NMCC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 26, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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DCI/IC 75-0543
26 February 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
AD/DCI/IC
PD/D/DCI/IC
SUBJECT: NMCC Intelligence Support Requirements for
Crisis Management
1. On 21 February 1975, I met with Dr. Don R. Harris, a
consultant to the WWMCCS Architecture Intelligence Interface Group.
The meeting was informal and at his request. At lunch we discussed
the progress of the DIA modernization program for the NMIC and how
the NMIC would eventually interface with the NMCC as a part of the
expanded National Military Command System.
2. Attached is a paper Dr. Harris prepared that addresses the
subject above. I think it is worth reading. There are a number of
implications for intelligence planning that may be of interest to
and I have provided them with a copy of this
memorandum.
3. Based upon my discussion with Dr. Harris and a review of
his paper, what follows are three issues, relating to the NMIC-NMCC
and associated considerations:
A. ISSUE
The production of joint operational-intelligence
situational reports for display on single screens
or produced as single, integrated reports. What
about NOIWON - Context?
CONSIDERATIONS
-- Protection of security of intelligence information
- Clearances for all personnel in operations center
- Security of transmission to displays in areas
other than the NMCC
25X1
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- Procedures for indicating sensitivity of
various elements of information contained
in the report
-- Procedures for integration of operational and
intelligence information
- Develop common format and agreed terminology
- Staff procedure for preparing joint situation
plot
B. ISSUE
The provision by the NMIC of total, integrated analysis
of all factors involved in a developing situation--
political, economic, social, environmental, and
military. What role for the Special' Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning and his Strategic Warning
Staff? How will the NIOs fit into this system?
Where do the Alert Memoranda fit?
CONSIDERATIONS
-- Effective and efficient interchange between NMIC
and other national intelligence agencies of
intelligence information, processed intelligence,
and intelligence analysts and estimates
-- Availability of analysts in the NMIC who can
perform requisite analysis and produce estimates
of meaning and impact of a developing situation
-- Ability of NMIC analysts to conference electronically
with analysts in other national intelligence agencies
to coordinate analyses and estimates and to
determine differences where they exist
The provision of direct, continuous, sensitive
intelligence support to DoD leaders involved in crisis
management meetings in the White House, Executive Office
Building or Department of State
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CONSIDERATIONS
-- The need for a technical ability to provide
at a national crisis management center the
information available in the NMCC in a similar
display
The need to solve security problems in the
transmission phase and at the receiving end
The need to develop a means for an institution
to interface with all aspects of NMIC reporting
system
4. The Harrig-mffnorandum is for information onlE y, since
have the action on this subject for the IC
tat . However, you might wish to discuss some of these issues with
Major General Faurer at your next meeting.
25X1
Captain, USAF
CS/ICS
Attachment: As Stated
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 Harris
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?:n .1CCq APC!ITTi'CTURT --I:~TEI.T.TGENCF INTERFACE
NMCC Intelligence Support Requirements
Crisis Management
(7.2.3) I. Introduction
1. The design for the National Military Command System of the future has
taken account of problems in crisis management, especially as they have
occurred in the past, and the impact of changes in U.S. nuclear strategy.
It proposes an expanded National Military Command Center (ENMCC). it
states requirements for improved facilities and communications in and
interfaces with the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and
Logistics Command Center (LCC).
2. The Master Plan for the NMCS recognizes that while in periods of crisp
the NMCS will be comprised of the OJCS, NMCC, NMIC, and LCC operational
facilities, these facilities belong to other entities of the Department
of Defense and will continue to be in their respective chains of command.l
The problems inherent in this situation are faced up to in procedures which
reflect that in time of crisis these several centers will be working toward
common objectives and that all come under the ultimate command authority
of the Secretary of Defense.
3. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of Defense ele-
ment responsible for fulfilling the intelligence requirements of the NMCS,
has also responded to its demonstrated weaknesses in past crises by planninf-
a greatly strengthened NMIC. In particular, its design is directed to
eliminating the "severe degredation (the NMIC suffers) in time of rapid
change associated with periods of crisis."2
1 P3-005, Master Plan NMCS
2 Pi, Volume 1, Design and Implementation Plan, DIA NT1IC Project Office
and Rome Air Development Center, April 1974.
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 4. To thisApP pvvd for.ReIealea20R4//10/?d8s CIA-R DP80MO11133A000800050020-4
center team, assisted by automated data handling Systems, which will b?
able to perform "primary intelligence support functions in normal, or non-
crisis, times. These are the functions of detecting, analyzing, and
reporting significant indications in the form of warning notifications,
the generation of current intelligence reports, and the channeling of
operational intelligence to the NMCC or other NMCS elements."3 The sys-
tem is designed to accomodate rapid augmentation when the situation.so
requires. The NMIC will have space and automated aids to support the
increases in staff. This approach tends to minimize the start-up problem
that has always been present in past major crises.
5. In the discussion which follows, intelligence support requirements-of-
the MCC in a crisis period will be specified. The NMIC design will be
reviewed to develop a base-line for intelligence support that it will
provide NMCC beginning in 1976-77. Certain problem areas will then be
presented, discussing certain requirements that the system as designed
will not meet.
II. NMCC Requirements for Intelligence Support, 1985
.6. The focus of the analysis of the intelligence interface of the NMCC
is on crisis situations. These are the periods which put the greatest
strain on the national security decision process. The Department of
Defense has two important elements in this process, the Secretary of
Defense. as supported by the office and staff of the several Assistant
Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Joint Chief of
Staff, and the Joint Staff. They each relate differently to the process
but the NMCS is charged with supporting both.
7. It should be noted that the requirements on the NMCC posed by a crisis
situation overlaps those inherent in the decision process concerning the
3 PP 1 & 2, D&IP
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 employment of Apprbamd Eonfteiease2OQ4i10/28e: Pb R@P8OMO OQ aOQ5Q{ O-4
tegic and tactical watch functions apply across the hoard, in normal
conditions, in a crisis, and in a conventional or 'war threatening situa-
tion. Similarly in all crisis, general purpose war and nuclear war situa-
tions, except for a surprise "bolt-from-the-blue" strategic nuclear attack
on the U.S. , continuous intelligence information on the enemy capabilities
and intentions are needed. However, if a crisis evolves into a war situa-
tion, conventional or nuclear, a unique set of intelligence requirements
develop. The assessment of damage and of the impact of enemy military
activity must be reported..in detail and as rapidly as possible.
A. NMCC Day-To-Day Intelligence Requirements
8. NMCC intelligence requirements on a day-to-day basis in a non-war,
noncrisis situation are focused on giving warning of a situation devel-
oping which will lead to a crisis and/or war. The warning of war must
include a capability which tells in seconds of a launch of nuclear missiles
against the U.S. as well as days to week estimates of a Soviet general
purpose focus attack in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The warning
of impending crisis must clearly link a developing situation to a threat
to specific U.S. interests in the area of concern. The occurrences of
hostilities and conflict in the world is not enough to create a crisis;
a threat to a U.S. interest must be involved. The warning should attempt
to relate the calculation of seriousness of threat of conflict (as other
harmful actions) to the value as worth of U.S. interests in the area.
9. The NMCC also needs daily intelligence reporting on the state of the
world. The focus of effort should be on areas of defined U.S. national
interest. The reporting, including brief statements of important events,
development, and trends and analysis of this meaning, should emphasize
warning. The longer the period between warning and a critical event
occurring, the more likely the U.S. leaders can either avoid or minimize
a crisis, as if it should occur, deal effectively with its causes with a
minimum of confusion. The possibility of the events leading to a war
situation could more readily be contained.
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 10. Si ec,ific..i1:.. it would appear that an a d-1y-to--day basis the N-CC
c:ou1.1 requi~'Lp~o ec#F - lg~s~2Q~4/o1p/?~8 CIA-RDP80i1V101,1 AOQQgPQ050020-4
Soviet Union
1) Military Forces
a) A statement of any changes in deployment, posture,
or equipment of major Soviet military elements.
b) Notice of impending major training exercises.
c) Estimates of Soviet reaction to U.S. force movements
including reconnaissance, training, ship and fleet
movements, shifts in ground and air unit deployment.
d) Important hench marks
in weapon systems research and
development activities together with estimates of
impact on existing projections of Soviet military
posture.
The Soviet Union, Other Than Military -
a) Note any political speeches or events that appear
to have an important bearing on"some aspect of Soviet
foreign or defense policy and give an assessment of
what the impact is or will be.
b) Note any economic development that appears to have an
impact on foreign or defense policy and give-an assess-
ment thereof.
c) Note any important internal dissention and assess its
impact on course of Soviet policy.
B. Communist China
Cover the same items of intelligence listed for the
Soviet Union.
C. Other Regions and Countries of the World
1) The focus will be in a priority set by extent of U.S.
interests involved.
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2) The N'fIC will he scek_inc to detect events and trends
th l 1; dic to t 't C:ti?V Z.C1i .ien cadvc rse to U.S. intcr(ests.
will occur. The emphasis is on forewarning rather than
mere reporting.
3) The events and trends covered will include political,
economic, social, and military.
B. NMCC Requirements in a Crisis
11. Both the NMCC and the NMIC have dual functions during a crisis
period. They each must focus on the crisis, developing all pertinent
information as fast as possible and planning how to get more. The NMCC
must develop plans for dealing with the crisis, in most cases new or
modified plans as the crisis proceed through stages. But both organiza-
tions must also handle the day-to-day problems in all areas not involved
in the crisis. In particular, the NMIC must search for events that might
indicate developments elsewhere that are threatening to U.S. interests.
In part, some of these activities elsewhere might be caused indirectly
by the crisis. 0-
12. Specifically, it would appear that in a crisis period the NMCC would
require the following types of information from the NMIC:
A. NMCC Requirements During the Crisis Initiation:
1) To be able to answer, in ever increasing detail and with
heightened accuracy, repeated questions from the President
and his chief advisors including:
a) Who did what to whom.
b) What is the status of Soviet forces, in the area,
and world-wide.
c) If the crisis is in the Pacific area, a similar status
report with respect to the North Koreans and Communist
China.
d) What additional events are likely to happen in the
crisis area and when and by whom and to what end.
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crisis area as a bCtsis for plii:liiiilg Or UpdaLillg Of
existing contingency plans, including:
a) Transportation capabilities including airfields,
harbors, raillines, major highways, etc.
b) Crisis specific information--if the crisis is the
result of a natural cause such as a flood then infor-
mation will be required on numbers of injured food
supplies, medical supplies, etc. If the crisis is
caused by an assassination, then information is
needed quickly on political grounds and their loyal-
ties, the status of sympathies in the military forces,
etc. In all cases immediate information is required
on numbers of Americans in the area in case evacuation
must be planned for.
B. MCC Requirements During the Crisis Period:
1) A continuous flow of information reporting events as they
are occurring in the crisis situation. Periodically, the
NMIC must summarize the events that have happened and pro-
duce a base-line statement of the situation as of a specific
time. Intelligence base-line statement must be timed to
conform to operational base-line summaries, in'a common
format, and readily integrated into a single report.
Reporting must include political, economic, social, and
military events. Reporting must be from all..U.S. elements
in the area including the Embassy, Defense Attache's,
CIA station, NSA element, any military command and to
extent possible from other national governments and/or
either elements in the area. Reports to NMCC must be
on all-source basis. If any sources excluded, DDO must be
notified so he can warn the J-3, Director Joint Staff,
Chairman and JCS, and Secretary of Defense.
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2) ply
the status and &."In?s,Tent of Sorirt (and %--here izl :i :~tcci
other Communist) forces. This must be cpaable of interyra-
tions into a report on status of U.S. forces, as both can
be read or viewed at the same time in the same format.
3) Daily reporting of press opinion and official views as
expressed in speeches in major countries as they reflect
support or opposition to U.S. positions or aid to one
group of participants in the crisis, etc.
4) Periodic estimates by the intelligence analysts of the
meaning for the immediate future of events that are
occurring. Only to the extent that these are produced in
a timely fashion and are accurate will the NMCC planners
be able to develop plans that can be effective in the
crisis situation. Estimates must deal on an integrated
basis with all factors influencing in the crisis--political,
economic, social, and military.
5) Estimates of reactions to U.S. policy options as requested
by the NMCC including those by major participants in the
crisis, the Soviets, Communist Chinese, etc.
III. NMIC Capability 1976-77
13. On the basis of approved plans, by 1976-77 the NMIC will be able to
meet most of the NMCC crisis requirements outlined above. The NMIC facil-
ities will be enlarged and co-located with the NrNCC. The number of personnel
on watch will be increased and will include trained. persons,' to cover the
regions of world who not only can alert the NMCC but can give them a
first-cut statement of what the event or events portend. The efficiency
of the NMIC operations will be enhanced by an automated information
handling system. However, some problem areas will remain. The most impor-
tant include:
a) The ability of the NMIC to provide political and economic
analysis equal to that produced in military field.
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 b) The i,dequacy of political and economic information received.
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c) The constraints on integrated operational and intelligence
reporting posed by compartmentation of intelligence infor-
mation. In large measure, the reason for constraints have
to do with protecting sources or concealing system operational
data.
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