COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE COLLECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000600160013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 12, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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12SEP1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Coordination
SUBJECT : Coordination of Clandestine Collection
Attached is a paper on this subject prepared as a result of
my recent trip to Europe for such use as you desire to make of it.
Having served during World War II in both OSS and G-2 and as As-
sistant Director for Special Operations, and having drafted the
first revision of NSCID 5, together with Brigadier General John
Magruder (USA Ret.), I have tried to approach this problem in as
practical a manner as possible keeping constantly in mind the over-
all interests of the United States. I hope this paper will prove
of value to you.
cc: DCI
DDCI
Lyffian B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
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SUBJECT: Coordination of Clandestine Collection of Intelligence in
The Field
i. Problem: How should the Director of Central Intelligence
exercise his authority and fulfill his responsibility for the coor-
dination of the clandestine collection of intelligence outside of the
United States?
2. Legal Background: The National Security Act of 1947 gave
the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to perform such
services of common concern as were agreed upon by the intelligence
community and approved by the National Security Council./The hearings
before the House Committee considering this bill indicate clearly that
one of the most important services of common concern that the Congress
had in mind was the conduct of espionage and counterespionage opera-
tions overseas. There is also evidence that the Congress felt that
this activity could best be conducted centrally by one Agency, although
there is no question but that the Congress intended to protect depart-
mental intelligence activities. It is not clear whether the Congress
intended to include espionage or counterespionage activities within
departmental rights, but it is clear that the Congress intended that
the Director of Central Intelligence should coordinate all intelligence
3. Historical Evolution: The problems of coordination of clan-
destine collection of intelligence overseas have multiplied in almost
direct proportion to the spread of United States military commitments
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New
and responsibilities abroad. Before Czechoslovakia and China were
taken over by the communists and while the United States military
establishment was being reduced in size, there was not much challenge
to the exclusive conduct of clandestine intelligence activities by
the CIA. But the creation of NATO and the Korean War brought large
U. S. military establishments overseas with sizable intelligence or-
ganizations. These military intelligence organizations had extensive
requirements for information, not all of which were, or could be, an-
swered by CIA. As a result, there was an inevitable pressure by the
military intelligence organizations to get into clandestine collection.
One of the results of this has been so-called "agreed activities,"
which, simply expressed permits the military intelligence services to
engage in clandestine collection so long as the operations are coor-
dinated with CIA.
4. The Situation Today: The problem of coordinating the clan-
destine collection of intelligence activities in Europe is the most
difficult to solve today, and is the one with which this paper is prin-
cipally concerned. In the Par East the withdrawal of U. S. forces has
lessened both the desire and ability of the military services to engage
in clandestine collection: Elsewhere in the world there is little
clandestine intelligence activity on the part of the services, and
generally speaking the service attaches have neither the capability
nor the desire to engage in clandestine activities and the MAAG's are
theoretically restrained by international agreement. The situation in
,Europe can be briefly summarized as follows:
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a. The Commands (their areas, authority, responsibility,
and requirements). There are the following military commands
in Europe which have intelligence requirements which must be
me.t :
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe -
Headquarters at Fontainebleau - has an international command
responsibility covering the area from the Arctic Circle to
North Africa and east through Turkey, with authority for the
allied command in the event of hostilities with the Soviet
Bloc. Its responsibilities are such that requirements extend
to potential hostilities against its command--thus the capa-
bilities and the intentions of the Soviet Union and its
Satellites--as well as threats of communism and subversion
within the command,, that is all Western European countries,
and all threats to the command or its country elements from
adjacent areas such as North Africa and the Middle East.
EUCOM - European Command - Headquarters near Fontainebleau -
is in effect the combined U. S. command supporting SHAPE, and
its intelligence interests and requirements are the same.
CINCNELM - Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic
and Mediterranean - Headquarters in London. While this com-
mand's authority and requirements are primarily naval covering
the Atlantic approaches to Europe and the Mediterranean, as
well as the capabilities and intentions of all potentially hos-
tile naval forces, it has also great interest in the internal
r.
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developments in countries where its ships are based, e.g.,
Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, etc.
USAREUR - United States Army Europe - Headquarters in
Heidelberg - commands the U. S. ground forces now based in
Germany. The primary concern is the order of battle of
the Soviet and Satellite forces in Eastern Europe, but it
is also vitally concerned with developments internally in
Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe that could affect
its ability to move supplies and replacements.
USAFE - United States Air Force Europe - Headquarters
in Wiesbaden - has the broadest authority and requirements
of all the European commands, covering an area from the
Arctic Circle through the Middle East. While its primary
interest is in hostile air forces and defenses, it also has
considerable demands for ground intelligence such as trans-
portation, troop concentrations, and industries to cite only
a few.
SEPAF - Southern Europe Task Force - Headquarters in
Verona - is basically the U. S. force which moved from
Austria after the peace treaty and has the responsibility
of being the blocking force against any communist attack
through the Balkans. Its requirements are directed pri-
marily toward Yugoslavia, but it is equally interested in
internal developments in Italy.
b. The coordination mechanism is complicated by the
variety of commands and the geographical interest.
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