INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000100080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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INTELLIGENCE WARNING
OF THE TET OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
':able of Contents
1. REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TEAM
If. COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT
III. CHRONOLOGY
IV. LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN THE FIELD
V. BRIEFINGS IN THE FIELD ON INTELLIGENCE WARNING
r CTZ
II. CTZ
4. 111 CTZ
5. IV CTZ
VI. 'SELECTION OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS
4:' III CI?Z
IVCTZ
VII. INDICATIONS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, 15-30 SAN 1963
I- P I terial Available in CIA
2. Material Available in DIA
3. Material Available in INR
4. Material Available in NSA
VIII. TREATMENT OF INDICATIONS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
IX. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
l_ CIA
2. DIA.
3. INR
4. NSA
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Countrywide
2:- I:CTZ
3. II "CTS
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INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF THE TET
OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(Interim Report)
A. Procedures
1. A working group; has been formed under the
- NSA1~d the Joint Stamz on
f are r esented. s group
has compiled dossiers on the.raw inte lzgence inform a- -
and- intelligence summaries and. jud mtints received in
,various - US headquarters before Tet _ wi f-T, A,T p s
.... on he p e l od 1 a -,au v anuary 19 b 8 , and on the finished
senior officers of-
of th t=aniCTAr - D
ted Vietnarx-frorzi 7
c PAC, MACV,,.. : and the CIA station in
Sa gon r : `
conducted. interviews,.. both in Saigon and the field,.
with mansenior officials, US and Vietnamese On
Ambassador. Bunker, General Westmoreland. 'Gene ra.%._-:`
.!Abrams; '.Ambassador Korner`-, . Lt. General Cushman-'
.[..t
:::i bard , and the - commanding generals of is-t Marine
, Division and 4th - Infantry Division. They also inter-
-viewed the G-2s, of 'I' and .II- Field Forces and, the
G-2 of III Mariz;e Amphibious Force, and the G-2
advisers and the CIA Regional officers in all.. four-
_, Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). They were briefed ex--
-tensively by MACV _ J-2 and by the CIA station in
and L:ontacted the Director o 1n :eL.L2_gence-,.,.
Seventh Air- Force; Vietnam. and
--cne army .Heaaquart omman in Saigon.. On
generals-'of -I and II. Corps, J-2 of the Joint General -
::Staff and has:. deputy, and the deputy director of
In _ the course of these
discus- Members-of--r-the group visited Phu Bair Da Nang,
Pleiku,~ Camp Enari, Nha Trang, Bien Roar. Long Birth;
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B. General Findings
a result, a series o:
actions were taken in Vietnam wh , -1,
and political- officers ` A ~++yvy ALL `J""
~?-y'._ L___3 . iactc.i iJeen. -
_-,identified. Both 'in. Saigon and in Washington this.
F
Intelligence Advisory Board in February, there waasn
evidence, both in Saigon and in Washington, that
the enemy was engaging in his much-advertised "Tuiiater
spring campaign" and was preparing for a series of
coordinated attacks, probably on a larger scale
than ever before. There was evidence in January=
that some attacks in the highlands might be con-
ducted during the Tet holiday. .In the latter part
of_ -the mnrtt?h ; -t- o.,a a ._ LL _ ._
3. As the DCI informed the President'
c+.+cai.,. ar-:li_.evement . ror the . ntelligence apparatus
. .) Vi.etTlaTTi
4 . The: warnincr thus
It must therefore rely on classic in-
dications techniques. ' This is difficult under any
C1rctmist?x-nr' Tl,- 4 _,km ..-r -7 _ ----
e ave equally little doubt that similar reports
could be found - alluding to attacks on many other-..
found forecasting many of the attack
w IN s made at Tet;
L-u zne --crying wolf syndrome. =
We have- 1i+--f-1= ~. +- , , s
o ac ground noise
:1 presents - a. major problem.. - MOrern -- ?-f-h.a yTOr., r , -
r
Po s r.rolm
-human sources through the blare f- b
,_ r an~a iea rs . -Large.
.-_ hus, the., recognition of significant re
t t
pJ.a,ns, n o . officer below the ?-
4z hours.::. kI-Ltnough US and Vietnamese authori.
seminated to - attackinq units on l v ; T, y~ tau ~; r z _
- yrn-_enrions . . Knowledge of his plans was fully corn.--
5
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level of CO.SVN, front, or military region was aware
of the full scope of the offensive. General West-
moreland believes the Communists sacrificed coordina-
tion for security, and this is evident in the pre-
mature attacks by units of Military Region 5 (MR 5)
on the night of 29-30 January, attacks which served
to alert the US command to the much more extensive,
pC
attacks on the following night.
before,. were in.-.the offing..
at-attac s,,pro a y on a larger scale than ever
able to provide clear warning
6.. Despite enemy security measures
urgency, along with. an emphasis on thorough lan--'
nin and secrecy not previ usly.seen
seen before. Moreover, they indicat d. a'--sense of
pending attacks, more widespread?an~_numerous than.
ey .lnc u e references to i.m-.-
(served both to validate informa-
tion from other sdgrces
f icient-- to predict .the exact. timing of. the attack.,
and to provide warningo senior o~ i--
- cials . .The indicators, however,-were not- suf-
..' Although warning had thus been provided,-
antiforeign, antiwar uprising. This did not take -
Communist.'. The Communists evidently believed they could
.exploit this solidarity to produce an antigovernment,
every family whether they are Buddhist, Christian, or
ese people. ' ? It is ,the e most important holiday-in
Vietnam, an occasion observed by all members of
important-factor was timing. Few US or GVN officials
believed the enemy would attack during Tet, nor did
the Vietnamese public. There was good reason for
this: Tet..symbolizes the solidarity of the Vietnam-
=the intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy-
attack were not fully anticipated. Ambassador Bunker
and General Westttoreland attest to this. The most
place.. The enemy therefore paid a price-in the
antagonisms he generated among the urban population,
 Approved For Releasd2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
rout ne gained enormously in two ways: The GVN'
army and police were generall f b
usual state of readiness, and.Z A. elow their
the made it possible for large nu:nberspofcVCeto enter
the cities without causing alarm. General Westmore-
land expected heavy attacks either just before or just
after Tet, and as Tet approached and major attacks
had not materialized,-the Vietnamese Joint General
Staff had authorized 50 percent leaves. Evidence
to upset this general belief did not come to hand
.until.24.hours or so before the_attacks were launched,
the most-important, being the
MR-S. The latter brought-the intelligence ~already---
available into sharp focus and mrnui a=A +-I,
ARVN -oerforrna ~,-aat.,~ c uYeia alerted and were, but
1.41 ILLa,rnyareaS
leaves....... _ by Tet-
=A.. second maiar. Ur6aWn~r'1-ea --I -___-
ou
attacks in a number off.' n ing coordinate
. areas. areas. He was not, however,
granted a specific capability for
coordinated
a --
tacks in all ar
'
-- "11~ YV111C=S j'/111CfZ he
'did in fact attack and of m
-t'
+~Gi 11 ti.V u~ u icacxs mounted. US
intelligence had given the enemy-a capability of
attackina~ vi r1-n 1 Y, -,, , _ r ~_, -
,
a
ins ARV1~ s
un
ic
and the Regional and Popular Forceg
qz~
nade were-particularly effective a
- t
weapons in the hands of Main and Local.nF=W, uern
orce''oxet:.
Cnnff w'Hn or?- r a _ - LL _ . .
AA '00 ice headquarters as primary
objectives. Fin lly, the auantit of
enszve to have fine
cities, the civilian command and control centers;.
radio stations a d -I
. .but they did not expect the off s on saace cztzes
ington and Saigon expected
attack
- ? 3IL[i70rtant
nature o:c. the tarcrecs way
eas. at .onca
? iiore
9. Underlying these snPr-, f:; ,:-
a
ocal-recruitment, reports of low morale,
.ments. Prevailing estimates of attrition,uinfiltra
tion
d I
.
g a e s
as they appeared in propaganda and in ca '- d gnat
enemy as capable of accomcl
i shin hisstt d
------ --.-~... V11G. laws L commanaers and intelligence
nff i r+= "r-c! -i- , , -1
--' ' . -. _ -
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and a long series of defeats had degraded our image
of-the enemy. The general picture presented was an.
enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope
and intensity. Commanders and intelligence officers
saw his generalized calls for a "general uprising".as merely exhortatory, and not as a blueprint for
what was to follow. Moreover,-in the past many
"great offensives" had blossomed in Communist propa-
ganda but had not materialized on the ground--,
D. Response to Warnings x.'
1(lw Nevertheless.' ' 7ashinaton and Saian -were
as. stated earlier,:. fully aware that the enemy-planned
a major- offensive,. probably coordinated attacks
'- nth I CTZP,t Dk T i th hihld
orern. a:aonegans of . It
CTZ,. 'and. toward Saigon from virtually all sides In.
III CTZ.-: As: early. as .10 January, General Westmore-
_~-Land had: canceled certain planned Sperations in
northern %III CTZ in .order to reposition US forces
nearer: to. Saigon..:.-. In subsequent days he issued a
Mission, 1that-the enemy was preparing to attack..:
Although ' he. had. not originally expected attacks dur-
`- ng Tet, he recognized ;the significance of the
fied all his. commanders to expect attacks that night-.
As a result all:-"US-units were fully- alerted, -'al--
enemy prior to the actual attack. -? All -Seventh Aim:
,Force bases-were. put: on a maxi-mum state of alert, a.nd
_ ''";the .. 7th AF Director of . Intelligence testifies. that. _
-..''this' step. "saved Tan 'Son Nhut. " Perhaps the best
,evidence that dOMUSI.~!ACV' s measures were effective and.
".-;'that the enemy} s - strategic intelligence was faulty is
that,.., with the exception. of Hue, the enemy failed to .
ho] d ' any of his major military. objectives for a.. sig--- _ _
nficant period of time
The urgency felt in .Saigon was not, however,,
__-
--,--fully- feltt in. Washington in the immediate pre-attack
- ' in Washington . aid not _ contai n ': the atmosphere oZ cris3-s
'present-in Saigon::.'.. We do not-believe this represents-
a ; failure on.. anyone's part..,- The. information availablet
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__r.,.,.,.. ...~.. a.a~t uul.y cmaiyzea, Jaut atmosphere is
not readily passed over a teletype circuit. Although
senior officials in Washington received warnings in the
period 25-30 January, they did not receive the, fall
sense of - immediacy and intensity which was present za
Saigon. On the other hand, with Saigon alerted., virtu_
ally nothing further could be done in Washington that
date in th
w
e game
hich could affect the outcome-
Within.this general picture
th
e
,
ere w
re sig'-
:..nificant"differences among. tho fn,,,- rte,-,.r
t~.
tea
ex
d
--??- :
ile . e
assaults on:'Khe Sanh. "and Quang Trz... It
..
f=:had-.-sreceiv~ed.: the --
~..., ,.. ~..+... ~a i11=44v ,.. but. not:.:.trie : date General. cash--.
prepared here- .than elsewhere :. Mos t"Vietnaraese nnita
a
- --
-
x
d
~..
-~ --- .
e
V.4en 4 ? GL11
GQ'??".
ordination of ' the enemy's attacks', ? considerably- -~
seeded ex
tatio
s
pec
n
, as did his=tenaciously held -
r , ..- ~. ~...- . r....-........,.....r.,.. u....+~ v ~.. ~.. c z lil - _L.... \... U I p S. ? .:: '1. n e Aq' 1 f T ecj.
6rCE?S" WA 4'A ~ em ?_'a - }?1 i rr'f^i or.? 4-1?.-,,..-
a
_th adv t ~g of forewarning : which these attac'r s_ pr_avi.de.c
zxa a ~ ~:
:.'929'3 Janua b MR. 5"unit=s They~did nat b
~"^
. lands `.were for. the .nost part. attacked on th-
which. was,-: howevar,.: directed :: against the inevztable
....cities.: -In . the :hi hlands s `
..prisoners, and documents reflect
Lg sped is plans for. attacks- during Tet-'Far
and - Kontum were known-well in advance,_ and the
other'-.- area,.
Division.' was able to. correlate -them with enemy de-
ployments"-f.-.- This provided one of':-the few.'-oppo tuni
-=
-
ties.for US' forces : to- take active.:measures. against:
the ' enemy r:. Pleiku was: the -most- successful US opera-- _=
_tion of., the offensive_....Elsewhere' in_ the .hi_g'hlands'-
intelligence was not as: good,.- but there was enough
information t o' .lead. two of the three AR I divisiarr_
commanders -in `jj.CTZ : to cancel-all leaves-. on- their
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 city. In addition, US and ARVIN intelligence officers
had earlier deduced-from a reorganization of the enemy
cox inand structure in MR 4, which surrounds the SaigorL.-.
enemy dzv.zsions along the Cambodian border north and,
northwest of Saigon and by indications that these
units were beginning to deploy southward toward th
these orders were totally effective in recovering per-
sonnel who had already departed.
14. It has been noted above that US redeploy-
ments in III Corps began before mid-January. These
movements were triggered by the concentration of three-
own i_nitiati've. We do not believe however 4- in 4-
appear to have been in their normal Tet condl-.-
tacked that night.. In most ARVN units in III Corps
t the
more. specific: information that Saigan was to^b;Yat-
resulting from the attacks in MR 5 the-previous night)-
+-I-
P ie force were put on a general.
aIPry- fnr in
control for the- coordination of- an attack on that; c.itlr.-
TIT Go s and I-r ? F ? ld
g
ad::
:li.ed forces were aware that Viet' Cong capabi l i t.17
enemy's attacks-were almost totally unexpected- AL-
wnen zne orrensive struck, but their units were far
units. The ARVN Corps commander and his three di_vi--
sion commanders were present at their headauartr-
tune available to restore the readiness of ARAN
.eral Eckhardt was able to alert the US support.and
'logistic units in-the Delta, but was. unable in. the
Westmoreland's alerting message of 30 January.-.Gen-
stated that :the only warning he received. was General. .
during Tet-was so traditional as to be accented
as routine. ?. General Eckhardt, Senior Adviser, -
czons.co a more aggressive allied posture in the
area... In the Delta cities the presence of the VC.
VG had shown an-ability-to conduct a series of CO-
attacks the Delta. To some
degree however, this could be interpreted as rpac-
T e.- supply of modern weapons had increased. and the
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16. The preceding paragraphs have been respon-
sive to General Taylor's questions a, b, f, and g_
Our preliminary findings on questions c, d, and.e are
s
E. Respon
es to Specific Questions
as follows :
c. (Provision of information by civilians
25
,and the basic difficulty of rapid cQmmuni.cation from
:.througA. territory much of Mai= was under iris control,
. The enemy's security'measures,.his rapid deployments
'of.-the degree of civilian cooperation with the-regime-
civilians volunteering information on the impending.-.-
attacks.,' This_is not necessarily,--however, a measure'
Prior to the offensive there were very few cases of
villages from passing warnings in maffy'cases. As
countryside to- city would have prevented frierxd.ly
ing, and since, there has been a marked increase in.
.was unremarkable during Tet. During the Tet fight=-
noted above the, presence of infiltrators in the citi_e.s
information, volunteeredtfrom the populace-
:Most of,.-the units engaged in the* offensive have been.
in the attacks,: although not all units eieployect )-n
area prior. to the attacks and the units identified
tion between US order-of-battle holdings in a. given.
identified. -.In general, there. was a close correla
any- given. area were actually committed in most cases,. _
,and some new provisional units were identified irt
the attacks.. As noted above, the enemy' facade-. of
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a "general, uprising" required him to attack with his
Viet Cong /units wherever possible. Espec5.,ally ixt Iii
and IV CTZS he held back many Main Force and most NVMI
units for follow-up. Because of the failure of the ini-
tial attacks, in all but a few instances a faUaw-up,` _ -
--
T e ve
r
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COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR THE TET OFFENSIVE
1_ The overall concept of a massive attacks
.against South Vietnam's cities and towns was prob--
ably? formulated. by :.the' High Command in Hanoi at
east as. early-,As last sunnier .'Subsequentlyr. the .
=outline plan- fore the, 1967-68 winter-spring Ga npa%crrr
precautions
taken to -keep the Tet plans-,secret in orde
forcedTii~ disseminating battle =mans
Communists'Central Office for South Vietnam
.and some, elements of the Ma.litarv Z-~dznlrri tra
Y RegJ.ons cur"- major: theatre. commands were --gzven
complete overvaew of_ the planned offensive..
=` 3 At .the other' end of the Communist chairs o-E
command, battalion commanders prababl r were rr-i cre
the specifics onl of;
their own ,missions and those-
of- cooperating units- The country-wide character-
the effart,? apparently was 'described only -
most general:terms to the command staffs even at
 Approved For Release R000100080001-8
highest echelons probably had clear knowledge -ghat
4.'' The Communists began a new indoctrination
.town in south Vietnam was to be invaded in force_
for the first time virtually every major,,city and
officers in September, based on Resolution 13 of the
program among all their party cadres and military.
Hanoi party central committee.
The- resolution called
or a "general offensive" and_ "general uprzsi:ng" which
r... .. c.~r .."~ C. %-V kU"LLUJ t.-Q0M3.TtateC.f..
_f battle separations fa
t
ff
e
o
ensiv had co be undertaken, many- of
eit starting in November_ Detailed operations
lanning commenced at each command level- Units had
o -be strengthened by., replacements 'and augmented
pparently was made. to' infiltrate guerril.I.as `lnta
ities and' towns to strengthen units there Special
ocal recruitij~q and. new infiltrators. provided some
fresh personnel . * Others were upgraded front.
irregular, elements. Larger volumes of supplies had
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for_
in strategy. that the resolution might have called
:.documents and. other sources have been so general
.
:been obtained-.the reflections of it in captured
*A copy of the resolution itself has
never
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6. Communist intelligence, security, an
1 pC
logistical elements probably began to reconnoiter
approach routes toward each target city and town
in order to assure that large forces would be able:
to march long distances in complete secrecy.. Re-.
quirements for detailed city maps showing key con-
trol points werelevied under some cover story fo
xample to support' stepped up terror operations.
Special. comrtiunicatjons were madeT
Special.. training for.. newly organized sapper
units.. presumaaly was. under way by late November..'. -All,-
,units needed special training in street fighting=_-;w
:'.as--.to keep nanai.- s Intentions well disguzsev
g the tactical plans of subordinate commands-a-nd
Many coordinatiort
By this time,.. al_l
. command levels of the Coznmur_ist military apparatus.
must- have had a clear idea that .a major coordinated
Z attack would be launched sometime around the tu=n o
e lunar. year. -._ -- - - ' - . -=-= ~_ - -- -" ~ - - - -_ _.-_
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By late December, preparations, along the
approach routes were almost certainly well ad-
vanced, since troops would begin to march in m_Ld-
routes kept silent.. Bivouac areas were selected
January. Security arrangements were completed
to assure that villagers living along the approach.
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and troops to fight in a new environment.
Shortly.. before 30 January, Hanoi gave th. -
14. As the troops neared their final pre-attacl
stations, rear services elements presumably supplier!
further south. These operations probably were mounted
partly to help screen the corning urban oaffensive_
them with the previously cached weapons and amrauznitiazx?
Final briefings were given to pr
attack: order and the Tet offensive was launched--
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-'LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN THE FIELD
SAIGON
CIA
CIA
CIA
-CIA
CIA-
C IA Chief
A mbassador Komer
General Abrams
Ambassador Bunker
General Westmoreland
JJ U'ran
of Station
Security ,Officer
Brig.-.`Gen
p d
Col.. Daniel Graham, J-2
J-2 brACV
Lrig. Gen. rzy , ea-quar ers
:Ar.ea:Command
Brig. Gen. Keegan, DI, 7th Air Farce
'Col'..-.Tarwater, 7th Air Force
Col. Hutchins, 7th Air Force
.oi, J-2 '`JGS
Lt.z Col. Thiep,:: Deputy J-2
~Bu3.' Van NNhu, ;Deputy Director
National Police
t' Gen Cushman, CG III MAF
Major Gen. Robertson, CG I Marine D%vsion
o- .Co1. Beckington, G-2 III NITAF
?A ^Col Randall G-3 MAP
Col'. Beeson,. Deputy Senior Adviser,.
I Corps
CIA
Gen ._ L , - CG I Corps
son,
25X1_
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PHU BA I.
PLEIKU
I CIA
E. Col. Kizirian, G-2 Adviser
Lclcnarat; Senior
7 tT ..
t. Col. Qjrey, G-2 Adviser
~+
CIA
Col. :ger. Senic .
;rnong Dinh Province
-Major Gen. Peers, CG, I Field Force
;Col
D
.
uchet, G-2, I Field Force
Ladd, CO. 5h Special Forces
w"1Y`' tsltvti Col.
. Foulks, G-2, II Field Force
ai..Giv nux Col. Peters De ut S
p
CIA
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Y enior Adviser,
;III Cc~rnc 7
ao
Lt. Gen. Rosson, CG, Province Corps,
Vietnam
Major Gen. Stone, CG 4th Infantry
. Division
Col. Barnes, Deputy Senior Adviser,
II Corps
Lt. Col.. Hindaven G-2 Adviser, II Coprs
..:Major Gen. Lam, CG II Corps
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INDICATIONS RECEIVED IN CIA, 15-30 JANUARY 1968
Field reporting from South Vietnaza during.
1the_.few weeks-prior. to Tet revealed-that widespread,
attackswere.likely some time around the
= attacks vrere expected to be
-= -- = h
e
x to C[e. cale=anl_.
among,_.he targets
The reporting dial not, - however, reflect txxe
the -ions under way' a.3
massive character of the prePara
:fo im-~?_1.taner _.,? , .:
r;7early all..ma~or citZeS and towns Nor did this* red
aboU-c Ga
_serlse~that .all hell" Vras
y~ r
that
- break loose Thee were few hints, moreover, i
any
~? _ - , _ , ,;, "at cks would be mass assaults M'
=
F rather than the tradit=_oval affairs which
caes
_
== ~- d faciles within the, towns were hit anct
-=- only a1lie a , ,
r ~ there:_cras-no intent to hold a major urban center
-- }
ei pproved..For Rel04j;2UO5/04-/1.8 : CIA-RDP80ROl720R00010008O04-8~
d ce of a developing nationwide Communist camp.
provided-clear eV-L-.
 Approved For Release 2005104/18 : CIA-RDP80R01720R00010008000a-8
,. wC as specific threats to a number o. population
centers and military bases. In addition to giving a
clear idea of the magnitude of the North Vid namese
build-up in the Dt4Z area,
II
indicated significant
pre-Tet deployments and concentrations of enemy units
near such areas as Quang Tri city. Hue_- fig gan
g ar
gets zn' Pleiku and F oni-um,- cer~ai'. provincial capita _
:`along the-central coast Threatswere also noted .
ti _`-' ~'~ , ivi-5.,._tt04TCVCr, off'; rOC)k7-cICp o .
mencs--towarct.Saigon. ._ .:
the,-enemy. was making major improvements
in his command and control posture,. including the itn-
25X1
 I suggested combat preparations over wide
lease-26/04/18 : CIA-RDP.80R01720RQfl0'F000$OU01=8_,
areas of the country hardly associated with a sevz--
day standdown.x
25X;1
referred to a plan. for a ";_inal,
.2
performance" that had to be reported by 0600 hours on.
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 7 .
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18: CIA-R P80RO172OR000100080001'-$?"
25X1
25X1
Some thirty. provincial summaries covering IDe--
26X1..::
cember 19671 made frequent:
-mention; of : increased terrorist activity in the 'Con-,
25X1
-the'_winter-sprincr The J3inh Tuona =-
--Conga planning.. for...: attacks on==district;:: to4ans' axxd`orY
tne . grovznce cap i:tal : wero cortsnuzz' g " '.'~=
~?Di.cture- ? Some. of:these contained lecture notes
which' represented-the-winter- spring campa-ign. as
of :`historical -importance; designed to zzs'ner . i.
risa.n
the " the ...general- uPr g
general-offensive-and
Approve. .E r Release 2005/04/18: CIA-RDP80R01720R0001Q 93 Qqj k-- r- :
earlier wiriter=spring-.campaigns =-
eoconceptdating^_from -Vie`.. Minh- days;. and'-
 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
One fairly specific docu:-r,ent, reported to
Washington?in mid-January, referred to attacks on
urban areas. According to the notes, the Headquart-
ers of Military Region 5, had pledged to liberate
its-,.entire area during the campaign. _ This was 'said
_;.to involve "very :strong. military .'attacks in_ cornjunc--
t-ion-:with uprisings ..". to take over, to,Sins and C tie a-
nff t.s.i...ve the- dail.y:`cable'' sur;un . arv_ sent to Washington.
allusions" to planned.actions
The 12 January. cable summarized a top secret`
memorandum captured in'Quang Da which stated that.
~ R.6.1. units and G.7 ...n~j_es tom',-i G1e
C e is riy for g
-_- "= ;.to-.regain control of rura ' areas,..-an
o launch attacks.,.on American and: Puppet_ units ogisti cal installations, district towns, heir posts.::"
2:-January the ~ cab,le referenced. a 2Q Novem-. .
bet:' directive captured in Pleiku. Province `;;'rich re
v=ealed that:--- "All 'provincial -and district conce?trated
ur-its: should-maintain. two-th?rds of the
orward'_ areas for':combat_.purposes_..'
-References like those. above had often been seen.
in past years in the usual exhortative tyla of
Approved For. Release '2f105HT4118 CIA-RDP80R0172aR'00010D:08a001--8
 Approved For Release 2005/04/?18 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000100080001=8' _-.
Communist documents- The number of the reference:
and their 'general format prior to Tet simply did not
arouse extraordinary concern in the intelligence
community and thus force attention on the: possibil--
in enemy action was impend-
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 25A
L4A1OR ~O~ATlO ~ TTc~C;~ m rr , I ~~
&WRW2DRO O .0-090001-8
YI[:MaM
FioiAn? Cities attacked night?of-2St-3QJar,
DaLat? Cities attacked night?of 30-3x Irit'
and Eater'
Cities where attack was quickly and
effectively beaten oft _
s= *?itiTullGa~_
0 Ban Me xh\uot r"'~`, -
-. -~ Clha iran.: -.
- .h,?. Lam. yl_,."~,"?t".i ._:~:
Chau Doe' ~ J'~ocHoax ` A;GQ -' Bisn H r ~~
Phan 7hist
r-
.. ~ mac.
. ?Approved.For Ret*ias 2465/O4118 CIA-RDP$:0RO I72ORAO01-0008DQ01 _
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA7RDP80R01720R00.0100080001-8
Procedures for Handling Current Intelligence
Material J.n CIA.
The Office of Current Intelligence in.
CIA receives indications intelligence and
night. Agency` traffic is routed. directly--
z omy the Cable Secretariat;-- rn ter.ial. from
other agencies is'' received electrically a:nc
regular courier runs.
incoming traffic.
CIA Operations Center is the Washington
terminal for the 'Critical Communications
.System)- -to' the slowest pouched material _.
". Classification' of- -the material ranges from
traffic . to .unclassified press.-ticker-
Cable traffic bearing on the situatic 1
Vietnam is -routed directly to the Indochina
Division of OCI's-Far East Area. Significan
items are selected by the: Operations' Center
-and sent , to .the command echelons icr_r*_edia.tely
on receipt', usually with appropriate analyst
comment- . Non-cable traffic is also routed
r codeword a'2d other sensitive top secret
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
directly to the regional division (e.g.,
captured documents and dispatches processed
00
both by CIA and other intelligence agencies).
OCI has the principal responsibility
within the Agency for receiving, disseminating)
:Analysis and- Reporting
._ _..= The Indochina -Division of.. OCI: is - respansi--
le for analyzing current. information an
..producing .iinlsnea intelligence c)u v c c s.u a .
Material from all sources is screened,,
.` The President's Daily Brief, artct
supplements thereto;
a iilea or aeszroyeu or ue is.
a nalvsts.responsible for various aspects of
the situation.'Si.gnif icant items. are sifted
from the large volume of daily take and selected
-'`for..:the, :da ly-and weekly publications.
and. are published in several daily pukblicat:ions:
The.'.Central Intelligence Bulletin;--
The Situation in Vietnam;
.The Current Intelligence Digest;.--
-2-
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO1720R0001.00080001-8
Weekly publications containing articles'
on Vietnam include:
a. The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly) ;
The Weekly Review (codeword) ; :--
The ` Weekly Summary -.(secret)
;
addition.. to articles prepared far ' the-_'
regular publ'ications;assessments in greater:
Report... These memos-..frequently: are pre-
maker, and. are given single-addressee or
limited distribution; they are also produced-
division. or- at=' the=direction- of senior-Agency-.-
.chiefs:
nfo.rmal spot -reports -and comments-
o ameiits are;- ::
prepared for. the White House and--sent by LUX-
-:regularl y - to: the_ Secretary' of De.:fense`. and - mss
deputies through the-: CIS.", liaisort officer- - -i is --
OSD.
The' same range of material processed fox-
use. in.. the publications and informal written;
Approved For i,elease 200.5LD4f13-r CIA-RDP8OR01,72OR000100080001-8=-
 .Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
briefs is used in numerous verbal briefings-
inside and outside the Agency. The Director
of Current Intelligence is briefed by his
staff each weekday morning, with emphasis
attends a morning executive meeting in which
on the situation in Vietnam. He in turn
he -briefs _the.Dirrector- of Central Intel-Lxge'aCe--
-F ca, developments- overnight-.'.
ion-and-branch. chiefs .in. the ..r'ar
Area. -participate, i.n a variety. cam- regu ar
ad lioc?:-briefings..on- aspects
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 Apprp k or Release 2005104/18: CIA-RDP80R01 720R000100080001:8._M~
TREATMENT OF INDICATIONS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCEz C',-
- -- shed ~_L t_v_lligence producea and dissem-.
picture provided the field reporting described aboved
It warned of impending large-scale attacks, incl.uct-- -':
ing._ some against. cities 'and towns.and described th4
p.Lanned `offer;szve as coordinated- and widespread..
n,.-;.he-,:other
J-j
r the field reports, did not carry strong o-%rertones
M al arrt Although a .Powerful
attac =was orecast,' it wa.C.
not predicted to go. beyond all- precedent-:- Nor. did the,:
warnings focus on the threat to the r ; +-i
as likely to occur before or after the Tet halida7 i
~y^cl.ca items . publishe riiiri nrr to T-cy _
fore -the attac;c By` the ;day beforc. the offensive. ac
"tually begar_r however, -readers were, warned -that. mac--
Tnefollowing excerpts are taken from. CI publz-
cations circulated during : tre Weeics immediatellr-xre--
f.=the.:_.ty ie of warI ing L o i e T.4r,,
dressed to they situation developing around yhe Sanh_
 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
and :developing more effective Command and cans;--_
.trot. procedures . (Th
phistica.ted.r.receivi_ng more modern WE` ;3 am
of the enemy actions suqqests that the- rrtm__
,
P a Lc a Ve information on the 1967-68 winter-spring
campaign goals. In addition, the conduct
'In recent months the intensity of:.
enemy activity in the Mekong Delta: has in-
creased markedly. The initiation of wide-
spread coordinated activity throughout the
corps is in line with captured documents and
interrogation re arts
h' h h
"
^
This .phase ref thC te ammuris
wintcr
spring campaign :Jhas -been. marked. .._by .unpre
UUU
Communists were killed. last-.'peek---1.-as,-Well'-as
possible---.that- the
shadow a. resumption of major- offensive ac-
,Dega.ns on iu January. _ Communist military
-cne popu.tace prior to the Tet holida;r t,h;:-t-
t.on : atter_ Tet (Weekly. Review. 12 Jan-'.
..January in. the nortnern -.area. of III Corps
A. series--of significant devel nnmPnf-e
noted -in: Communist coz nunications since early
or shift of fur_ctions_ bv-
ee unaer '-way t lbza _ )
 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000100080001-8
In South V
pears to be a distinct ,
SCCIYI Corps r there ap-.,
;_ xt._
r
",~
en G ti~~ nter-s rzn - ~~.y`
paign.. The majo
P q cni
r attacks--
Bu Don
against Lor
?
- and f
'
,
.
.
ire-SLI
pport base Burt--
curved at aPproxiznate-Z one __ . , haves oa
-7 zachs---spearheaded ,. cfloruinated.
_s?ans . -- -- `6-7 V 2lnamese
~,. could' occur en. -i-1,~ m 7th divz
elemen is of . the ~r; .
beveralrecently=capt: ddocumens
add to_ eviaenc
enemy
ary .action?:in th
h
e
igands:
documents reflect a
z
n increased c
o~ djna.j
between--mr%,- 7, v7..-. _s_
o
and Viet- ,