TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 27, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
27 JLNE 1973
CVOL. XXIV, NO. 26)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is bused exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press racdia. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthor'?ted disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
Approved For Release I 9~9i l 3i tDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 19 'i3
C0i~ TEATS
Moscow Lauds Summit and Vew Era in East-West Relations. . . . .
1
East Europe Allies Hail Success of Summit Meeting-. . . .
5
MIDDLE EAST
Brezhnev calls for Peace Settlement; Moscow Reassuies Arabs. .
9
INDOCHINA
PRG, URV Protest U.S., Saigon "Violations" of Peace Accord. . .
12
KOREA
Pyongyang Decries Separate UN Seats as Promoting Two Koreas . .
15
APPEIJDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Approved For Release 1999/09i2fFijQI*. RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
U. S. -SOVIET SUMMP~ 1 T
MOSCOW ..ALIDS S "IT AND NEW ERA IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS
The S,:,viet Union has m de extraordinary e.ftorts over the past week
to present. Bmaz:hnev `s 18-25 June visit to the. United states as an
event of hist.cricui significance, The. 'rolume cf cadio comment on
the visit has alone exceeded that devoted to any previous visit in
more than a dozen years, being matched only by the coverage of
Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959. The message
conveyed is that of satisfaction. with recent developments in Soviet-
U.S. relations and of optimism about the future. The comment has
stressed two main themes in characterizing the results of the visit:
-t The visit has solidified the gains made at the Moscow summit of
1972, added mc,mentu.m tc the trends set in motion by that event,
and created an atmosphere conducive to f urrher practical achievements?
+ The talks have recorded a number of historic achievements, including
commitments to expand trade and to move ahead on strategic arms
control., The crowning achievement is the agreement on the prevention
of nuclear war,
POLITICAL Mosco;a has given a highly positive assessment of the
ASSESSMENT results of the .suiraui.it, going sec far as to assert that
its achie ements exceeded 411 e:;pectati'c s. Echoing
a theme developed in the weeks before the summit, r,.,e .,-:c-nrnent_ has
played up the notion that Br.ezhnev's visit marks a "povo:cot" or
`urning point in East-West relations, IZVESTIYA on 26 J'.rne expressed
confidence that the "long-awasted era cf post-war history is now
coming." Stressing the long-term nature of the developments
represented by the visit, the comment has presented it both as a
consummation of trends set in motion by the Moscow summit and as
a powerful new impetus to those trends,
A corollary theme is the notion that the summit represents a
political commitment with long-term implications, This theme was
stressed by Brezhnev himself at the Soviet embassy dinner on the
22d, when he reassured skeptics that the Soviet attitude toward
improved relations with the United States was "not something
temporary" but a policy that derived from permanent principles,
In underscoring this theme, the media has sought to provide
historical justification for a belief that U.S.,-Soviet detente
can be a stable, long-term proposition by emphasizing the absence
of inherently insoluble problems between the cwt nations and by
recalling the good relations they had enjoyed in the past. The
Approved For Release 19990 Y28EP,,U94-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
Moscow domestic service roundtable on the 24th concluded a review
of these relations with the assertion that the two countries had
"always ended up as allies" whenever their paths had crossed.
CONTINUING Neither Brezhnev nor Soviet commentators have
PROBLEMS attempted to gloss over the difficulties that
remain on the road to full normalization. Brezhnev
more than ou-' spoke of the long road ahead. At the Soviet embassy
dinner he acknowledged that "many unsolved problems" await solution,
citing specifically strategic arms limitation and trade. While the
media have focused primarily on the bright prospects for improved
relations they also have acknowledged the existence of problems,
including those posed by the U.S. domestic opposition. Yuriy
Zhukov and fellow correspondents in the 21 June PRAVDA reminded
their readers that the favorable turn in relations between the two
countries is not yet irreversible.
Moscow has displayed confidence, however, about the advantages and
durability of the new relationship it is cultivating with the United
States. It has b,:en much less cautious than in the past in publicly
acknowledging that common ground exists between the two countries on
key world problems. Although Moscow has reacted strongly to
charges that the summit represents a further example of superpower
"collusion," it has nevertheless not hesitated to portray a
deepening collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United
States an a wide range of issues and a joint U.S.-Soviet
responsibility for the maintenance of world peace.
In justifying its policy of improved relations with the United States,
Moscow has cited evidence from public opinion polls and elsewhere
of the rapidly changing attitude of Americans toward the USSR and
its policies. Though residual elements of opposition to bilateral
cooperation are duly noted, their importance is discounted.
Moreover, comment during the summit asserted that the Brezhnev
visit itself has contributed to the process. The domestic service
roundtable concluded that the summit and the agreements signed had
"radically altered the attitude of Americans toward the land of the
Soviets."
COOPERATION, TRADE Moscow has to a large extent eschewed extensive
comment on the individual cooperation agreements
signed during the course of the visit. The media has instead focused
on the impetus they are expected to give to the development of a
network of ties and to the encouragement of an attitude of coopera-
tion between the two countries. In explaining the need for increased
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
trade and the poteati.al of the USSh as a partner in trade, the
comment has genera.ly echoed the arguments that were fully expounded
in the media in the months preceding the summit.
As expected, the Soviet commentaries have emphasized trade as a key
element in the development of a better cooperative relationship.
They have focused on the sharp increase in trade registered during
the past year and on future prospects rather than on the difficulties
noted by U.S. economists and congressional critics. This approach
was likewise taken by Brezhnev in his official statements during the
visit. The media have been highly critical of the congressional
frustration of moat favored nation status for the USSR, with
IZVESTIYA calling it "intolerable discrimination to which the Soviet
Union cannot agree." At the same time, the PRAVDA report suggested
flexibility in the Soviet position by noting Washington POST reports
that the meeting with Congressmen had given rise to talk of
compromise--"and this is what the Soviet Union is seeking."
Most of the Soviet comment on trade was centered on Brezhnev's
meetings with members of Congress on 19 June and with prominent
U.S. businessmen on the 22d. On the first meeting, the comment
went to unusual lengths to acknowledge the critical role that
Congress will play In deciding the success of Brezhnev's efforts to
increase Soviet-American trade. lip discussing the meeting on the
22d, PRAVDA, along with most of the central press, gave front-page
treatment to Brezhnev's unusually candid remarks regarding the
mutuality of interests and the urgency of abandoning "obsolete
ideas and traditions" in this field, Sc'--ier accounts suggested
that Brezhnev had achieved some success in his talks, and it was
in this context that praise fcr his personal role, otheriiise at a
moderate level., was most. apparent.
STRATEGIC ISSUES The comment has described the agreement reached
on SALT as marking "a new step forward" and as
opening "favorable prospects" for a permanent. agreement on c:trategic
offensive arms in the future. Zhukov and others in the 22 June
PRAVDA. said that. the agreement. on the principles of negotiations
signed on the 219r should "accelera.:e" the talks, but they reflected
the cautious language of the agreement by speaking only of the
"possibility" that the eventual p-:rmanent agreement would limit
qualitative aspects of the arms race. Or. the whole, the media has
praised the SALT document in general terms but has avoided
substantive comment, hewing to a well-established practice on
sensitive SALT issues.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
Attentioa in the strategic area has been focused instead on the
agreement on prevention of nuclear war, signed on 22 June. That
agreement has bean portrayed by Soviet media an the main document
to emerge from the summit and as an event of supreme historical
significance. In addition to stressing its importance for U.S.-
Soviet bilateral relations, the comment has drawn particular
attention to its importance for third countries. TASS director
general Zamyatin, in a press conference at San Clemente reported
on the 22d, said that the agreement is inte:.ded in part to "prevent
the outbreak of nuclear war between either side and other states."
By playing up the image of superpower self-restraint implied by the
agreement, Moscow may hope to allay third country suspicions
regarding U.S.-Soviet "collusion" and in general give support to
its claim that U.S.-Soviet cooperation is beneficial to all
countries. It may also hope to counter the suspicions concerning
a possible Soviet nuclear strike against China. The comment has
already asserted that the agreement refutes the "superpower collusion"
charges made by the Chinese and the opponents of detente in the West.
In France on 26 June, Brezhnev reaffirmed the significance he
personally attaches to the agreement while reassuring the French
and other third parties potentially affected that the accord is
"in the vital interests of a7.1 peoples."
The aonuse of force pledge in the agreement is consistent with
Moscow's lon3 expressed desire and its efforts in recant years to
reach comprehezsive bilateral and regional nonuse of force agreements
with potential adversaries. Such agreements were a basic element of
the Soviet "peace program" outlined by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU
Congress in the spring of 1971. The USSR has concluded such a
treaty with the FRG and has proposed one to the Chinese. The
formulation in the U.S.-Soviet agreement differs from earlier Soviet
versions by pledging nonuse of force with respect to third countries
and by declaring the pledge applicable only in circumstances "which
may endanger international peace and security."
The emphasis on nonuse of force has largely replaced the earlier
Soviet advocacy of a specific ban on the use of nuclear weapons
alone--a notion which made little headway in the postwar period in
the face of West European concern about a nuclear an while Soviet con-
ventional forces remained intact. A Soviet proposal at the United
Nations last fall formally linked the two concepts for the first
time. Brezhnev in December 1972 announced a Soviet desire to follow
up he UN resolution by signing bilateral commitments with the
nuclear powers.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
EAST EUROPE ALLIES HAIL SUCCESS OF SUMMIT MEETINGS
Brezhnev'u U.S. visit was warmly approved by Moscow's orthodox
East Eurraean allies, who published the text of the 25 Juue final
communique in their main party dallies d;.: maintained a moderate
volume of favorable comment during the course of the summit. In
contrast to the treatment of the earlier Moscow summit, the comment
this time largely avoided criticism of the United States, stressing
instead the achievement of the summit a:3 a triumph for Moscow's
det?.ate policy. Sporadic criticism of Pekin in connection with
the visit appeared in the comment of Czechoslovakir., Huagary, and
Bulgaria.
Concern on the part of Romania and Yugoslavia over the implications
of the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations resulted in more restrair:ed
treatment of the recent summit by these two countries, as comparc;d
with their comment last year. Typically, Tirana stepped up its
diatribe against the alleged U.S.-Soviet "collusion."
CZEChOSLOVAKIA Moscow's most reliable allies in East Europe
POLAND, BULGARIA hailed the summit and the agreements that
accompanied it as an unprecedented and
unqualified success for the Soviet detente policy and for Brezhnev
personally. This success was attributed to the adoption of
"realistic" policies by the Nixon Administration allegedly prompted
by the repeated failure of the policies of the "cold war." The
achievements of the summit, however, were said to be opposed by
cold-war politicians in the United States and elsewhere in the West
and, as pointed out by Prague commentators, by the "Maoist"
leadership of China.
Following Brezhnev's departure from the United States, the Prague
party daily RUDE PRAVO commented that the Nixon-Brezhnev talks had
"followed the systematic and continuous current of the Soviet foreign
policy inicat.Lve, a current which the entire progressive world
correctly calls 'the peace offensive."' Referring to the 22 June
agreement on prevention of nuclear war, the paper added that "the
United States was compelled to sign" this document providing for
renunciation of the threat of force against the Soviet Union and
its allies. Also in the wake of this agreement, the Bratislava
radio on the 24th said unqualifiedly that Brezhnev's visit was
"the most productive summit in history,"
A Warsaw PAP commentary on the 23d was similarly lavish in declaring
that "the number and scope of agreements signed by L. Brezhnev and
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1.973
R. Nixon have no precedent in the history of international relations,"
and that "all these agreements provide breathtaking vistr.s"
regarding detente, removal of tensions, and arms control. The
Bulgarian military daily NARODNA ARMIYA on the 26th attributed
the trend toward detente in international relations "primarily
to the peaceful and constructive foreign policy of tho. Soviet Union
and the socialist countries," exemplified by Brezhnev's visit. A
RABOTNICHESKO DELO editorial on the 22d had noted, like Prague,
that the Soviet detente policies were not to the liking of either
the "cold war" exponento or "the Peking rulers."
Polish commentaries, including one in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 25th,
called attention to the effectiveness of Brezhnev's TV speech
both regarding its content and its impact on the American public.
Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 21st also noted the effectiveness
of. Brezhnev's informal appearances before American TV cameras.
GDR, HUNGARY Comment by East Berlin and Budapest was somewhat
more restrained, combining praise for the achievements
of Brezhnev's visit with reminders of the obstacl.c:a facing detente.
The visit did not receive primary attention in East Berlin newscasts
until the 25th, when the final communique appeared. In contrast
to the optimistic treatment of Brezhnev's TV speech by Warsaw and
Prague, an East Berlin radio commentary on the 25th used the speech
as the occasion for a long diatribe against the opponents of detente.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, which carried the text of the final communique
on the 26th, commented in the same issue that Brezhnev's visit
was "an" outstanding event in international relations and "a
significant contribution" to consolidating peace.
Hungarian comment, while more optimistic than that of the GDR
regarding the long-range impact of the summit, still manifested
caution in this regard. Thus NEPSZABADSAG's authoritative foreign
affairs commentator Ferenc Varnai observed on the 24th that even
with the "tremendous" results of the summit, "foreign political
experts and commentators are analyzing whether we are facing an
assured and lasting tendency" or "only a short-lived detente."
He went on to note that militarists ind anticommunists, whose
"role is still a significant one, are doing their utmost to curb
the present process." Varnai concluded that on balance the
situation "may develop in the world when a large part of the
socialist resources are not tied down by the expenditures of
military defense," but can be devoted to peaceful competition with
capitalism "in a hard and complex struggle over many more decades."
NEPSZABADSAG's correspond."nt on the 26th referred to the "not
yet completed balance of the Soviet-American summit" in noting that
Approved For Release 1999/6?YfPEL1*JRDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/PNF&-N'1'I RDP85T0087B5R0O0300060026-1
FIS 27 JUNE 1973
"more and more Americans understand and agree that, in the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union, the tradition sealed with the name of
President Franklin Roosevelt is beginning to dominate," This fact,
he added, is reflected in "the present American Government's
considerably deeper sense of reality" than that of its more regent
predecessors.
On the 16th, two days before Brezhnev's arrival, NEPSZABADSAG's
correspondent had bracketed opposition in the United States to
Brezhnev's visit i,i.th tendencies toward closer relations with the
People's Republic of China. The correspondent warned that "the
'ober American circles know well that this 'Chinese orientation'
would be a dangerous policy from the point of view of America's
interests."
ROMANIA, The two Independently oriented European communist
YUGOSLAVIA countries--fearful that intensified U.S.-Soviet
detente could be detrimental to their precarious
position vis-a-vis Moscow--evinced less enthusiasm for. Brezhnev's
visit than they had for the President's visit to the USSR. They
had, in turn, been less effusive about the Moscow summit than
they had been over the President's trip to Peking. In contrast
to the coverage of the Moscow summit, when Bucharest's SCINTEIA
commented favorably on the Presiient's visit the day after his arrival
in the Soviet Union, Romanian media carried only factual reports on
Brezhnev's visit to the United States, without comment, In addition
to Bucharest radio news bulletins, the party daily SCINTEIA carried
brief news reports of Brezhnev's activities and summaries of the
bilateral agreements on its back page tinder the heading "International
Life."
Yugoslav comment, smaller in volume than during the Moscow sumrmi.t,
treated Breztnev's visit as a success but noted "many obstacles"
remaining in the way of full rapprochement between the two countries.
Also, with obvious reference to the interests of the t'&i.rd-world
countries, Belgrade's POLITIKA cautioned on the 26th that "great
hopes stimulated by American-Soviet rapprochement should be confirmed
by practical broadening of the possibilities of democratizing
wotid relations," adding that "if these relations are not democratic,
t:hL.y cannot be firm." Similarly, BORBA urged the same day that
the results of the visit be applied to "the main problem" of peace,
security, and International cooperation "on an equal basis."
Another commentary, carried by the Belgrade domestic radio on the
26th, noted that 1:he final communique did not reflect agrec:.nent on
the Middle East, adding however that, "in spite of everything, the
Nixon-Brezhnev talks have yielded positive results."
Approved For Release I 90 P ~ A-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
ALBANIA Tirana stepped up the volume of its charges of
"collusion" between "the two superpowers" over the
level reached during the Moscow summit. A broadcast in Polish on
the 26th charged that "the numerous agreements" signed during
Brezhnev's visit "have been depicted in a demagogical way in the
communique as a considerable contribution to world peace," thus
"camouflaging the dangerous plots" between the two leaders. ATA
on the 24th assailed the agreement on prevention of nuclear war,
citing "foreign observers" to the effect that the United States and
the USSR "are continuing underground nuclear explosions." The
same report cited REUTER for the observation, regarding Brezhnev's
visit to San Clemente, that "the chieftain of the Soviet revisionists
'was the first leader of a foreign country to whom this honor has
been reserved."'
In one of the few references to Peking in the Albanian comment, an
editorial on Brezhnev's visit in the 21 June ZERI I POPULLIT
charged that "the brezhnev clique . . . aims at placing China in a
double encirclement, from one side with its armies which it has long
since concentrated along the Soviet-Chinese border and, on the
other, with the Americans who are setting foot and extending their hands
on Siberia" in the form of "broad plans for mass exploitation"
of its underground resources.
Approved For Release 1999/09tB5ri 1kRDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
(MIDDLE EAST
BREZHNEV CALLS FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT; MOSCOW REASSURES ARABS
The joint communiq'.e on Brezhnev's U.S. visit dealt with the Middle
East in much mare cursory fashion than the communique issued at
the conclusion of the President's visit to the USSR in May 1972,
but the two sides did pledge to continue their efforts to faciliate
a settlement. Brezhnev referred only briefly to the Middle East
in his speech on U.S. television, but this was in keeping with his
generally low-key i.reatment of major international questions.
Broadcasts in Mosccw's Arabic-language service during the Brezhnev
visit plA,-ed up the significance of his discussions there for
international detente and asserted that Arab public opinion considered
that the visit and "other Soviet foreign policy steps"--unspecified--
would have a "direct influence" on the Middle East situation.
Followup comment in Arabic described the Middle East passage of
the communique as in harmony with the interests of the Arabs and
claimed that it compelled "the forces of aggression" to take into
account "objective facts" of the contemporary world.
U.S.-SOVIET In the joint communique the sides expressed deep
COMMUNIQUE concern over the Middle East situation and exchang'd
opinions on ways of achieving a settlement, agreeing
"to continue their efforts to facilitate an earliest possible
settlement." As in the U.S.-Soviet communique on the May 1972
summit talks in Moscow, the current document qoted that the sides
"set out their positions" on the problem. But in a notable
variation from the 1972 communique the current one failed to repeat
the sides' expression of support for Security Council Resolution
242. The communique's failure to mention the resolution is the
more puzzling in view of Moscow comment before and after Brezhnev's
visit. Thus, a Petrov article in NEW TIMES (No. 23, 8 June)
observed that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet communique "officially sealed
the U.S. position" with regard to the need for a settlement of the
Middle East conflict on the basis of Resolution 242. And TASS
commentator Kornilov commenting on the summit meeting on 27 June
cited the resolution, and Jarring's mission, in reiterating Soviet
support for a peaceful political settlement.*
* Arab criticism of the communique for failing to mention Resolution
242 was obliquely acknowledged by TASS in a Beirut-datelined dispatch
on the 27th. According to TASS, a Lebanese paper editorially
defended the communique for speaking of "more important matters"
than those dealt with in the resolution--specifically, Palestinian
rights, which were "discussed for the first time at summit level."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :c0fBTUT00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL HIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
Lu the course of registering both sides' hopes for a settlement
In line with the interests of all states in the area, the
communique referred to the Palestinians' "leg.timate interests."
Such expressions of concern for the Palestinian people have long
been it staple of Soviet propaganda, but there was no such reference
in the 1972 Moscow communique.
BREZHNEV Brezhnev's brief remarks on the Middle East in his
TV ADDRESS television address were consistent with Moscow's
low-keyed treatment of the problem in recent months,
and Brezhnev himself in formal speeches has usually addressed the
Issue only in generalized terms. Remarking that he and the Presideut
had "touched" on the "acute" Middle East situation, Brezhnev
went on to express the belief that Justice must be insured in the
area and a lasting price settlement achieved which would restore
"the legitimate rights of those who suffered in the war" and would
insure "the security of all peoples of the area." While the
formulation on security of "all" peoples has seemed ca L uiated
to point to Israel,* Brezhnev might also have had in min_,, Arab
arguments that- their security interests should also be considered.
He added that this "is important for all the peoples of the Middle
East without exception."
Brezhnev's reference to "the legimate rights of those who suffered
in the war" would seem to be a variation of the phrase in his 21
December report last year on the 50th anniversary of the USSR.
On that occasion he called for "concrete political actions" to force
Israel to agree to a peaceful settlement and to recognize "the
legitimate rights of the Arab peoples." In that speech he had
pledged Soviet readiness to contribute to this effort and had
referred to resolution of the conflict on the bas2Aj of relevant
Security Council resolutions.
ASSURANCE During Brezhnev's visit, Moscow radio repeatedly
TO ARABS assured Arab listeners that the U.S.-Soviet summit
would not be detrimental to their interests.
Arabic-language broadcasts have said, among other things, that
the Soviet struggle for general international detente is compatible
* The security formulation has apparently been used as an alternative
to Moscow's previous expressions of support for Israel's right to
exist. Brezhnev in a speech in August 1970 declared Soviet support
for insuring "national rights, security, and independence for all
states" in the area. And a Soviet Government statement in September
1972 called for "an opportunity for all peoples of the area to live
in peace and security."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
with hopes ic,'r .1 just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Denying Arab press allegations of U.S,-Soviet "collusion,"
Moscow insisted thri' efforts to achieve a solution in the Middle
East do not at all mean that the USSR is anxious to settle the
problem ~'at any cost."
Moacr) 's reassurance has ueen directed in particular to Egypt,
and a %'PSU delegation's visit to Cairo coincided with the beginning
of Br 7',nev's U.S. trip. Arabic-language broadcasts reported that
the delegation stressed to its hosts--the Arab Socialist Union--
the significance of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks and at the same
time reaffirmed "consistent" Soviet assistance and support for the
Arabs' struggle for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories.
The delegation head, in an interview broadcast in Arabic on the
21st, insisted that officials of the Arab Socialist Union regarded
the Brezhnev visit as an important international event, while
"ordinary people" in Egypt expressed total satisfaction with the
USSR's peaceful coexistence policy.
The CPSU delegation apparently also sought to restrain Egyptian press
criticism of Moscow's Middle East policies: TASS reported on 17
June that at a meeting of the delegation with Deputy Prime Minister
for Culture and Education Hatim, the sides agreed that Egyptian and
Soviet mass media "should be urged only in the interests of strengthening,
developing, and propagandizing" the friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations,
and should expose all attempts to question the sincerity and strength
of this friendship,. Moscow has seemingly tried to keep its rejoinder
to recent Cairo press critiques in low key; thus a 2 June article
by the editor of the weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM speculating on the correct
interpretation of the Middle East passage In the May 1972 Soviet-
American communique drew no direct Soviet reply, but a week later
the Cairo paper published what it described as a response by
"officir_ Soviet sources" In Moscow,. The "Soviet official,"
maintained, according to AKHBAR AL-YAWM, that Brezhnev during his
meeting with Nixon would defend the Soviet. Union's interests in the
Middle East which they described as in line with Arab interests.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FB':S TRENDS
-7 JUNE 1973
INDOCHINA
Within two weeks after the conclusion of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
talks in Paris and the signing of the 13 June communique reaffirming
the Vietnam peace accord, both the PRG and the DRV have issued
of'icial protests over alleged Saigon violations of the agreements.
While Hanoi is generally more restrained than the PRG in criticizing
the United States, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
on the 26th und!rlined its view that the United States is responsible
for Saigon's actions.
Moscow continues its circumspect treatment of the United States while
deploring Saigon's violations of the peace accord. Brezhnev in his
24 June speech on U.S. television went beyond earlier Soviet
statements when he declared that "the improvement of Soviet-American
relations "ndoubtedly has played a role in helping to end the years-
long Vietnam war." Other forums for Soviet statements since the
peace agreement have not lent themselves to such a claim. But a
Soviet role in the settlement could be read into Brezhnev's 30 January
Moscow remarks in Le Duc Tho's presence that the USSR actively helped
its Vietnamese friends on the "diplomatic" as well as military and
political fronts. As though to reassure its allies of its concern
Moscow radio on the 23d broadcast in Vietnamese a PRAVDA article
warning that the prospects for full implementation of the peace
agreement have been darkened by reported Saigon military operations.
While rianoi hF.s carri,,:d brief reports of Brezhnev's activities during
his visit to the United States, it has refrained from comment.
Moreover, VNA excised an endorsement of the trip from is account of
a speech by Mongolian party chief Tsendenbal at a 22 Jui,e reception
honoring a DRV party-government delegation headed by Premier Pham Van
Dong. PRG media have ignored Brezhnev's tvip.
Le Duc Tho on 25 ?:une returned home from his Paris talks with Kissinger
after a week's sojourn in Moscow, from 16 to 23 June, and a stopover in
Peking on the 24th and 25th. There was no explanation for the lengthy
stay in Moscow, where he had been received on the 18th by Kirilenko and
Katushev. The Chinese gave him their standard reception--a meeting
with Chou En-lai for a "very cordial and friendly conversation" and a
banquet in his honor.
PRG. DRV PROTEST U.S., SAIGON "VIOLATIONS" OF PEACE ACCORD
The 25 June PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement accused both
the United States and Saigon of "violating their commitments by words
and deeds" during the past two weeks and demanded that they strictly
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONI EDIENTIAL FB!S TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
implement the pence accords. Tho statement Bald that, "first
and foremast," Saigon must "seriously" observe the cease-fire
ordcrr, and it claimed that in the two..-week period the GVN had
perpetrated 2,405 violations o; the cease-fire, including 184
infantry operations, two of thew of division size. Saigon, it
said, had also violated other provisions of the accord, including
those on guaranteeing the reailzntion of democratic liberties
and the return of prisoners, and had obstructed the consultnrive
talks with thr: PRG In Paris as well as the two-party JMC sessions
in Saigon.
DRV endorsement of the PRG charges came promptly on the 26th with
a foreign ministry spokesman's statement of its own. And the
seriousness with which the communists view the continued military
action in South Vietnam was demonstrated in an article in the Hanoi
army daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th. It asserted that the
PLAN has the right to "use all forces and take all measuree to
cope with Saigon's war acts," and it specifically warned that the
PLAF would not only respond to Saigon attacks in the "liberated
areas" but would also, "when recd be, directly strike at their
staging and command bases."
The complaints against t'ie United States were In terms of its
support of the GVN and of the continued U.S. bombing of Cambodia.
The PRG statement r^id that Saigon in vi.olating the accord had
been "supported and encouraged by the United States," The I)RV
spokesman protested that "the U.S. side has not taken any positive
action to make the Saigon administration seriously implement the
Paris agreement on Vietnam and the joint communique." Both the
PRG and the DRV statements made clear that they regard U.S. 'ombing
in Cambodia as a violation of the peace agreement and the Paris
communique. While the PRG spokesman directly challenged Kissinger's
13 June Paris press conference statement that the communique does
not restrict U.S. military activities in Cambodia, the spokesman for
the DRV, like earlier Hanoi comment, avoided mentioning Kissinger
and instead criticized only Schlesinger for his 18 June remarks.
Both statements cited Schlesinger as saying that he would not rule
out a resumption of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 27th suggested concern about
possible bombing of the North. Repeating earlier denials of
reports that a North Vietnamese jet had flown over Quang Tri a
week earlier, it asked rhetorically: "Did they fabricate these
stories in preparation for ncw sinister schemes and adventures?"
The paper pointed oul, that the c ory was released on the heels of
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONF IDENT IAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE, 1973
Schlesinger's statement raising the possibility of resumed
bo,d'tiing of the DRV and that it coincided with President Thieu's
19 June Armed Forces Dry statement that peace could only be
achieved by military force.
PRG ROLE The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on
the 25th took particular issue with GVN refusal
to recognize the legitimacy of the PRG in South Vietnam. The
spokesman specifically protested remarks by GVN Foreign Minister
Tran Van Lam, at n 14 June press conference, to the effect that
the zones of control mentioned in the Paris agreement are merely
areas of troop encampments and his view that the GVN is the only
legitimate government in South Vietnam. The PRG statement
charged that Lam had revealed the GVN design to annex PRG-administered
areas and to deny the "reality" that "there exist in South Vietnam
two administrations, two armies, and two zones of control."
Emphasizing the importance the PRG attaches to this point, the
spokesman added: "If this reality was not recognized, there would
be no Paris agreement, no act of the international conference on
Vietnam, and no joint communique."
While communist comment on the peace accord has argued that it
recognizes the situation in South Vietnam with the existence of two
administrations, the obverse proposition--that the agreement would
not have been reached without this recognition--has not been commonly
stated. But this notion was broached in a 10 June NHAN DAN editorial
on the international stature of the PRG. It maintained that "denying
the existence of the revolutionary administration means denying a
basis that led to the signing of the Paria agreement."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONF I I)EN'I' IAL IF 1115 'I'RI?NUS
27 JUNE 1973
KOREA
PYONGYANG DECRIES SEPARATE UN SEATS AS PROMOTING TWO KOREAS
In the condlt.l.on8 of stalemnu. fit the North-South Korean talks
on reunif.icaitlon, bot.ti Seoul and Pyongyang have made sharply
opposing moves in their Icckeyl.np, for pc,eltlon in the international.
cominunILy In anticipation of this fall's UNGA consideration of the
Korean c;uestlon. On 23 June, two days before the 23d nnnlversary
of the outbreak of Lite Korean War, ROK President Pak Chong-hui
announced n new policy supporting entry of' both North and South
gore.i into the United Nations, a policy he interpreted in the
Lonicxt ;)f big-power developments as well the flagging momentum in
relations between the Korean reg:.mes. Later that day North Korean
Leader KA',m I1-song expressed acute concern over the effect of
separate membership in the UN on perpetuating a two-Koreas situatira,
and he countered by refurbishing Pyongyang's proposal for a
North-South confederation nP ;: means [or enter'ng the world body
under one name. At the same I.ime, both sides nave expressed
readiness to be represented separately at the UNG, debate on Korea,
Pak having dropped Seoul's opposit.'.on to a North Korean presence,
and Kim having omitted the demand that Pyongyang be invited
"UflCOfl(I it mull I)' -
Kim elaborated the U1'RK's line at a Pyongyang rally honoring a
visiting Czechoslovak delegation that began only ten hours after
Pak's sp^.ech on the 23d. Avoiding ar.y mention of Pak by name or
any explicit reference to his statement earlier that clay, Kim
accused the "South Korean authorities" of obstructir.g the North-
South dialog and -eekir,g to perpetuate the division of Korea.
Reflecting Lite deadlock in the talks between the two sides, Kim
acknowle(!ge,l that "Lite bright prospect foi national unification
which was opened before our nation when the historic North-South
joint statement was publlsaed a year ago is now darkening." He
then proceeded to "newly clarify" Pyongyang's proposals, including
the convening of a "national assembly" comprising North and South
Korean groups and fcrming it North-Scuth confederation, "leaving
intact tL' two systems existiig in the North and South for the
time being.''
Embellishing this proposal,, Kim suggested that the confederation
be named "the C-u:ederal Republic of Koryo," taking the name of a
Korean kingdom from the 10th to the 14th centuries which Kim
described as "the worldwide-known name of a united state which
existed once on the territory of our country." Adapting this
Approved For Release 1999Mi2f ldtALRDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CON I? IDENTIA;. hBIS 'T'RENDS
27 JUNE 1973
suggestion to Pyongyang's opposition to separate membership in
the UN, Kim declared that if the two Korean des "want to enter
the UN before the achievement of the reunification of the country,
they should enter it as one state nt least under the name of the
Confederal Republic of Koryo" after a confederation has been
arranged. Kim indicated that in the meantime, however, he
wanted Pyongyang's voice to be heard in international forums.
lie said that "separately" from the question of UN membership,
the DIRK "should naturally be invited" to take part in the
discussion if the i{orean question is inscribed on the UN agenda.
Ile made no reference to Pyongyang's longstanding insistence that
is be invited unconditionally.
Where his South Korean counterpart had invoked international
realities as Justifying a policy which acknowledges two Korean
regimes competing in the international arena, Kim registered
disquiet over the stabilizing effect of improved U.S. relations
with the big communist powers. lie twice attacked the United States
for seeking to dominate smaller nations while "improving its
relations only with big countries," and ho criticized th^ Nixon
Doctrine as designed to create two Koreas. The international
considerations in Pyongyang's reaction to Pak's demarche were
,evident in a 25 June KCNA assessment of the statement by "the
person in high authority" in South Korea. Deriding Pak's
statement as revealing his unchanged "treacherous stand" on
Korean unification, KCNA complained that separate entry into
the United Nations would foster a two-Koreas situation "even in
the international arena," and it look exception to his
"impertinent" overture for contacts with the communist countries.
KOREAN WAR Pyongyang's treatment of this year's Korean War
ANNIVERSARY anniversary muted the customary vituperation
against the United StL,es and the ROK while
focusing on "the program for preventing the country from being
divided indefinitely and promoting the cause of reunification"
advanced in Kim's "historic speech" of 23 June. As if to under-
score the importance of Kim's proposals, the usual Pyongyang
rally on the 25,.h drew a higher-level leadership representation
than last year ai:d the size of the rally crowd was given as
200,00--ten times larger than last year. Premier Kim I1 and
Vice Premier Pak Song-chol headed this year's turnout followed
by KPA Chief of General Staff 0 Chin-u, the ranking leader at
'.ust year's rally. 0's address at the rally consisted almost
entirely of a reiteration of the major points contained in Kim's
23 June uneec.:, 0 pointed specifically at the "so-called 'special
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFI.DEN'1' IAL FBI.S TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
statement' made public by the person in high authority of South
Korea on 23 June" as evidence that "the South Korean authorities
do not want the ccuntry's reunification." 0 refrained, however,
from criticizing Pak by name in calling for the "South Korean
authorities" to "give up at once the plot to create 'two Koreas'
and respond without delay to our proposal for foundinn, the
Confederal Republic of Koryo between the North and the South."
PEKING In keeping with its close ties with Pyongyang, Peking
promptly weighed in with support for Kira Tl-song's
position on Korean unification, Only a day after Kim's 23 June
speech, Chou En-lai used the occasion of a banquet given by the
visiting Malian president to endorse Kim's "new initiative" as
one that "will truly help toward the independent and peaceful
reunification of Korea and the further relaxation of the tension
in the Korean per.insu.la." NCNA highlighted Chou's endorsement
by issuing a separate report on his remarks about Korea.
Peking also used the Korean War anniversary to offer authoritative
support for the North Korean line, but its treatment of the
anniversary reflected Peking's improved relations with the United
States and Japan--two targets of Kim's polemical thrusts. A
25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the anniversary
expressed support for Kim's elaboration of Pyongyang'% proposals
on Korean reunification--including his objection to separate UN
seats--and 1143 demands for a U>S. troop withdrawal and tc.
dissolution of. UNCURK. Using an image favored by Mao in recent
months for expressing Peking's affinities w.tth ether Asian
communists, the editorial said that "China and Korea are of
one family." However, Peking's divergences from Pyongyang
regarding relations with the United States and Japan were
reflected in the editorial's mild treatment of the United
States and its failure to repeat last year's attacks on
"Japanese militarism." For the second successive year, Peking
failed to hrld a rally to mark the anniversary.
The Taiwan question, which formerly figured prominently in
Pe!?.ing's ubservance of the Korean Wa: anniversary, received only
a pro forma past+age in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, which
notably failed t_Q mention the United States in this co_itext.
The editorial omitted last year's criticism of two-Chinas
proposals and failed to renew the demand for the United States
to withdraw its troops from Taiwan, That demand was last presented
authoritatively in the editorial marking the Korean War anniversary
last year.
Approved For Release 1999/09/259081bD 3l *5T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
MOSCOW The Soviets have been less reserved than a year ago
in reacting to Pyongyang's moves on Korean reunifica-
tion, but there has been only sketchy comment thus far. TASS
briefly reported a "warm and friendly" meeting on the 26th
between Premier Kosygin and the DPRK ambassador at the latter's
request at which kosygin termed Kim's proposals an "important
initiative" aimed at "easing tension on the Korean peninsula."
Also on the 26th, a Moscow broadcast in Korean told of a press
conference in Moscow held by the DPRK embassy to explain the
reunification policy "newly clarified" by Kim, but the specific
terms of the policy were not discussed.
Another Soviet broadcast in Korean en the 26th reported the
customary Iioscow rally on the 25th to mark the Korean War
anniversary and the attendant Soviet-Korean "solidarity month."
The chairman of the Soviet-Korean friendship society voiced
support for Pyongyang's reunification poiicy.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1
FBIS TRENDS
27 JUNE 1973
- i -
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 JUNE 1973
Moscow (2909 items)
Peking (1117 items)
Brezhnev in U.S.
(17%)
55% Domestic Issues
(41%)
42%
[Brezhnev Speeches (--) 20%]Mali President in PRC
(--)
13%
[U.S.-Soviet
Agreements
(--)
8%] DPRK Ec Gnomic Delegation
in PRC
(2%)
6%
China
(5%)
3% PRC Foreign Minister in
(7%)
5%
Soviet Local
(7%)
3% Iran, Pakistan
Elections, 1; June
Cambodia
(7%)
5%
Vietnam
(3%)
2% [Sihanouk in East
Europe
(4%)
3%]
(19%)
4%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Mcscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060026-1