TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 17, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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STATSPEC Confidentia
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
17 APRIL 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO, 16)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with n'her U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 APRIL 1974
CONTENTS
Teng Speech Confirms PRC Activist, Open Foreign Policy .
Gromyko Reaffirms Soviet Views on Energy, World Situation . . .
USSR-SYRIA
Moscow Greets President al-Asad With Ceremonial Flourishes
INDOCHINA
Hanoi, PRG Deny That Communists Overran South Vietnamese Base .
12
DRV Delegation Ends Tour With Moscow, Peking Stopovers .
13
Hanoi City Party Congress Elects New Secretary . . . .
14
YUGOSLAVIA
Tito Registers Defiance to "Pressures" From Abroad . . . . .
17
FRENCH ELECTIONS
Moscow Ranks French Candidates: Chaban, Mitterrand, Giscard .
19
EUROPE
Moscow Sees "Monopolies" Behind U.S.--EC Differences .
20
USSR
K.OMMUNIST Chief Editor Removed Amid Signs of Disgrace . . . .
22
CHINA
Rehabilitated Cadre Named to PLA-Vacated Kwangtung Posts . . . .
25
NOTE
Moscow on PAC Disarmament Role . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics .
i
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CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
17 APRIL 1974
UNGA SESSION
TENG SPEECH CONFIRMS PRC ACTIVIST, OPEN FOREIGN POLICY
Teng Hsia.o-ping's 10 April. speech to the UNGA special session
provided a new and broader framework for Peking's claim of
kinship with developing countries while reaffirming that Peking
is not turning away from its recent closer relations with the
Went. Teng also affirmed that the current PRC anti-Confucius
ideological campaign will not cause a retreat from the international
scene--as did the cultural revolution--but that it will instead
serve to maintain the revolutionary activism of. PRC foreign policy
during the current favorable period of "great disorder under heaven."
Both the United States and the USSR come under attack as superpowers
bullying the smaller countries, but Teng continued the recent PRC
practice of treating the USSR in far harsher terms.
In noting the "drastic division and realinement" in the world, Teng
referred to the breakup of the "socialist camp" and the disintegra-
tion of the "Western imperialist bloc," recalling the thesis of
the authoritative 1972 New Year's Day joint editorial which had
stressed the regrouping of international forces to rationalize
Peking's invitation to President Nixon and other moves in foreign
relations. Reiterating Peking's premise that U.S.-Soviet rivalry
is irreconcilable--the paramount "contradiction" of the present
age, and the chief cause of world disorder--Teng implicitly
reaffirmed that Peking sees ample opportunities for continued
Chinese maneuvering in the triangular relationship..
The circumstances surrounding Teng's presence at the United Nations
serve to underscore his address as a major statement of PRC foreign
policy aims. The speech is the first by a member of the PRC
Politburo in a Western country since the cultural revolution.
Peking also acted to present Teng as the envoy of a united PRC
leadership, not a particular faction, by providing him with a
high-level farewell ceremon'y in Peking, attendee by almost all
active, Peking-based Politburo leaders.*
PRC-THIRD WORLD Teng carefully stuck to the framework of the
SOLIDARITY flexible Chouist foreign policy of recent
years, stressing that the present situation
is one in which "international relations are changing drastically,"
but added the notion that international regrouping has new reached
0
* Teng's departure is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974,
page 27.
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CONFIDENTIAL, FBIS TRENDS
17 APRIL 1974
the point where "three worlds" have been formed: one consisting
of the United States and the Soviet Union; one, made up of China
and other developing states; and one representing developed
states that sometimes oppress developing nations but which in
turn are subject to oppression by one or both superpowers,
Teng's groupings represent a departure from Peking's previous,
longstanding framework which held that China and its socialist
allies were on one side, the imperialist powers led by the
United States and the USSR were on the other, and between them
lay two "intermediate zones": one made up of developing,
non-socialist third world states and the other of developed
nations such as France that were opposed to superpower dominance.
Peking had been moving gradually in the direction of Teng's
view over the past few years, with spokesmen noting in particular
the growing unity of the "small and medium-sized countries"
against the superpowers. Chou En-lai in his 24 August 1973
report to the 10th CCP Congress called on world. nations to form
the "broadest united front" against the superpowers.
An effect of Teng's new division is to drop Peking's former
insistance on socialist credentials for its close allies, and
thereby open the way for more intimate Chinese unity with the
entire third world. In portraying an attractive image for the
developing nations, Tang was at pains to demonstrate PRC solidarity
with them and all oppressed nations and peoples, and to show China's
determination not to become a superpower. In this regard, Teng
referred to the cultural revolution and to the current domes.1c
campaign against Confucius and Lin Piao as designed in part to
insure that Peking, while pursuing a greater role on the inter-
national scene through flexible policies, will not lose its
bearings as a socialist state committed to third ward interests.
On issues of specific import to the developing nations at the
session, Teng lauded the Arab use of the oil weapon during the
Middle East waras a model for third world struggles and broadly
supported moves to safeguard political independence and sovereignty
over resources. He took a more moderate stand than some speakers
by avoiding a blanket call for nationalization, but asserting
support for steps to control. fore:tgn influence "up to and including
nationalization," He also stated that developing countries should
"gradually shake off control. of foreign capital." Meng assumed a
flexible attitude toward the role of trade and foreign exchanges--
subjects of supposed debate within the Chinese leadership. The
vice premier stuck to Peking's stress on self-reliance but also
affirmed the Chinese belief that this in no way means "self-seclusion"
or rejection of foreign exchanges on an equitable basis.
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17 APRIL 1974
SINO-SOVIET ISSUES While generally softpedaling criticism
of the United States, Teng strove to
isolate Moscow with a tough indictment of Moscow's international
economic policies. Teng attacked Moscow's advocacy of "inter-
national division of labor," its economic domination in East
Europe, Its use of joint enterprises abroad, its aid policies--
especially in the Middle East--and its alleged thesis that a
country's sovereignty over its resources depends upon its
ability to exploit and use those resources.. Teng's criticisms
cap a series of major PEOPLE'S DAILY and NCNA commentaries leading
up to the special session that have been designed to show the
developing nations that the Soviet Union is not, only a military
and political threat to their security but an economic superpower
as well.
BACKGROUND Teng's speech climaxed a period of increasing
Chinese attention to and support for third world
countries and oppressed peoples generally. This emphasis became
particularly manifest after the PRC leadership's consultations
with visiting Algerian President Boumediene in February, following
his call for the UNGA special session. Since then Chinese
leaders have taken pains to display to third world visitors PRC
solidarity with their cause, suggesting that China may have been
tailoring its recent foreign policy comment with an eye to making
a splash at the UNGA session. Chou En-lai, in a 24 March banquet
speech for Tanzanian President Nyerere, strongly reaffirmed
Peking's "bounden proletarian internationalist duty" to support
oppressed nations and peoples, while Wang Hung-wen in a 3 April
rally speech for visiting Cambodians disclosed a new Mao
instruction regarding Chinese duty to help world struggles.
Peking's effort reflects the continuing concern of Chinese
leaders to balance China's various world constituencies and
retain revolutionary credentials, while flexibly pursuing broader
goals abroad. From time to time over the past few years of
developing detente with Washington and pragmatic international
contacts, the %"hinese have striven to reassert their credentials
as supporters of revolutionary movements. For example, following
public indications of movement in Sino-U.S. relations in late
1970, Chou, in a March 1971 rally speech in Hanoi, reported a new
Mao instruction testifying to Chinese support for revolution
abroad. Similarly, a month after President Nixon's visit in
February 1972, Chou affirmed in a banquet speech for Prince Sihanouk
that China regarded continued support for world revolution a "bounden
internationalist duty."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 APRIL 1974
NCNA TREATMENT NCNA and other Chinese media have given full
OF SESSION coverage to Teng's activities and to his
UNGA address. NCNA promptly reported
Secretary Kissinger's 14 April banquet for Teng and his assistants,
Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Permanent UN representative
Huang Hua. Like NCNA's coverage of a comparable banquet given by
Kissinger for Ch:iao Kuan-hua during the regular UNGA session last
October, there was no 'characterization of the atmosphere.
NCNA's coverage of Kissinger's 15 April UNGA speech routinely
criticized his call for continued international "interdependence"
and his remarks on the Arab oil embargo, charging that he had
"threatened" third world countries with retaliation if they used
control of resources to exert international pressure. NCNA gave
similarly critical coverage to Gromyko's 11 April low key address,
rebutting his claim that Moscow is the natural ally of developing
countries and noting his alleged unease over the exposure of
Moscow's "superpower hegemonism" at the session,
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17 APRIL 1974
GROMYKO REAFFIRMS SOVIET VIEWS ON ENERGY, WORLD SITUATION
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 11 April address to the UNGA
special session, as reported iu PRAVDA on the 12th, broke no
new ground on issues nominally on the agenda. He restated
previously announced Soviet positions on the causes of the
world energy shortage, the right of developing countries to
exercise full sovereignty over their natural resources and
Moscow's willingness to participate in a broad international
effort to examine energy problems. Given the forum, the most
siE;nificant aspect of Gromyko's remarks was rather his own
affirmation of the continuity in Soviet foreign policy, as
evidenced in his attempt to place the immediate resource issues
under discussion in the context of broader Soviet concerns
about detente and international economic cooperation. Moscow
had earlier shown signs of mixed emotions about the UNGA
session, undoubtedly due in part to the expectation that
Peking and a number of the nonalined states would use the
occasion to attack Soviet policies. Reflecting this concern,
the thrust. of Gromyko's effort was to defend the Soviet role
in the third world while shifting the focus of UN discus3ion
to areas where Moscow has traditionally felt more comfortable
and in which Soviet policies could be more easily defended.
While responding only indirectly to Teng Hsaio-ping's earlier
barbs and making perfunctory comments about the sinister role
of "monopoly capital" and "neocolonialism," Gromyko moved on
quickly to point out that the session was being held in condi-
ticne of "deepen ng detente" and indeed that the improved
international situation had made such a meeting possible, He
cautioned that any recommendations emanating from the session
should "accord with the interest& of further improving the
int.e.rnatio~ia.l situation," Echoing a persistent Soviet complaint
at recent UN sessions, ~romyko urged that, in di'cussing narrower
economic and social ts3ues, the delegates not lose sight of the
fact, that. "concern for peace" remains the "main UN task." In
that regard it was noteworthy that his only specific recommenda-
tion regarding any resolution adopted by the session was that it
attach "due significance" to "tasks of preventing war and
preserving peace,"
Gromyko took advantage of the session's focus on international
economic relations to reaffirm Moscow's interest in expanded
in.ternarional economic cooperation. Twice noting the need for
a "restructuring" of international economic relationships,
Gromyko pointed to Soviet industrial and scientific might and
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- 6 -
to a "large domestic market" as evidence of Soviet potential
for participation in such expanded international exchange.
Gromyko offered a guarded assessment of East-West economic
exchanges to date, noting that while progress is being made
While breaking little new ground on energy, Gromyko put an
authoritative stamp on earlier Soviet statements and analyses.
He argued that the origins of the recent energy shortage lay
not in natural but in social and political causes--including
Israeli policies in the Middle East and a history of Western
"plundering" of the oil reserves of producing countries. He
pointedly observed, in this connection, that the socialist
countries had been "hardly affected." He also denied that
the oil-producing states could be blamed for exerting sover-.
eignty over their own resources and gave implicit support for
the Arab oil embargo. He did, however, say that Moscow does
not favor an embargo "for its own sake" and conceded that "an
aggravation of the oil problem" could cause a "new flareup in
international tension." Gromyko did not make more specific
Moscow's rather vague hints about its own ideas fc'r a solution
to energy problems.. He did, however, reaffirm earlier Soviet
statements, including his own in Paris on 18 February, in
arguing that any solution should combine the efforts of "a
broad circle of states" and in stating Moscow's "readiness to
participate both in bilateral and in multilateral discussions."
REACTION TO Following the lead of TASS commentator
TENG, KISSINGER Mikhail Yakovlev on 11 April, Mosc::: broad-
casts to the third world were quic_--. to take
issue with Teng Hsaio-ping's 10 April broadside at Soviet policy,
Yakovlev concluded that the Teng speech constituted clear
evidence the main aim of the Chinese delegation to the session
was "to attack slanderously the Soviet Union's foreign policy
and undermine relations between the Soviet Union and other
socialist states and the developing countries," Radio commen-
taries went on to point out that Moscow had expected nothing
less from a "veteran anti-Soviet" figure like Teng and that
Peking's tactics played directly into the hands of imperialistic
interests.
step by step," much remains to be done.
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Not surprisingly, Moscow has sustained a hands-off policy toward
Secretary of State Kissinger's 15 April address. A TASS report
of that day's developments at. the session concluded with a brief
report on his remarks. Correspondent Yuriy Romantsev noted both
Kissinger's "emphatic" point that a solution to these problems
was possible under only conditions of detente and his "barrage
of attacks" on developing countries for their efforts to unite
to influence world prices for raw materials. Commentary on the
session has ignored Kissinger's remarks and gone on to attack
only in general terms "imperialist" economic policy in the third
world.
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U S S R - S Y R I A
MOSCOW GREETS PRESIDENT AL-ASAD WITH CEREMONIAL FLOURISHES
Moscow provided some unusual ceremonial flourishes to underscore
the importance it wished to be attached to Syrian President
al-Asad's 11-16 April "friendly official" visit to the Soviet
Union at the head of a party-government delegation. The treat-
ment was presumably contrived to impress Washington and Cairo
as well as al-Asad himself. Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin
showed up to greet al-Asad on his arrival in Moscow and
the same leaders saw him off: cr., the 13th for visits to Volgograd
and Tashkent en route home. The airport ceremonies were
carried live on radio and television---an unusual treatment
not known to have been accorded previous Arab visitors. And
the concluding document was dressed up as a joint statement
signed by Brezhnev and al-Asad, whereas most such Soviet-Arab
documents have been issued unsigned.*
PROGRAM Apart from these csremon:ial extras, al-Asad's
OF VISIT visit followed much the same pattern as that of
his last official visit in July 1972.** On both
occasions he was preceded by an economic delegation for
advance talks. In 1972, he had been met by Podgornyy and
Kosygin; Brezhnev did not join these talks until the second
day. On the current visit, all three Soviet leaders partic-
ipat(:d in, the two sessions of the talks on the 11th and the
12th. Brezhnev spoke at a dinner on the 11th for al-Asad,
greeting him as an "outstanding political leader of the Arab
world," and Pcdgornyy spoke at a luncheon given by al-Asad
the next day, also attended by Brezhnev and Kosygin.
On both visits, agreements were signed on the third day and
al-Asad left Moscow-in 1972, for an overnight stopover in
Sochi on his way to Cairo, and this year for visits to
* Khrushchev signed communiques with Ben Bella on the Algerian
leader's visit to the USSR in May 1964, and with Nasir on his
visit to Cairo later that same month. Kosygin and Boumediene
also, signed a joint statement on the former's visit to Algeria
in October 1971.
** The 1972 visit is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 12 July
1972, pages 29-33.
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Volgograd and Tashkent en route home. The documents signed
this year included the Joint statement, a plan of party ties
for 1974, a long-term economic-technical cooperation agreement,
a cultural-scientific cooperation plan for 1974 and a protocol
on trade for 1974.
Moscow also took the unusual step of providing al-Asad an
opportunity to address the Soviet public in a speech over
Moscow television--an honor that has been accorded President
Nixon and West European, but not Arab, leaders. According to
Damascus radio, the speech was delivered on the 12th, and it
was reported by TASS and broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the
14th. On the 1972 visit he was interviewed by a Moscow radio
and television correspondent; this interview was reported by
TASS and Moscow's Arabic service, but there were no reports
that it was televised.
BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev in his dinner speech on the 11th
warned against the substitution of "partial
solutions" for an overall settlement, a warning that he had
also voiced in his last remarks on the Middle East in a 30 January
Havana speech. He said in Cuba that the Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement agreement was a positive step but "only a partial
measure of purely military character" and that the Geneva
conference should carry out its mission of achieving a cardinal
political settlement. Without mentioning the Suez disengagement
accord in the current speech, Brezhnev cautioned that "against
the background of a certain decrease in tensions, the aggressor
and his patrons" might again try to avoid an overall settlement.
It was not accidental, he said, that "ersatz plans" for a
settlement had recently been launched, in effect replacing a
general solution with "partial agreements of different kinds."
Brezhnev supported Syria's position that agreement on troop
disengagement must be regarded as part of an overall Mideast
settlement including complete Israeli withdrawal from all
occupied Arab territories. A just peace, he reiterated, means
Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967 "and later,"
insurance of security and sovereignty for all states in the
region, and respect for the Palestinians' legitimate rights.
He claimed that the Soviet Union consistently pursued this
course in talks with the United States, coordinating its
actions with the Arabs.
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Brezhnev again underscored Soviet concern to get the diplomatic
action back to Geneva, asserting that a settlement "can and must
be" worked out within the Geneva framework. He expressed
appreciation that Syria shared the view--set out in the 7 March
communique or), Gromyko's talks in Damascus and repeated in the
joint statemeat--that the Soviet Union should participate in
"all stages" and "all fields" of a Mideast settlement.
Brezhnev appeared to pledge continued military assistance
when he said, speaking of bilateral cooperation, that this
the following day also mentioned that new agreements to be
signed in economic, technical and cultural cooperation would
help in strengthening Syria's "defense capacity," and the joint
statement made three references to Syrian defense in a ?imilar
vein.
srread to the field of defense." Podgornyy in his speech
PODGORNYY SPEECH In his luncheon speech on the 12th Podgornyy
took up a common theme in current Soviet
comment on the Mideast which has reflected Soviet misgivings
over "liberalizing" political. and economic trends In Egypt. He
called for vigilance toward the intrigues of "imperialist and
reactionary forces" in the present "acute political struggle"
going on around a Middle East settlement. It is important, he
said, that the current situation be assessed "correctly and
realistically" and that one should see "all the concealed
plots" and be able to see the difference between friends and
allies. Echoing his call for vigilance, a Moscow commentary
in Arabic on the 16th warned against machinations by Tel Aviv
and its protecting forces which "appear to be seeking to
establish peace" but are "drawing the Arabs into a trap" and
imposing a settlement on their own terms.
Along the lines of the 7 March Gromyko communique, Podgornyy
declared Soviet support for the Arabs' use of "all the means" of
struggle to establish peace. The Soviet-Syrian joint statement
tied this phrase to Syria's military strength, confirming the
importance of strengthening Syria's "defense potential and its
lawful, inalienable right to the use of all effective means" for
liberation of its occupied lands.
JOINT STATEMENT The Soviet-Syrian ;statement was cast in an
unusual format for a Soviet-Arab document,
apparently to give it a more formal character. It was divided
into sections under headings on Soviet-Syrian friendship, Middle
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East peace, and international security, preceded by what
Damascus radio called a "preamble" anii TASS described as an
"official report" listing those participating in the talks
and summing up al-Asad's acttvities.
The most notable substantive feature of the joint statement is
the passage on detente. It pledges efforts by both parties
to oppose attempts by "aggressive and reactionary circles" to
complicate relations between states and aggravate the international
situation, and affirms that "international relaxation" should
become irreversible and be expanded to encompass areas dangerous
for peace. This is apparently the first time that such a passage
in support of detente has been included in a Soviet-Arab document.
It would seem to signify that despite rloscow's displeasure at
being cut out of the diplomatic activity for a Mideast settlement,
the Soviet Union does not want the Arab-Israeli problem to affect
adversely its overall relationship with the United States. In
obtaining Syrian agreement to this passage, Moscow might also
be replying indirectly to Egyptian accusations that the USSR
believes detente should be, restricted to the two superpowers,
while small stales should be under the tutelage of one or the
other great power.
The section on "strong and invincible" Syrian-Soviet friendship
contained the usual expressions of satisfaction with past
cooperation and of interest in improving it in various fields,
including unspecified steps for further strengthening Syria's
"defense capacity."
The section of the statement on the Middi. East was similar to
the 7 March communique on Gromyko's talks in Syria.* Thus it
reiterated that peace cannot be achieved without full Israeli
withdrawal and guarantee of the Palestinians' lawful "national"
right.. Reviewing "steps being taken" to settle the conflict,
the s,tiatement reaffirmed that troop disengagement must be part
of an overall settlement including Israeli withdrawal; it did
not include the call., in the March communique, for a timetable
for withdrawal.
* Gromyko's visit to Syria is discussed in the TRENDS of
13 March 1974, pages 1-4.
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INDOCHINA
HPNOI1 PRG DENY 1 RAT COMMUNISTS OVERRAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE BASE
A 13 April PRG vereign 11-1ALiStLy eLutement promptly rejected
Saigon charges that communist forces had overrun Tonle Cham
base the day before and condemned South Vietnamese air strikes
against the PRG-controlled area of Loc Ninh in retaliation for
the alleged communist attack.* The statement claimed that the
base--located on the border of Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces--
had been shelled in response to ARVN "nibbling operations" and
that the GVN troops finally withdrew "to avoid being used as
scapegoats for the Nguyen Van Thieu clique's bellicose policy."
The PRG's version of the incident was endorsed in a DRV Foreign
Ministry statement on the 16th. Later the same day', a spokesman
for the DRV Foreign Ministry issued another statement assailing
a 15 April. 3i:atement by a U.S. State Department spokesman that
the base had been attacked by North Vietnamese troops in "one
of the most flagrant DRS' violations" of the cease-fire since
the peace agreement. The DRV spokesman reiterated that the
GVN troops fled of their own accord and charged that Saigon
had "fabricated the so-called attack" as an "excuse to escalate
the war."
Communist reports claim that the South Vietnamese carried out
bombing raids on the Loc Ninh area for four consecutive days--from
the 12th to the 15th--and that schools, pagodas, and a hospital were
hit.
Early reaction by Vietnamese communist broadcast media to the
Saigon announcement it was suspending GVN participation in the
Paris bilateral talks because of the Tonle Cham attacks was
confined to a passing reference to the GVN's intention to walk
out, in the 16 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement,
as well as in a 17 April NHAN DAN commentary. The NHAN DAN
commentator noted that Saigon had suspended the Paris negotiations
"of its own volition" and reiterated standard charges of
"intensified" U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. A
statement by the PRG Paris delegation--carried by VNA on the
* For background on earlier fighting at Tonle Cham, see the
TRENDS of 28 March 1973, page 5.
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17 APRIL 1974
17th--called the Saigon suspension "a very serious and fully
premeditated act" designed to sabotage the negotiations. It
accused the United States of "openly inciting the Saigon admin-
istration to sabotage the talks and aggravate the war."
DRV DELEGATION ENDS TOUR WITH MOSCOW, PEKING STOPOVERS
A DRV delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong returned home on
16 April, via Moscow and Peking, from a month-long series of
official visits to Cuba, Algeria, Yugoslavia, and Sweden to
thank those nations for their wartime aid.* The deputy head
of the delegation, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, is not
reported to have gone to Sweden. And according to Moscow
media, Trinh arrived in the Soviet capital from Budapest on
the 11th, the same day that Dong arrived from Sweden. Trinh
had made a brief official visit to Hungary between the de-lega-
tion's sojourns In Cuba and Algeria; the reason for his being
in Budapest again has not been explained, and available DRV
and Hungarian media have not reported any details of Trinh's
second Budapest visit or his departure following it.
Soviet Premier Kosygin met with Dong and Trinh during their
11-13 April stopover in Moscow and held talks, in an atmosphere
of "fraternal friendship and cordiality," on Soviet-Vietnamese
cooperation, the situation in Vietnam, and "some international
problems" of mutual concern. TASS and VNA accounts of the
meeting did not indicate whether the issue of alleged violations
of the Paris agreement was raised, but they did note that the
Soviet side offered conventional assurances of "firm and
consistent" support for DRV-PRG efforts to secure strict
observance of the accord. The Soviets also reaffirmed their
"high appraisal" of the 22 March PRG six-point proposal. Kosygin
had similarly met with the DRV leaders on 20 March during the
delegation's stopover on its way to Cuba.
During its 14-16 April stay in Peking the DRV delegation was
duly feted on the 14th by Chou En-lai, who had a "very cordial
and friendly" talk with the guests, acc~-~rding to NCNA. Dong
and Trinh on the 15th called on Cambod.-an Prince Sihanouk's
* The delegation's stopover in Moscow en route tj Cuba was
discussed in the TRENDS of 27 March 1974, page 20, and the visit
to Cuba in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 11-12.
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mother, Queen Kossamak, and had lunch with RGNU Prime Minister
Penn Nouth. The Cambodian Front delegation presently visiting
China, led by insurgent forces chief. Khieu Samphan, had left
Peking for a tour of the provinces on the 14th prior to the
DRV delegation's arrival, and Sihanouk had left Peking for
North Korea on the 11th.
As was the cage during the DRV delegation's passage through
Peking en route to Cuba, Chou Eri-lai failed to attend airport
ceremonies on its arrival or departure; Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
was the top PRC official present. Last October Chou had also
failed to make his usual appearance at such airport ceremonies
when Dong stopped in Peking on his way to East Europe; however,
Chou did greet Dong upon his return through the Chinese capital
on 4 November,
HANOI CITY PARTY CONGRESS ELECTS NEW SECRETARY
The holding of the sixth congress of the, Hanoi municipal party
organization from 8 to 12 April, reported by Hanoi radio on the,
14th, brings to the fore the question oC Then the fourth Vietnam
Workers Party Congress will be held.* it would seem likely that
the Hanoi congress--the pacesetter for party organizations
throughout the DRV--will be followed shortly by other local party
congresses.
The Hanoi city party gathering devoted extensive attention to
economic restoration, agriculture, and management tasks; elected
a new executive committira of the municipal party organization;
and named Nguyen Lam, a member of the VWP Central Committee, to
the new executive committee. Lam replaces Secretary Nguyen Van
Tran, who "has been given a new assignment by the party Central
Committee," according to the first Hanoi account, which did not
specify Tran's new poeitiona The first Hanoi report on the
congress gave no indication that any VWP Politburo members
attended, although Premier Phem Van Dong addressed the fifth
Hanoi party congress in. April 1971.
* The date for the VWP's last congress, the third, held in early
September 1960 immediately after observance of the DRV's national
day on 2 September, was announced in March of that year, and pre-
congress preparations, including the issuance of new party
statutes, were publicized throughout the spring and summer of that
year.
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Some indication of the timing of local preparations for the
Hanoi municipal party congress was evident in the fo.Llowing:
the city party newspaper HANOI MOI announced on 1.9 March
that Hanoi districts and wards had completed between 11 and
18 March the organizing of congresses of local party delegates
to discuss the draft political report for'tlie'municipal
congress, review 1973 tasks and the local tasks-for 1974,
and elect delegates to the I aaoi' mturiicipgl ddngres's. Thus,
about',6ne' mouth elapsed between local preparations and the
holdipg: of -the. .}janoi congress..
CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS Outgoing Hanoi municipal VWP Secretary
Nguyen Van Tran delivered the-main
report at the congress, according to Hanoi radio, and dwelt on
the situation over the past three years and the tasks for the
coming two years. The short summary of his report available
and reportage on the congress' activities su2est that most
emphasis was on economic matters and management. The congress
reviewed "shortcomings in economic management" and adopted
five "major tasks" for 1974 and 1975, including overcoming the
war's consequences, restoring and developing the economy and
culture, socialist construction, and others dealing with
improving management and leadership. The congress also stressed
the need to "vigorously develop agriculture" to supply Hanoi's
food needs and to solve "urgent problems" in. living conditions,
food, housing, and the like.
The Hanoi congress elected a new executive committee composed
of 35 permanent and 16 alternate members, the radio noted,
pointing out that 10 of these are economic management cadres,
scientific and technical cadres, and young cadres working in
the economy. Hanoi's first report on the election of
Nguyen Lam to the new executive committee did not specify that
he was replacing Tran, although the juxtaposition of their
reassignments implied as much.
The first available confirmation that Nguyen Lam also is
secretary of the Hanoi municipal party committee came in
Hanoi's list of officials greeting Premier Pham Van Dong's
arrival back in Hanoi on 16 April after his European tour.
Nguyen Van Tian, last identified as secretary of the Hanoi
city party committee on 2 April, was identified only in
his other position as a member of the VWP Central Committee
Secretariat in the same listing of those welcoming home Dong.
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A 2 April announcement of changes in government positions had
noted that Nguyen Lam was giving up his chairmanship of the
State Planning Commission and the State Price Commission
in order to assume an unspecified "new assignment."*
Nguyen Lam had previously held the post of Hanoi party secretary
in the early 1960's; he was identified in that position as late
as December 1966. In February 1967 Nguyen Van Tran evidently took
over the party post at the same time that it was announced that
he was relinquishing his job as minister of heavy industry.
Nguyen Lam has not had a very active public role since 1966, but
he served from 1967 to 1969 as vice minister of light industry,
and in December 1969 he gave up `:hat post to become a minister
and vice chairman of the State Planning Commission. He was
given the chairmanship of the Price Commission in 1971 and
became the head of the Planning Commission in June 1973.
* The 2 April announcement, contained in a communique of the
DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, is discussed in a
supplementary article in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages S1-S3.
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- 17 -
YUG0SLA'1IA
TITO REGISTERS DEFIANCE TO "PRESSURES" FROM ABROAD
President Tito has added his authoritative voice.for the first
time to the current chorus of Yugoslav defiance against foreign
upressuresii and Italiau,cl_nims to Line Yugoslav-administered
"Zone B" area south of Trieste. Speaking on 15 April to'a
meeting of the Sarajevo political aktiv preparatory to the LCY
congress, Tito reflected sensitivity about those who would
seek to exploit potential Yugoslav disarray under conditions
of Tito's disability or death, The Yugoslav leader charged
that those exerting pressure from abroad "constantly wait for
something to happen in Yugoslavia, for it to split and break
up," hoping that they will "get something." He went on immedi-
ately to characterize the border dispute with Italy as a type
of pressure and reiterated the standard Belgrade position on
the border dispute with Rome. While voicing aaope for good
relations with Italy and denying any intent to indulge in
"sabre-rattling," he portrayed the dispute with Rome as a
lasting "scar" on the two countries' relations and strongly
asserted Yugoslav sovereignty over the disputed zone. The
Yugoslavs, he. declared, view the territory in question not as
Zone B but as an integral part of the Slovenian republic. He
~,en.t: on to observe that the dispute involved not only Italy
but also NATO, terming it "not an accident that [in Mar.h] the
Americans held these maneuvers with them there, that is, here
in the Adriatic under our noses, at our border."
Tito seemed concerned to refute the notion that Yugoslav fears
the Soviet Union. Such a fear had been suggested by recent
Yugoslav commentaries which cited Czechoslovak defector Sejna's
claims--voiced in an interview aired on Austrian TV in
February--of a detailed Soviet plan to invade Yugoslavia
following Tito's demise, Tito referred to "other pressures"
and to propaganda in the Western and Austrian press. In an
"authorized" version of his speech carried by TANJUG, but not
in the Belgrade radio recording of the speech, Tito was quoted
as following the reference to the Western press by saying
For instance there are also some calculations against
the Soviet Union here. They try to frighten us with
the Soviet Union and constantly talk about a great
danger threatening us from that side. I know for
certain that we do not need to fear the Soviet Union.
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As far back as the time of the war Soviet troops have
been in Hungary. And when we were in the most diffi-
cult situation, in our quarrels with Stalin; when
Stalin threatened us with troops, we were not afraid.
We were preparing ourselves in the necessary manner,
and in case of need we would have defended ourselves.
Now we have good relations with the Soviet Union. We
have a tremendous amount of foreign trade with it.
We have very good relations with Hungary.
While Yugoslav media have in the past complained about joint
Soviet-Hungarian maneuvers in Hungary, they have not commented
on recent extensive military activities there. Observers of
maneuvers in March had included Lt. Gen. Andryushchenko, the
Warsaw Pact high command representative in Hungary. And on
26-28 March Budapest was the site of a Warsaw Pact Military
Council session presided over by Pact Commander Yakubovskiy.
Presumably to reassure Belgrade, the early March exercises
were followed up with a visit to Yugoslavia by Hungarian
Defense Minister Czinege, who had talks with Tito on, among
other things, "the broadening relations cf the armies" of the
two countries.
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- 19
FRENCH ELECTIONS
MOSCOW RANKS FRENCH CANDIDATES: CHABAN, MITTERRAND, GISCARD
Although Moscow's general coverage of the French presidential
election campaign has continued to be confined for the most
part to brief, factual, and relatively straightforward reportage,
some comment has made increasingly clear Moscow's caution in
treating the possibility of a Mitterrand victory and the result-
ing unknown effect this would have on Soviet relations with
France and Europe.* This was clearly demonstrated in the weekly
Moscow domestic radio observers roundtable discussion program
of 14 April, which in effect revealed Moscow's implied preference
for the relatively known quantity of a Gaullist victory in the
person of Chaban-Delinas and seemed to rank Mitterrand and 'Giscard
d'Estaing-after Chaban, iii that order.
Coming two days after Mitterrand's 12 April. press conference,
in which he touched upon future French policy toward Europe,
NATO, CSCE, and MBFR if he became president, the roundtable
discussion refrained from commenting on the leftist candidate's
foreign policy remarks, while readily evaluatng Chaban and
Giscard in this field. Regardi_:g Chaban, LIFE ABROAD deputy
chief editor G. Kuznetsov favorably observed that Chaban had
stated that he would follow de Gaulle's foreign policy of
"independence in all forms," including the further development
of Soviet-French cooperation, On the other hand, Kuznetsov
followed with a comment on Giscard portraying him as trying to
establish a presidential majority around Independent Republicans
and centrists, who are "ardent Atlantists and supporters of the
political, not just economic, unification of the Common Market
countries"--attributes that are damning in the vernacular of
the Soviet media. But as regards the foreign policy remarks of
Mitterrand, who had so conveniently opened the door for the
discussion, there was a striking silence by the roundtable
participants.
While Moscow has commented favorably on the leftist Joint Program,
it has entirely ignored the foreign policy aspects, limiting its
remarks to innocuous replays of PCF leaders' statements suggesting
that implementation of the program would alleviate such internal
French economic difficulties as inflation and unemployment.
* See the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 3-4, for initial Moscow
reaction to President Pompidou's death.
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EUROPE
MOSCOW SEES "MONOPOLIES" BEHIND UaSi-EC DIFFERENCES
Moscow has been performing a delicate balancing act in the comment
it has offered or, U.S.-European differences over the past half-year.
On the one hand, it has presented these dcv-l.opments as a positive
phenomenon, testifying to the willingness of the European countries
to stand up to the United States, and hence--given Moscow's view
of the issues, such as the Middle Eaat--to stand up for peace. On
the other hand, it has stressed the undiminished strength of the
forces of reaction in the Western world, and it has interpreted
some of the European actions, particularly the drive for European
defense cooperation, as motivate,-11 by these sinister forces. An
article in the 3 April LITERATURNAYA GAZETA attempts to square the
circle in this regard by suggesting that the U.S.-dominated
"multinational monopolies" lie behind all the troubles in the
Western world, exacerbating both the divisions among the European
countries and between the European countries and the United States.
THE MONOPOLIES The article, written by veteran European
commentator N. Molchanov, like virtually all
recent Soviet comment on U.S.-European differences, is stronger
on imagery than logic0 It likens the "crisis" in the Western
world to the decline envisioned by Spengler and notes that Marxists
have long predicted it, The root cause of the problem, it says,
is economic, and the culprits are the multinational monpolies
which "have refined to the highest degree the parasitic art of
extracting profits." Although the article asserts that "all West
Europe's present disorders" can be ascribed to the machinations
of the msanopolies, it offers no explanation of how this is supposed
to have taken place.
The article is a little clearer in explaining the alleged relation-
ship between the activities cf the monopolies and the current
strains in U.S.-European relations. It implies that the European
revolt against U.S. "tutelage" is in effect a revolt against the
domination of the multinational monopolies, long known to be
controlled by U.S. interests. Thus it says the links between
U0S. firms and the multinational monopolies provided the "background
against which the strongest outbursts of anti-Americanism in
West Europe erupted."
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CSCE Summing up this preliminary analysis with the bland
assertion that the conflicts between the United States
and the European countries are an "inevitable phenomenon
arising out of the very nature of capitalism;" the article
goes on to suggest that the CSCE offers a way out of the
crisis. It asserts that the talks in Geneva have reached
a crucial stage on which the outcome of the entire conference
depends. While it professes optimism about the prospects for
agreement, it warns of the "stubborn efforts" being made to
entangle the talks in the contradictions of the Atlantic
alliance, the Common Market, the energy crisis, and the Middle
East conflict. It describes as a "vestige of the cold war"
the "hullabaloo in the Western press" about the free exchange
of persons and ideas, asserting that it concealed a desire
to frustrate the achievement of agreements. The article is
equally emphatic in insisting that not the "slightest ambiguity"
could be allowed regarding the principle of the inviolability
of borders.
THE FRENCH One of the more notable features of the article
CONNECTION and a sign of its topical character is the great
stress it places on the importance of Franco-Soviet
relations as a foundation stone of European security. The
article gives unstinting praise to General de Gaulle and the
independent line he introduced into French foreign policy. It
recalls with approval his decision to withdraw France from
the NATO military system, and it condemns those who are now
allegedly pressuring France to abandon the "independent Gaullist
line of its foreign policy and return to 'orthodox Atlantism. "'
It gives equal praise to Pompidou and recalls that France, along
with the Soviet Union, played an "enormous role" in bringing about
the CSCE talks. It asserts that the continued cooperation of the
two countries is of "no less significance" in insuring the
successful completion of the talks.
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USSR
KCMMUNIST CHIEF EDITOR REMOVED AMID SIGNS OF DISGRACE
The circumstances surrounding the mid-January removal of
A. G. Yegorov as chief editor of the CPSU Central Committee's
key party journal, KOMMUNIST, suggest that he was fired
suddenly in disgrace. The likelihood that Yegorov's ouster
was precipitate was clearly indicated by the fact no successor
was named at the time of his removal and that KOMMUNIST has
remained without a chief editor for more than two months.
His removal evidently caused some delay and disarray in cele-
brating the journal's 50th anniversary that fell on 5 April.
While the immediate cause of Yegorov's removal as KOMMUNIST
chief editor remains unclear, an article by him in the November
1973 literary journal ZNA14YA may have outraged conservatives
by its strikingly undogmatic formulations on culture and
nationalism.
Yegorov, a 54-year-old philosopher, was last listed as chief
editor of KOMMUNIST in issue No. 1 for 1974, signed to the
press on 14 January. The succeeding three issues, covering
February and March, list no chief editor in the masthead. There
have been no other changes in the membership of the editorial
board.
Evidence of disarray ensuing from Yegorov's removal surfaced
in the confused and uncoordinated handling by the Soviet
central and regional press of KOMMUNIST's 50th anniversary,
which according to Soviet calendars was scheduled to be
celebrated on 5 April. Although the less prominent journal
PLANNED ECONOMY had been awarded an Order of the Red Banner
on its 50th anniversary on 18 March, as reported in the
19 March PRAVDA, no award for the prestigious KOMMUNIST was
announced on its anniversary. In fact, the entire central
press--except for the twice-weekly paper SOVIET CIJLTURE--
completely ignored the 5 April anniversary. The 5 April
SOVIET CULTURE ran a long anniversary article stressing
KOMMUNIST's role as a reliable guide in literature and art
and indicating that the April issue would be the jubilee
issue. Yet, when PRAVDA on 6 April routinely announced the
appearance of issue No. 5, its description of the contents
did not mention the anniversary.
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Moscow's silence was underscored by the fact that a few regional
papers--apparently uninformed of Moscow's decision to ignore the
anniversary--on ,5 April ran a NOVOSTI agency article on the
journal's anniversary. This article, by Aleksandr, Bakin, was
published in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA,
SOVETSKAYA LITVA, and TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA. The Bakin article
struck an odd note, stressing the usually ignored 20th CPSU
Congress, "in the work of which the question of overcoming the
cult of personality occupied an important place" and after
which, it declared, the journal had improved its work.
On 16 April Moscow radio finally reported a belated message
of cgngratulations from the Central Committee to the KOMMUNIS T
editorial board on its anniversary. The message stressed that
a "high party attitude and uncompromising struggle against
bourgeois ideology and right and left revisionism" are
"characteristic" of KOMMUNIST articles.
NOVEMBER ARTICLE Although there has been no recent public
criticism of Yegorov, he may have come
under fire for expressing unorthodox views in his article on
art and its national and international manifestations that
appeared in ZNAMYA's November issue. Avoiding a narrowminded
or simplistic approach and customary stereotypes about the
need for party loyalty and ideological. struggle, Yegorov dealt
with the touchy subjects of artistic freedom, cultural exchanges
and slavophilism. He discussed art in terms of its value for
all mankind, rather than as "class" art, cited talent and
originality as criteria for an artist's work rather than
ideological criteria, and declared that progressive art is
not limited only to works of socialist realism.* He argued
that the scientific-technical revolution and detente increase
the need for exchange of "artistic valuables" with the West.
While chiding slavophiles fcr their nationalistic idealizing
of the "archaic," he defended the features of nationalities
against "leftists" and their "national nihilism" and insisted
that despite what internationalistic extremists say, nations
and national languages are not dying out in the Soviet Union.
Yegorov previously had written articles on art and nationality--
in a mid-1954 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY .nd in June 1956 and
March 1960 issues of KOMMUNIST--as well as a number of books
on art and esthetics.
* For a discussion of the appearance of this modernist-
traditionalist dispute in the-social sciences, see the TRENDS
Supplementary Article of 3 Apri "1974, "Challenge to,.Party
Domination of Soviet Sucia:1 Sciences."
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Yegorov's article, with its undogmatic approach and frequent
use of the term "all-human" in discussing the value of artistic
works, contrasted sharply with an article by ideological hard-
liner V. N. Yagodkin, Moscow gorkom ideology secretary, that
appeared in KOMMUNIST shortly after Yegorov's removal--in issue
No. 3, signed to press in mid-February. Yagodkin complained
of increasing e2forts by bourgeois propagandists, revisionists
and opportunists to label one-sided the class approach to
social phenomena and to "replace it with an abstract, 'all-human"
approach. He did not deal specifically with the subject matter
of Yegorov's article, however.
Yegorov's article also appears at variance with the views, of
KOML'IUNIST deputy chief editor E. A. Bagramov. As reported in
issue No. 2 of the journal RECENT AND MOST RECENT HISTORY,
Bagramov delivered a speech in late October 1973 on the
"Marxist-Leninist theory of national relations and the present
ideological struggle," stressing the class approach and
declaring that conflict between socialist and capitalist views
of national relations io "sharper than ever before,"
YEGOROV' S CAREER Yegorov originally joined KOMMUNIST in
1952 at the aga of 32 as deputy chief and
then chief of one of its departments, After serving as chief
editor of the journal POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION from :.956 to
1961, he rose to deputy head of Agitprop under. Khrua+r. _heV' c
ideological chief, L. F. llichev. In July 1962, shortly after
V. P. Stepanov replaced a Stalinist, F. V. Kon.stantinoir, as
KOMMUNIST .:.hie" editor, Yegorov joined the journal's editorial
board. Ye.go-rov also became a men,'fer of the Central Cc;mai.t'cae's
i:deologioai Commission when it wa created by Ma ushchev in
late 1962.
Whe:,,, the ideological. apparatus was reorganj zec, in 1965 after
Khrushchev's fall, Stepan was demooted. and Ye or.?c.v appo;.nted
KOMMUNIST chief editor. Howe-_;rer, there were sig. .s c cpposition
to him prior to his appointment. In. June 1965, while Yegorov
was deputy Agitprop head and a member of KOMMUNIST's a t-! torial
board and Stepenov was chief ed i : or. , a cartoon in the PART LIFE depicted a cha'.:ac er named "Yegorcv," who was abaut to
sharply criticize a character named."Stepanov" but who then changed
his mind, for? opportunistic reasons ..nd eulogized "Stepanov" instead.
In:December of the same year Ysgovov became chief editor of the
journal and. Stepanov was demoted to a member of the board. Soon
afterward, in late March 1966, PART" LIFE chief editor Ye. I. Bugayev
was removed and transferred to deputy chief editor. of KOMMUNIST under
Yegorov, whom he had appeared to criticize in 1965. Bugr:yev
and Stepanov have remained on the board ever since,
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CHINA
REHABILITATED CADRE NAMED TO PLA-VACATED MANGTUNG POSTS
A 15 April NCNA report on the opening of the Canton trade fair
identified Chao Tzu-yang as Kwangtung first party secretary and
chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Chao's
promotion to provincial chief provides dramatic testimony to
the success of Chou En-lai's party-oriented coalition, in
divesting the PLA of the civil administrative tasks it Inherited
during the turmoil of the cultural revolution and in restoring
rehabilitated civilian cadres to power. Chao, Kwangtung party
chief prior to the cultural revolution, is the first person named
to fill one of the vacant provincial party first secretary slots
left by the transfer of all military region (MR) commanders who
were also provincial party chiefs at the end of 1973.
Chao's appointment is especially significant in that the new
Canton MR commander is Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, who had
enjoyed the top military, party, and government posts in Ki.angsu
before he took command of the Canton MR. Hsu's failure to
regain civilian authority over his new base suggests that the
other rotated commanders, who are mostly of lesser rank, are
unlikely to emerge as party chiefs in their new provinces. More-
over, the political future of at least one recently transferred
MR commander appears to be even more troubled. Han Hsien-cuu,
commander of the Lanchow MR, has not made a publi: appearance
since his transfer was announced early last January. Han was also
the apparent target of a recent RED FLAG article attacking regional
supporters of a war memoir praising Lin Piao.*
Chao Tzu-yang had slipped from public view in 1966 at the time
of Red Guard attacks. He was charged with ueing a follower of
Tao Chu, the purged head of the former Central-South Bureau, and
with making mistakes in carrying out several rural work programs.
Chao did not appear again until 1971, when iie surfaced in Inner
Mongolia as a secretary on the newly rebuilt provincial party
committee. He moved to Cannon in March 1972 as a vice chairman
of the Kwangtung provincial revolutionary committee and was
identified as a provincial party secretary in January 1973.
Chao's regaining of control over his old provincial bailiwick appears
to be responsive to recently intensified media calls to correctly
For a discussion see the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 24-25.
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distinguish between aiming the anti-Confucius struggle more
directly at a relatively small number of cadres designated as
diehard followers of Lin Piao, while allowing "a second chance"
to cadres who have corrected their mistakes. An unusually
frar% Chengchow broadcast on 10 April, for example, called
for "punishing" those who opposed the cultural revolution, but
at the same time firmly declared that a majority of cadres
criticized during the cultural revolution should be allowed
"to atone for their mistakes through meritorious service." In
a sweeping statement with far-reaching implications for speeding
the rehabilitiation of many cultural revolution casualties, the
broadcast stated that "we must realistically appraise all those
cadres who were criticized and struggled against" during the
cultural revolution. The majority of these cadres were said to
realize that the cultural revolution "redeemed them" and that
criticism from the masses "did them much good."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 APRIL 1974
- 27 -
NOTE
MOSCOW ON PRC DISARMAMENT ROLE: Moscow appeared to move a step
closer to requiring Chinese participation in multilateral arms
control agreements at the opening session of the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 16 April. Soviet
representative Aleksey Roshchin's opening remarks, as reported
by TASS, included a call for "enlisting in the negotiations on
disarmament all militarily powerful countries, including all
nuclear powers and, first and foremost, the Chinese People's
Republte whose negative stand provides one of the major obstacles
to the implementation of disarmament programs." Moscow has
been persistently vague about Chinese participation in the
past, but there have been signs of a possible reevaluation of
this posture over the past year. Roshchin raised Western
eyebrows in his speech to the opening session of the disarma-
ment conference last year on 20 February by arguing that "it
is necessary for all nuclear powers to take part in talks on
ending nuclear tests." Several Soviet srms control observers
have in recent months reiterated Brezhnev's remarks in his
World Peace Congress speech on 26 October 1973 which seemed
also to reflect concern about China. Brezhnev had said: "It
is clear that the struggle to prevent nuclear war cannot for
long be reduced to the efforts of two states alone., especially
if others, first and foremost other nuclear powers, continue
to build up these axins."
CONFIDENTIAL
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FBIS TRENDS
17 APRIL 1974
- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 APRIL 1974
Moscow (2856 items)
Peking (803 items)
Syrian President al-Asad
(--)
9%
UNGA Special Session
(--)
in USSR
[Teng Hsiao-ping
(--)
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
2%]
Speech
UNGA Special Session
(--)
8%
Criticism of Lin Piao
(5%)
[Gromyko Arrival
(--)
5%]
and Confucius
Remarks, UNGA Speech
Cambodia
(28%)
Indochina
(1%)
8%
[Sihanouk in DPRK
(--)
[Kosygin Meeting
(--)
4%]
Lao Coalition
(9%)
With DRV Leaders
in Moscow
(Lao Coalition
(1%)
3%]
Government
Government
China
(7%)
5%
Bangladesh Premier
(--)
3%
Rahman in USSR
Warsaw Pact Meeting
(--)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
S Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070016-1