CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800050006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 26, 1973
• Content Type: MF

SE,CR:ET/
Approved For Releawi~ 2004/12/02: 20ROOW0050006-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2,0505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
26 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Cambodia
1. Per our various conversations, over the past week we
have been giving increasing attention to the increasingly
messy situation in Cambodia. Last week John Holdridge asked
two of my colleagues if the Agency would do an assessment of
the course of current Cambodian events -- a project that
actually was already in train.
2. Attached are two copies of a memorandum responding
to John Holdridge's request and his specific questions.. I am
also sending copies to Dick Kennedy and, of course, to John
Holdridge.
3. This memorandum is an internal Agency product for
otherwise.
which we plan no further distribution unless or until you direct
. George A , arver Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
cc:. Mr. Kennedy
Mr. Holdridge
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 - 1720R000800050006-9
SECR?=. T
25X1
25X1
 Approved For R & J2OO /OAF l3Dgq 1720R00 005
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO: See Below
FROM: GACarver,Jr.
SUBJECT:
Attached is a memorandum sent on
27 March to General Scowcroft, together
with my transmittal note.
Geor e A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assi tant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
Distribution
DCI
DD CI
DDO
C/FE
C/VNO
DDT.
D/OCI
OCI/FE (Paul Arnold)
1. - VAS/RAC for C rnbodian file q
1 GAC Ch-rono
1--Bill C
STAT
? STAT
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800050006-9
 SECRET
Approved For Reldae6 2004/12/0 : CIA-RDP80R01720R00 0050006-9
26 March 1973
SUBJECT: The Cambodian Political Situation
Key Judgments
The course of events in Cambodia since 17 March
has all but eliminated any near term prospect for
achieving greater political unity and stability in
Phnom Penh.
Much of the current stress and difficulty within the
Lon Not Government is the result of the machinations and
malign behavior of the President's younger brother,
Brigadier General Lon Non. Lan Non seems bent on advanc-
ing his own fortunes--in the guise of protecting his
brother's interests--by systematically denigrating and
undercutting every potential rival.
Lon Nol and Lon Non are a symbiotic pair. The
chances of inducing Lan Nol to curb Lon Non's activities
are minimal. The chances of getting Lon Non out of the
country (even via a prestigious Ambassadorship) while'
Lon Nol remains are virtually nil. Events since 17 March
also appear to have precluded the option of encouraging
Lon Nol to leave on an extended trip (the medical gambit),
with Lon Non along and a solidly based caretaker regime
behind.
As a result, the downward spiral in government
effectiveness and es rit will continue. But this process
can go on for some time before rock bottom is hit. On
balance, we believe the regime can muddle through the
next three to six months but with mounting political,
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800050006-9
 SECRET
Approved For Rele 6 20t/12/02 : CI - 000050006-9
economic and military problems and a diminishing posi-
tion vis-a-vis the insurgents.
The primary threat to the government's authority
during this time frame will come from the military.
The present ascendancy of the dangerous and highly
unpopular Lon Non makes a military coup a stronger
possibility than before, especially if Lon Nol dies
or is incapacitated, or if Lon Non tries to purge
the military. But key military commanders in a posi-
tion to move against the government, however, would
probably first seek assurances of US approval.
Successful military action against Lon Nol and
Lon Non would probably result in a civilian government
headed by opposition figures such as Sirik Matak or In
Tam and dependent on support from the United States.
Such a government would be a better performer than the
present regime, but we would expect no dramatic shift
in the generally unfavorable military situation. Such
a government could serve minimum US interests and
objectives in Cambodia equally as well, if not better,
than the present government.
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800050006-9
 SECRETI
Approved For Relevat 20 4/12/02: CIA-RDP80RO1720 0 0050006-9
Discussion
I. The Events Since 17 March
The bombing attack on the presidential residence in
Phnom Penh on 17 March and a violent incident earlier
that day between Cambodian Army soldiers and striking
teachers and students has ushered in another political
crisis. The government has adopted stringent population
controls. All forms of public assembly have been banned,
foreign travel by Cambodians has been prohibited, stiff
censorship regulations have been imposed and the regime
has arrested at least 120 actual or suspected civilian
critics and oppositionists, including teachers, students,
and newspaper editors. Particular attention has been
paid to members of the royal family. Virtually all
civilian members of the royal family are under house
arrest, including President Lon Nol's former close asso-
ciate Sirik Matak. The government is reportedly thinking
of exile for Matak and is also moving to force the dis-
bandment of his opposition Republican Party by intimidating
its members. The latest instance of this tactic was an
unsuccessful assassination attempt on 24 March against a
key Republican and close Matak associate.
25X1
25X1
Lon Non, the President's younger brother is behind
these acts. In the past, he has consistently and success-
fully sabotaged Lon Nol's intermittant efforts to install
Matak as vice-president and broaden the base of his gov-
ernment. Lon Non now appears to have convinced his ailing
and shaken brother of the existence of a "royalist-Communist"
conspiracy and persuaded the President to let him deal with
it. This has in effect given Lon Non a free hand to move
against his political enemies, who include some of the most
able men in and out of the government. (Lon Non's conspiracy
thesis is contrived. The bombing incident of 17 March
apparently was the isolated act.of a disaffected air force
officer while the violence between the strikers and troops
was instigated by Lon Non himself).
The events since 17 March impact severely on US interests
and policy in Cambodia. Instead of a broadened government
including Matak--the most able Cambodian political admin-
istrator--Lon Non is well on the way to becoming the dominant
political figure in Phnom Penh, if he has not already achieved
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800050006-9
 Approved For Rele 20 4/12/02: CIA-RDP80R01720R00Q00050006-9
that position. Instead of a government shored up to
the maximum extent possible in preparation for an even-
tual negotiated settlement of the Cambodian conflict,
the short term prospects are at best for a continuation
of the very low level of government effectiveness.
There is /real danger that Lon Non's ascendancy
will prove too great a burden for the already fragile
political structure. The Cambodian military, which
ultimately holds the key to power, has so far remained
on the sidelines watching carefully for signs of US
reaction. But a number of key commanders--especially
those who may believe themselves to be on Lon Non's
blacklist--are dismayed and apprehensive. In this
unstable atmosphere, a collapse of the Lon Nol regime
as a result of a military move against it becomes a
much stronger possibility.
II. Continuation of the Status Quo
A. Short Term Prospects
If the Lon Nol-Lon Non regime continues
along present lines, it is headed for eventual collapse.
The process of decline, however, could go on for some
time before rock bottom is reached. Barring a sudden
grab for power by the military, the regime can probably
muddle through the next three to six months--but with
mounting economic, military and political problems and
diminishing position vis-a-vis the insurgents.
On the economic side, the government will
continue to face the same intractable problems of cor-
ruption, inflation and shortages of rice and other
essential commodities. How well it copes will have a
distinct bearing on its duration. Trouble is already
looming on the horizon. Mounting popular unrest in
recent months over rising prices has forced the govern-
ment to modify some badly-needed economic reforms. As
a result of the regime's backtracking, subsidy costs
will now rise even higher and--coupled with earlier wage
hikes--will feed the country's inflationary spiral and
produce even greater problems later in the year. The
government may be hard pressed to survive a repetition
of last September's serious wave of economic unrest
which saw undisciplined troops take the lead in looting
rice stocks.
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800050006-9
 Approved For Releaect 20
0R000050006-9
The regime's already bleak negotiating and
military prospects have been further diminished by the
recent events. The insurgents have shown no interest in
negotiating with a regime headed by Lon Nol and will be
even less inclined to deal with a government dominated
by Lon Non. Both the insurgents and their North Vietna-
mese backers probably now see little merit in seeking a
compromise settlement with a government they possibly
judge to be-teetering on the brink of collapse. They
may try to provide a push by stepping up their military
pressure, especially against the capital itself. The
insurgents could orchestrate their military pressure by
holding out the possibility of a cease-fire and negotia-
tions--providing the Lon Nol government is overthrown.
Insurgent forces are not able to directly
challenge the army's control of the Phnom Penh area but
they do have the ability to significantly step up sabotage
and terrorism in the capital and further erode public
confidence in the government. Outside Phnom Penh, the
insurgents can be expected to retain the initiative over
the dispirited and defensive-minded Cambodian Army through
a continuation of their attacks on the main lines of
communication and on isolated population centers. The
army's ability to contain these actions and to keep open
its key supply arteries--Routes 4 and 5 and the Mekong
River--will continue to depend to a considerable extent
on the availability of US air support.
In sum, we believe that all factors, politi-
cal, economic and military point toward eventual collapse
if the present regime fails to make fundamental changes
that have some prospects of reversing the current trends.
II. B. Potential Contenders for Power
Before the more fundamental problems can be
addressed, Lon Nol and Lon Non must ride out the immediate
political crisis they have created. Since the regime's
civilian opposition has been cowed, the only remaining
group that has real potential to challenge the brothers'
authority is the military. In the past, the military's
loyalty to Lon Nol has not been in question. But recently
there have been some signs of slippage in the army's sup-
port for the President. Some senior officers share concern
over the present situa lion and are united in their strong
dislike of Lon Non. Chief among these are Cambodian Army
(FANK) Chief of Staff General Fernandez and FANK's three
key field commanders. The latter have the capability--
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 004/12/02 m - R000800050006-9 25X1
SECRET 25X1
 Approved For Rele2
ROOO_8,00 050006-9
acting in concert under Fernandez' direction--to change
the government. Any such move might well be taken in
Matak's name and could result in a government headed by
him.
Given the present confused and fluid situa-
tion in Phnom Penh, such a development cannot be ruled
out. We believe, however, that neither Fernandez or any
other ranking officer is likely to act without some kind
of assurance and encouragement from the US Government.
In the event of another crisis such as a major military
setback, the death or incapacity of Lon Nol, an especially
severe economic crisis, or an effort by Lon Non to extend
his political purge to the military, a military move
against the government could occur even without US assur-
ances. But even then, Fernandez and his supporters would
be hesitant to make common cause against the government
if US support clearly continued to rest with Lon Nol. (A
more detailed assessment of possible contenders for power
within the military and the government's capability to
counter a coup is presented at annex.)
III. Some Other Scenarios: Their Feasibility and
Consequences
A. Lon Nol and Lon Non out of the country with
a caretaker regime in char e
This
on Lon
Nol's dissatisfactionbased
with slow ace of his
medical recovery, and his stated desire to seekpadditional
treatment abroad. Although the President's condition does
not call for any surgery at this time, an extended period
of diagnostic and therapeutic treatment abroad would be
appropriate. In considering this possibility, it had been
hoped that Lon Nol would be able and willing to ensure that
his younger: brother would depart with him, or that in any
case Lon Non would not wish to stay without the protection
of the President.
Assuming an effective caretaker administration
formed by the men of the caliber of Sirik Matak and In Tam,
the voluntary departure of the brothers Lon could stabilize
the deteriorating political situation and offer some hope
of improvement in over-all governmental effectiveness.
Freed from the meddling of both brothers, General Fernandez
would have a better chance of upgrading the will and ability
of the Cambodian Army to fight. Such a caretaker regime
Approved For Release 20 CZMR': - 720R000800050006-9
 SECRET 25X1
Approved For ReleftW206-112102 - - 2OROOa$ 0050006-9 25X1
could be counted on to adopt a more realistic and flexible
approach to the problem of national reconciliation. The
beginning of a constructive dialogue with the Khmer insur-
gents and their North-Vietnamese backers would be facili-
tated.
Lon Nol has been well aware of the possibility
that in such a case a caretaker regime might not "invite"
him back. But in our judgment, he was, until recently,
prepared to-take that risk. Events since 17 March, however,
make it clear that Lon Nol now believes his position to be
directly threatened and is more than ever before prepared
to depend on the advice of his younger brother. Lon Non's
acceptance of "exile"--no matter how disguised--has always
been the most dubious aspect of the voluntary departure
scenario. Given his growing confidence and influence and
the President's current.siege mentality it is almost certain
that the two would not accept a "leave of absence" no matter
how forcefully suggested by the US Government. Furthermore,
the possibility of forming an effective caretaker administra-
tion any time soon is probably out of the question. Based
on Matak's bitter anti-Lon Nol remarks made in a press inter-
view after his detention, the break between the two men may
now be irreconciable at least for some time. The voluntary
departure scenario may still be a possible solution--but
only over the longer term. It will require an end to Lon
Non's witch hunting and a period of political reconciliation.
How fast the-two brothers would move in this direction would
depend in large part on the forcefulness of US persuasion.
B.. Lon Nol without Lon Non
.Lon Non's departure would be a constructive
development allowing greater political stability and unity.
But it alone would not solve Cambodia's basic political ills
and.would.probably result in only a marginal improvement
in government. effectiveness. Lon Nol is divorced from reality
and increasingly, intolerant of all signs of dissent,-real
and imagined. These characteristics play into his brother's
hands and make a bad situation much worse. But the Presi-
dent's own mental condition and his inability to delegate
authority are largely responsible for the government's
demoralization and drift. Even with Lon Non's negative
influence removed, there is no guarantee that fresh blood
such as Matak or In Tam could long endure or be effective
in-a government headed by Lon Nol.
In any case, the possibility of splitting the
two brothers now appears as academic as Scenario A. Under
'Approved For Release 20 E 0R000800050006-9 25X1
25X1
 Approved For ReleaVW 20
R00050006-9
25X1
25X1
the circumstances, the President is likely to view any sug-
gestion to dispense with his brother's services with deep
suspicion. Given Lon Non's pervasive influence and his
ability to isolate and "protect" his brother, privileged
private discussion of this possibility between the Presi-
dent and the US may no longer be feasible. Nevertheless,
a forceful proposal to this effect, even if rejected, would
convey a strong sense of US disapproval of the government's
recent actions. It could prompt Lon Nol to repair some of
the damage done and perhaps be a first step in disengaging
the President from his brother's influence.
C. A Lon Non Government
This could come about as a result of Lan Nol's
death or incapacitation--possibilities which must be kept
firmly in mind given the President's precarious health.
There is already a question as to whcih brother is in effec-
tive charge of the government. Nevertheless, we believe
that most of Lon Non's clout derives from his role as brother
and confidant of the President. Lon Non is intensely dis-
liked by key military commanders and does not have a par-
ticularly solid military power base of his own. (See annex)
Most of his political entourage consists of young oppor-
tunists who hope to advance their careers through Lon Non's
links to the palace. We believe that this support would
quickly evaporate at the sign of a serious threat to Lon
Nol's authority. A Lon Non government would be sure to
meet strong opposition. Unless it received direct and
unqualified support from the US it could not survive.
D. A New Government without Lon Nol and Lon Non
This could come about in two ways: permanent
extension of the caretaker regime envisioned in Scenario A
or through a military coup. In either case, the end result
would be largely the same--a regime under the leadership
of opposition political elements such as Matak and In Tam
and a grouping of key military commanders dependent on the
support of the United States. Such a government would
probably be a better performer than the present regime, but
we would expect no dramatic shift in the countrywide military
equation which now favors the Communists. In our judgment
such a government could continue to protect minimum US
interests in Cambodia during the next 3-6 months at least
equally as well as, if not better, than the present regime.
It could successfully defend Phnom Penh, maintain at least
intermittent control of key highways, deny the Vietnamese
Communists use of the port facilities at Kompong Som and
provide justification for continued US air operations in
Cambodia.
Approved For Release 20'R/1P2~-~ h DP80R0 720R000800050006-9 25X1
25X1
 SECRET
Approved For Relea'2 04/12/02: CIA-RDP80R017 OR000WO050006-9
ANNEX. Potential Contenders for Power Within the Military
25X1
The Cambodian military's previous tendency to avoid
involvement in national politics obscures the present play
of specific political loyalties within the military
establishment and this makes it difficult to predict the
likelihood of its playing a more decisive role in the future.
The following judgements are the most precise we can make,
given the limited information available.
In considering potential military contenders for power
in Cambodia, it is necessary to distinguish between those
who might want to move against the regime and those who
not only might want to. move but also have the actual ability
to do so. This latter group consists of only four generals,
who are discussed below. In addition, the power base of
Brigadier General Lon Non is discussed to include an
assessment of its strength and capability for countering
an attempted coup.
It should be noted that while the motives and loyalties
of the potential contenders are relatively apparent, it is
difficult to get a firm fix on the present availability of
some of the forces that they command. The current
disposition of the various forces available to Lon Non is
also hard to determine. With the exception of the 13th
Brigade Group, substantial elements of all of these forces--
which make up most of Phnom Penh's general military reserve-
are now committed to clearing operations south and east of
the capital along or near Routes 1 and 2. If necessary,
these forces could probably return to Phnom Penh within
24 to 48 hours. Assuming that their presence in the
capital for political reasons would not be protracted,
the Khmer insurgents probably would not be able to take
undue military advantage of their temporary withdrawal
from the battlefield.
At the moment, the defense. of Phnom Penh proper is in
the hands of a hodge-podge of at least five brigades, which
may total about 15,000 troops. The political loyalties
of these units' commanders are not known. Their immediate
commander, however, has in the past reportedly been
sympathetic to Sirik Matak. Cambodian Army (FANK) Chief
of Staff Fernandez has been prohibited from moving any
1 11
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800050006-9
 SECRET 25X1
Approved For Relea 2 04/12/02: C - 0R00Q&0050006-9 25x1
general reserve forces without first obtaining the approval
of the army's assistant chief of staff for operations.
This arrangement was set up last December by Lon Nol as
an additional control mechanism for himself over troop
units tasked with defending Phnom Penh.
Major General Sosthene Fernandez, FANK Chief of Staff
Fernandez is the key figure to any successful military
coup. Without his personal assurances and urgings it is
very unlikely that two of the three key FANK field
commanders, Brigadier Generals Dien Del and Un Kauv,
would act on their own. Without their support the
third field commander, Brigadier General Norodom Changtaraingsey
could not successfully act against the government.
Fernandez is a generally capable military officer and
he appears to have the backing and the respect of most
FANK officers. Fernandez has always been loyal to President
Lon Nol, but at the same time has been a close friend
and associate of Sirik Matak. Under normal conditions,
Fernandez probably would not consider moving against Lon
Nol. Like most FANK officers, he owes much to Lon Nol
for past favors and help. But--again like most FANK
officers--he dislikes and distrusts Lon Non. He does not
consider Lon Non a competent military officer and resents
the ways in which the latter exploits his unique access
to Lon Nol. Ever since Fernandez was appointed Chief of
Staff in September 1972, Lon Non has tried to discredit
his standing with the President. Just prior to the
17 March bombing, an anonymous letter was passed to Lon
Nol--probably at the direction of Lon Non--which implicated
Fernandez in the recent teacher/student strikes. Only
Fernandez' fast reaction to protect Lon Nol on 17 March
apparently convinced the latter that Fernandez is loyal
and the letter was untrue.
Fernandez, like most Cambodians, is a cautious man
and would prefer to wait in hopes that an unpleasant
situation might correct itself or disappear rather than
have to take action. Although there are noreal signs
that he is seriously considering action against the
government, Fernandez is worried and has stated the
government is in for some bad times.
Brigadier General Dien Del, Commanding Officer, 2nd Division
Dien Del is a Khmer Krozn officer and one of FANK's
A-2
Approved For Release
25X1
 SECRET
Approved For Releaw 2 04/12/02 : - 20 00000050006-9
25X1
best field commanders. (The Khmer Krom are ethnic Cambodians
from the Delta area of South Vietnam.) He is respected
by junior officers and has the loyalty of his troops,
which may number as high as 4,000 men. He has been very
vocal to personal friends over the past twelve to eighteen
months about the drift of the government and FANK's many
deficiencies. He dislikes and distrusts Lon Non intensely.
Although he has a personal liking for Lon Nol, he no longer
believes that the latter is capable of running the
government. Dien Del has stated on several occasions in
the past few months that the only way to settle the war
is to negotiate. He does not like the prospect of a
protracted civil war.
Dien Del is first and foremost a military officer.
This, combined with his personal feelings towards Lon Non,
is likely to make him agreeable to any orders he might
receive from Fernandez to move against the present
government. He has no strong brief for Sirik Matak, but
if he believed that Matak had US backing he probably would
give Matak his own support. Currently, some of Dien Del's
units are operating south of Phnom Penh between Routes 1
and 2, while others reportedly are deployed west of the
capital.
Brigadier General Un Kauv, Commanding officer, 7th Division
Un Kauv is also a Khmer Krom officer. He is
considered to be an excellent field commander, probably the
best in FANK. At full strength, his division would total
about 7,200 troops. Un Kauv is a close colleague of General
Fernandez and, along with Dien Del, has been a steady
supporter of the former's attempts to reduce FANK's
payroll by eliminating "phantom troops." He apparently
has some political ambitions, but realizes that being
Khmer Krom is a significant drawback. As early as December
1971, Un Kauv has been identified as an admiring supporter
of Sirik Matak. Un Kauv's 7th Division has been carrying
the brunt of the fighting on Route 2 near Takeo City near
the South Vietnam border.
Un Kauv, like Dien Del, has been critical of Lon
Nol and Lon Non and has no military respect for the latter.
If approached by Fernandez, he would be likely to cooperate
in a move tt change the present government. This would
be particularly true if Dien Del also were involved.
SECRET 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800050006-9
 Approved For Releal _RnPFtQRQ1 72 ROOA050006-9
25X1
Brigadier General Norodom Changtaraingsey, Commanding
Officer, 13th Brigade Group
A prince of the royal family, the independent
Changtaraingsey controls the area around Kompong Speu,
southwest of Phnom Penh, much in the manner of a warlord.
His 13th brigade is one of the largest military organizations
in FANK and has been estimated to contain as many as
13,000 troops. These men have all been recruited by
Changtaraingsey from the Kompong Speu area, are paid by
him, and they are loyal to him.
Changtaraingsey is related to and is a strong
supporter of Sirik Matak. He is also a life-long friend
of Fernandez. While he has remained nominally loyal to
the government and Lon Nol, he does not like Lon Non.
He has closely guarded his own area and has refused to
allow his brigade to be moved outside of it to fight.
Assured by Fernandez of the participation by Dien
Del and Un Kauv, he probably would be willing to participate
in a bid to oust the present government. Although he
might want to try and move against it unilaterally, it is
not likely he would succeed.
Support for the Government
Brigadier General Lon Non, Commanding Officer, 3rd Division
The nucleus of any resistance to a coup would almost
certainly have to be centered around Lon Non. Lon Non
commands the 3rd Division and has about 14 infantry
battalions (or some 5,000 troops) under his effective
control. Some of these units are currently engaged in
clearing operations southwest of Phnom Penh along Route 2.
Many unit commanders of the 3rd Division are Khmer Krom.
Since Sihanouk was ousted in 1970, the brunt of combat
in Cambodia has been borne by Khmer Krom units to the
point where their morale, efficiency, and loyalty has been
seriously affected. Khmer Krom commanders have become
increasingly disaffected by FANK's poor military showing
for which they hold Lon Nol responsible. Consequently,
the President's standing among them has slipped considerably.
Lon Non is even less popular with them.
Major General Thappana Nginn, Minister of Defense
General Thappana Nginn is personally loyal to Lon Nol,
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : IA- 720R000800050006-9 25X1
 Approved For Relea20
OROOO OO50006-9
and his political fortunes are linked with those of the
President. Nginn does not command any military units,
however, and it is doubtful whether he has sufficient
personal influence to bring troops to the support of
Lon Nol.
25X1
Brigadier General Ith Suong, Commanding Officer, lst Division
Ith Suong commands the 1st Division, elements of which
are currently operating along the Mekong River south of
Phnom Penh. His troops are not very effective because they
lack discipline and training. He has a poor record as a
field commander and retains his position because of his
personal relationship with Lon Nola Although Ith Suong is
considered loyal to Lon Nol, he dislikes Lon Non.
The Unknowns
There are other miscellaneous military units of
varying size (from company to brigade) and effectiveness
in the Phnom Penh area. They are commanded by men of
unknown ability and loyalty. Like many other FANK units,
they are poorly disciplined, trained, and paid. Their
loyalty to the present government and their effectiveness
in any coup situation is questionable.
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 1900411910910 1720R000800050006-9
 VIETNAMESE iA~FFAIRS STAFF
Approved For Ref eq*e X200 /1:06~T~6IA-FRB TdMb4 VhW i0050006-
DATE: 27 March 1973
TO: Rear Admiral James C. Longino, Jr., US
Deputy Director for Plans
FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Working Group C Papers
Per our conversation at the 23 March
meeting, attached are copies of the
basic Working Group C papers for
forwarding to Admiral Gayler and
General Tighe.. I would appreciate it if
you could transmit these papers as
expeditiously as possible. As you know,
I discussed them with Admiral Gayler
and his staff when I was in Hawaii in
mid- February.
/B/
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
ppies 26 and 27
Copies 26 and 27
1 - VAS/RAC (Working Group C file)
1 - GAC Chrono
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800050006-9