WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT PHILIPPINE STUDENT ACTIVISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 26, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP85T0087405 "50 40 6
Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Philippine Student Aaivutc
CIA
OOUM?1JT SFRVmS BRANCH
Secret
W. 605
9 G COPY 26 May 19729
No. r cNaTr SI Y11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0015 004 0201672A
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP8
 The sudden emergence of a vigorous anti-
establishment student movement in 1970 rattled
President Marcos' government and frightened
some members of the Filipino establishment. In
early 1970, large-scale and sometimes violent
demonstrations created an atmosphere of urban
chaos unlike anything that the country had ex-
perienced before. The demonstrations seemed, at
the time, to portend the beginning of an era of
chronic political instability. The movement raised
questions whether the opening of the constitu-
tional convention in mid-1971 would prompt
another series of violent anti-Marcos student
demonstrations. As it turned out, none took
place, :;ad student activism seemed to lose its
original, dramatic momentum. In late 1971 and
et.tiy 1972, student activists tried to mount only
a few mass protests or rallies, and attendance at
these averaged only a few h:indred, as compared
with 1970 crowds that had numbered in the thou-
sands. The only sizable demonstration since early
1971-an anti-Vietnam war protest on 20 May
1972--attracted some 2,000 students, far short of
the 15,000 the radical leaders had expected. The
apathy apparent on campus today represents in
Special Report
large part a strong reaction against the violence
and almost constant disruption of education and
campus life caused by earlier activity. The numer-
ous casualties suffered during the demonstrations,
combined with a government crackdown on radi-
cal students, intimidated many a would-be pro-
tester.
For other students, the contradiction be-
tween activism and education was an important
factor behind their drift away from the move-
ment. A college degree is highly prized in the
Philippines, and the average student's presence on
campus is, in many cases, the end result of family
sacrifice. Thus, many of the students who fur-
nished the manpower for the demonstrations
were ready to resume the pursuit of their degree
once activism lost its initial excitement. The stu-
dent movement was also deflated by a strong
backlash from the adult population, as evidenced
by the decision of many parents to enroll their
children at provincial universities rather than at
more prestigious institutions in Manila.
25X1
Coincident with the anti-activist backlash,
the student movement on campus lost much of i
25X
underground; others were arrested during the gov-
ernment crackdown in the fall of 1971. This has
deo; ived the campus-based sector of the student
movement of much of its direction and sense of
purpose.
Because the most active students are engaged
in less visible activities in the countryside instead
of rioting in the streets of Manila, some observers
have concluded that the student movement has
lost its force and significance. The tumult and the
shouting have faded, but the process of student
alienation and radicalization has continued as has
a vague commitment to radical social change.
2- 26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/0,qPCF(DP85T00875R001500040020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
SECRET
Origins of the Activist Movement
The rise of political and social consciousness
among Filipino students was part of a growing
sentiment against the enormous power wielded in
the Philippines by a small, corrupt, self-per-
petuating oligarchy. A desire for change is being
articulated by a post-colonial generation whose
view of the importance of the national good is at
odds with the value that Filipinos have tradi-
tionally placed on personal and familial loyalties
and ties. These contradictions-between the old
and the new, between the reformers and the
oligarchy-will bring tension to the Philippines'
political and social life for some time to come.
The loudest voices and most active organi-
zers for reform have come from the liberal wing
of the Roman Catholic Church and the university
community. They are supported, albeit quietly,
by a growing professional and managerial class
that has few direct, ties to the small group of
families which constitutes the backbone of the
oligarchy. The students are the most dynamic and
radical force for change; they are potentially the
most important because of their numbers, their
concentration in Manila, and their greater dis-
affection.
As is true of most developing nations, the
Philippines is a youthful country; over two thirds
of the population (some 26 million) is under the
age of twenty five. About 600,000 are enrolled in
institutions of higher , ducation, and half of these
attend the 33 colleges and universities in the
greater Manila area. With 300,000 student.; to
draw upon, student organizers need attract only a
small fraction of the student community into the
streets in order to have a mass confrontation.
Numbers alone do not fully explain the stu-
dents' political potential. Their leading role in the
earlier disturbances has given them an awareness
of their own importance, and their sub-culture,
replete with rock music, marijuana, and radically
different hair and dress styles, gives them a sense
of identification with one another. The students
see themselves engaged in an "us-against-the-
establishment" struggle. Not only that, but the
mass demonstrations of 1970 and 1971 showed
Special Report
that, for the first time, the students were not only
extending their particular problems to those of
society as a whole, but were also ready to demand
political change.
Although the students have discovered the
magic of politics, their political sophistication is
not high. For all of their expressions of dismay
with the oligarchy, the students have a faulty
appreciation of the ills that beset the country.
For example, their complaints about the short-
comings of higher education center on high tui-
tion rates, the "commercialization" of education,
poor instruction, and lack of academic freedom.
All of these criticisms are valid, but student lead-
ers have failed to zero in on a most significant
failing of the Philippine educational system-that
it is educating students for unemployment by
emphasizing liberal arts programs over more prac-
tical training. The students are trained for jobs
that do not exist, and the unemployment rate
among new graduates is extremely high. For
example, six candidates apply for every available
teaching position. The government has proposed
changes but has run into strong opposition from
the students, who continue to equate success with
white collar or professional employment. Student
activists have denounced the government's
26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/01/6EQ1RE85T00875R001500040020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11S?CIA,Qf3 T5T00875R001500040020-6
suggested reforms as schemes to undermine stu-
dent political power.
The students al-o have too strong a pro-
pensity for seeing political problems in terms of
personalities. They have come perilously close to
identifying President Marcos as the prime cause of
the deficiencies of the present political system.
By concentrating on the alleged culpability of
Marcos, the students in effect have exculpated the
oligarchy and the system that is at the root of
much of what is wrong with the Philippines. The
obsession with Marcos, whose very name has
become an epithet on the campus, is a sign of the
activists' lack of intellectual depth. It has two
consequences. One, it makes the student move-
ment inordinately dependent on the figure of
Marcos, and his sudden removal from politics
would deprive the movement of its principal
impetus. Two, it makes the students vulnerable to
manipulation by anti-Marcos politicians, who
themselves are part of the ruling oligarchy and
have little interest in changing the way the Philip-
pines is governed.
The student position on what ails the Philip-
pines is not always wholly consistent. Although
Marcos is seen as the cause of the exploitation of
the Filipino people, the students also view him as
a tool of "American imperialism." In taking this
line, the students are inadvertently revealing their
Signs on campus, 1972.
Special Report
own mental set, i.e., that Filipino politicians and
businessmen are not responsible for their own
actions and that in an ultimate sense the Ameri-
can military presence and capital investment in
the Philippines are responsible for the country's
inequities. One might reasonably expect that anti-
Americanism would fade into the background as
the students began to call attention to corruption
and incompetence within the Filipino political
system; in fact, denunciation of American "neo-
colonialism" has remained a mandatory part of
student rhetoric. These regular student denuncia-
tions of American "imperialism"-in a nation
where four million people recently signed a peti-
tion favoring US statehood-provide striking evi-
dence of the cleavages of viewpoint that exist
within Filipino society.
More importantly, student preoccupation
with American imperialism dilutes the force of
their demands for reform. President Marcos and
the Filipino establishment are alert to the pos-
sibilities of exploiting anti-American feeling
among students in order to divert wrath from
themselves. The oligarchs reason that, as long as
students remain attracted to the foreign devil
explanation of Filipino problems, they will not be
able to focus their full attention on the establish-
ment itself.
Organizations and Leadership
From the beginning, the student movement
has suffered from competition between factions,
a lack of recognized leaders, and the difficulty
that the highly individualistic Filipinos always
have in working with each other. Although the
students have similar views about what ails the
Philippines, they are lar from being united about
remedies.
It is difficult to fix the numerous Filipino
student organizations along an ideological spec-
trum. Most politically aware students can be con-
sidered radical ;n the sense that they favor sweep-
ing and fundamental change, but moderate in that
few are willing to risk their lives or their futures
to bring about the change. The students them-
selves tend to label as moderate any group falling
to the right of the Maoist organizations, ..hus
- 4 - 26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/01 /1$E T p85T00875R001500040020-6
 Approved For Re
lumping together
everyone from the
most conservative
Roman Catholic group
to the Student arm of
the pro-Soviet Com-
munist Party.
The vast majority
of students, of course,
are moderates, but
their influence is not
proportionate to their
numbers. The moder-
ate National Union of
Students of the Phil;p-
pines and a number of
allied organizations
spearheaded student
'F d v ll~
00040Q20-e ? " ' v
After A Kabataang Makabayan "Rally" Near US Embassy, 1972
activism in late 1969 and early 1970. They first
defined student issues and originated non-violent
protest demonstrations. Despite their early as-
crndency, however, the moderate student leaders
were a small elite with little ability or inclination
to build a disciplined mass following. When vio-
lence broke out during the large-scale demonstra-
tions of early 1970, the moderate leaders dis-
associated themselves from confrontation tactics,
and the radicals quickly assumed unchallenged
leadership of the protest movernent.
The moderates stood aside as the radicals
took the students into the streets, but by the fall
of 1970 large-scale demonstrations waned, and
the moderates became active in support of a con-
stitutional convention. With the prospect of
writing a new constitution that would be a truly
Filipino document and reform the political sys-
tem. the moderates worked hard to elect sympa-
thetic lelegates and involved themselves deeply in
the formulation of convention issues and alterna-
tives for constitutional reform. But as it became
clear that Marcos and the oligarchy would
dominate the convention, students rapidly lost
interest in what they had once viewed as the
greatest political happening since independence.
line moderates, aving
identified themselves closely with the principle of
Special Report
reform within the system, now risk being dis-
credited by a constitutional convention that
shows little promise of fulfilling even modest
reformist expectations.
25X'I
The Kabataang Makabayan, together with its
satellite organizations, is the most energetic and
hard-working student group in the Philippines,
and the one best able to articulate the mood of
Filipino students. Because of its activist program
and its flamboyant anti-establishment line, it has
had a spontaneous appeal on campus. Most politi-
cally active students are inclined to romantir'ze
themselves in the role of committed revolution-
aries. Its direct and open link with the Marxist-
Leninist party and its military arm, the New
People's Army, has undoubtedly helped win it a
rrdasure of popular support on campus. Even the
moderate students seem to hold a vague empathy
for the New People's Army leaders and they
grudgingly admire the Kabataang Makabayan for
its commitment and its willingness to take daring
and dramatic action.
26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/01/115 5T00875R001500040020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/1 EC lA--ff85T00875R001500040020-6
Despite its success, the Kabataang M;,ka-
bayan has significant weaknesses. Even more so
than its moderate counterparts, it depends on a
small corps of leaders. Over the years, they have
grown conspiratorial and have begun to hold
themselves more and more aloof from the student
masses. Various estimates place the organization's
membership somewhere between 3,000 and
12,000; it claims 200 chapters scattered through
the Philippines. The militant hard core probably
numbers no more than a few hundred.
The Kabataang Makabayan's aggressive pro-
motion o' violence during demonstrations of
1970 and 1971, its doctrinaire Maoist propaganda
and its continual ideological squabbling with the
relatively inactive student arm of the pro-Soviet
Phi;ippine Communist Party, have undoubtedly
cost it many potential members. The Kabataang
Makabayan has failed to develop its own mass
following and has therefore had to rely on bor-
rowing from the natural const&iencies of the
Special Report
larger moderate organizations. It has been able to
attract broad student support only when the is-
sues involved have a general popular appeal, as in
the case of recent student demonstrations against
the Vietnam war.
Although it has not attracted a mass base of
committed followers, it has been the principal
beneficiary of the continuing radicalization of
Filipino students. The Maoist organizations have
been slowly growing despite the relative apathy
on the campus. Many moderate activists, who
have not yet given up on the system, have drifted
away from purely student groups to join the
campaigns of other reformist organizations, such
as the Federation of Free Farmers. Others are
supporting the individual efforts of priest and lay
social workers. Students who have become totally
alienated from the system are still attracted by
the simple, action-oriented solutions of the
Kabataang Makabayan and its satellite
organizations.
Maoist Strategy and Student Activism
Phiiippine Maoists at one time saw student
activism as the vanguard of the revolution. They
thought that a mass student movement, mobilized
and directed by them, could paralyze Manila and
cause the government tL overrea:t with force,
thereby creating a revolutionary situat?on. The
party's emphasis on student activism in the early
years was a natura! consequence of the fact inat
the Marxist-Leninist party was created by Maoist
student leaders of the Kabataang Makabayan. The
Kabataang Makabayan was founded by Jose Maria
Sison, a member of the pro-Soviet Communist
Party, but in 1969 he broke with the party and
formed the Maoist-oriented Marxist-Leninist
party.
After forming the new party, Sison's view of
the student's role in the revolution began to
change. Gradually, he became committed to what
he now calls the "proper Maoist strategy" of
armed insurrection in the countryside. This
change has relegated campus activism to second-
ary importance. The campus-based Maoists had
always propagandized workers, peasants, and
other non-student groups. The new emph-,sis on
-6- 26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 S l B5T00875R001500040020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
SECRET
building a rural Communist movement has di-
rected the main Maoist energies away from the
campus and from Manila. Many student cadre
now spend their summer vacation in the prov-
inces, often working in conjunction with the
party's para-military arm, the New People's
Army.
They work actively with the insurgent
army's political units in politicizing peasants and
otherwise helping pave the way for the army to
spread into new areas. Early in 1972, for instance,
two of them were killed in a clash with govern-
ment forces in the Bicol region of southern
Luzon. Given the success the New People's Army
has had in extending operations into new areas,
the Marxist-Leninist party presumably will con-
tinue to emphasize rural operations. It has not
disowned campus activities, and it will continue
to exploit student activism in Manila, but these
activities are apparently now subordinate to the
primary goal of rural insurrection.
Inevitably, the redirection of priorities weak-
ened the Maoists on campus; in addition, the
government's crackdown against prominent stu-
dent agitators forced top cadre to go under-
ground. The leadership of campus organizations
has, therefore, been inherited by second-echelon
cadre
De_;?ite its present difficulties, the Kaba-
taang Makabayan is still a resilient organization,
and will probably remain the single most effective
entity in the urban student movement. Despite
the Maoists' current preoccupation with rural
areas, it seems doubtful that they will sacrifice
too many of their urban assets. The Maoists con-
sider urban guerrilla war as a part of proper revo-
lutionary strategy. They almost certainly want to
maintain a strong nucleus in Manila, both to pre-
pare for the future and to be in a position to take
advantage of opportunities that may arise.
Students are away from campus for the
April-July summer vacation. Things are likely to
Special Report
remain reasonably quiet at least until they return,
but there are a number of issues that could briny
the students back into the streets. The war in
Indochina has already precipitated protest rallies
during the past week. A scheduled increase in
petroleum prices might cause others.
The closing of the constitutional convention
in late 1972 or early 1973 will almost certainly
stir up the campus if, as expected, it somehow
paves the way for Marcos to stay in power. The
students are already disillusioned with the con-
vention, and when it is over the moderates may
once again be ready to join radicals in mass
demonstrations. Anti-Marcos sentiment is the one
sure issue on which students can unite. Even if
they are handed a provocative issue, however, the
student groups still must overcome deficiencies in
leadership and organization before they can field
a truly effective force for mass action and not just
an unruly mob. Moderate student organizations,
for example, are so weak that effective direction
26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 Sl t5T00875R001500040020-6
M. I
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040020-6
SECRET
would either have to come from radical organizers
or some non-student source.
One such source could be Senator Jose
Diokno, a politician who has demonstrated inter-
est in incorporating students into a wider reform-
ist movement. The serator is a political maverick.
He is trying to ingratiate himself with the stu-
dents and convince them he is a genuine drop-out
from the establishment and a sincere reformer
who means what he says. Should the constitu-
tionai convention arouse great public resentment,
it might hand Diokno the extra ingredient he
needs for success ?n U- is endeavor.
Predicting the future course of student ac-
tivism is complicated by the movement's vul-
nerability to outside manipulation-by Com-
munists, by the government, and by the anti-
Marcos oligarchs. During the past two years, the
government has mounted an energetic propaganda
and public relations campaign against the Maoist
student organizations. Studies documenting the
role of the Marxist-Leninist party within the stu-
dent movement have been released to the public,
and government teams have toured the provinces
urging parents and school administrators to take a
tough line against radical students. At the same
time, the government continues the time-honored
Philippine practice of trying to buy off opposi-
tion. Marcos in the past has tried to play off one
student group against another, and it seems likely
that plenty of money is still being employed to
this end. 25X1
Student activism has not developed into the
immediate threat to political stability that stemed
possible a year ago. The conditions that led to the
violence of 1970-71 have not abated, and a sense
of urgency infuses those who wish to change the
system. Any of several factors could create a
situation favorable to a revival of the radical stu-
dent movement-an arrogant political decision by
President Marcos, a marked increase in Commu-
nist insurgency, the sudden deterioration of the
economy, or a general rise in urban inse u-
rity.
25X1
Special Report
26 May 1972
Approved For Release 2005/0t1~(1~~I~-RDP85T00875 R001500040020-6