D/INR'S LETTER TO ASD(A), DATED 2 NOV 70, RE ALTERNATIVES TO BLUE RIBBON PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001000030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 6, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: D/INR's Letter to ASD(A), dated 2 Nov 7 0,
re Alternatives to Blue Ribbon Panel / v 6,114
Recommendations
1. I have sent Ray Cline's letter to Froehlke on to Jack Smith
with the suggestion that, when he has had a chance to comment on it,
25X1 he forward it to ho also seems to me directly concerned.
2. Ray has made two specific proposals in this letter, one
of which he apparently made to Henry Kissinger on the 15th of Septem-
ber. Both of these, I might say, strike me as a little gratuitous but
I suppose come within Ray's charter, although it would have been a
little more careful on Ray's part to have sent us a copy of his memo-
randum to Kissinger. (Perhaps he did, but I have no record of it. )
3. Ray's first proposal (which is one that he also made to
Kissinger) suggests the creation of an Assessments Panel of USIB
"to plan, review, and approve substantive joint studies or reports
of direct relevance to NSC policy papers and decisions.... " This
obviously is a function done, in part at least, by the Board of National
Estimates. It is also an area reviewed by Andy Marshall in his
capacity as a consultant to Kissinger to review the intelligence process
generally and propose ways to make it more helpful and responsive
to the needs of policy makers.
4. The problem of how to relate intelligence estimates and
judgments to policy and planning needs and discussions has never
been wholly solved, in my opinion at least. I believe that the new
format for the national estimates has gone a long way toward improv-
ing our position in this respect and satisfying earlier criticisms
expressed by the NSC staff. I believe Andy Marshall's conclusions
were that the normal estimating process was appropriate and
adequate to fill needs in most instances. His recommendation was to
single out a few topics of priority importance and subject them to a
more detailed and comprehensive analysis than has been the case in
the past. This is about what has happened to the 11-series estimates
as I understand it.
F :Fg4s 'k 3/04/25,~f FD
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5. It may be that further improvements are possible in
arrangements under which people preparing intelligence estimates
meet directly. with policy makers for the purpose of (a) identifying
subjects for estimates and (b) the substantive implications of the
estimates themselves.
6. Ray Cline's proposal, it seems to me, would have the
effect of removing the Board in very large measure from this process,
which I do not think would be a good idea.
7. Ray's second proposal relates to the NIRB, which he wants
to reconstitute as a Resources Panel of USIB. The relationship
between the NIRB and USIB has always been a little ambiguous. We
have been proceeding on the assumption that as a practical matter
the Board can already "levy requests for studies and advice directly
on USIB subcommittees" and has been doing so regularly from the
very beginning of the Board. The committee chairman will report to
the DCI and will presumably do what the DCI desires him to do.
8. My own view is that the NIRB is more useful if it is kept
distinct and apart from USIB, with the thought that USIB determines
requirements and priorities for intelligence coverage. The NIRB on
the other hand is the advisory body to the DCI to help him develop a
responsible judgment about the need for resources, particularly those
which cost a lot of money. USIB committees can help this process by
interpreting the requirements and needs for data in particular areas.
If a member of a committee objects to a position which the committee
is taking in response to a request from the NIRB, it can always have
the matter referred to USIB. Otherwise the NIRB is entitled to
presume that a committee position is authoritative insofar as it con-
stitutes a statement of substantive intelligence requirement. This
may be a little complicated but I don't think that integrating the NIRB
in the USIB would help very much.
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Dear Bob:
0000 QQ i e a gistzy
X 90
af, /I
November 2, 11170 ,1zr6 -
I appreciate very much the time and effort you took last week
t r C tiai nt us with the planning presently under `!,3y on the i ntT1 1 i -
aence recommendations of the Blue "il;bon defense Panel. From
personal experienlce, I know that your task is a difficult one,
and I am happy to see the beginning to hat I hope will be a big
step forward.
Your invitation for comments on the alternatives was also
appreciated. We who are workers in the foreign policy vineyards
are not only to a very large extent dependent upon riefense-'T ": laved
collection systems for information but also are deeply and directly
concerned with the Political -icat ions of the deployment of these
svs terns abroad We are, t: erefore, very conscious of the need for
the intelligence organization which eventually develops from your
pianniri to have a close and sensitive interface with the national
foreign policy machinery.
In reviewing your alternatives, I find that we lean strongly
toward alternative three. It has many merits, and would avoid the
bureaucratic upheaval that would occur if you tried to move immedi-
ately to alternative four--which arinears to be a not unreasonable
long-term goal. The principal reasons for preferring alternative
three are:
1. This alternative would retain a considerable degree
of decentralization in the operational management of
the collection system so that effective technical
liaison can be established at working levels with-
out the need to penetrate too many layers of
:ureaucrati c anproval s a we also believe such
decentralization is more likely to insure respon-
sivene!ss to requirements not self-generated, that
is, specifically to political and other foreign
pol i 4,P requirements.
The Honorable
Robert F. Froehlke,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Room 3E822, The Pentagon.
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2. It would strenrithnr; the position of the Director of
DIA and would einahle him to use the authority he
needs to fulfill his responsibilities for research,
analysis and reporting, not only in Defense, but in
the Intelligence Community as a whole.
3. This strengthening of the position of PI,.'ould also
help to place the producer-collector relationship in
proper balance production of finished intelligence
in support of the needs of the national policy maker
should drive collection, and this is not so easy if
analytical and research elements seen. junior and
subordinate to the collection system.
4. Finally, this alternative would provide the ASD (I)
with a staff large enough to enable him not only to
make intelligence policy, but also to monitor the
process of its implementation and even perhaps to
undertake program evaluation studies, which Probably
can be dealt with meaningfully only at this level.
The ASD (I) concept paper is, in my estimation, excellent. I
believe if this concept can be followed and your alternative three
placed into effect, you will have Provided Defense with an organiza-
tion that will have gone a long Way toward netting the intent of the
suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.
';y only reservations about the reorganization you are considering
relate to the interface between Defense intelligence components and the
rest of the Intelligence Cos :muni ty. I realize this problem cannot be
dealt with unilaterally by Defense, but I think State, CIA and Defense
should address themselves to interface arrangements very promptly.
Briefly, my suggestions for critical elements to be considered are
as follows:
1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB),whaL-
ever else might happen in the light of the Defense
reorganization, should be restructured in the two
following important respects:
a) An Assessments Panel, or Steering Committee
of USIB, should be established to plan,
review, and approve substantive Joint studies
or reports of direct. relevance to USC policy
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pavers and decisions (cf. attached mer?o to
Dr. Kissinger spelling out this sungestion
it would consist of senior analytical (as dis-
tinct from operational) intelligence officers
of Stato, Defense and CIf\, with other members
of USIA 'serving as observers or participants
upon invitation according to subject matter,
and i-141-1 should deal directly with N SC Committees
insofar as possible.
b) The National Intelligence Resources Board, (':IRB)
should be reconstituted as a Pesources Panel, or
S Leeri nq Corimi ttee of UUSIB , th appropri ate
State, Defense and tCi me.mit-hership (as now con-
stituted, I should t.=pink) and be authorized to
levy requests for studies and advice directly
or, USIB subcommittees which have functional
wel l
managemc --ori entcd r soonsi bi l i ti es as
as on intelligence program di rectors in the
whole Co unity.
2. State (MR) and ASP (I) should at an early date ex-
Ii wi a"} = officers :who would ;-ork
4, ~ a rs ~ .~
change h I e v
with our res ec .~ btu' front--office staffs t to insure
that essential info rmae,ion about on-going projects
and activities is provided in timely fashion from
each agency to the other,, special emphasis should
be put on arranging -v.+orking-level contacts on an
informal basis at the earliest possible point in
the development of important joint studies.
My suggestions are all designed to 'knit the intelligence elements
of State, lle'iense and CIA closer together and enable them to deal
effectively with -the pol i c~;-Maki -Making el events of our Government both at
the Departmental and +1SC levels. Only by this joint approach can we,
in my vies=ww, achieve the better interface with intelligence users which
your reorganization is partially intended to facilitate.
I wish you much success in this important and difficult task, and
want to thank you for the opportunity to comment on matters in which
we have a deep, common interest.
Sincerely,
Attachment:
Ray S. Cline
Cl i rte7Ki ssi nger Memorandum,
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Available
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Semaker 15. VA"
Dr. i'Fi;.."v K'i i
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You J1.R i..: /j.~ .r?t:.- t ?::i some 1.i'~ "~. -' ago that I JC.f ~ sen f you 11 note s'e t Inn out
.. :. i.;i
1 l i l'~;wlti,~.'. machinery needed to
y Lance,t of a new ti.1t~r;7it G in the ?Iite"}
y; ".; v'i f.f more intimate and effective support to SC policy-making.
Are it is., in brief.,
'j. present . ...~:t l eiii.. Y subcommittee a. system seems to tail
t NS C ?.. Cit..al-L. L.: L'. to be . faulty in An way it . arrives at intelligence appreciations o
' and ct.. .,wsioas of it.t'i'I:ti..S ( a /i c ' /.C-Aus c.. t
the character a i ) in foreign,
.if i``lf... rr ' .li" security The present
v':t C.\'? f{: IC?~. i.tf+'. . _!~`7 .~.1a.n t national r ~'tll-} ifi-4c{:.~,._ ?oii.,, style is to analyze the key factors in the situation as supporting
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arrun*nt for t.. analysis of what n,_it'(s 1. he done. :+i,i4fnos is and
. . ... ' get a lei.! up in one hall ax, . by the same grou-n of
people. This :if) ?fi t necessarily give bad solutions. i believe,
..
?it-.i_vor, it 1s intellectually and ptrocc ;oral) sou Rd :r to separate
?L0..._ two analytical fCArictio Policy studies should be based on,
;grand intelligence findings (with dissents as appropriate) se fo Ln
truly
~ f c+ answers i y quG.~ stiC`i> which are ii~
f e which riSliE. j:t i;. i e~ `
in the manner 7~.:..,
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to influence the policy makers' thinking c ho G ha L to do. In
Now, intelligence should ;be 1?2"'Ct. ~ .,.~ ' tt?itil~)'`~ ic.? !'' j'???' the "what is
t analysts ,f
p..c'?.Y'v of ,r, the };... ''ne1?` ,ii... .a and policy makers should develop the
i.... trouble" H4 ;3,.inrls ` sec ion. If policy staffs choose to deviate from agreed
inOrprotations of the i['e..S, situations they are dealing with, the
can do so,, but .they should note the point at which h decide to flake
a line differing from what the evidential base suggests.
f a .. ~'e ri L.c.~i^.
The U.S. }.1-to!lic. ;a!'iCr: L'.C:~~.o ,.t..f'!"tf;~ f ' T L1;1' not not now be 1 eiY'~. J r 1 f 11:U the
NSC `?y-'tow is a ?'o.' that permits it 1-''.".:'.iii iy to provide the kind of
nd ,. .S r s< l':fsat-,.,.n o ~..
Erg of l:v{t,! is. !erl.' and nC. t of trends that is needed. I
evaluation
think t .. e to .,,?G4 rt~~tt...u~;aM..S end3 4 you and t 3 e 1 Director of Contra!
if I a.to ~'l w L iv r
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DEPARTMENT OF StA-TE
Ti-IE DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
x IVv.v- /R 7o
'1% L ~ ~-t Pti
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L-4.1 44wt4l"~
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