SECURITY OF CS HISTORICAL PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000300100036-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: October 7, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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S E C R E T
7 October 1968
CS/HPM-18
MEMORANDUM FOR : All CS Historical Officers and
Writers of CS History
SUBJECT : Security of CS Historical Papers
REFERENCES : A. CSHB 5-13-1, 1 February 1966
B. CSI 5-13, 9 August 1967
RESCISION CS/HPM-3, 11 October 1967
1. This rescinds CS/HPM-3, 11 October 1967: Security
of CS Historical Papers. Revised procedures based on our
experience of the past year are outlined below.
2. Because each CS history is a. uniquely sensitive non-
compartmented story of an element or activity of the Clandes-
tine Services, we must be constantly concerned with the
security of the paper and its contents as well as with its
usefulness as an historical document. The security risks
inherent in pulling together such an articulated story must
be recognized, considered, and controlled from the time a.
paper is started. The measures for insuring the security of
historical papers involve: (1) safeguarding source docu-
ments, the paper during preparation, and the completed his-
tory; (b) controlling the distribution of readership of the
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paper; and (c) further protecting highly sensitive content
through the use of cryptic references or other security
devices, as judged necessary by the responsible CS component.
3. Custody and Safeguards
Uniform procedures for the custody and safeguarding
of CS historical papers have been established? The completed
paper, classified SECRET or higher if necessary, is produced
in an original and one copy only. The original is held in
the custody of the chief of the responsible CS headquarters
component or his designated representative, and the single
Xerox copy is held in the DDP vault. Completed histories or
drafts are never transmitted outside the CIA headquarters
area. (Special procedures for transporting historical papers
between the Headquarters Building and the Historical Staff
offices in the Key Building are set forth in HPM-15, 15 August
1968.) All working drafts or extra copies are destroyed upon
completion of the paper, and all sensitive source documents
used in preparation of the paper are returned to the files
from which they were drawn, or destroyed if they are extra
copies.
4. Controls
The officer responsible for custody of a CS histor-
ical paper insures that the paper (or any portion of it) is
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issued only on a need-to-know basis. He must know at all
times who has the paper and where it is located. He main-
tains necessary logs and records, and provides the annual
report required by paragraph 3c (11) of Reference B. (The
procedures for controlling and accounting for the use of
historical papers are set forth in CS/HPM-2, 6 October 1967
and CS/HPM-7, 6 November 1967.) To facilitate the use of one
section of a paper by a person who does not need to know its
total content, the histories are bound with a plastic spiral
binder which permits easy copying of pages to be issued to
the reader. Procedures for controlling such portions of a
paper are the same as for the document as a whole.
5. Protection of Sensitive Content
It would be unnecessary and undesirable to use
cryptic references or compartmentation procedures for any
portion of a CS history, if controls on distribution were so
restrictive that the paper could be seen only by the DDP.
But if a CS historical paper is to be of maximum usefulness,
it must be available (within security limitations) to all CS
officers who have a legitimate need for the information it
contains. In many instances officers can profit from the
reading of a CS history without knowing the true identities
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
of the most sensitive assets or all details of the most sen-
sitive operations which may be discussed in the paper. With
a view to making 'historical papers available to a wider
readership, the Historical Officer should determine which
identities or details (if any) are of such continuing sen-
sitivity that they must be encrypted or compartmented from
the basic paper, or omitted entirely. When making this deter-
mination, the Historical Officer and the responsible component
officers should take into consideration the special safeguards
and controls applied to all CS historical papers. They should
avoid making the basic paper meaningless or unreadable through
the needless use of cryptic references for relatively nonsen-
25X1A
sitive matters.
Guidelines. Chapter III, if states:
"Cryptonyms should be used to designate sensitive operations,
agents, and organizations...". Of course, all CS operations
and clandestine assets are sensitive, but not all are of such
sensitivity that they must be excluded from a. document so
tightly controlled as are the CS historical papers. Obviously,
no exact rule can be made on where to draw the line as to
what true identities and details should or should not be
included in the basic history. The sensitivity of the subject
matter in each individual paper must be considered separately.
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However, there are a few general guidelines for the use of
true names and cryptonyms:
a. Generally, true names are used for: (1)
CS components and staff officers at Headquarters
and in the field; (2) foreign intelligence and
security services and their key officers with
whom official liaison is maintained; (3) key
political leaders or other prominent foreign
personalities (unless a sensitive clandestine
relationship is involved); (4) unwitting per-
sons; (5) individuals, organizations, and
installations against which operations are
targeted.
b. When considered essential to security
by the CS component responsible for the activity
described, cryptonyms and/or non-pinpointing
descriptions are used for: (1) recruited
agents, cover organizations, and other clan-
destine assets of continuing sensitivity; (2)
staff agents under deep cover; (3) target
installations of unusual sensitivity.
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S E C R E T
6. Responsibility of Historical Officers
Historical Officers have the same responsibilities
as releasing officers. When the HO has completed his work
on the draft of a. CS historical paper (Step 7 of Flow Chart,
CS/HPM-10), he signs the cover sheet routing it to the CSHB
editors, and by his signature certifies that the paper is
consistent with operational and security considerations
pertinent to the subject matter.
25X1A
Executive Secretary
CS Historical Board
S E C R E T
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