TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060037-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: August 29, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
F B IS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
29 AUGUST 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 35)
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A
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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29 AUGUST 1973
CONTENTS
Party Congress Reflects Enhanced Authority of Chou Coalition. . . . . 1
Moscow Condemns "Mao Group" for Trying to Scuttle Detente . .
DRV Commentator Lauds Strength of Communist Forces in South . .
Moscow Attacks Detente Foes, Warns of Ideological 3sbversion. . . . .
10
Moscow Offers Countercharges i--c Schlesinger MIRV Announcement . .
Moscow's East Europe Allies Register General Approval . . . . . . . .
14
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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CHINA
PARTY CONGRESS REFLECTS ENHANCED AUTHORITY OF CHOU COALITION
Meeting in secret without prior announcement, the Chinese have
held their party congress to formalize the results of the Lin Piao
affair and to sanction a new leadership coalition marked by
Chou En-tai's enhanced authority. The CCP's 10th congress, held
from 24 to 28 August "at a time when the Lin Piao antiparty clique
has been smashed," was nut announced until the day after it closed.
Mao presided and was accorded his honorific title of "great leader,"*
but he did not speak at the congress, as he had at the previous one
in April 1969. The political report, delivered at the previous
congress by Lin, was given by Chou, whose status second only to Mao
was reflected also in the leader rankings at the congress- The
29 August press communique, the only document thus far available,
also reported that rising star Wang Hung-wen delivered the report on
the revision of the party constitution and that a new central
committee was elected.
In addition to expelling Lin, "the bourgeois careerist, conspirator,
counterrevolutionary doubledealer, renegade and traitor," the
congress also expelled Chen Po-ta, "principal member of the Lin Piao
antiparty clique, anticommunist Kuomintang element, Trotskiyite,
renegade, enemy agent and revisionist." This marked the first
official public denunciation of Lin and Chen. The communique treads
gingerly around "the other principal members" of the Lin clique, the
central military figures in the Politburo who were purged in the fall
of 1971. The communique notes merely that the congress supported
unspecified decisions and "all the corresponding measures" taken with
.regard to these unnamed figures.
While formally announcing the expulsion of Lin and Chen, the congress
communique calls for continuation of the campaign of criticizing Lin
and rectifying the style of work, using the Lin clique as a teacher
by negative example. This suggests that the cong:ess' main purpose
was to dispose of the Lin affair at; the top ranks but that no new
policy lines have been determined. On the international front, the
communique stresses the line on drawing wide support against "the
hegemonism of the two superpowers," naming the United States ahead of
* In his last appearance, receiving two Chinese-American doctors on
2 August, Mao was called merely "the leader" of the Chinese people.
See the TRENDS of 8 August 1973, pages 12-13.
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the Soviet Union. In a striking reference to Sino-Soviet
tension, the communique calls for vigilance in'particular
against "surprise attacks by social imperialism." Though the
communique fails to use the formulation that Moscow's "social
imperialism represents a danger greater than old-line
imperialism, such a reference to a possible Soviet strike
reflects the Chineje leaders' fundamental suspicion toward
Moscow.*
Judging by the leader rankings given in the press communique's
account of congress proceedings, Chou and his allies in a
party-centered coalition have consolidated their power in the
process of overcoming the Lin affair. The communique lists a
congress presidium of Mao as chairman, Chou: Wang, Kang Shang,
Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Te-sheng as vice chairmen, and Chang;
Chun-chiao as secretary general. If the pattern of the ninth
congress holds, this group will corm the new Politburo Standing
Committee. Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-;*uan, generally regarded
as radical elements who may be the source of recent sniping at
Chouist policies, are ranked {.n another group that might largely
compose the remainder of the Politburo. The two incumbent
Politburo members who are military regional leaders, Hsu Shih-yu
and Chen Hsi-lien, are included in this second-level group.
The strength of Chou and his allies was demonstratively reflected
in appearances during the course of the five-day congress. On
the second day, reports on the attendance of all of the active
Peking-based Politburo members at an international table tennis
tournament registered Chiang Ching's change in status. In the
live television coverage and the original NCNA report of the
event, Chiang was listed in her normal position ahead of Chou's
close associate Yeh Chien-ying, but all the later reports reversed
that order. There had been two precedents for Yeh ranking ahead
of Chiang, including one last March at a time when the leadership
was evidently engaged in major deliberations.
* Sinkiang party chief Saifudin, who was elected a full member
of the new Central Committee, was present at his Urumchi home
base on the 26th for the opening of the region's trade union and
women's congresses. Speaking In that border area, Saifudin
named "Soviet revisionism" ahead of "U.S. imperialism" and warned
about the "aggressive nature of Soviet revisionist social
imperialism." His speech was carried in the. Sinkiang media.
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Midway in the congress, on the 26th, Peking signaled the political
strength of Chou by resurrecting two former Politburo members who
had fallen victim to the cultural revolution. Tan Chen-lin and
Uianfu, the most important officials to be rehabilitated since
former secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping resurfaced last April as
a vice premier, were named by NCNA as attending the table tennis
tournament that day. No titles were given for them in the NCNA
report, but both were included in the list of full members of
the new Central Committee elected at the congress.
The return to grace of Tan, an agricultural specialist whose
expertise must be welcome now, is the most dramatic testimony
to Chou's ability to fill the leadership void created by the Lin
affair with leaders who had been purged during the cultural
revolution. Reviled by name in the central media, Tan was
accused of seeking to protect government offices from Red Guard
attack. According to Red Guard sources, Tan was attacked by
Chiang Ching for "opposing the great proletarian cultural
revolution and attempting to write off the achievements of the
great proletarian cultural revolution." The cultural revolution's
achievements hardly figure in the 10th congress communique, which
mentions that event only in noting that the new Central Committee
includes "young comrades who newly joined the party" during- the
cultural revolution.
BACKGROUND The ninth congress, meeting for over three weeks in
April 1969, was announced on the day it opened, and
an interim communique was issued two weeks into the proceedings to
report that the new constitution and Lin's political report had been
approved. The constitution and the political report, delivered on
the first day of the congress, were released on 27 April, three days
after the congress closed. The new Politburo was announced on
28 April, the day when the new Central Committee held its first
plenum.
The eighth congress was held in two sessions, for two weeks in
September 1956 and for two and a half weeks in May 1958.
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U S S R - C H I N A
MOSCOW CONDEMNS "t'O GROUP" FOR TRYING TO SCUTTLE DETENTE
Moscow's detente policy toward the West and Peking's vigorous
effort to undercut it have brought the Sino-Soviet rivalry into
sharper focus and wade the likelihood of significant improvement
in their relations as remote as ever. Brezhnev's gloomy
assessment of Sino-Soviet relations in his 15 August Alma-Ata
speech was sandwiched between two major PRAVDA articles under
the authoritative byline "I. Aleksandrov" taking a sharply
hostile approach to the China problem: A 7 August article
denounced the Chinese in connection with a forceful appeal for
communist unity in the wake of the late-July Crimea conference:*
and a 26 August article developed a lengthy bill of particulars
to indict Peking on the counts of sabotaging detente and
promoting neutralist sentiments regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict.
As in the 7 August article, which also expressed concern over
neutrality in the communist movement, the one on the 26th
invoked the 1969 international party conference and its two
predecessors in charging the Chinese with diverging from the
"collectively" determined line of the communist movement.**
The latest article reflected Soviet pique over Romania's
determinedly independent stance, observing that the Chinese urge
"individual" communist parties "at least to renounce criticism"
of Peking and to assume a neutral position. The article cited
the April CPSU plenum as denouncing Peking for struggling
against cohesion within the communist movement, and claimed that
Peking's foreign policy reflects most clearly its rupture with
"class and Marxist-Leninist positiors" in both theory and practice.
Neither the second Aleksandrov article nor Brezhnev's 15 August
speech cited peaceful coexistence as a basis for Sino-Soviet
relations. The 7 August article had cited the April plenum
as having reconfirmed Moscow's desire for normal relations based
on peaceful coexistence, though the published plenum resolution
had not in fact done so. Moscow is clearly having difficulty
* See the TRENDS of 8 August 1973, pages 1-3.
** Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies treated the second Aleksandrov
article this month much as they did the first one. Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland published the text of
the article in their party dailies. Hungary carried a shorter
version. Romania ignored both articles.
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defining its position on this matter. hoping to remove the
? ideological dimension from the Sino-Soviet negotiations but
hesitant about reading the PRC out of the ranks of social st
states.
The 26 August article incorporated in full Brezhnev's 15 August
remarks on the admittedly stalemated Sino-.Soviet negotiations.
Recalling that he had addressed this subject in Alma-Ata
three years ago, Brezhnev put the blame squarely on the Chinese
for the failure to achieve any "notable progress" toward
improving state relattons. He in effect demanded that the
Chinese renounce their current policies toward the Soviet Union
as the condition for an upturn in Sino-Soviet relations. Fuxther
spelling out the Soviet position, the 26 August PRAVDA article
recalled that Moscow has repeatedly advanced "constructive"
proposals on the border question and offered to conclude an
agreement on nonuse of force more than two years ago.
Brezhnev's somber glance back at the years of stalemate contrasts
with the sanguine tone of his remarks in Alma-Ata three yevri ago.
While acknowledging at that time that the border talks were
"going slowl"," he did not blame the Chinese and instead stressed
that Moscow is "not losing hope" and will "continue to display a
constructive and patient approach" in the hope that the Chinese
"will respond in the same way." Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev
had arrived in Peking 13 days earlier to assume the post of
chief Soviet negotiator at tha talks. Similarly, Brezhnev's
major conciliatory address in March 1972 had coincided with
Ilichev's return to the Peking negotiations. Brezhnev's latest
speech, delivered at a time of T_lichev's absence from Peking,
contained only a pro forma assertion that Moscow's readiness to
normalize relations with Peking, combined with resolute struggle
against "Maoism as a trend hostile to Leninism," remains
unchanged.
In addition to nriplifying the communique on the Criu_ea meeting,
Moscow's current polemical offensive may be timed for the
Chinese party congress as well as next month's Algiers conference
of nonalined nations. It may have been with an eye to the latter
that the latest Aleksandrov article struck at Peking's efforts to
identify with the third world against the superpowers. The
article also accused Peking itself of aspiring to become a nuclear
superpower, and both the recent Chinese nuclear test and Mao's
alleged 1957 remark about accepting the sacrifice of half of
? mankind were invoked to portray the Chinese as addicted to war
as a primary political instrument.
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In view of the widely anticipated Chinese congress, it may be
significant that the 26 August article repeatedly referred to
"Mao Tse-tung's group," an anathema formula introduced in the
landmark 27 November 1966 P:RAVDA editorial article and justifying
efforts to work within or outside China to overturn an illegimate
faction. lu an intriguingly curious citation of a Khrushchev-era
document on Sino-Soviet relations, the latest. Aleksandrov article
quoted a statement from the February 1964 CPSU plenum Lu the
effect that Peking was virtually alining it.ielf with the
reactionary elements of imperialism. The article added that "this
warning was not heeded in Peking."
The February 1964 plenum statement on China had been delivered by
Suslov, in a show of unity bohind Khrushchev, and was published
belatedly seven weeks later. During that period there was a
further exchange of letters between the two sides involving
Soviet proposals to renew the abortive bilateral talks held in
July 1963 and to prepare for a new international party conference.
Suslov's February 1964 report called for a new conference in
order to undertake a "collective" effort to promote communist
unity. That an authoritative PRAVDA article now should recall
as a "warning" the Suslov report's reference to Peking's
convergence with "imperialism" may reflect a new effort by
Moscow to probe Chinese leadership ranks for elements concerned
that Peking may have gone too far toward antagonizing Moscow
while moving closer to the West. As Suslov had calmed China's
alliance with the communist countries the guarantee of its
advancement along the path of socialism, the Aleksandrov article
pointed out that China's socialist development can be assured
not along the path of struggle against the Soviet Union but in
"alliance and fraternal cooperation" wicii it.
Whatever alements tl'o Soviets might hope to sway toward a more
balanced position between the Soviet Union and the United States,
the Aleksandrov article's repeated citations of Chou En-lai in an
unfavorable context suggest that the Chinese premier is not
Moscow's man., Moscow is thus not likely to be reassured by the
Chouist orientation of the CCP congress that was in secret session
at the time of he second Aleksandrov article.*
* See the China section of this issue of the TRENDS.
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INDOCHINA
DRV COMMENTATOR LAUDS STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH
After a hiatus of almost a year, Hanoi media have carried two
articles attributed to "Chien Thang" (Victor)--a pseudonym
that ha, appeared periodically In the past in connection with
some of Hanoi's most outspoken arguments for the 1972 communist
offensive and its sharpest criticism of detente with the
United States. The current articles--published in the North
Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and broadcast by Hanoi
radio on 18 and 25 August--appear to be arguing that a new
military effort in South Vietnam "ould succeed. They thus stand
in marked contrast to the essentially temporizing comment since
the January peace agreement, which suggested that Hanoi was
preserving its options while strengthening its forces and
evaluating the situation in the South.
Since the provisions of the peace agreement which would have
facilitated communist political gains in the South have not been
implemented, it is not surprising that such a traditional
proponent of decisive military action as Chien Thang should now
be raising the question of eventually returning to a military
confrontation. It would appear that his two articles may open a
new round of debate over policy rather than reflect an official
decision. The Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP)--
which would be expected to ratify any major new program--is not
known to have met in plenary session since the 20th plenum early in
1972. With the announcement that First Secretary Le Duan on
28 August left Moscow for home after his si::-week vacation in the
Soviet Union, the stage seems to be set for a leadership review of
the post-agreement situation and the results of Le Duan's visits in
Moscow and Peking as a necessary prelude to the adoption of a future
course of action.
Whf 1e the Chien Thang articles offered a pro forma pledge of
determination to carry out the provisions of the Paris agreement
and the 13 June joint communique, their main thrust was that the
L3lance of forces in Indochina has shifted decisively and that the
communists are in an advantageous position to achieve complete
victory. The commentator maintained that the forces in the South
are already adequate to launch an important military effort: "The
southern revolution's forces in place (taij choox) now have
sufficient strength to initiate developments of strategic signifi-
cance." Clearly assuming North Vietnam's continued military
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involvement in the South, he also asserted that the North has
always played "an extremely important role" in the balance of
forces "in the entire country," and added: "Never before could
the North's effect upon the revolution throughout the country
develop as favorably as it is doing now."
Chien Thang touched upon other questions which would figure
in a Hanoi debate over its future course of action in the South.
For example, he indirectly deprecated the importance of U.S.
economic aid for the Nortb by noting that while some countries
have been subverted by the bait of U.S. economic assistance,
the Vietnamese could not be "seduced" by "riches." He similarly
seemed to downplay the role of assistance from Vietnam's
communist allies: acknowledging that past aid was "extremely
important," he argued that the aid had to be used in Vietnamese
conditions and that "our people's subjective effort was the
most decisive factor."
BACKGROUND Chien Thang had been closely identified with the
1972 communist offensive: He signed an article
published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the party paper NHAN DAN on
24 March 1972--six days before the offensive was launched--which
set up Hanoi's rationale for the attacks, contending that the
communists were in an advantageous position and that major
battles by main forces were required to further alter the balance
of forces. After the offensive was launched, a 10 April 1972
Hanoi report on the VWP 20th Plenum held earlier that year, made
clear that the line pressed by Chien Thang was identical-with the
view endorsed by the plenum. As early as March 1971, Chien Thang
had argued that conditions were ripe for communist attacks, and
in ? August 1971 article he had stressed the importance of the
role of main force units. His 13uspicions of the United States
were reflected in a highly polemical article published a day later,
on 3 August 1971, which responded to Peking's rapprochement with
the United States with a comprehensive indictment of all who would
moderate their "struggle" against the United States or shift the
focus of that struggle from the "main enemy."
Prior to Chien Thang's recent resurfacing, his last previous article
was published on 22 September 1972 in both the army and party
dailies. In light of Hanoi's presentation of its comprehensive draft
peace agreement to the United States at the secret Paris talks two
weeks later, on 8 October, Chien Thang seemed to be arguing against
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any major concessions in the negotiations. Warning against
Nixon's "crafty diplomatic tricks" and putting the best possible
face on the military situation, he contended that Saigon's army
could not handle communist main-force attacks and that the U.S.
air and naval forces would not be able to compensate for Saigon's
earlier losses.*
* Previous Chien Thang articles are discussed in the TRENDS of
4 and 18 August 1971, and 12 January, 29 March, 12 April, 3 May,
23 August, and 27 September 1972.
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- 10 -
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCOW ATTACKS DETENTE FOES. WARNS OF IDEOI OGICAL SUBVERSI,)N
While drawing the lines of battle with Peking in terms calculated
to portray the latter as pro-imperialist and anti-socialist,
Moscow has been applying a similar tactic to sharpen the lines
of ideologici,'_ struggle in the West. Apparently believing that
a divide and conquer strategy will help stem any erosion of
ideological allegiance in a period of detente, as well as stiffen
Ear* European support for its policies :ln the forthcoming rounds
of .:ast-West. negotiations, Moscow has stepped up its attacks
on alleged opponents of detente in the West. In a series of
commentaries over the past several. weeks, Moscow has projected
an image of growin, reaction; in the West to the trend toward
improved East-West relations. At the same time, it has stressed
the potential dang-rs of detente itself, warning that the c.nemies
of socialism can cie it to undermine the socialist countries'
vigilance and unity.
EXTERNAL THREAT In depicting the growth of reaction in the
West, Moscow has employed a device made
familiar during the years of Stalinist: repression, In a virtual
paraphrase of Stalin's dictum that the class struggle intensifies
as the goal of socialism approaches, a commentator on the Moscow
domestic service on 20 August explained: "the deeper detente
goes the more violent will be the resistance from the reactionary
forces." In this light, he went on to detail activities in the
FRG over the past year which allegedly illustrated the efforts
of the forces represented by such figures as Axe]. Ppringer and
Franz Joseph Strauss to block the progress towar._ East-West
detente. Other familiar targets of Moscow's criticism hai?e been
trotted out in other commentaries. The German transmitter
Deutsche Welle was attacked in a LITERARY GAZETTE article on
15 August. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty came {n for sharp
criticism in a Yuriy Zhukov commentary on Moscow domestic service
on 18 August. Even the new U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
was given a critical profile in RED STAR on 18 August, although
Moscow has refrained from attacking U.S. policy directly.
Along with these familiar targets, Moscow has ati.acked what it
describes as an upsurge of neo-fascism in the West. In an
article entitled "The Black International," carried in LITERARY
GAZETTE on 15 August, author Ernst Henri described the emergence
throughout Western Europe of reactionary terrorist organizations
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- 11 -
"stirred to fury" by detente. Spiced with references to "execution
squads," secret staffs nestled in Bavaria and the like, they article
conveyed the imprc-ssion that such organizations threaten the
political Fcability of Western Europe. "Is it fortuitous,"
the author asked, "that in recent months. . . reports on the
wild attacks of new fascist bands are arriving almost continously
from different countries of the capitalist world?"
INTER'AL THREAT Along with the crude attacks on the alleged
foreign enemies of detente, Moscow has
stressed the more subtle internal dangers posed by detente.
It has pointedly warned against the theory, allegedly perpetrated
by bourgeois ideologists, that detente signifies the onset of a
new era in International relations in which class conflicts are
superseded by world brother