MEETING WITH NSC STAFF (9/14/79) RE STRATEGIC FORCE POLICY AND CRISIS WARNING (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000400060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1979
• Content Type: MFR

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SECRET
26 September 1979
SUBJECT: Meeting with NSC Staff (9/14/79) re Strategic Force Policy
and Crisis Warning ^
1. invited to his
office to discuss the NSC Staff interest in U~I. MEN Rosenberg and
COL William Odum were also present from the NSC Staff. The item of primary
interest to the NSC representatives turned out to be Strategic Force
policy. Joel raised the subject of warning and handling of crises toward
the end of the meeting, to get the NSC v' f the substance of a previous
meeting with Mr. Lehman (Attachment 1).
2. Strategic Force Policy
a. The NSC Staff argued strongly the merits of enhancing
strategic deterrence and war fighting potential through strategic
flexibility: mobile targeting, reconstituting of forces for
repeated attack, and survivability. Rosenberg described a 1977
visit by Mr. Brzezinski to SAC at which he (Brzezinski) was appalled
to learn that Strategic Force Policy and capability were quite
inflexible. He wants to induce change. Rosenberg complained that
DoD had not taken seriously Brzezinski's memo to them in June 1978
on this subject. He gave Joel a copy of a recent follow-on memo
to DoD (August 1979) which spell~d out more clearly their objectives
for a more survivable enduring C I, with considerable emphasis
on the problem of NCA vulnerability. Rosenberg asked Joel to see
that the DCI got a copy, since he should be strongly involved in
the effort. (A subsequent discussion between the DCI and Brzezinski
confirmed this interest on their part.)
b. GEN Rosenberg inquired about a previous meeting, which he
had apparently prompted, between Joel and RADM Butts (Dan Murphy's
Deputy). Joel said that Butts had expressed concern that the PAO
contractual efforts on Task #3 (Strategic Forces) might not be
well coordinated with ongoing DoD efforts and could be premature.
Joel indicated that Butts was going to set up a meeting next week
to expose to PAO the ongoing DoD efforts, and that he would continue
working with RADM Butts to ensure that the two efforts were supportive.
The NSC Staff seemed to be seeking assurances from Joel that the
PAO STOF report on Strategic Forces and the planned contractor
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efforts to follow would provide the kind of information needed
to develop a plan for achieving an enduring C I. Joel assured them
that the PAO efforts were intended to examine the im act on the NFIP
of the various ways this could plausibly be done. 25X1
3. Crisis Warning
a. Joel summarized the Navy STOF report. PAO follow-on work in I&W,
and the meeting with Mr. Lehman. reaction seemed impromptu 25X1
(he seemed surprised by this agenda item), but he was unequivocal. Referring
to the DCI's role in crisis and war, he said that the DCI had failed to
capitalize on previous initiatives (e.g., PRM 11) which ultimately led to
Executive Order 12036. He said that the DCI had made adversaries of natural
allies (e.g., Brzezinski, Brown) and might have expected that the Executive
Order would not resolve the turf questions associated with the DCI's roles
vis-a-vis SECDEF. Moreover, contended that the NSC would do 25X1
nothing further on the subject unless the DCI and SECDEF surfaced the issue.
Even then, he was not sure that the NSC could undertake a solution to thq
problem this late in the current administration. 0 25X1
b. GEN Rosenberg said that Deputy SECDEF Duncan had written to the
NSC in the Spring of 1978, suggesting that outdated memos of agreement
between the SECDEF and the DCI (1950's vintage) were in need of revision.
Rosenberg said that in June 1978, Duncan had been told to work out a revision
with the DCI but that he had heard nothing further on it. He suggested
that we look into the status of the memo. (Subsequent inquiries with the
NIO for Warning and the DCI's personal staff have failed to produce any
evidence that Duncan had pursued this.) 0 25X1
c. Joel returned to the point raised in the Navy STOF report, that
some Navy forces have often been placed in vulnerable face-to-face
situations in past crises. He asked whether the NSC recognized the
Navy's problem and the usefulness of more effective crisis management
in addressing this nrnhlnm n r vw
ha
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most would not be in imminent danger.
He was not persa d that the Navy's dilemma was cause for action at
the NSC level.
4. The bottom line of the meeting was unmistakable:
-- The DCI support (perhaps even leadership) is wanted in developing
an enduring C I capability (see Attachment 2, a recent MFR concerning
a DCI meeting with Brzezinski on survivability in limited nuclear
warfare).
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-- The DCI's role in crisis and war is a dead issue for now, unless
the DCI and the SECDEF agree that it should be resurrected. A
major effort by PAO for the remainder of the Presidential term
would have to be regarded as an investment in understanding how
a DCI (and his staff) could support the next administration in
warning and crisis management. F
Attachments:
1. Memo for the Record dtd 12 Sept 79
2. Memo for the Record dtd 20 Sept 79
Distribution:
1 - EA/D/DCI/RM
1 - CDR PAO
1 - D/PA
1 - Subj File
1 - Chron
1 - RM Registry
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 ATTACHMENT 1
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12 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with the NIO for Warning on 7 September 1979 re Navy
STOF Follow-on Work in I&W
1. and the undersigned met with Mr.
Richard Lehman and Assistant NIO) pursuant to our
request for an exchange o views on I&W. Our objectives were:
a. to apprise Mr. Lehman of Navy STOF conclusions regarding
warning and to get his reactions,
b. to offer our assistance in providing a response to the
HPSCI request for a report on overall I&W effectiveness, due 31
December 1979.
2. Joel explained that we seek ways to enhance the I&W process
through improved crisis forecasting and effective interaction between
the intelligence community and the NCA in crisis management. Mr. Lehman
was sympathetic but concluded that significant improvement is impossible
unless:
a. the JCS and SECDEF show more willingness to share contingency
plans and military information with the DCI in crises,
b. the NCA defines a role for the DCI in wartime (hence in
crises that could lead to war); i.e., less the NCA explicitly
involves the DCI in crisis management.
3. Mr. Lehman does not think the DCI will use the HPSCI request
a forum to raise old political issues. Accordingly, Mr. Lehman
*.ends to prepare a pro forma report of I&W progress during his tenure
r a response to the HPSCI. He did not ask for our help in this limited
fort; although he did state that some office in the community should
he responsible for conducting post mortems, as OPEI used to do.
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SUBJECT: Meeting with NIO for Warning on 7 September 1979 re Navy
STOF Follow-on Work in I&W
4. Joel said that he intends to meet withi of the NSC
to determine whether there is a will at the NCA eve to promote change.
Mr. Lehman did not object, but holds little hope for significant progress.
We came away from the meeting with the impression that solutions to I&W
problems lie well above our pay grade. If the Earmarth meeting does not
change that impression, our continued study of I&W effectiveness could
become an exercise in futility. I
Distribution:
1 - D/DCI/RM
1 - D/PAO
1 - DD/PAO
1 - PA
1-PA
C1 PA
1 PB
1-PG
1 - PA
PAQJ
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I(12 Sep 79)
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 ATTACHMENT 2
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20 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
19 September 1979
0
1. On 10 August, Dr. Brzezinski sent a memo to Secretary Brown
requesting more attention to survivable command control communications
and intelligence. He claims that somebody in our organization received
a copy of this. He believes we should participate in this activity (1).
I told him I thought we should have the lead on the intelligence part
of it. The objective is to determine whether we should be affording
more survivability for possible limited nuclear warfare. He-is concerned
of overreliance on the concept of mutual assured destruction. He is
concerned that, while the Soviet strategic force buildup may primarily
be for diplomatic leverage, it is possible that in fact they would find
themselves in a corner and decide to apply it in a limited way.
Ask CT to get on to this one; see who in Defense is handling
it and what need for an input on the survivability of intelligence
collectors.
/.S(I) Dr. Brzezinski indicated he'd recommended to the President if
there is any increase in Defense funding as a result of the Cuban fiasco
(or perhaps as a result of the 3%/5% issue though that wasn't clear),
should also have an increase for intelligence.- I thanked him.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director n n *,
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