ABC NIGHTLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500240015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 25, 1983
• Content Type: TRANS

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03&7 NebA P91-00
25 October 1983
KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nightline.' UNIDENTIFIED
BROADCASTER (Radio Free Grenada): United States paratroopers invaded at 5:40 this
morning. Our armed forces are engaging them in fierce battle. All Grenadians report
immediately to our respective militia bass.
KOPPEL: The invasion of Grenada, more U.S. military men died today in another foreign
country, as the Reagan administration turns to gunboat diplomacy. We'll talk tonight
with Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, with the prime ministers of two Caribbean
countries, whose troops are also on Grenada tonight and with the former deputy
director of the CIA, Admiral-.Bobby Inman./
KOPPEL: Joining us now live in our New York studios is Admiral\Bobbv\Inman, former
deputy director of the CIA. In our Washington bureau is Seymour\Weiss, former
director of the State Department's bureau of Political Military Affairs, and the
former U.S. ambassador to the Bahamas. And also in Washington, the previous U.S.
ambassador to Grenada, Sally\Shelton. She served in the post of ambassador to five
east Caribbean nations, and special representative to five others. I'd like to begin,
if I may, with Admiral Inman. Admiral, one of the things that I think has gotten a
little bit lost in our discussion here this evening is why not so much Grenada, but
the waters around Grenada are of strategic alue or importance to the United States.
Would you give us a bit of a briefing there? ADM. BOBBY INMAN (Fmr Cia Deputy
Director): As you'll see when you put your map back up, Grenada commands the
approaches to the Panama Canal from the eastern Caribbean area. Uh, when the airfield
first started being expanded, uh, there was substantial concern that it was more than
was required simply for tourist trade on the island, that it looked, uh, from an
outside observer, as though it was a field that was being prepared to use as a staging
base. Uh, as you can see from looking at Grenada, even if, uh, Cuba was not
available, planes coming from eastern Europe down across Africa to Grenada could
easily move on into the Carib, (sic) to. the Central American area. Uh, so the, the
worries, when the intelligence community began some length of time ago about whether
.the island was being prepared for use, uh, for intervention elsewhere in the .
hemisphere..
KOPPEL:- What about the amount of, uh, of supplies, of commerce and, and oil supplies
that pass through that region? INMAN: Well, it's a very heavy area of interest.
Again, if you just simply look south at, uh, at both Venezuela and across. at Mexico,
most of the oil from both of those countries flows across the area directly within the
reach from Grenada.
KOPPEL: All right. I'm afraid that, that map isn't doing us 4 whole lot of good, but
we, we get a sense of what you're talking about. All right, with all of that in mind,
then, uh, without getting involved in, in loaded language or emotional language, uh,
of any kind, uh, we probably, we the United States, we probably were looking for a
good excuse to get in there and clean it out a little, wouldn't you think? INMAN:
Earlier, when there were, uh, clearly some, lots of discussion about various options,
uh, there were no excuses that were available. Uh, I was fascinated this morning by
the presentation, particularly from Prime Minister Charles, and took it at absolute
face value from someone who has served her country extraordinarily well, uh, that
this, in fact, was an invitation not inspired by the U.S., from the concern of those
countries. Uh, and there's some real basic. questions here about how much are we
CONT]NU., D
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 Approved For Release 2001:0cl to
anTIC1E AMARED I AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION
N PAGE /~. October 1983
ing
easi.,,1 '
1cr
to r
.An interview
with Adm.
Bobby R. Inman
USN (Ret.)
: AFCEA's role in increasing
intelligence awareness is
growing. Intelligence symposia and
conferences are being held in
Washington and in some AFCEA
chapters throughout the nation.
SIGNAL magazine has dedicated
one issue per year to intelligence.
AFCEA awards are provided for
excellence in the study of intelli-
gence in service schools. Do you
see any other areas that AFCEA
could pursue in improving intelli-
gence awareness?
I had the privilege of being
present -when VAdm. Boyes
hosted the first session with leaders
from the intelligence community to
discuss an expanded role of AF-
CEA: for the first time to have a
major association specifically con-
centrate on intelligence as one of
its areas of interest. There were
many present that day who were
skeptical, but I had some optimism
about the role that AFCEA could
play from my own experience with
them on the question of public
cryptography. I therefore have
been very pleased to -see the pro-
gress over these last several years.
My judgment is that the pace is
about right. I don't think one wants
to try to undertake too many varied
things, before the intelligence com-
munity is comfortable with the role
and also the industrial partners -see
some value for them. My recom-
mendation is steady as you go.
The AFCEA Professional
Q Development Center has en-
-loyed excellent success in teaching
classified courses in C' and military
satellite communications. AFCEA
has beep examining the idea of
offering a basic eight to 10 hour
introductory course on intelligence
to industry and those who would
like to know more about how our
military intelligence system is orga-
nized. The course could be unclas-
sified or classified, according to
content. How do you feel about.
this initiative?
Adm. Bobby R. Inman
,
(Ret.), President and Chief Execu-
tir e Off.cer.' microelectronics and
Computer Technology Corp., vwa,~
previously' Deputy Director, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. Prior to
that assignment, he serr'ed as Di-
rector, National Security Agency.
Do you believe the intelli-
gence courses provided by the
De ense Department should in-
clude some technical courses, say
in computers and satellites, so that
intelligence personnel will better
understand the equipment they
use?
Again, one needs to look
back at history. The old Naval
Intelligence course at the Naval
Postgraduate School, which was
conducted in Anacostia, was the
nucleus for the long course at the
Defense Intelligence School. The
short courses were taught at an
Army school in the Washington,
D.C. area. They were serving fixed
purposes, that is, training analysts
and training collectors, human col-
lectors of intelligence. There was
minimal focus on technical intelli-
gence collection or on analyzing
weapons systems, scientific and in-
telligence data.
By 1972, my predecessor as Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence,
RAdm. Earl Rectanus, had per-
ceived the need for more formal
technical education, at least for
those who were going to be fulfill-
ing key analytical roles in the Navy
Scientific and Technical Intelli-
gence Center as it wa, then called.
He was the sponsor for the creation
of a new intelligence course at the
Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, with a very
heavy technical curriculum. There
were many students who thought it
was too technical and did not give
them a sufficient broad base for
subsequent roles. But, on balance.
I think it has filled a void. I had
hoped, over the years, that the
other Services would ultimately
use that school as well as the Navy.
I believe there are roles for he
Defense Intelligence College and
CONTINUED
I am approached frequently,
particularly by officials of
small companies who have a new
idea, a new concept, a new prod-
uct, that they believe has potential
value to the U.S. intelligence cony, munity, but they don't know how
to make contact to present it. It is
clear that some courses explaining
in simple direct ways the complex
structure of the U.S. intelligence
community and how to go about
introducing new products, new
concepts, new ideas, could play a
very constructive role. I believe
the introductory course could be
unclassified. I do think that there is
also a potential for a classified
course in this area. From my per-
ception of exchange over the last
10 years, 1 believe there is inade-
quate information currently avail-
able to industry about the potential
uses of intelligence, particularly in
the tactical arena. 1 would like to
see some courses aimed at intelli-
gence from the perspective of how
it could be used to help industry
focus - better (or maybe it might
even help the government focus
better) on information need and
information flow as opposed to
who owns what specific piece of
equipment.
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for the technical curriculum at the
Naval Postgraduate School as they
are now established. I think there is
also some utility in creating shorter
courses at one of the institutions
focusing on technical intelligence
collection, analytical matters and
how to help prospective users.
: Do you see the Soviet threat
to the Free World lessened
q er Andropov?
A The answer is no. Andropov
has played a leading role in the
formation of policy in the Soviet
Union over the last 20 years. After
he came back from his stint as
Ambassador to Hungary, he served
on the party Secretariat in charge
of relations with governing Com-
munist parties. He then moved to
head the KGB for a long period of
time to try to improve its effective-
ness both at home and abroad.
Throughout that period, he. had a
very close working relationship
with Ustenov, who moved up from
being in charge of defense produc-
tion to ultimately being the defense
minisizr. 1 do not believe there are
any long-term policies in dealing
with the outside world to which
both Andropov and Ustenov have
not been parties to in their forma-
tion., So 1 would be surprised if we
saw any major new change in stra-
tegic direction in dealing with the
outside world.
.1 think what we may see is faster
tactical decisions: taking advantage
of opportunities within the broad
framework that is already estab-
lished. When Vice President Bush
went to Berlin and read a letter
from the President, within 14 hours
Andropov had a press conference
to respond. That kind of quick re-
sponse would have been unthink-
able in the Breshnev era. I believe
we are likely to see much more of
the same. There may be some
change in internal Soviet relation-
ships and activities. Andropov has
seen firsthand the corrosive effect
of corruption on the society, and
the economy. I believe he will
make some efforts, within careful
limits, to try and clean up the cor-
ruption, try to make the economy
function in a more effective man-
ner. He will have to move carefully
so as not to threaten the power
A ,~L Frankly, it is going to require
.t congressional action. We have
been fascinated now for 20 plus
years with questions such as is it
cost effective?" and "Fly before
buy"; all kinds of slogans that
sounded great in their concepts,
but have proven over time, I be-
lieve, to drive up the cost of de-
fense substantially and to make it a
far longer process in moving tech-
nology from the laboratories to op-
erating systems in the hands of the
deployed forces. We need to re-
think many of the approaches that
have been legislated. We need-mul-
tiyear authorization appropriations
as the fundamental first require-
ment: for not less than three years,
preferably even five. That will go a
long way towards moving us to
buying in the most economical
manner. rather than stretching out
procurement simply to keep lines
open in what often turns out to be
the most uneconomical and most
expensive manner.
It was a matter of great frustra-
tion to me when I was spending
billions of U.S. taxpayers' money
that I could not reward superior
performance. When a company
completed its contract, a very com-
plex contract. on time and within
dollars, I could not reward them by
a follow-on contract. I had to go
back in every case to competitive
bidding. Not only was it less effi-
cient, but it removed the incentive
to industry to perform superbly.
How will R&D projects of
QMCC (Microelectronics and
Computer Technology Corportion)
be selected?
base which he now has. and which ! tems before the high technology
rests primarily on the defense es-
tablishment, the KGB and the par-
ty members who play key roles in
both major operations. He is not a
transition leader, but he is certainly
not one in which we are likely to
sec any substantial lessening of the
threat.
: We share an equal concern
about technology transfer to
tbF-Soviet Union. Yet, there is a
vital need to share amongst Free
World Allies the advanced technol-
ogy many are developing. How can
we accomplish this objective of
sharing without building a large,
cumbersome, delaying bureaucra-
cy?
A R&D projects for MCC will
be developed through internal
mechanisms of the corporation.
We have a Technical Advisory
Board (TAB) composed of a senior
technical person from each of the
shareholding corporations. I chair
it. The chief scientist will serve as
the executive secretary. The TAB
The technology transfer issue
is a very complicated matter.
The Soviets have done a very skill-
ful job of vacuum cleaning. The
knowledge concerning technology
development is always going to be
available in a free society Not only
has that vacuum cleaning taken
place in the United States, it has
also occurred in western Europe
and Japan. And in this day of mod-
ern alliances and multinational cor-
porations with operations in many
countries, it is simply not feasible
to look at technology transfer as a
U.S.-only problem. When we are
looking at trying to block the flow
of critical information to the Sovi-
ets, we have to focus on acceptable
programs with our Allies as well as
ones in the United States. That
argues to me that you do not try to
deal with technology transfer by
avoiding transfer of technology to
our Allies. They need technology
transfer to build up their own mili-
lary capabilities and to ultimately
serve to keep the alliances stronger.
Q Now that you have joined
industry. would you give us
your impression of the steps which
might be taken to cut down .he long
delivery delay involved in high
technology systems for defense:
steps which would allow fuller ad-
vantage to be taken to deploy sys-
IUNTINUE?
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will look every six months at the
status of progress in each of our
own research projects. But they
will spend much of their time scan-
ning the horizon looking for new
technology: determining if there is
new technology that we ought to
i incorporate into ongoing programs,
but more importantly deciding
what additional programs the
shareholders should undertake.
The TAB will make recommenda-
tions and the Board of Directors
must approve by substantial mar-
gin, for new programs to be under-
taken.
Where will MCC's technical
work be done, in house, in
universities or in facilities of mem-
ber firms, or elsewhere? How will
the place be determined?
MCC's technical work will, in
very large measure, be done
in-house at MCC facilities which
are going to be established in Aus-
tin, Texas. We will not be a major
source of funding for outside re-
search, either at universities or oth-
er research houses. It is the first
time on any sizeable scale that an
effort has been undertaken in this
country to pool technical smarts
from the competing corporations,
as well as their dollars, to try to
produce breakthroughs in long-
range research that none of the
corporations would have been able
to accomplish independently.
Q Will results of R&D efforts of
MCC be provided to all of the
member firms?
Each shareholder, the funds
and area of research will be
licensed to produce the products
that come out of the research in
competition with one another.
They will have a three year lead to
get to the marketplace. After three
years, we can license any other
company. Shareholders who did
not invest in an-area of research get
no advantage over outside compa-
nies in being licensed after the
three.years. A portion of the royal-
ty income from that licensing proc-
ess will go to helping those who
invested Initially recover t'rcir sunk
costs And another portion will be
retained as the means by which we
reward the individuals. direct hire
employees of MCC and those indi-
viduals on loan from the corpora-
tions who have in fact come up
with the intellectual property of the
patents which let us make the right
moves.
How do you pian to balance
the need for exchange of tech-
nical information between MCC
scientists/engineers and others in
the technical community with in-
terests of MCC to project some
technological data? What main cri-
teria will be applied?
The need for exchange of
technical information between
MCC's scientists and en*ineers
and others in the technical commu-
nity will be a subject of great inter-
est to us. There Is a potential here
that we can play a catalytic role in
the information handling industry.
A number of campuses have al-
ready expressed to me great inter-
est that we try to play that role. So
have companies that are not joining
but that are going to be associates.
We will structure from the out-
set to hold symposia to establish
other means for technical ex-
change. But this is a privately held
corporation. It will succeed in the
long term only if the stockholders
of the parent corporations end up
making money from products
which we develop and which are
then marketed by thier own indi-
vidual companies. That means we
are ultimately going to have to pro-
tect the direct application of these
ideas to ensure that they do get a
return on their investment. It is
proprietary data.
: Which areas of C3 will MCC
focus on?
/~ : MCC does not currently have
l~,a a program for a project that
would be directly described as be-
ing part of command, control, com-
munications or intelligence. But
our efforts at packaging integrated
circuits, computer software tech-
nology. computer design and man-
ufacturing and advanced computer
design all offer the prospect of
breakthroughs which could,.have
significant impact.
3.
Some of our shareholders have
also expressed the view that we
ultimately ought to develop some
additional, programs. One technical
member has particularly focused
on the telecommunications area as
one area where we might ultimately
do some additional research. It is
simply too early to examine that. It
will be about three years before we
turn to the question.
Are there any other areas
you would like to discuss"
A At the outset, this administra-
tion fulfilled a commitment
that they would examine the status
of U.S. Intelligence and would sup-
port the development of a long-
term program to rebuild the capa-
bilities of the country. The Presi-
dent approved that plan for
improving the intelligence capabili-
ties of the United States 1985-1990
on December 19. 1981. And it had a
major impact on the flow of re-
sources. not only in amendments to
the 82 budget but in the preparation
of budgets for fiscal years 83 and
84.
The plan as it was laid out runs a
full seven years to achieve a gener-
a] level of capabilities in collection.
that is. in analysis that we believe
is essential for the United State,, to
be properly supported, both at the
strategic level nationally and sup-
port for the tactical operating
forces. It is going to be critical to
sustain the pace of that build-up. I
see the pressures building for cut-
back in the percentage of overall
funding for defense. I regret that.
but 1 accept it as reality given the
economic performance. But I think
it is absolutely critical that we not
take the usual approach of applying
that cut in every direction without
examining the need..! believe AF-
CEA can and should play a role
and its members must playa role in
ensuring that we keep the Congress
on the right track, and that the plan
which was laid out for rebuilding
U.S. intelligence capabilities over
the seven years not be stretched
out or slackened, even as we are
adjusting the annual percentage
that we are going to invest overall
in defense.
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