INTERVIEW WITH MR. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000300030008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 19, 1963
• Content Type: TRANS

WOR-TV (New York) and January 19, 1963
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PROGRAM: Ladies of the Press
INTERVIEN WITH MR. DULLES
Moderator: Clifford Evans.
Guest: Allen W. Dulles, former Director of Central
Intelligence Agency.
Panel: Gay Pauley, UPI
Georgiana O'Kane of World Telegram & Sun
Joan Cook, New York Times.
THE PARTICIPANTS I ERE SEEN ON THE TELEVISION
SCREEN, SEATED IN THE STUDIO.
EVANS: "Our guest is Allen W. Dulles, honored by President.
Kennedy, with'the National Security Medal in 1961, decorated by
the governments of France, Belgium, and Italy, and Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency for nine years. Allen W. Dulles,
welcome to 'Ladies of the Press.' And now our first question from
Gay,Pauley, of United Press International, whose column appears in
the Philadelphia Bulletin, and in 300 other newspapers throughout
the country.
PAULEY: "Mr. Dulles, does Fidel Castro have a future?"
DULLES: "I hope not."
man?"
PAULEY: "What is your judgment of what is to become of the
DULLES: "ti"dell, I rather think he may fade away."
PAULEY: "How soon, when?"
DULLES: "Well, that I can't tell. As soon as the economy
of Cuba has reached the point of no return. How long that will
take, I don't know. And that of course is leaving aside what
other extraneous things may come in. But let's assume the situation
continues as it is today--it will be I think, when the economy falls
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to pieces."
FAULEY: "What extraneous things, sir?"
DULLES: "The intervention of some other power."
PAULEY: "You mean Russia?"
DULLES: "No, not Russia. Russia has already intervened."
FAULEY: "Well then what other power, possibly?"
DULLES: "Any of the American powers, including the United
States."
PAULEY: "Mr. Kennedy keeps talking about a free Cuba. If
Castro is to go, who is to succeed him?
DULLES: "That one rarely knows, in a situation of this kind.
There are leaders--underground leaders in Cuba. We have a great
many devoted, able Cubans in this country--in'Floride and all over
the country.
PAULEY: "Yes, but we don't hear of any particular one, like
we did when Castro was rising to power and Batista was being over-
thrown."
DULLES: "W"dell that often happens in situations of this kind.
Once the communists have taken over in a country, you don't hear
of people any more that are opposed to the communist leaders, that
is insofar as the country itself is concerned. And I would think
that the future leadership of Cuba would very likely come from
inside of Cuba--it might of course come from the exiles."
'FAULEY: "Do you think in,the form of possibly an overthrow,
as it happened when Castro overthrew Batista?"
DULLES: "Like a watch that might run down. 1 ether there'll
be a dramatic overthrow, that's hard to tell."
EVAWS: "Georgiana O'Kane of the New York World Telegram &
Oun* ti
O' KANE: "M-. Dulles, the Cuban exiles have claimed that they
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were promised support when they invaded Cuba in the Bay of Pigs
invasion. Were they promised such support?"
DULLES: "Not so far as I know--not so far as I know. No one
in authority, as far as I know, had promised them support, as far
as the American government is concerned."
0tKANE: "It has been reported that you had expected that when
they arrived, there would be uprisings within Cuba, to meet the in-
vasion. Did you expect uprisings`?"
DULLES : "2rs. O' Kane, during the war, I was working--that is
during the last war I was working in Switzerland, and there I was
in ~ o eh with the underground, and I knew that the last thing that
one wanted was an uprising against overwhelming superior forces.
And therefore, as far as I know, there was no attempt made to have
a spontaneous, unarmed uprising at the time Of the Bay of Pigs."
O'KANE: "Did you expect that there would be spontaneous help
given to the invaders:'"
DULLES: "I think it was generally considered in the United'
States that if the brigade was successful in making a landing, that
there would be a considerable accretion to the already existing
underground that there was in Cuba."
O'I ,ENE: "We've heard so much about dissatisfaction in Cuba
that it seems--if it's true that they are dissatisfied--that it
would have been a perfect moment for uprisings, demonstrations--"
DGLLES: "There is always dissatisfaction in all of the
countries that have been taken over by communists--dissatisfaction
in Hungary, dissatisfaction in Poland; so was there dissatisfaction
in Cuba. They're a police state--it's very hard to register that."
EVANS : "Joan Cook, New York Times."
COOK: "%r. Dulles, as Director of the CIA, you have been
accused. of being responsible for the blunder of the Cuban invasion
at the Bay of Pigs. Do you accept this responsibility?"
DULLES: "In intelligence, -s. Cook, one does not discuss
one's operations. What I have been saying here is what I have from
general knowledge. And I never discuss--never have discussed any
phase of the brigade's invasion of the Bay of Pigs. By the way, I
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understand that really should be the Bay of Pigs (?)--really that
word in tiapana.sh, as I understand it, means a small fish that looks
-like a pig, but it's got the name the Bay of Pigs--I believe that's
a small fish, but I've never verified it..."
COOK: "2,,Ir. Dulles, the CIA was also accused of being strongly
influenced by information provided by exiles, who were out of touch
with their country, in the case of Cuban exiles in Florida. Do you
care to comment on that?"
DtJLLES: "Well I would say that in general, and I've had quite
a long experience with exiles since World War I, I never have relied
on the word of exiles alone."
COOK: "Do you measure up the information from exiles as against
information from within a given country?"
DIJLLES: "Oh certainly--certainly one always would do that,
because the exile always has such deep feelings and deep prejudices,
that while I respect them, I want some confirmation of their
j u.dgmen t . "
COOK: Dulles, may I ask, when the CIA recommends support
to a given government, is this done on the basis of the fact that
the government is anti-communist, or that it is supported by the
people of a given country. On what basis is such a recommendation
made?"
DULLES: "I don't think I quite understand your question. How
would that arise;? I wish you could be a little more precise as to
what the question is. We don't go around giving advice to govern-
raents--that isn't the job of the CIA. At least it wasn't in my
day; I'm speaking as an individual of course--I haven't been in
charge of it for over a year."
COOK: "Then in, for example, let's say in support of the
government of Laos, or the support of the Chinese government on
Taiwan, or any government that the United States decides to give
its support to, the incumbent leadership, or a particular segment
of leadership, on what basis is--"
ILLE:S: "That is determined by the President and the Secretary
of State. They are the ones to decide to whom support should be
given, and from whom support should be withheld, not the CIA."
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EVAVS: W. Dulles, would you clarify a word...in answer to
a question before--what support did we promise the exiles in their
attempted return to Cuba? They say that we promised air support,
in addition to materiel support. Is your answer negative on both
scores?"
DULLES: "As far as I know, it's negative, yes."
EVtdiS: "Gay, Pauley, United Press International."
PAULEY: "Well a lot of Cubans say that we did promise air
support. A lot of Cuban exiles, certainly--a lot of them denounced
the CIA at the time."
DULLES: "I don't know about that--I'm just answering what I
know."
PAULEY: "Why didn't you advise Mr. Kennedy to stop the in-
vasion, Mr. Dulles?: Or at least slow it down--delay it?"
DULLES: "These matters are policy matters. And in the CIA
we have always tried to follow a policy, and not make policy."
PAULEY: "Aren't you supposed to advise though, on the basis
of the knowledge you have, as head of an intelligence agency?"
DULLES: "If they ask on matters within our competence, Mrs.
Pauley."
PAULEY: "Well if you had it to do over again, as head of
CIA, would you go ahead with the Cuban invasion?"
DULLES: "in our field, we don't speculate on things like that."
PAULEY: "Oh you don't speculate on things like that? Well,
let's go to Mr. Khrushchev. He has said that he will never leave
Cuba in a lurch. Do you think that Cuba could still trigger World
War III despite Mr. Kennedy's very strong stand, and which MY.
Khrushchev backed out?"
DXTLLES: "I doubt whether Cuba could. I believe Cuba could
make a certain number of difficulties, but I doubt now whether
Cuba could trigger a world crisis.''
EVA''S: "Georgians O'Kane, New York World Telegram & Sun."
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0' KAANE: ".. r. Dulles, the U-2 flight, in which Francis Gary
Powers was brought down, caused a lot of grief to this country.
Do you feel that the flights themselves were of enough value to
overcome that one incident?"
DULIE:S: "I would say the flights were of great value. I don't
think it's up to me to judge. Our job is to get intelligence
within the limits allowed and permitted, and advised by the policy
makers. They have to judge--the policy makers have to judge the
risks, and the relative value or demerits--the balance sheet, the
cost, which sometimes is' high; but the intelligence may be vital
to our security."
O' 1QV,TE: "I have another question on Mr. Powers. But first I
just want to say that this is not the impression that had been
given for a long time about the CIA, when you were the Director.
The charges were made on all sides that it was a policy-making
organization, that it made too much policy,'that it was too strong,
and that it wasn't simply an adviser."
DvLLES: "You've been reading some books, I think, that have
been published recently. Those were written by people that had
about as much knowledge of the CIA as I have of the atomic bomb."
O'.KANE: "I also would like to ask you if you believe that Mr.
sowers should have taken a .pill to end his life, as some critics
of his actions have said, instead of letting himself be captured."
DULLES:' "He was under no instructions to take the pill. The
bill was given to him, in the event he was in a situation where he
thought death was the best way out."
EV NS: "Joan Cook, New York Times."
COOK: Dulles, in regard to the Soviet Union's military
future, you have said that they have conditioned their people to
accept very real. sacrifices and low standard of living to permit
the military buildup to continue. How would. they accomplish this,
in your opinion?"
DULLES: i1'Vell I don't recall where I said that exact state-
ment. A lo-i:w standard of living, or a lower standard of living
than they otherwise would have, has been forced upon them by the
diversion of so large a part of the assets of the Soviet Union to
heavy industry and military equipment. Now they had no choice.
They cart' t say we want a higher standard of living--give it to us,
and have less missiles. That choice is made by others, so that--"
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COOK: "But, sir, in a speech before the Edison Electric
Institute in New Orleans on April 8th, in 1959, you used the
phrase 'they have conditioned their people to accept very real
sacrifices.' I wondered what you meant by this, that they have
been forced to accept--"
DULLES: ''They are under very stern discipline, and if one
looks back on the 30 years that Stalin was really in control, and
what he forced the people to accept during that period--there has
been some relaxation since--but they were conditioned over a long
period, to take what they got from the government and to like it.
They had no choice.'COOK: "Do you feel that there is any real rebellion or dis-
satisfaction from within the Soviet Union on any large scale?"
DULLES: "As 1 said there has been a certain amount of relax-
5.on under Khrushchev, not as far as general liberalization is
concerned, but the concentration camps have been pretty largely
done away with, and there is somewhat more freedom--not much
freedom--than there used to be."
3: Dulles, during World Var 11, your base was in
Switzerland. Now the Potsdam Conference--Stalin and President
Truman. At that conference you came there with information from
Japan indicating the possibility of a Japanese surrender. Do you
think, in view of that, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
was necessary?''
DULLES: "That's a pretty tough question to answer, Mr. Evans.
I did not have the facts to pass on that. I went to Potsdam; I
was then in touch with certain Japanese in Switzerland, who in turn
were in touch with high quarters, and I assumed, the Emperor, and
they came to me and said that Japan was ready to surrender, provided
the Kikado, the Emperor could be saved, so as to have some unity in
Japan. I took that word to Secretary Stimson at Potsdam on the 20th
of July, 1945. But 1 had been cooped up in Switzerland most of the
time, and I don't think I had any right to any judgment. Wiser. men
than I, people that knew the military situation, reached the
decision. 1 have great admiration for Secretary Stimson and
:?resident Truman, and of course their judgment was controlling."
ETUAl S: "From a moral Point of view, do you have any feeling
on the use of the bomb at t ht time?"
DULLES: "No, 1 don't think I have any feeling of that kind.
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The history of the world is that you use the best weapon that you
have in case you go to war, and I think we've got to assume that
is the situation today, and was the situation got
1945."
GAY PAULEY: "You've been advising our government for some
20 years in intelligence work, counting your years in Switzerland,
sir. for What is your educated guess on that At. Khrushchev's plans
are i:Berlin?
DULLES: "(LAUGHTER) I don't believe in 20 years--twenty-five,
as a matter of fact--even 25 years is enough to give me the hardi-
hood to say what hr. Khrushchev will do. ~ I think that for one
thing, that since Cuba, we've got to expect Mr. Khrushchev to do
the unexpected--he Often does--"
PAULEY: "And he always has--"
LULLES: "And therefore, not the thing he's going to do,
-necessarily in Berlin or anywhere else, is exactly what you expect.
That the unexpected is in this case, I just can't tell you."
AULEY: "You don't want to speculate at all' Does time work
for the Reds in Berlin?"
iJLLES: "No, I don't think so. I don't think particularly
so. I think that the Wall, which looked like a defeat for the
West is more and more becoming a defeat for the communists. And
therefore I don't want to say that time is working for the Reds."
E VANS: "Georgiana O' Kane, New York World Telegram.''
O' KAN .: "0. Dulles, in 1953 and 154, the CIA was organizing
commando raids by the nationalist Chinese against the China coast.
Recently Chiang Kai-shek has been announcing similar raids, by
commandos, and I'm curious as to just what point there is in this
kind of small riding, against the communists--"
DULLES: "You started off, Mrs. O'Kane, with a statement, and
7 don't wish to by not denying the statement, to admit its truth.
Comrando raids, looking at the thing from the technical point of
view, are engaged in in order to test out an enemy as to where his
forces are, what his reaction is likely to be, and I assume that
if Chiang ?