LETTER TO THE HONORABLE PHILIP C. HABIB FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001100080015-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 28, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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The Honorable Philip C. Habib
Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
Dear Phil:
This is a very rough cut at an
idea. I frankly think it might help
out there. You wcauld be the better
judge of its effect here.
Sincerely,
/!//.
W. E. Colby
Director
WEC:jlp (28 March 1975)
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att. (Volunteers for Vietnam - A Proposal)
1 - DCI
- ER
Executive Regis
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Volunteers for Vietnam
A Proposal
Introduction
There is a large number of Americans who:
Know the Vietnamese people and culture;
Understand the Vietnamese power structure and
how it works;
Have a strong sense of commitment to the South
Vietnamese people;
Are frustrated and want to help.
We could draw on this talent to provide an all civilian,
volunteer team of highly qualified, experienced and dedicated
professionals to the GVN during the current emergency.
Purpose
The volunteer team could:
Assist the GVN to regain and retain control over the
situation;
Assist the GVN in preserving what will be left of SVN
after the current dry season;
Evidence to the South Vietnamese and the world some
semblance of our support to the South Vietnamese people.
III. Concept
There are Americans who have served in SVN in almost
every capacity, civilian and military, and during virtually every
conceivable situation. There are ex-military and civilians who
have fought alongside the South Vietnamese. There are civilians,
and ex-military, who advised and worked with the South Vietnamese
during the Tet offensive coping with extreme disorder, paralysis
of Q ~FQnRR4eds1dz20041421f A bOdjk4R13R80 MQ 66SAMR008004g es all
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over the country. There are Americans who served at every level of
the GVN from national to village. Many of these people would
volunteer to help again.
A group of such people, carefully chosen, and carefully placed
within the military and civilian structures of the GVN could operate
effectively with a minimum of support. They could bring to the
South Vietnamese not only moral support but administrative and
organizational experience. They could help tighten and reinforce
the relationship between military and civil administration needs and
actions. Properly placed within the GVN power structure, they
could provide a catalyst for action and perhaps more important a
separate, reliable set of eyes and ears for the national leadership
of the GVN. And, incidentally, . a source of information for the US
that is unavailable today.
A few such volunteers in the right ministries and offices in
Saigon, at Corps and Province level and at Division level would
suffice. The only support required would be a reliable communi-
cations net. They could fit into the current Embassy organization
through the existing office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador
for Field Operations.
Assuming that the current fighting will leave the GVN with
enclaves in MR II around Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang and Cam.
Ranh, defensible positions inPhuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong,
Hau Nghia and Gia Dinh and the Capital Mil. Dist. in MR III, and
all of MR IV, the size of the volunteer group could be as small as
250-300 people. This would provide the following network:
Saigon - 41
Ministries - 8
Headquarters - 33
- Corps and Capital Mil Dist - 16 l/
Division - 44 1 1
4 each
Province - 1241"
4 each
1~ Api~i9c1ILad(04k1C9i~RDPr86N~Li1/~?0~4QD$iQOr~aa83t one
ex-military professional as a member of the team.
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This deployment would result in about 50 radio stations.
Preliminary indications are that there are sufficient radios in
country to provide each location with a principal radio, a back-up
and a mobile communications capability (single side-band radios--
not a secure net which would be considerably more difficult). The
volunteers would live off the country for their food and outside
Saigon would depend on the SVN for housing and transportation
support. Emergency transportation and other emergency support
could be provided by the DAO. In Saigon the Embassy, DAO,
or AID should be able to provide housing and transportation.
Cost
Salaries and allowances:
Transportation: I
Pros and Cons
Pros
Shot in the arm to SVN
- Possibility of bringing order out of chaos
- A useful demonstration internationally
- Better intelligence for GVN and US
Cons
- Congressional view of "here we go again"
- NVN view as best we can do--futile gesture
May appear condescending to SVN and also the
best we can do
Sponsorship
This program, if undertaken, should be governmental, fully
explained to the Congress and, if necessary, specific Congressional
approval obtained. The specific sponsorship and administrative
responsibility could reside with:
- State /AID
- CIA - on overt basis
- DOD contract with private corporation
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