CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 16, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 2, 1951
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6.pdf420.54 KB
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Approved For Rele 2006/ : C UcIW iA00 0560001-6 2 . $eptember 1951 25X1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BUL JETIN NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [ ; DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANCED TO, TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUT HR 70- ?1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 State Department review completed TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved For 25X1A SUMMARY GENERAL.. 1.. British ambassador recommends headquarters outside Egypt for proposed Mediterranean command (page 3). 2. Egyptian diplomats make last minute .effort to postpone UN action on Canal issue (page .3.)....._. FAR EAST Macao prepares for increased trade wi communists page NEAR EAST 5,. Afghanistan. and Iran reach. oil agreement (page 6).. WESTERN EUROPE 25X1A 7.. French concurrence in Germany's admission to NATO is foreseen for 1952 (page 7). 8. Schuman adds Moroccan question to Washington agenda (page 8). 9. French Premier considers coal shortage serious problem (page 8). 25X1A 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved For Rellease 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A0003005q0001-6 25X1A 25X1A GENERAL..... British ambassador recommends headquarters outside Egypt for proposed Mediterranean commancl: The. British .Ambassador to .Egypt has recom- mended. to his government that the headquarters of the proposed..Allied command for the eastern Mediterranean should be located outside Egypt, since its location there would prejudice the chances of obtaining Egypt's participation in the command structure. Comment: One of the main reasons.which led the British to propose this combined regional command, which would ini- tiaJUy include the UK, the US, France, Turkey and -- they hope -- Egypt, was their belief that Egyptian nationalist sentiment would prove less hostile to granting military facilities to such a multinational organization than to Britain alone. Available. evidence suggests, however, that the current mood in. Egypt would preclude agreement not merely to the command head- quarters but to the stationing at present of any foreign troops on Egyptian soil. 25X1 A 2. Egyptian diplomats make last minute effort to postpone UN action on Canal issue: Both the Egyptian Ambassador and Egypt's Chief UN Delegate have approached US officials with the aim of developing a new formula for settling the Suez Canal dispute, now before the UN Security Council.. Both men have asked the US to help in postponing the UNSC action on. this issue. The UN Delegate frankly expressed his for delay. He suggested that this embarrassing situation be resolved by further postponement on the pretext 'of appointing a committee or individual to investigate the matter further. concern, over a unexpected support the USSR gave the Egyptian request 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300 25X1A In answer to the US.comment. that the best way to counter the Soviet move would be for.Egypt to lift the restrictions, the Egyptian Delegate intimated that internal political problems would prevent Egypt from, complying with such a.suggestion. He then warned that the proposed UN resolution would "further prejudice the US position in the entire Arab. world. ...Comment. Egyptian desire to avoid an s,dverse Sc ,city Council decision on. the Canal issue has not been suf - .'ficieantly strong to, inndueo It to make a compromise offer which might be acceptable. While some Egyptian leaders recognize the dangers of Soviet support, there are other nationalists who agree with the Foreign Minister, who has been quoted as welcoming the Soviet maneuver as, "a happy surprises -, 25X1A 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 25X1 25X1A 40 Macac prepares for increased trade with Communists, Macac officials are planning to make the Portuguese colony a more important transit base for strategic shipments to the Com- munistso The Macao government has pur- Iapanq four other vessels will be chartered to step up service with Portu- guese Timor9 and quick turn-around is planned for vessels bringing petroleum from Thailand and the .Phtlippinneso chased three ships and intends to acquire three more for direct trade with PO J. Lobo, Macao's Director of Economics, is personally connected with these deals, at the same time officially dis- claiming ability to prevent the traffic. Twelve trade advisers from Peiping were recently added to the staff of the fan Kwang Company, the principal Communist purchasing agency in Macao, Comment: Communist interest in utilizing Macao as a smuggling base has become particularly manifest since Hong Kong broadened its export control program last June. Petroleum appears currently to be the principal item in this traffic, but truck tires, crude rubber, metals, motor vehicles, auto parts, radio equipment, and on occasion munitions are also handled. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved Fo 25X1A 25X1A NEAR EAST Afghanistan and Iran reach oiLagr.eemento Agreement between Iran and ,Afghanistan for the delivery of oil. to Afghanistan has been formally announced in Kabul. The US Embassy. in.Afghanistan, in. expressing doubt of the feasibilI.ty of overland transportation, points out that the roads linking ]bran with Afghanistan are inadequate for regular and size- able oil shipments. Comment.- Both countries are impelled by obvious propaganda motives. Afghanistan wishes to free itself from dependency upon Pakistan and the USSR. Iran needs to sell oil. Afghani- stan's annual oil consumption, however, is equivalent to only a small fraction of one day's normal production of the Abadan refinery. 25X1A 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 25X1 WESTERN. EUROPE 25X1A 7. French concurrence in Germany's admission to NATO is foreseen for 1952,P According to a report from the US Embassy in London, a "responsible official" of the French Foreign Office has stated that he and some of his colleagues are personally con- vinced that Germany's membership in NATO is both inevitable and de- sirable. These officials emphasize, however, that the worst way of accomplishing this would be for the US or UK to raise the issue with the French before or at the time when the Germans agree to a defense contribution. In the opinion of the source, French public opinion would be able to accept German membership in NATO about six months after that date, or about mid-19520 Comment. This is the first indication that any French officials are prepared to consider German admission to NATO at a definite future date. In all aspects of the German problem, French officials stress the importance of careful timing in order to insure that German commitments to the common defense will induce a further swing of French public opinion in favor of new steps toward German equality. A relatively tolerant attitude toward Germany has been developing in France since July 1949, when Schuman informed the Assembly that Ger- many's participation in NATO was "unthinkable" and a question that "can never come up now or even at a later date. " 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 25X1A Approved For 25X1A 8. Schuman adds Moroccan question to Washington .agenda French. Foreign. Minister Schuman plans to add the question. of Morocco to the agenda for his bilateral.. talks.with .Secretary Acheson. A memorandum is now being drafted in the 25X1 A Foreign Office outlining France's policies and. practices in Morocco. Because the Foreign. Office believes that US officials want future French policy to be built around the nationalist Istiglal party, the memorandum will disparage the party and point out that Istiglal rule would result only in civil war and chaos. The French will draw heavily on the paradox of US and Communist support for Istiglal, and stress the "advantages to the West of a cooperative Morocco in case of war. 11 The memorandum will not contain an over- all plan for the progressive Independence of French North Africa, a policy long recommended by US diplomats. Comment. Sensitivity of the French over US influence in their Moroccan protectorate has become an obsession. US diplomats have not advocated that French policy be built around the Istiglal party, which not only does not have US support but also. has rib - Jected all Communist overtures. The US has repeatedly urged that the French adopt a concrete program looking toward greater autonomy for Morocco-- a policy similar to the granting of independence to the Philippines. These recommendations have been rejected by the French. 9. French Premier considers coal shortage serious problem. French Premier Pleven has told Ambassador Bruce and Mr. Harriman that the general European coal shortage poses the greatest economic problem currently facing France. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A00030g560001-6 25X1A The French feel that solutions for this problem should be sought in the coming Foreign. Ministers' talks. One possibility would be to finance coal shipments. from the US out of mili- tary assistance funds to the extent that the coal is to be used in the manufacture of military... items.. Commennte According to. official French. estimates of 1 July, France will, produce about 55 million metric tons of coal in 1951 and obtain 5 or 6 million tons from the Saar. The balance of French import needs for 1.951 is estimated at over 15 million tons, of which the traditional suppliers in Europe cannot furnish more than 9 million tons. Of the remaining gap of over 6 million tons, for which France looks to the US, less than one-fourth was obtained from the US in the first half of 1951. Meanwhile French steel production is at only 80 percent of capacity, The Office of EOA's Special Representative in Paris estimates that foreign demands upon the US for coal in fiscal year 1952 might rise as high as 30 million tons at a cost representing about three-fourths of total US foreign economic aid. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6