THE TOTAL PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400020045-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: August 15, 1952
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Closing Lecture
Psychological Warfare Seminar
University of North Carolina
Sponsored by Office of Naval Research
Alagust 15, 1952
By Raymond Be Allen
THE TOTAL PROBLEM
M hat is the Problem?
The problem is how to fight a war in a period of "no war and yet
no peace" but a mixture of war and. peace. The problem was created by
the Bolsheviki when they continued to foment world revolution while
at the same time they entered a collective security system, the United
Nations, which outlawed international war. They believe in a "one
world" concept alright but they have made it crystal clear that the
world must be organized according to their blueprint. It would be a
peaceful world but the "peace" would be that of complete tyranny; a
world in which very fear Americans would find much ahppiness to pursue,
many would certainly have their lives taken away, and there would be
little or no liberty as Americans understand the word. Therefore,
we have decided that this is too high a price to pay - our fundmen-
tal national principles by which we live - the right to Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness - for a peaceful world.
Americans feel that these principles of our Declaration of
Independence are for export. We are the prudent trustee of them for
all mankind. You will remember that the American Declaration of
Independence said that these rights are unalienable for all men -
and that to secure these rights governments are instituted among Men.
Governments, according to the American idea, must be responsive and
responsible to the people who are the sovereign temporal will. This
concept grew out of the centuries of bloody struggle men have waged
to be secure as individuals and at the same time free men. But the
idea that government is sovereign has many lives. In its modern
form it is called the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and this is
described as merely the "anteroom for ushering in socialism" to bring
about the "+withering away" of the coercive apparatus of the state.
This is the Red form of tyranny. It takes a slightly different form
in Fascism and Nazism but it is still the same old tyranny with different
colors, Black and Brown. These colors are no more acceptable to men who
have the wit to see that they were born to be free than the Red or diabolical
tyranny.
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It took two world wars and a great depression to convince the
people of this country that America is not an island that could be
isolated from the raging storms arising elsewhere and that to secure
freedom for Americans in a fast changing and revolutionary world -
they had to support freedom everywhere. In short, we have finally
learned that freedom is indivisible and that if America is to remain
free and healthy, it can only do so in a healthy world. Like free-
dom, the health of men the world over is indivisible; this is as
true economically and politically as it is true physically and men-
tally.
We hoped, of course, that the Red tyranny would accommodate it-
self to the collective security principle embodied in the charter
of the United Nations. But we soon learned that the accommodating
would have to be by one side our side - if the system was to bring
security. But as I have suggested, this kind of Red security was the
security of the grave, a kind of security that has never appealed to
red-blooded Americans.
Personally, I am glad that we made this effort to "live and let
live" with the Bolsheviki. We are a people who want to believe the
best of others. If we had not made the effort to do this we would
not be in the position of moral strength we stand on today in fight-
ing for our principles and our very lives.
Our disillusionment has been gradual. It began, the historians
will perhaps say, in Christmas Week of 1944 when communist guerrilla
forces attacked British forces, their allies, in Athens: This, they
* ' T Re ax Comintern, held in 1928, outlined the policies, tactics
and slogans for the use of communism in its plan for seizure of world
power. A particular chapter dealt with "colonial and semi-colonial
areas," primarily with Asia. This carefully documented section out-
lined the steps by which imperialistic colonialism would be destroyed
and culminate in "annexation to the Soviet Union" of the area under
colonial power. It was a declaration of intent for continuous war
an;ainst the non-communist world. A committee of 18 for action inclu-
ded Stalin, Molotov, Manvilsky and other leaders of the present USSR.
Because of relative world stability at that time the timing of
this Soviet aggrandizement was left to events. A pact with the Germans
in 1939-4O (Nazi-Soviet Relations) afforded a first step in enlarge-
ment of the USSR in the Baltic and Balkans, but this came to an end in
June 1911. But France and Great Britain were so weakened by World War
II that the USSR decided the next move would be in the Near East. By
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(Continuation of footnote)
fall of 1 , , the outcome of World War II was inevitable - Germany
would be defeated. So the Soviet put into motion the first steps
for wresting the Near East from the weary western allies. These
moves were three in number.
1) A demand in September 1944 by the USSR that Iran give con-
cessions in an area of 214,000 square miles of northern Iran border-
ing the USSR, including all minerals, communications and development
projects. Such a concession given with Red troops in occupation
would have meant an advance of the Soviet Union 200 miles southward.
This concession excuse failed, so in the spring of 1945, the Soviet
Union arranged for the establishment of two "autonomous peoples demo-
cratic governments in Azerbaijan" which would have destroyed Irants
viability, paralysed any resistance, and made of Iran a Soviet satel-
lite. This too failed in 1946.
2) In Greece, the communists had organized a militant revolu-
tionary force prior to World War II which organized a coalition anti-
German underground in 19141-144 with a political facade party known as
EAM. While including many liberal elements, its direction was com-
munist. In late 1941 British and Greek forces re-entered Greece and
re-established the Monarchy. An agreement (the Caeserta agreement)
was made between the EAM, the UK and the Greek government, that as
rapidly as the Greek government forces occupied any liberated areas,
EAM would disarm and disband its military forces. In December 1944
the British discovered large numbers of Greek guerrillas converging
on Athens and discovered large caches of hidden arms. When the Brit-
ish forces ordered a stop of this armed movement, EAM seized parts of
Athens and the Greek so-called "civil war" began. It was really a
USSR war against the non-communist west and lasted until 1949 when
U. S. aid finally enabled the Greek government to drive the communist
guerrillas across the bordders.
3) In 1945, the Soviet Union began by direct foreign office
pressure and through the Soviet press to demand the cessation of two
provinces of Turkey to the Soviet Union plus the right to modify the
Montreaux Convention. The USSR demanded the right to establish naval,
military and air bases in Turkey on the Dardanelles.
Looking at these concerted moves in Trans Greece and Turkey in
194-4-45., it is evident that the Soviet Committee of Action (1928) had
decided the year 19ti.-L5 was the propitious time to start its annex-
ation of the Near East in its global plan toward eventual world con-
quest.
(By Edwin M. W`ght, State Department, GTI)
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may say, is the date of the beginning of a new kind of war which it
is the purpose of this paper to examine.
The ideological declaration of war against western civilization
occurred when the Bolsheviki seized power in Russia on October 17,
1918v* The organizational declaration of war occurred in 1928 at
the Sixth Comintern. (See footnote by Mr. Wright).
The war is called a "cold warts but you of the Navy know that
this is a misnomer for surely it has gotten awfully "hot'? in Korea
and off its shores and in its skies, just as your fellow fighters of
the TZarines, the Army, and Air Force have learned the same thing.
Some have called it an "International Civil War" which is descriptive
of many of its characteristics. Actually, of course, the wars thus
far in the Twentieth Century are World Revolutionary Wars and they
are, perhaps;, phases of but one ware These great climactic wars may
some day be called "tThe World Revolutionary Wars of Interdependence."
Whatever its name should be, we can all agree that this is the war to
end wars, for whatever ppens this will be its outcome, however long
or violent the struggle. We are living in an apocalyptic period of
'no peace and no war," This is a paradox arising out of the confused
and contradictory relations between sovereign states, some of which
refuse to behave according to the rulesof civilized international
relations which they helped to write.
This is where the issue is joined. It is a moral issue involv-
ing the noblest principles men have evolved to guide their conduct
as men and as societies. It is deeply rooted in the history of man
from earlies times of record when men learned that to survive as
individuals they had to organize collectively as a tribe and later
as a nation to gather strength for the hunt to provide food and for
security from the bandit, be he a robber baron or the head of another
tribe or state, History is a story of the bloody struggle for indi-
vidual security and liberty in an increasingly interdependent world,
Ours is the challenge of living at a time when this issue is joined
by protagonists commanding and contending for resources of material
and manpower of proportions beyond calculation. This war, whatever
its name,,, dramatizes the same age-old issue but its resolution can
destroy civilization or it can usher in, not socialism and "?pie-
in-the sky by and by," to paraphrase Marx, but the opportunity and chal-
lenge for men everywhere to be independent and free under forms of
government of their own devising, governments which recognize the
interdependence, the brotherhood of all mankind. Whether you and I
live long enough to see this result or not, I cannot say, but our
faces are firmly set along the right road.
~. This culminated a 70=year program initiated by Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels in their Communist Manifesto of 180.
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Two things we should never forget in the years ahead.. Firsts
that we are right - it there be no least doubt about that. Seconds
that the great majority of the peoples whom the Bolsheviki have en-
slaved are with us. Nor should we ever forget their suffering. They
suffer the tragedy of all mankind when liberty is lost.
Their souls as well as our owns are at stake in this historic,
epic struggle. If we and men of good will and like mind everywhere
have sufficient humbleness of spirits sufficient moral fibres steadi-
nees of nerves resolution and management skills to deal with the play
of forces sweeping mankind and recognize our kinship with men every-
where, all will yet be well..
This is our problems perhaps the greatest in scope any people
have faced in history. How are we doing in fighting this new kind
of undeclared war which the Bolsheviki have thrust upon the free
world? I should say that we are bringing the enemy's offensive in
some parts of the world to a halt. His fifth column in this country
has taken a severe licking. His propaganda and subversion is recog-
nized for what it is. But perpetual vigilance is the price of liberty.
In Europe2 beginning with his defeat in Greece and Berlins he
is not doing well but he never gives up. The security systems of the
Free World are gathering strength but some of the links in the coali-
tion which NATO represents would probably not withstand much addi-
tional pressure.
In the Far East we took a disastrous defeat when China fell to
the Reds. But when the enemy let his confidence in his own strength
and our weakness get the better of his judgment and invaded South
Korea, the Free WJorld decided it was time to use force to stop him.
He has been stopped and pushed back to where he started and there
he is being held and hurt.
In Southeast Asia the Free World is holding its own and begin-
ning to build greater strength though it is touch and go in Indo-
China.
In South Asia our friends are becoming alert to the common
peril?
In the Middle East there is an acute revolutionary situation
which will be critical for some time. The Bolsheviks must considers
however, that a naked act of aggression will be met with force. This
is the lesson of Korea which they will not soon forget. Their techni-
ques of internal subversions however, are in full play in Iran and
elsewhere.
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In Africa the agents of Soviet imperialism are hard at their
divisive work but the Free World is at its work also of consolida-
ting its strength.
In Latin America the snemy took a real licking in Panama in
the last elections, and elsewhere among our South and Central Ameri.
can neighbors there is increasing awareness of their peril if they
fail to build strength in their own countries as parts of the Free
World.
Recently ANZUS was formed in the South Pacific as the latest
collective security system to build together the strength this im..
portent region should have.
And we should remember also the lesson of the Philippines, our
heroic partner in World War II, now an independent nation, which
knows how to fight and win against subversion and social and econ.
omic weaknessF
Asiatic nations are pondering the contrast between our treat-
ment of the Philippines, giving her independence, and of Japan - so
recently our mortal enemy - with the Soviet system which enslaves
any state she can entice or subvert into her orbit.
Considering the fact that we were the only large industrial
power in the Free World that had not been devastated by World War
II and that we almost completely dismantled our military power when
the shooting ended and the further fact that we almost alone had the
means and the goods to initiate the rehabilitation and reconstruct-
ion of the war torn countriesf Europe and Asia while the Bolsheviks
did not weaken their military machine, I suggest that the last five
years is a remarkable record of achievement of which every American
has reason to be proud. To paraphrase a Churchillian phrase of an
epic period when the British alone defended the ramparts of the west
never in history have so few done so much for so many in so short
a time. The conception of post-war mutual aid and security, like
that of war-tine lend lease, was not the conception of an imperial-
istic, real estate hungry, power mad mation3 No, when the judgment
of the history of the first half of the Twentieth Century is in.. the
Bolsheviki like the Fascists before them will be convicted of mon-
strous crimes against the very basis of civilization.
THE FUTURE
But what of the second half of the century? That depends upon us.
The first rule of war is to know your own strength and how to
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use it and the strength of the enemy and how he is using and likely
to use it.
The first rule of strategic planning in any kind of war includ.
ing the present unconventional one is to so dispose and use your
strength and str,king power as to reduce and ultimately des,roy the
enemyws will and capacity to fight.
The period now coming to a close has been a defensive one dur-
ing which we have been tooling up on every front of the war, carry
ing on research and development and testing which will continue
indefinitely in every field, including, for the psychological front.,
the social sciences; stock piling of material, techniques, industrial
capacity,, trained manpower in reserve, like yourselves; perfecting
coalition alliances in collective security systems; fighting holding
actions in Berlin, the Middle East; Korea and elsewhere; and finally,
offering our protective shield to those who are too weak to contribute
much strength and who need and want time and help to adapt themselves
to present day recp.,i.rements of a peoplets sovereignty. Time presses
heavily and will not wait for those governments which fail to meet
their responsibilities. Farouk of Egypt discovered this just the
other day,
You have had a full review of the organization of the govern-
mental departments which carry the main responsibility for psycho-
logical operations. During the past year many organizational changes
have been made which reflect growing awareness of the importance of
these operations. I am glad to report that these improvements are
bringing resultse There is better and faster coordination in plan-
ning and executing departmental policies and programse
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
The Psychological Strategy Board was established by directive
of the President on April 4, 1951 and its first Director, Mr. Gordon
Gray;, the distinguished President of this fine University and an ex-
perienced and w--se governmental official, began work on July 1. He
o:VnJ.red the office, largely completed its staffing and established
its operational policies by January 1 when he had to return to the
University. I had the honor of succeeding him as Director on January
1 of this year.
The responsibilities of the Board are three: (1) to develop
strategic psychological plans for the guidance of departmental psycho-
logical operations; (2) to see to it that psychological operations are
adequately coordinated under strategic guidance and (3) to evaluate
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the effect or impact of the national psychological effort.
The Board consists of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, The
Board members become., when wearing their departmental hats., the prin-
cipal executive agents to see to it that the plans they have approv-
ed as a Board are actually carried out. In short, just as combined
operations is an accepted doctrine of military planning$ psychologi-
cal strategy is combined operations under strategic plans approved
by the Departments of State, Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.
The present method of dealing with these problems is a response to a
recognized need and we are currently developing the working habits
and procedures to bring these great departments together to fight
this war to win, The crux of our problem is the stress and strain
between the divisions of power and responsibility that are deeply
rooted in our government and our way of life. We have not insisted
on clea^^=-cut definitions of what is psychological strategy, After
the growth period is over., definitions will be possible. Meanwhile.,
psychological strategy is anything the Board approves as a plan or
guidance for the operating departments. It is always, however., a
method for integrating government efforts from a certain point of
view, Perhaps a few examples of the work of the Board will help
to give you a better picture of this ingenious interdepartmental
agency. Remember that while it reports its activities to the Nation-
al Security Council. and to the President., it has power of decision
on psychological strategic plans. Its actions occur in the frame of
national policy as laid down by the NSC. It makes no national policy
though the Director is represented by an adviser to the senior staff
of the NSC.
Among the first tasks which the PSB undertook at the request of
the President was the development of a planned guidance to delineate
the responsibilities by departments in time of declared war for the
conduct of psychological operations. This has been completed and
approved by the Board and the President. Obviously, such a plan is
necessary in order for operational planning to be carried out intel-
ligently,
A psychological strategy plan for the future role of Germany is
before the Board for adoption this week.
Other plans for Japan., Southeast Asia and the Middle East are
in various stages of completion. This is forward planning which is
not concerned, for example., with the current crisis in Iran, Egypt
or Tunisia. We follow events in these places closely, particularly
as new policy evolves that will effect guidance of future psycho-
logical operations. The policy determines, by and large, the propa-
ganda output of IIA and other agencies.
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On the other hand PSB planning may get close to operations as
in the case of what should be done if the Panmunjom talks were termi-
nated. This might be a good example to detail the planning process.
bat prompted the plan?
Requested by the then Assistant Secretary of State Rusk as
part of a fifteen point program for courses of action in Korea devel-
oped in July 1951.
(a) A panel composed of members having special knowledge
from Department of State, (Policy Planning Staff., Office of Chinese
Affairs, and. Public Affairs Area); Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA.
Three of these persons placed on 90..day temporary duty. The others
participated in daily meetings as a part-time duty.
(b) Office of Plans and Policy prepared terms of refer-
ence and assisted the panel by guidance on the planning task, by
administrative aid and by obtaining basic data.
(c) Panel members., based on individual backgrounds and
knowledge of departmental thinking, developed integrated plans.
After panel members have completed., plans reviewed by the Office of
Plans and Policy and then by the Director and Staff.
(d) Presented with the Directorts suggested changes to
PSB alternates.
(e) The Board members then examined the plans in conjunct-
ion with comments of the Director and the alternates and took approv-
al action.
(f) Plan transmitted for implementation to Secretary of
State, Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence.
(g) Operational planning based upon these strategic
plans developed within departments.
(h) Interdepartmental aspects coordinated with the assist-
ance of the Office of Coordination, PSB.
(i) Field execution, based upon transmittal of operational
plans to responsible officials in the field.
The coordinating phase of the PSB cycle consists in following
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through on PSB approved plans to see that the operational plans of
the departments and agencies who must carry them out are accomplish-
ed in time and consistent with the PSB plan. In addition, all de-
partments and agencies, private as well as public, are encouraged to
co;oitribute their maximum effort to the particular project. Thus, in
the light of existing policies, PSB attempts to draw together the
national effort in support of our objectives.
Here are specific examples of this coordination effort as
applied to some of the plans I have just enumerated:
a. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees.
This is a plan to determine the best means of existing
policy to employ, resettle and care for current escapees from the
Soviet orbit or its control, The coordination effort determined the
diraensioiis of the problem as involving 18,000 persons, the private
avid public efforts for caring for them and recommended a Department
of State coox'di.nating effort to cost $7,200,000 to achieve integrat-
ing all such activities.
b. Surve of Overt Information Facilities Responsibilities
and Progrm*nso
A facts-finding survey is currently under way in order to
prepare an accurate factual picture of all the "voices of America"
currently in operation,
c. Relationship to Point IV Program..
An effort is currently being made to determine the role of
the PSB and its staff in the furthering of the general aims and ob-
jectives of the Point IV concept.
Most difficult of all is the function of evaluation. Currently
our approach is to secure the departmental evaluations of their own
programs and evaluate them in our own shop. If additional informa-
tion is needed, we ask the appropriate questions. If we don't get
the answers we explore all possible means including, with Board ap-
proval,, an on-the-spot evaluation by consultant experts. To get as
much information as possible, we interview government officials and
civilian experts recently returned from areas in which we are inter-
ested. Obviously, this function will require much originality and
research, and, in tune, as strategic plans for all of the areas of
concern to our national interest are in operation, the evaluation of
their impact will become a dominant function of PSBc Out of this may
then come tremendous leverage in government policy formulation and
programs in the event that an evaluation shows that the operations
are not having the desired effect and impact.