportedly made in Havana by one of the
guerrillas the Dominican Government said had been killed along
with him. Concurrently, Havana media carried--without comment--
their first acknowledgment of Dominican and Western media reports
of Caamano's death. Cuba has been circumspect in its coverage
of the 5 February guerrilla landing in the Dominican Republic:-,
apparently out of concern not to lend credence to Dominican
charges of Cuban involvement in the operation.*
Radio Havana reported on the 20th that Wellington Petersonp one
of tho allegedly slain guerrillas. had turned up at PRENSA LATINA
headquarters to refute the reports of his death. Describing him-
self as a Dominican political exile whbhad been in. Cuba for five
years and was now attending Havana University, Paterson said the
Dominican regime's report of his death was "aimed at involving
the Cuban revolution in the Dominican internal revolutionary
process." He declared that if Caamano were in fact in the Dominican
Republic, he "would like to be with him as a simple fighter."
Adding that he did not believe Caamano was dead, he labeled the
Dominican report "a maneuver... to demoralize the people." PRENSA
LATINA the next day reported a press conference at which Peterson
said he was acquainted with Caamano and with the other guerrilla
who had reportedly been killed but disclaimed any knowledge of
whether Caamano was leading the guerri?.la band in the Dominican
Republic.
In response to the Havana report on Peterson, Santo Domingo con-
ceded that its initial announcement of his demise had been mis-
taken. The body of the dead guerrilla was identified as that of
Alfredo Perez Vargas.
Although initial Havana reports on the Dominican landing had
referred only to widespread "rumors" of Caamano'e involvement
in the guerrilla landing, more recent comment appeai.ad to
* For a discussion of Havana us early reaction to the guerrilla
landing, see the TRENDS of 7 February 1973, pages 27-28.
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acknowledge it as a fact. Thus a radio commentary on the 14th
referred to a communique by Dominican revolutionary organizations
as "confirming" Caamano's presence at the head of the guerrilla
band. The commentary depicted the Balaguer regime as being in
a state of "panic" and noted "uneasinejs in the Yankee embassy"
as a consequence of the guerrilla landing. "Balaguer is frightened
now," it said, "ass he hears the roar of the revolutionary movement
that is on the pith of the country's liberation, which even now
may not be far away." A PRENSA LATINA commentary on 8 February
raised the possibility of a civil-military split in the Dominican
Republic, suggesting that Caamano's return might produce "a
rupture with Balaguer inside the armed forces ranks."
CUBA. URUGUAYAN COf+IUNISTS DIFFER ON URUGUAYAN CRISIS
In a belated reaction to the Uruguayan civil-military confronta-
tion, Havana took a critical view of the settlement reached by
Uruguayan President Bordaberry And the military. Havana's posi-
tion diverges from the, generally favorable view of the settlement
taken by the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU). PCU Secretary
General Arismendi is now in Cuba, and he met v'ith Castro on
20 February, presumably to iron out these and other differences.
i
CUBAN COMMENT Havana's only comment on the Uruguayan develop-
ments appeared in a 19 February PRENSA LATINA
article by Carlos Maria Gutierrez. Noting that the hopes of the
Uruguayan left had been buoyed by the civil-military crisis,
Gutierrez alleged that "results have yet to confirm these hopes."
He referred disparagingly to the Uruguayan military's 19-point
"rebrmist" plan of 9 February which Bordaberry had been forced
to accept in order to resolve the crisis and to which the PCU
had g4l.ven qualified support; and he concluded that "facts seem
to indicate that the program will remain a paper one." Gutieri^z
ridiculed the notion that "positive elements" %..tisted within the
Uruguayan armed forces. The failure of the Uruguayan navy to
support Bordaberry throughout the confrontation, he observed,
"indicated that any fcture democratic military movement has little
hope of success."
I
URUGUAYAN CP By contrast, the PCU hailed the 9 February mili-
POSITION tary communique as "a positive document," taking
exception only to a clause stressing the need to
combat Marxist-Leninist "infiltration and influence." The PCU
organ EL POPULAR on 11 February editorial:' expressed agreement
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R
with the armed forces program, noting that it in "not incompatible"
with working class ideology "or detrimental to our long-range plant
for the establishment of a socialist society." Referring to the
warning against Marxist-Leninist influerce, EL POPULAR said "this
is obviously a mistake, whi^.h is contradicted by the rest of the
document and which could confuse a great many of the workers."
TASS on the 15th and Moscow radio the next day summarized a
conciliatory PCU Central Committee statement which hailed the
armed forces for beginning "to play an important part in the
process" of instituting radical changes which would terminate
"the rule of the oligarchy and imperialism." The statement also
warned the military against assuming an attitude of "mistrust or
reticence" toward the working class and advised against adopting
a "negative view of Marxism-Leninism."
BACKGROUND Even before the recent crisis, Havana had depicted the
Uruguayan military as having gained the upper hand over
a weak executive. Havana frequently condemned the armed forces for
torturing captured revolutionaries and for posing as "moralists"
in the struggle against political corruptron in Montevideo. A 5 February
Havana radio commentary typically declared that Uruguay was following
the path of Bolivia and Paraguay in falling victim to Brazil, "which
has set itself up as the U.S. gendarme in South America."
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA-FRG
HUSAK SAYS TIME IS RIPE TO RESUME STALLED BILATERAL TALKS
New impetus for resumption of the talks between Prague and Bonn--
stalled in June 1972--looking toward negotiations on normalization
of bilateral relations was provided by Gustav Husak in his report
to a two-day plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, keyed to
implementation of the results of the 14th CPCZ Congress of May 1971.
Husak said in his 20 February report that "the time is now ripe"
for resuwing the talks with the FRG and used the more flexible
formula recently prevalent in Moscow and Prague statements on
invalidation of the 1938 Munich pact--a key issue in the talks.
The plenum met on the eve of Brezhnev's arrival in Prague on the
22d for the observance of the 25th anniversary of the February 1948
communist takeover.
Husak's report was summarized, with lengthy quoted passages, by
CTK on the 20th. The Prague domestic service began to carry the
speech live, but interrupted its direct relay following Husak's
review of the CSSR's history since February 1948 which culminated
in praise of friendship with the USSR. As quoted by CTK in English,
Husak declared:
It is our view that the time is now ripe for official
talks between the governments of the two countries.
We are prepared to start them at any time. With good
will on both sides, agreement can be reached and a
standpoint adopted that is acceptable to both sides
which would contribute to the problem of the Munich
diktat, that unlawful act which became the symbol for
the start of World War II, being once and for all
definitely terminated.
Husak thus dispensed with the Prague demand, standard prior to the
June talks, that the FRG must acknowledge the invalidity of the
Munich pact "ab initio." his proviso--at times included and at
times omitted in Soviet bloc media statements on the Munich issue
since the June talks--had also been assent from Foreign Minister
Chnoupek's positive response, on 19 January, to Chancellor Brandt's
statement the day before welcoming an early FRG-CSSR agreement "so
that t1'.e Munich agreement will no longer impede relations between
the two states." Using phraseology similar to Chnoupek's, Husak
prefaced his :Jew call for bilateral talks with the remark that
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"we noted with interest the recent statement of Federal Chancellor
Willy Brandt expressing readiness to settle relations between the
FAG and Czechoslovakia."
DPA repor6ad on the 20th that the Bonn foreign office had noted
Husa::'4 remarks "with interest" and was examining them. The
report added that Bonn was awaiting indications that Prague was
ready to adopt a "more flexible" stance on the Munich issue.
TASS on the 20th carried a report on Husak's speech which noted
his remarks on Vietnam and the Middle East but omitted the
passages on Europe and the FRG.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PODGORNYY'S 70TH BIRTHDAY HONORS ARE COMPARABLE TO SUSLOV'S
On the occasion of his 70th birthday on 18 February, Podgornyy
received much the same honors as Suslov did on a similar occasion
last November.* Like Suslov, Fodgornyy was awarded an Order of
Lenin and a second Hammer and Sickle medal, his picture and a
message of praise were given front:page treatment :.n PRAVDA, and
the awards were presented that same day by Brezhnev with a speech
of warm praise. However, while Suslov was 'u'nored by the
publication of a collection of his speeches and articles on the
eve of his birthday, Podgornyy received no such honor.
In his acceptance speech at the awards ceremony Podgornyy appeared
to be somewhat more solicitous toward B!izhnev .&an Suslov had
been. Where Suslov had ;raised the Politburo mnllec:i.ve, "along
with the General Secretary, our dear Leonid Jlich Brez:inev,"
Podgornyy praised the Politburo and noted "the great perAonal
contribution" of Brezhnev, "who has been able to brilliantly
unite and organize our collective and all our party . . . ."
* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, page 29.
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-32-
TUPICS ICJ BRIEF
JOURNAL ARTICLE FORESHADOWS USSR POSITION AT GENEVA
Soviet delegate Roshchin's statement at the 20 February opening
session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)--
reported by TASS the same day--that "all nuclear powers should
take part" in talks on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) was fore-
shadowed in an article in the first 1973 issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA
ZHIZN by A. Alekseyev. The article is discussed Ln the TRENDS
of 24 January 1973, pages 11-13. Alekseyev has been a major
contributor to MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN on disarmament issues for
the last several years.
Alekseyev's article also anticipated the new position in stating
that the USSR now believes "nuclear weapons tests, including under-
ground explosions, must be ended by all states and everywhere."
Roshrhin used the same words, as did V..Viktorov in the 20 February
IZVESTIYA. Rather sparse routine-level Soviet coement to-'date on
the new Geneva round has not broached the CTB issue, focusing
instead on the need for a treaty limiting chemical weapons.
WARSAW PACT EXERCISE IN ROMANIA
A Warsaw Pact staff exercise held in Romania, announced after
the fact by Moscow on 21 February and by Bucharest the next day,
was the first announced joint Pact exercise to be held on
Romanian territory since 1962. While the Romanian reports
indicated neither the participating countries nor the time span,
noting only that Pact Commander Yakubovskiy was in command,
Soviet reports specified that the participants were "the staff
of the joint armed forces and the staffs of army, naval, air
forces, and anti-aircraft defenses of Bulgaria, Romania, and
the USSR"--the same three countries that had participated in
the 1962 maneuvers--and that the exercise lasted from the
12th to the 21st. Both Moscow and Bucharest described it as
a staff exercise "on the map," and the Romanian reports made a
point of explaining parenthetically: "without troops." Bucharest
also reported that Ceausescu had held a "warm, comradely" meeting
with Yakubovskiy and Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko.
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MOSCOV ON DOWNING OF LIBYAN PLANE
While Moscow has made standard propaganda attacks on Tel Aviv in
connection with Israel's 21 February raid on two Palestinian camps
in northern Lebanon, it has thus far reacted with relative caution
to the incident later the same day of the Libyan passenger plane
shot down over Sinai. TASS, in one of two dispatches from Cairn
on the 22d, called the "criminal act" a "gross violation of the
generally recognized norms of international law" and claimed that
Tel Aviv revealed its "cynicism" with the "hypocritical condolences"
offered by the Israeli Government to families of those who died in
the crash. But Moscow has devoted only ua commentary to the
incident--also on the 22d, by TASS commentator Kornilov. And
although Kornilov said the plane incident had touched off world-
wide protests and TASS rounded up world reactions to "Tel Aviv's
crimes," there have been no Moscow reports of Soviet protests at
any level or any indication that the Soviet leadership has sent
condolences to Libya'% al-Qadhdhafi.
Kornilov's commentary coupled the "bandit attack" on the plane with
the "new armed provocation" against Lebanon as efforts by Israel
to terrorize the Arab countries, exacerbate.the situation, and
"exclude, at my price and by any means, the very possibility"
of a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. But he
concluded merely that peace-loving countries and peoples could
not be "indifferent" to Tel Aviv's "air piracy" and that the
world public demanded that "the aggressor immediately be curbed."
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